# TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................. i

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1

II. ELECTORAL REFORM .................................................................................................... 2
    A. The Old System ........................................................................................................... 2
    B. Direct Election of the President .................................................................................. 2
    C. Election of Legislatures ............................................................................................ 4
    D. More of the Same? ...................................................................................................... 5

III. PARTIES ......................................................................................................................... 6
    A. PDI-P .......................................................................................................................... 6
    B. Golkar ........................................................................................................................ 7
    C. PKB ............................................................................................................................ 9
    D. PPP ............................................................................................................................. 9
    E. PAN ........................................................................................................................... 10
    F. The Small Parties ...................................................................................................... 11

IV. VOTERS ........................................................................................................................ 12

V. POLITICAL CONTEXT .................................................................................................. 14
    A. Gubernatorial Elections .............................................................................................. 14
    B. Military Involvement? .............................................................................................. 15
    C. Party-Affiliated “Security Forces” ............................................................................. 16

VI. STRATEGIES .................................................................................................................. 17
    A. Scenario One: PDI-P Wins the General Election ....................................................... 17
    B. Scenario Two: Golkar Wins the General Election .................................................... 18
    C. Scenario Three: Golkar’s Nightmare ........................................................................ 19
    D. Scenario Four: PDI-P’s Nightmare .......................................................................... 20

VII. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 21

APPENDICES ..................................................................................................................... 22
    A. Map of Indonesia ........................................................................................................ 22
INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: A GUIDE TO THE 2004 ELECTIONS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Indonesia faces at least two and probably three national elections in 2004, including a presidential vote, but they are unlikely to bring fundamental change. Citizens are increasingly disillusioned with the half-decade of democracy and “money politics” they have experienced since the collapse of Soeharto’s authoritarian New Order.

The first election, on 5 April 2004, will fill almost 16,000 seats in legislatures at the national, provincial and district levels. The second, on 5 July 2004, will be its first direct presidential vote ever. If, as is almost certain, no candidate meets the criteria for election in the first round, a run-off between the top two vote-getters will take place on 20 September. The process needs to be completed before President Megawati Soekarnoputri's term expires on 20 October.

Public disillusionment with the performance of democratic government since the first post-authoritarian election in 1999 has been spreading rapidly. The elected government is widely seen as having failed to cope with the massive challenges that the nation is facing. Elected politicians at all levels are commonly perceived as venal and corrupt. And the ordinary people who constitute the poor majority complain that democracy has not brought any improvement in their economic welfare. Indeed, a credible public opinion poll indicated that 58 per cent of respondents believe that conditions were better under Soeharto's New Order.¹

Political reformers have called for a thorough overhaul of the constitution and the electoral system to ensure that leaders are responsive and accountable to the voters. The most important reform has been the adoption of direct presidential elections in place of the indirect system that was mired in the backroom dealing of political parties and “money politics”.

Reform of elections to the legislatures has been more limited. Apart from the removal of appointed military and police representatives, those bodies will be elected through proportional representation, much the same way as before. The main difference is that the old province-based constituencies will be reduced in size in the large provinces so that representatives, theoretically at least, will be closer to their constituents. This limited reform, however, may entrench rather than overcome the political fragmentation that has bedevilled post-authoritarian democracy.

Public opinion surveys indicate that the two leading parties in 1999 – President Megawati's PDI-P and Golkar, the party of the Soeharto government – are again likely to occupy the top positions. However, the polls suggest that many who voted for the underdog PDI-P in 1999 have been alienated by its behaviour and are returning to Golkar.

Among potential presidential candidates, Megawati retains the most support, but the gap is narrowing. Golkar, however, has been unable to capitalise on its growing support because of inability to determine its presidential candidate. The party's chairman, Akbar Tanjung, is appealing against a three-year prison sentence for corruption. Meanwhile seven potential candidates (including Akbar) remain in the race for the party's nomination, which will be determined only in April 2004.

¹ Poll conducted in August 2003 by Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia: LSI), Saiful Mujani, Denny JA, M. Qodari, Survei Perilaku Pemilih Indonesia (Survey of Indonesian Voting Behaviour), Seri 1, August 2003 (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, Jakarta, September 2003), p. 85. LSI is supported by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA).
Six months ahead of the first round of the presidential election, four possible scenarios suggest themselves.

- If the PDI-P clearly wins most votes, it is likely that Golkar will be satisfied with the vice-presidency and will join a coalition supporting the re-election of President Megawati.

- If Golkar wins more votes than – or roughly the same number as – PDI-P, it is likely to nominate its own presidential candidate. Following Golkar's “pre-convention” in October 2003, retired General Wiranto has emerged as a leading candidate.

- The second possibility, however, could lead to a nightmare for Golkar. If it nominates its own candidate, Megawati could respond by offering her party's vice-presidential nomination to a Golkar candidate, perhaps Akbar Tanjung or Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla. This could not only split Golkar's votes, but lead to a major division within the party itself.

- The PDI-P's nightmare scenario, on the other hand, follows from the first scenario above. A Megawati-Golkar team would almost certainly come out far ahead of its nearest rival in the first round of the presidential election although without sufficient support to win outright in that round. The candidate running second might take only 10 to 15 per cent of the votes but could then launch an “Anyone-But-Mega” campaign in the second round. Such a campaign could mobilise Muslim votes against the secular-nationalist Megawati. The most dangerous potential run-off rival for Megawati would be the current chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly, Amien Rais, although his prospects of reaching the second round seem bleak. Another dangerous rival would be Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs General (Ret.) Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, if his tiny Democrat Party is able to secure the backing of one of the larger parties. In December 2003 another possible challenger emerged, former President Soeharto's eldest daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, but her chances look slim at this stage.

Whatever the result of the presidential election, the next government will be based on a coalition of rival parties. In the absence of a strong leader capable of imposing cohesion on such a government, its performance will be hamstrung by many of the problems that hampered the previous three.

Jakarta/Brussels, 18 December 2003
I. INTRODUCTION

Indonesians have been gradually losing much of their enthusiasm for democracy since the country’s first post-authoritarian general election in June 1999. Many observers noted the “euphoria” that accompanied that election, the first genuinely free one since 1955 in the early years of independence. But as the second post-authoritarian election approaches in 2004, the early hopes that democracy would take Indonesia into a new era of social order, prosperity and the rule of law have been largely disappointed. The Reformasi (Reform) slogan that was loudly proclaimed by the leading political forces during the first few post-Soeharto years is rarely heard today. Instead political discussion is dominated by accusations of corruption against the political elite, while people complain that living conditions are worse than during the authoritarian past.

This does not mean that nothing has changed since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, however. Indonesians now enjoy extensive political freedoms – freedom to form political parties, freedom to organise, and freedom of the press. The extremely centralised authoritarian state has given way to a highly decentralised form of government. The military – while retaining a political presence – no longer overshadows all other political groups. But popular aspirations have been lowered drastically. There is no longer an expectation that free elections will lead to effective and accountable government. On the contrary, cynicism about the new political elite of elected politicians is almost universal.

Since 1999 important revisions have been made in the constitution and electoral laws. Drawn-out debate over constitutional amendments eventually produced a drastic change in the way that the national leadership is elected. The president and vice president will no longer be chosen by a partly appointed electoral college but directly by the people in a national election. New laws have also been adopted to regulate elections to legislatures at the national and regional levels although the changes in this area have been much less drastic than those for election of the president. The final withdrawal from the legislatures of appointed members representing the military and police is important both symbolically and substantively. Regional autonomy laws have vastly expanded the powers of provincial and district governments.

These changes, however, are unlikely to overcome the political fragmentation that has bedevilled democracy. In an ethnically, religiously and geographically diverse society, political parties tend to be identified with particular communities. Although national parties to some extent bring together diverse communities through ideology and patronage, the party system remains fragmented. Not only is it hard to imagine that any single party could win at the national level, but parties have been unable to work out durable coalition arrangements. The problem was overcome temporarily by the Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati governments, which formed coalitions among all the significant parties in the parliament. This, however, only transferred parliamentary fragmentation to the cabinet where it has been a major obstacle to effective government. It also has been no guarantee of stability, as shown by the experience of President Wahid, whose short presidency ended with impeachment. A limited attempt has been made in the new legislation to provide incentives for coalition-building but this is only a first step.

The outcome of the first round of presidential elections in 2004 is very uncertain. Although public opinion polls show President Megawati ahead, her support is declining.
II. ELECTORAL REFORM

A. THE OLD SYSTEM

Under the original 1945 constitution proclaimed at the beginning of Indonesia’s revolution against Dutch colonial rule and later re-introduced by President Soekarno in 1959, the president was elected by the partly-elected and partly-appointed People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawarahan Rakyat, MPR). The 1945 constitution provided the legal basis for Soekarno’s authoritarian Guided Democracy and Soeharto’s even more authoritarian New Order. In practice the formal rules for election of the president made no difference to political realities before 1998. Soekarno had himself appointed for life before his overthrow while Soeharto was re-elected unanimously at six consecutive sessions of the MPR over 30 years.

The 1945 constitution, which had acquired almost sacred status, remained in effect after Soeharto’s downfall in May 1998 but the way it operated changed drastically. Lacking legitimacy and credibility, the new president, B. J. Habibie, who had been Soeharto’s longest-serving minister, had little choice but to make democratic concessions. New political parties were allowed to form, popular demonstrations became routine, political prisoners were released, and restrictions on the press were lifted.

These reforms culminated in the June 1999 general election – the first genuinely competitive vote since 1955. The constitution provided for a national parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and regional parliaments (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) at both the provincial and district levels, which were elected simultaneously every five years. Military and police officers were appointed to the DPR and DPRDs. The members of the DPR then constituted themselves as members of the MPR, together with appointed members representing the regions and “special groups” in society.

Under Soeharto the additional members made up half the MPR, but after 1998 their number was reduced to 200 out of 700, and the regional members were elected by the provincial assemblies. Apart from electing the president and vice president every five years, the MPR also laid down general guidelines for government policy. Following a series of constitutional amendments, the MPR no longer elects the president and has lost much of its original power. ²

The 1999 election produced a DPR – and therefore an MPR – in which no single party enjoyed anything close to a majority. In these circumstances, the presidential election was far from the ceremonial affair it had become under Soeharto. It was an undignified scramble of behind-the-scenes deal-making that resulted in the election of a president – Abdurrahman Wahid – who was the leader of a party that could claim only 8 per cent of the seats in the MPR.

The deal, however, soon came unstuck, and 21 months later Wahid was dismissed from office after a drawn-out constitutional process – an unimaginable outcome under Soeharto.³ Vice President Megawati Soekarnoputri replaced him in July 2001 to complete the remainder of the five-year term.

These events showed that the 1945 constitution that had been regarded as “presidential” under authoritarian rule could operate in a “quasi-parliamentary” way in democratic circumstances by dismissing a president who had lost the confidence of the parliament. This character was reinforced by several amendments made in successive sessions of the MPR between 1999 and 2001 that strengthened the authority of the DPR in such matters as law-making, the appointment of ambassadors, and international agreements.

B. DIRECT ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

In 2001 and especially 2002, however, the MPR restored to a considerable degree the constitution’s presidential character. In its 2001 session, it amended the constitution to provide for the direct election of the president and vice president, running as a team. However, the amendment imposed

² MPR functions are now limited to amending the constitution, making the final decision on the impeachment of the president or vice president, formally installing the president and vice president after election, selecting a new vice president if a mid-term vacancy occurs, and selecting a new president and vice president if both “stop” at the same time. Law No. 22/2003, “Susunan dan Kedudukan MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD”, Article 11.
³ The early stages of this process were reported in ICG Indonesia Briefing, Indonesia's Presidential Crisis, 21 February 2001, and ICG Indonesia Briefing, Indonesia's Presidential Crisis: The Second Round, 21 May 2001.
conditions that made it very unlikely any team could win. The victorious pair was required to win at least 50 per cent of the votes and 20 per cent in at least half the provinces. The latter provision was intended to ensure that Java, where nearly 60 per cent of the population lives, did not dominate the voting.

But what to do if no ticket met the requirements? All agreed that a second round would be held between the two leaders, but there was disagreement over its form. President Megawati and her party, the Indonesian Democracy Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, PDI-P) wanted the second round to be restricted to the MPR, in effect retaining the existing system. They argued that a second election would be too expensive, too difficult to organise, and might lead to heightened tensions and violence. The other side argued for a second direct election.

The positions of the parties were usually expressed in terms of democratic principles and the need to maintain national unity. In fact, they reflected electoral calculations.

The PDI-P, which from the beginning had little enthusiasm for a direct presidential election, calculated that it would once again lack the support to win in the first round. It preferred to restrict the second-round election to the MPR where, its opponents alleged, the vast financial resources it had accumulated as the party of the incumbent president could be used to win over sufficient votes. Potential challengers calculated that they would have a better chance in a repeat direct election to mobilise anti-Megawati votes behind a single opposition candidate.

At the 2002 MPR, however, the PDI-P itself was divided. Although one section, including the president’s husband, Taufik Kiemas, had reservations, another was convinced that a direct election had strong support in the country and persuaded President Megawati to accept it.\(^4\)

\(^4\) Megawati’s ambivalence was apparent when she explained that "If I were only General Chairwoman of the PDI-P, I would instruct the party to reject the amendments. But because I am at the same time also the president, I must also protect all the political forces". \(\text{Tempo}, 11\ August\ 2002\). Earlier, she said during a visit to Slovakia that Indonesians "are not ready" to participate in a direct presidential election. \(\text{Koran Tempo}, 7\ June 2002\).

limited – step towards reducing political fragmentation. Given that no party is likely to win anything close to half the votes, it provides a strong incentive for presidential candidates to select running mates not only from parties other than their own, but also from communities other than their own. There will be advantage for Javanese presidential candidates, for example, to team with non-Javanese and vice versa. Similarly, presidential candidates who do not have strong Islamic credentials will be inclined to seek vice-presidential partners who do. There is no guarantee that such alliances will be durable but at least the rules encourage cooperation.

The DPR eventually adopted the Law on the Election of the President and Vice President (Law No. 23/2003), which regulates the election process in more detail. In the parliamentary debate, the larger parties, especially PDI-P and Golkar, expressed concern that too many parties would nominate candidates and thus confuse voters and complicate the voting process. They proposed that only parties gaining at least 20 per cent of the votes in the general election for the DPR have the right to nominate presidential candidates – implying that theoretically there could be no more than five candidates and, on the basis of the 1999 election results, only two: PDI-P and Golkar.

This was naturally resisted by the other parties, and a compromise limited the right to nominate to parties winning 3 per cent of the seats (i.e. 16 seats) or 5 per cent of the votes, although in later elections the limits would be raised to 15 per cent of seats or 20 per cent of votes.

One implication of this decision is that the general election for the DPR will have to be held before the presidential election. The law provides that parties must nominate their presidential and vice-presidential teams no later than seven days after announcement of the DPR election results.

Another contested provision of the law listed qualifications for candidates. Several proposed qualifications seemed designed to eliminate particular individuals. Golkar proposed that all candidates should be university graduates – a requirement that would have excluded Megawati. The PDI-P supported disqualification of candidates “either charged with, or convicted of, crimes carrying penalties of five or more years imprisonment”. The Golkar general chairman and likely presidential candidate, Akbar Tanjung, is appealing against a
three-year prison sentence following his September 2002 conviction in a corruption case. The charge carried a potential sentence of more than five years.

Former President Abdurrahman Wahid, a likely candidate of the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, PKB), was widely seen as the target of a provision that required candidates to undergo a medical examination to determine their physical and mental capacities to carry out their responsibilities. And former President Habibie, an unlikely candidate who now lives in Germany, would have been excluded by a requirement of residence in Indonesia. In the end, compromises left all likely candidates in the race.  

C. ELECTION OF LEGISLATURES

A major criticism of the old laws was that they failed to provide mechanisms to make members of legislatures accountable to the voters. Under the proportional representation system based on province-wide constituencies that has always been used, voters simply voted for parties rather than individuals. Especially in the large provinces of Java there was little incentive for successful candidates to keep in touch with voters who did not even need to know who the candidates were. Reform groups have advocated replacement of this system with single-member constituencies. This, however, has not attracted support from the major parties, whose power has been reinforced by their role in selecting candidates.

Following the constitutional amendments completed in 2002, a new set of electoral laws was adopted. The Law on General Elections retains the proportional representation system while introducing limited reforms aimed at making MPs more accountable.  

One is reduction of the size of the larger constituencies. Thus, while the smaller provinces will continue to constitute single constituencies for the national election, the larger provinces will be divided. In the DPR elected in 1999, the largest provinces – West Java, Central Java, and East Java – had 82, 60 and 68 seats respectively. Under the new law, each constituency will contain between three and twelve seats. The number will vary with population so that each member of the DPR will represent between 325,000 and 425,000 people.

The government’s original bill proposed that the “closed list” version of proportional representation, used in 1999 and throughout the New Order period, be replaced by an “open list”. In the old system, voters simply selected a party while the allocations of seats was determined according to a list of candidates nominated by the party. It had been criticised because it allowed the national party leaders to determine the candidates, who tended to be clients of the bosses in Jakarta and provincial capitals.

Under the “open list” system, voters first select their party and then their own preferred candidates from among the party’s list. A major argument in favour of this system was that it would break the grip of unresponsive national leaders at party headquarters. Candidates would be forced to appeal to voters rather than hide behind party labels. The assumption, of course, is that voters would be sufficiently familiar with candidates to make sensible judgements among them. But opponents doubted that voters, especially in national constituencies representing some 400,000 people, really would know the individual candidates and what they stood for, except perhaps for entertainment or sport celebrities.

Further, by forcing candidates from the same party to compete with each other, the “open list” system was expected to aggravate factionalism. There were also reservations about the practicality of the proposal, especially among less-educated voters. If voters were required to select both a party and individual candidates not only for the DPR but also for the provincial and district DPRDs as well as vote in the election for the new Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD), it might take a very long time for each to exercise his or her democratic right, the likelihood of mistakes would be high, and vote counting would be complicated.

The PDI-P, the largest party in the DPR, preferred the old system but in the end compromised. Although the law describes the system as proportional with an “open list”, it is not very different in practice from its predecessor. Voters can make two choices. They will
select their party and may then choose one candidate from its list. Alternatively a voter may just choose a party without selecting a candidate, but if he or she selects only a candidate, not a party, the vote will be invalid. Since it is quite likely that most voters, especially in rural areas, will just vote for a party without choosing between candidates, the “closed list” system will in effect continue to a large extent. It is also not improbable that many confused voters will vote for a party but then choose a candidate from another party, thus invalidating the ballot. The large parties are therefore likely to urge their supporters to vote just for the party.

All candidates in the general election must be nominated by an eligible party. The 1999 general election law had provided that only those parties that won at least 2 per cent of the seats in the DPR or 3 per cent in DPRDs at the provincial or district levels in half the provinces and half the districts could contest the 2004 election. In the 1999 election, only six parties qualified to contest in 2004. However, parties that failed to meet these criteria are permitted to merge with other parties or to dissolve themselves and form new parties which must then meet criteria established in the new general election law. Parties must have “full leadership” in at least two thirds of the provinces and two thirds of the districts within those provinces and meet minimum membership requirements. 24 parties have met these criteria and are eligible to contest the general elections.

The rationale for the restrictions on participation is fear that hundreds of tiny parties might contest the election and thus confuse voters. In view of the adoption of a voting system that requires the listing of all candidates, in contrast to previous elections that only required voters to choose a party, the ballot could be extremely long. If 40 parties were to contest a ten-seat constituency, for example, there could be 400 candidates. It needs to be remembered that voters will be choosing not just the national DPR but also provincial and district DPRDs and the new DPD. This would challenge a highly educated electorate with a long history of competitive elections, let alone a society like Indonesia where most voters have not completed high school and have voted in only one genuinely contested election. The constitutional changes of 2002 also created the new Regional Representatives Council (DPD), that together with the parliament will form the re-constituted MPR. This council, however, is not a Senate-like component of a true bicameral system in which both houses exercise more or less equivalent powers. The DPD can propose, discuss and monitor laws relating to regional autonomy, centre-regional relations, the formation and merger of regions, management of natural and other economic resources, and the financial relations between regions and the centre. It can also discuss and monitor laws relating to the budget and laws concerned with taxation, education, and religion and can make recommendations to the DPR on these issues. It cannot, however, veto legislation adopted by the DPR.8

Each province regardless of size will have four representatives elected at the same time as the DPR. The constitution provides that elections to the DPR (and the regional DPRDs) can only be contested by parties, while the DPD elections can only be contested by unaffiliated individuals. In order to ensure that candidates genuinely represent their region (in contrast to “regional representatives” in the Soeharto-era MPR who often lived in Jakarta), the law requires residence in the province for the previous three years or for at least ten years after the age of seventeen.

D. MORE OF THE SAME?

Those who had hoped the electoral reforms would bring about basic changes in the form of government are bound to be disappointed. A directly-elected president will enjoy more legitimacy than one who emerged from deals in the MPR. But an assessment of likely candidates in 2004 shows that it is unlikely a new style of leadership will arise from the electoral process. The next president will almost certainly be nominated by an already-entrenched party, and the new government will be based on a fractious coalition of rival parties. The president will not be as vulnerable to impeachment as before but would, if so inclined, still find it difficult to force through reforms against the wishes of the main parties and the interests they represent. The legislatures, both national and regional, will undergo even less reform than the presidency.

---

7 In simulated voting trials conducted in various provinces by the Centre for Electoral Reform, 33 per cent of votes were invalidated, including 54.7 per cent in a district in Jakarta. Jakarta Post, 24 October 2003. In Keerom district in Papua, the percentage was 50.4 per cent. Koran Tempo, 15 October 2003, Jakarta Post, 24 October 2003.

8 Article 22 of the amended constitution.
III. PARTIES

The general election for the DPR in 2004 is unlikely to produce a very different result from 1999 when the PDI-P came out on top with 33.76 per cent of the national vote, followed by Golkar with 22.46 per cent. Well behind were PKB with 12.62 per cent, the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) with 10.72 per cent and the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN) with 7.12 per cent. Three more parties won more than 1 per cent: the Crescent and Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang, PBB) with 1.94 per cent, the Justice Party (Partai Keadilan, PK) with 1.36 per cent and the Justice and Unity Party (Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan, PKP) with 1.01 per cent. The remaining 9 per cent was divided among 40 tiny parties of which fourteen obtained seats in the DPR.

PDI-P and Golkar are again expected to be the leading parties, but the gap between them is likely to be narrower. Some even expect Golkar to outpoll PDI-P in April 2004. The PDI-P, however, expects to have an advantage in the presidential election because Megawati is widely perceived to be more popular than her party (although this is not confirmed by one major opinion poll). Rivalries within Golkar have not only prevented it from picking its presidential candidate, but there are doubts about whether it will contest the race at all. The PAN leader, Amien Rais, seems likely to contest the presidency seriously but his chances are slight. The other significant parties, PPP and PKB, are more likely to concentrate on bargaining for the vice presidency although there is speculation the latter might nominate Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Megawati's Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs for president.

A. PDI-P

The PDI-P’s presidential candidate in 2004 will be Megawati Soekarnoputri, the incumbent president and party leader. The daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Megawati became one of the main symbols of resistance to Soeharto in the 1990s although she did not herself play a significant role in his overthrow. The PDI-P’s main base of support lies in that part of Javanese society that puts more emphasis on Javanese than exclusive Islamic identity. Outside Java it attracts support from Muslims reluctant to engage in exclusive Islamic politics as well as from non-Muslim communities. Although most of its leadership is Muslim, reflecting that Muslims are 87 per cent of the population, it includes Christians.

After emerging as the leading party in the 1999 election, it suffered the ignominy of seeing its leader fail to win sufficient support from other parties in the MPR to claim the presidency which she thought was rightfully hers.

As president, Megawati has been able to restore a measure of calm to the political scene. In contrast to her predecessor, who faced continuous challenges aimed at forcing him from power, Megawati has not been seriously threatened. But her leadership has been deeply disappointing, not only for those who had once upheld her as a beacon of reformasi but also for those who had hoped she would use the opportunity provided by relative political stability to tackle some of the country’s enormous problems. Her administration lacks cohesion and continues to be marked by the absence of a sense of urgency in dealing with blatant corruption, economic stagnation, communal violence, and terrorism.

Public-opinion surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest that the president has lost much support among urban middle-class voters. Megawati does not hold press conferences and her speeches tend to be platitudinous. On the rare occasions when she speaks off-the-cuff, she often confirms doubts about her grip on issues. Conversations with government insiders suggest not only that she has very limited understanding of policy but also that she has little inclination to learn.

Her party’s standing has suffered as well. PDI-P politicians have acquired a reputation for corruption. Kwik Kian Gie, a senior party leader and cabinet minister, admitted that “the largest corruption is committed by my party”. PDI-P leaders do not deny the poor quality of the party’s members, including those elected to the national and regional legislatures. Party Secretary-General Sutjipto acknowledged that not a few of the party’s cadres

---

9 PKP was established by two former commanders of the armed forces, General (and former Vice President) Try Sutrisno and General Edi Sudrajat, after they failed to gain control of Golkar in 1998.

10 LSI poll. See fn.1 above.

11 Jakarta Post, 18 February 2003.
have had problems with the law. This, he explained, was because of the circumstances of the emergence of Megawati’s faction in the wake of the New Order. The party just accepted anyone. “So, the ones we got were recidivists, yes former thieves, yes former whores...”.

Another party leader used the Javanese term aji mumpung (making the most of an opportunity) to describe the attitude of many members elected to regional legislatures or as regional executives. On one widely reported occasion, two PDI-P members of the DPR returned envelopes containing U.S.$1,000, which they claimed had been given by a government agency to PDI-P members of a parliamentary commission in order to gain their support for the divestment of a state bank. The implication was that others had kept the money.

The PDI-P has lost its image as the party of the wong cilik (the small people) and is likely to lose votes among the urban poor, who have seen no improvement in their circumstances since Megawati took power. The reduction of fuel subsidies has increased prices, while many have become victims of slum clearance projects. It is not clear how much rural support PDI-P has lost, however, and Megawati herself seems to have retained the respect of many voters outside the main cities. Her capacity to mobilise her party’s traditional bases of support, especially in Java and among religious minorities, will be crucial for her re-election chances.

B. GOLKAR

As noted above, party chairman Akbar Tanjung was convicted in a corruption case in September 2002 and sentenced to three years imprisonment. His appeal to the High Court failed in January 2003 but he is free while awaiting the decision on his final appeal to the Supreme Court.

Golkar found a novel way to respond to the difficulties it faced in naming its presidential candidate, coming up with the idea of a long-running “convention” process. It presents this as a democratic innovation that will allow grassroots party members to play a decisive role in selecting the candidate. By this means it hopes partially to rehabilitate its image as a key component of Soeharto’s authoritarianism.

Each of Golkar’s 416 district branches was given the opportunity to propose five candidates to 30 provincial “pre-conventions”, which then each selected five candidates from among those proposed by the district branches. This was followed by a national “pre-convention” in October 2003, which was initially intended to select five of the candidates who were proposed by at least five provinces. Finally the candidate would be selected at the “convention” initially planned for February 2004, two months before the general election. The rules, however, were changed in mid-stream when a national leadership meeting in October 2003 decided that all seven candidates proposed by the provincial pre-conventions would remain in the race. The meeting also decided that the final selection would be delayed until mid-April 2004, after the general election and only a little more than two months before the presidential election due on 5 July.

The final convention will be attended by 534 delegates. Despite its democratic pretensions, the convention process is widely seen as a ploy (akal-akal-an) by Akbar Tanjung to delay selection of Golkar’s presidential candidate until after the Supreme Court has decided his case and thus allow him to be nominated if his conviction is overturned. Akbar’s supporters were behind the move to postpone the final selection from February 2004 to April to allow more time for a court decision.

The convention process itself, however, has involved risks for Akbar. In order to reinforce its attempt to build a new image as open and democratic, the party even permitted non-members to compete for the nomination. By August 2003, the party had identified nineteen candidates, and Akbar faced the possibility that a candidate might prove more popular than

---

12 Koran Tempo, 6 March 2003.
15 The corruption charges relate to his alleged role, as state secretary in the government of President Habibie, in diverting government funds to Golkar in the months preceding the 1999 general election.
16 These will include eighteen members of the central leadership board (who will vote as a bloc for one candidate), 90 representatives of the provinces (three from each of the 30 provinces, with each province voting as a bloc), ten from affiliated organisations and one representative from each of 416 district branches.
17 As a party deputy chairmen, Fahmi Idris, said in a television interview on the morning of the pre-convention, “if I am asked whether it is a ploy, it is difficult for me to deny it”. RCTI interview, 'Nuansa Pagi', 21 October 2003.
himself. In the first round of the selection process in which district branches proposed five names, three newcomers received more nominations than Akbar. Of 370 districts for which data was available, 324 had included former armed forces commander, General Wiranto, 321 media tycoon Surya Paloh,\(^{18}\) 303 the chairman of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin), Aburizal Bakrie, and only 301 Akbar.\(^{19}\) Wiranto topped the list in 124 districts, followed by Akbar in 91, Surya Paloh in 64, Co-ordinating Minister for People's Welfare Jusuf Kalla in 40, the Sultan of Yogyakarta in 26, Aburizal Bakrie in 21, and former Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) commander, Lt. General Prabowo Subianto, in only four.\(^{20}\)

These nominations were then carried to the provincial level where district leaders joined provincial officials to propose five names to the national pre-convention. Of the seven who met the minimum requirement of nomination by at least five provinces, Aburizal Bakrie headed the list with nominations from 28 of the 30 provinces, followed by Surya Paloh with 27, Wiranto with 25, Akbar Tanjung with 23, Jusuf Kalla with 20, Prabowo Subianto with 14 and the Sultan of Yogyakarta with seven.\(^{21}\) These results indicated that drastic changes had taken place since the voting at district level, most dramatically in Central Java where Akbar – second at the district level – was not among the five nominated to the national pre-convention. Wiranto, who had led the district voting, fell to fourth, while Prabowo leapt from seventh to top place with 45 of the 47 votes.\(^{22}\)

Allegations of vote-buying were made by both disadvantaged candidates and observers. How could two business tycoons, Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Paloh, with no track record as Golkar leaders or government officials, have led the field with support from almost all provinces? How could Wiranto, a newcomer to Golkar politics, have won such widespread support? And how did Prabowo achieve such a spectacular advance between district and provincial selections in Central Java? The answer appeared to be money.\(^{23}\) If indeed votes were sold, there is no certainty that strong support at the provincial level will guarantee success in the final selection at the national level in April 2004.

Campaigning for the nomination was very expensive. Surya Paloh travelled in a private plane, while Wiranto, Jusuf Kalla and Aburizal Bakrie reportedly chartered aircraft.\(^{24}\) “The smell of money politics in the elections of bupati (district heads) and walikota (mayors) is strong enough, even more so in the election of a president”, said Oetojo Oesman, chairman of the convention committee and a former cabinet minister. “Logically, if the election of a governor costs M, for a president it could reach T. But can this be proved in law?”\(^{25}\)

One Golkar deputy chairmen, Fahmi Idris, pointed out that regional party leaders “tend to support candidates who can provide financial assistance”.\(^{26}\) A Golkar leader in West Java reportedly said that several district branches had submitted proposals for assistance of more than Rp. one billion (U.S.$120,000). “There are even some who in a vulgar way set a price for assistance of up to Rp. five billion”, he added.\(^{27}\)

Some candidates found the costs too high and withdrew. An early casualty was the prominent Muslim intellectual and rector of Paramadina Mulya University, Nurcholish Madjid. Never a Golkar member, he had been persuaded by friends and admirers to take up the party’s offer to consider non-member candidates. Some Golkar officials saw his involvement as a means to clean up the party image. Nurcholish was attracted to Golkar because it seemed to be the only party with a modern structure that could reach people throughout the country. He proposed a ten-point program for good government and began a speaking tour to present his visi (vision) and misi (mission). But he found that the Golkar officials were primarily interested in what they called gizi (nutrition i.e. money). At the end of July 2003 and feeling increasingly uncomfortable in the Golkar milieu, he announced that his own agenda would be compromised if he continued to participate in the convention process.\(^{28}\)

\(^{18}\) An Acehnese, Surya Paloh owns the Media Indonesia newspaper group and Metro TV.

\(^{19}\) Kompas, 19 October 2003.


\(^{21}\) Kompas, 19 October 2003.

\(^{22}\) Tempo, 26 October 2003.

\(^{23}\) Tempo, 5 May 2003.

\(^{24}\) Kompas, 12 September 2003.

\(^{25}\) Kompas, 30 July 2003. M referred to miliar (billions of rupiah) and T to triliun (trillions of rupiah).

\(^{26}\) Koran Tempo, 16 July 2003.

\(^{27}\) Kompas, 17 September 2003.

\(^{28}\) Kompas, 31 July 2003.
The immediate reason for the party’s decision to allow all seven candidates to stay in the race and postpone the final decision until April 2004 was the Sultan of Yogyakarta’s plan to withdraw and avoid the humiliation of defeat. His withdrawal could have had a negative impact on the Golkar vote in Central Java in the general election. Another possible loser may have been Jusuf Kalla, the only candidate from eastern Indonesia, which was a Golkar stronghold in 1999. A no less important consideration was the need to avoid the risk that unsuccessful candidates might withdraw their support for Golkar and even transfer their allegiance elsewhere in the general election. As long as they remained in the race the seven – all extraordinarily wealthy – were expected to continue to channel funds to Golkar.

C. PKB

The PKB was established in 1998 by the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the “traditionalist” Islamic organisation that has roots in rural Java but also branches in other parts of Indonesia. The NU claims more than 30 million members. In contrast to the “modernists”, who rely on the original sources of Islam (the Koran and the Hadith, or the sayings and behaviour of the Prophet Mohammed), traditionalist teachings are derived from the authoritative interpretations of successive generations of scholars. The NU’s organisation is based on a network of thousands of mainly rural religious schools (pesantren) headed by religious scholars (kiai). Under Abdurrahman Wahid since the early 1980s, the NU’s approach to religion has been pluralist and tolerant, rejecting the goal of establishing an Islamic state to implement sharia law.

After the fall of Soeharto, NU leaders formed a new party, the PKB, not restricted to NU members but open even to non-Muslims. Under Wahid, the PKB is overwhelmingly run by NU members, although several branches in predominantly Christian regions such as North Sulawesi and East Nusa Tenggara are headed by Christians. Not all NU members support the PKB, however. Indeed, the current PPP vice president and general chairman, Hamzah Haz, belongs to NU, as do some from other parties such as Golkar and PDI-P.

The poor performance of Wahid as president makes it unlikely that PKB will be given a second chance of forming a government. As the 2004 elections approach, some NU kiai are exploring ways of nominating Hasyim Muzadi, Wahid’s successor as NU leader, for the presidency, instead of Wahid, who now heads the party’s Religious Council (Dewan Syuro). One possibility is that Wahid might be declared ineligible to run on health grounds, particularly his near blindness. One fear is that Wahid might be seeking a candidate from outside the NU rather than Hasyim. He occasionally says he will not run and is apparently attempting to persuade Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono to accept the nomination.

The division within the PKB came to a head in September 2003 when Wahid decided to “reposition” the party secretary general, Saifulillah Jusuf. He made a series of accusations against Saifulillah mainly concerning unwillingness to carry out instructions. However, a divided leadership voted 18 to 17 to postpone Saifulillah’s “repositioning” until after the elections – an indication Wahid no longer dominates the party.

Without NU backing, the PKB would have little chance of improving its electoral performance in 2004. Many in the party would prefer to concentrate on the vice presidency. The cautious Hasyim is an unlikely partner but he could be an attractive partner for Megawati or whoever becomes Golkar’s presidential candidate.

D. PPP

The PPP, together with the PDI, participated as one of the two minor parties in the New Order elections against Golkar. Unlike the PDI, which was superseded by PDI-P following the fall of Soeharto, it has remained more or less intact.

---

29 ICG interview with senior PKB leader, October 2003. A national working conference in May 2003 of the party proposed that Wahid be nominated as the presidential candidate together with several “alternative” candidates including Hasyim Muzadi and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Tempo, 8 June 2003.

30 Saifulillah, who is Wahid’s nephew, had been a PDI-P member of the DPR until 2002 when he crossed to PKB and contested the presidency of the party against his uncle’s preferred candidate, former foreign minister, Alwi Shihab.

31 Kompas, 28 September 2003.

32 The PPP was the product of a forced merger in 1973 of Muslim parties, of which the traditionalist NU and the modernist Indonesian Muslim Party (Partai Muslimin Indonesia: Parmusi) were the most important. To this day the party’s older generation is divided along NU-Parmusi lines.
In December 1998 the party elected Hamzah Haz as the first NU member to be its general chairman. Hamzah, however, comes from West Kalimantan and is not part of the East Java-based NU elite. He served in the DPR through most of the New Order period. During the 1999 campaign, he called on Muslims not to vote for Megawati on the grounds that Islam did not permit a woman to lead the government, but in 2001, after she had replaced Wahid, he accepted her endorsement for vice president. Megawati threw her support behind Hamzah not because his party wielded great influence in the MPR but because he was not considered a potential threat. The Indonesian constitution provides for automatic succession of the vice president if the president loses office. Megawati apparently believed she would be safer with Hamzah as her deputy rather than the other leading candidates, Akbar Tanjung and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In contrast to them, Hamzah lacked credibility as a potential president and was unlikely to be able to mobilise support against her.

Hamzah Haz is sometimes portrayed in the international media as a radical fundamentalist. His party, for example, was among those that unsuccessfully proposed that a phrase from the Jakarta Charter be inserted in the constitution in 2002. A casual comment of his following the 11 September 2001 attacks was widely misinterpreted as saying that the U.S. deserved what it got. More recently, when pressed by journalists on why he had not condemned terrorism more strongly, he accused the U.S. of being “the king of terrorists” in a context where he was referring to the Iraq war. He often claimed there were “no terrorists in Indonesia” and had friendly meetings with the leaders of the three most prominent radical Islamic organisations, the Laskar Jihad, the Islamic Defenders Front and Jemaah Islamiyah, including a visit to the Laskar Jihad leader in prison. Hamzah, however, said that he had been asked by the president to approach the three radicals and then felt betrayed when the Laskar Jihad leader was arrested. He believes that moderate Muslims should maintain contact with the radicals in order to encourage them to be more accommodating.

In fact Hamzah is far from an ideological radical – as shown by his long career as a party politician during the New Order era. Most of his statements should be read in political context as attempts to win support from more radical groups. But, as one PPP member of the DPR explained, “Hamzah is very different from the Golkar leader, Akbar Tanjung, who calculates the political impact of his every word. Hamzah just speaks spontaneously without giving much thought to how his statements might be interpreted by others”. Although the party formally supports the introduction of Islamic law, its day-to-day aspirations are more mundane. Like the other main parties it maintains its own patronage network and wants to win more seats in the parliament, have more members appointed as ministers and bureaucrats, win positions in regional government, and channel more contracts to its business supporters.

Hamzah’s tendency to take a radical stance may also be influenced by the factional rivalries within his party. His election as general chairman in 1998 followed a hard-fought battle. In 2002, the popular preacher, Zainuddin MZ, led a group out of the PPP and established the new Star Reform Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi), among the deputy chairmen of which is Mahendradatta, a lawyer who has specialised in defending Muslim radicals accused of violence. At the party conference in May 2003, he faced a stiff challenge from the Minister of Social Welfare, Bakhtiar Chamsiah, who refused to take a position on the party board after his defeat. At that conference, Hamzah placed two retired military officers in the party leadership. The former head of the military’s social-political structure, Lt. General Yunus Yosfiah, was elected general secretary, and Lt. General Andi Ghalib, Attorney General under President Habibie, was elected to the central board.

The PPP is unlikely to contest the presidency seriously, but Hamzah has made it clear that he is willing to consider an alliance with other parties.

E. PAN

PAN’s origins are in the Muhammadiyah, the “modernist” Islamic rival to the NU. Its leader, Amien Rais, a professor of political science from Gajah Mada University in Yogyakarta, became the chairman of the Muhammadiyah in the 1990s and

33 The Jakarta Charter was drawn up in 1945. The relevant phrase makes it obligatory for Muslims to carry out their religious duties.
34 Following his visit to the Laskar Jihad leader, Ja’afar Umar Thalib, in prison on 7 May 2002, he accepted an invitation to open the annual meeting of the Laskar Jihad. Straits Times, 14 May 2002.
35 Tempo, 13 May 2003.
36 Interview with PPP member of DPR, October 2003.
was in the vanguard of the anti-New Order movement. Following the collapse of the Soeharto government, he was approached to lead a new Muslim party that eventually became the PBB, and then by elements within PPP who saw in him a means to ride the wave of reformasi and discard its New Order image. Amien, who had previously largely restricted himself to Islamic circles and seemed suspicious of Christians and other non-Muslims, rejected these approaches and opted to form a new party not based on Islam. Whatever their reservations about him in the months leading to the fall of Soeharto, Amien's outspoken courage in confronting the president won the admiration of many liberal reformers, who began to see him as an alternative national leader. It was in these circumstances in 1998 that PAN was born.

Amien's decision was based on rational political grounds. By taking over the PBB or PPP, he could have brought his Muhammadiyah supporters into a party with a solid base in the modernist Islamic community. But such a party, he calculated, would be doomed to permanent opposition. Amien saw that the only path to power lay in co-operation with nationalist political forces that would be reluctant if he retained his narrow Islamic image. PAN, therefore, became an “open” party, which included non-Muslims although its main base remained in the Muhammadiyah. PAN, however, remained divided between those, including Amien, who were committed to preserving this open nature and a larger group of activists who were reluctant to sacrifice what they saw as Islamic principles. In early 2001, several of the Islamic moderates and Christians left the party, but Amien succeeded in preventing it from reverting to an essentially Islamic platform.

Unlike Muslim leaders such as Hamzah Haz and Hasyim Murzadi, Amien shows no interest in the vice presidency. He knows that his only chance of winning the presidency is to finish second in the first round of the presidential election. Facing the reality that it is barely imaginable that the Islamic parties would join to nominate him, he is seeking an alliance with a strong nationalist and has announced that he would like to recruit a running mate from the military – an institution that has never shown enthusiasm for him.\footnote{Kompas, 13 September 2003.} In June 2003, he listed ten potential partners, only two of whom were retired officers – Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Lt. General Agum Gumelar, the current Minister of Transport and an early unsuccessful aspirant for the Golkar nomination.\footnote{Kompas, 12 June 2003.}

F. THE SMALL PARTIES

Most of the tiny parties – Indonesians call them gurem, chicken-flea parties – will have no impact on the results. Even if they win a few seats in the DPR or DPRDs, they will fail to reach the threshold of 3 per cent of seats or 5 per cent of votes to entitle them to nominate presidential candidates. Four parties, however, might have some marginal significance.

The new Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat, PD) was formed in 2001 as a vehicle for General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who was the driving force behind reform in the armed forces after the fall of Soeharto but, perhaps for that reason, failed to win widespread support within the military. After retiring, he was appointed as Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs in the governments of both Abdurrahman and Megawati. Among those initially considered by Golkar, he made it clear that he was unwilling to seek its nomination.

More “civilian” in outlook than most military officers, his strength is his personal popularity, shown in opinion polls, but his weakness is his tiny party, lacking an entrenched nationwide machine. For that reason, Yudhoyono seems willing to consider PKB approaches although his nomination could split that party. He is also among those being considered by the PDI-P as a running mate for Megawati, although conventional wisdom suggests that as a Javanese, he would add less than a partner from the Outer Islands. Like Amien Rais, Yudhoyono might have a chance to win the presidency if he could get to the second round but that prospect seems slight. Known for his propriety, the cautious Yudhoyono feels that it would be inappropriate to campaign openly while he is in Megawati’s cabinet.

Another new party, formed in 2002, the Concern for the Nation Party (Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa, PKPB), announced in December 2003 that it was putting forward former President Soeharto’s daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (usually known as Mbak Tutut) as its presidential candidate. The PKPB is headed by former army chief of staff and Minister of Home Affairs, General R. Hartono, and...
portrays itself as the “true” Golkar. The party hopes to capitalise on increasing nostalgia for the “good old days” when the economy was growing and political disturbances were put down firmly. Mbak Tutut was at the centre of the New Order’s “crony capitalism” and still faces legal problems. At this stage her electoral prospects look very uncertain.

The PBB is noticed less for its own importance than for the prominence of its leader, Minister of Justice and Human Rights Professor Yusril Ihza Mahendra, in opinion polls. Public support for his presidential candidacy is far above his small fundamentalist Islamic party’s 2 per cent in the 1999 election. One poll suggests he could seriously challenge Megawati if he reached the second round, a prospect that seems impossible, however, given his party’s low support.

The Justice and Welfare Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS), another fundamentalist Islamic party, won a few seats in 1999 when known as the PK. Because it failed to reach the threshold required to contest the 2004 election, its leaders dissolved the party and merged with the existing PKS. Inspired by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the PKS differs from similar Islamist groups in that it believes in working through democratic elections. Many of its well-educated and youthful supporters are affiliated with the Muhammadiyah and disappointed by Amien Rais’s unwillingness to start an exclusively Islamic party.

In legislatures where money politics is the rule, PKS members stand out for their honesty and integrity. The party has organised huge demonstrations against U.S. policies in the Middle East, including the war in Iraq. It also held a large demonstration against moves by Christians to amend Indonesia’s new Education Act. PKS demonstrations are marked by absolute discipline and the absence of violence. In the DPR, PKS aligned itself with PAN and is likely to support Amien Rais’s bid for the presidency.

### IV. VOTERS

During the New Order era, Golkar’s vote usually hovered between two thirds and three quarters of the total but it is now much more difficult to predict elections.

As the 2004 elections approach, polling is a growth industry. Some polls, however, use faulty methodology and have produced bizarre results.41 Some have even relied on telephone polling in large cities, which biases results heavily in favour of urban middle class preferences. In several polls, many respondents (46 per cent in one, 34 per cent in another, 20 per cent in a third) either claimed that they had not made up their minds or refused to answer.42 Another limitation is that the polls have largely focused on the popularity of individual candidates whereas in the election voters will be asked to choose a president/vice president ticket. Finally, polls a year early cannot, of course, be expected to predict the election result.

Despite the limitations, a common trend has been revealed by the more credible polls. Although President Megawati still seems to be leading, she has been losing ground steadily. A poll in six provinces in late 2002 by the respected Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (Pusat Pengkajian Islam dan Masyarakat, PPIM) showed Megawati, with 37 per cent, far ahead of Vice President Hamzah Haz, with 14 per cent.43 In August 2003, a poll by the new Indonesia Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia, LSI) that covered all provinces except

---

40 “Fundamentalist” here means that the party supports the introduction of sharia law. It does not imply sympathy for terrorism. In fact, Yusril, as Minister of Justice and Human Rights, sponsored Indonesia’s new law on terrorism.

41 For example, in July 2003 a poll conducted by Soegeng Suryadi Syndicated identified Muslim intellectual Nurcholish Madjid and the Sultan of Yogyakarta, as the leading candidates.

42 It is commonly believed that, in contrast to Western political cultures which regard polling as a normal part of political life, many Indonesians are suspicious of strangers asking intrusive questions and are reluctant to give frank answers. It is also assumed that rural voters are less open to inquiries about their intentions. However, the experience of the main political polling organisation indicates that rural respondents tend to be more cooperative than those in urban areas. Villagers seem pleased that their opinions are recognised as sufficiently important to be sought by a national polling organisation. On the other hand, urban respondents sometimes expect a financial reward for cooperation. Discussion with Saiful Mujani of the LSI who also conducted the PPIM poll, October 2003.

43 Koran Tempo, 14 November 2002. PPIM is based at the Syarif Hidayatullah National Islamic University in Jakarta.
Aceh showed Megawati with only 17.7.\textsuperscript{44} A poll conducted in all provinces in June and July 2003 by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) found only 13.7 per cent favouring Megawati.\textsuperscript{45} It needs to be noted, however, that the proportion of uncommitted voters was high in both these polls – 19.6 per cent (LSI) and 34 per cent (IFES) – and both showed her still ahead. The nearest potential challenger was her senior cabinet colleague, Yudhoyono, with 11.8 per cent (LSI) and 11.2 per cent (IFES).

The LSI poll showed not only a substantial fall in PDI-P support but also a sharp increase in Golkar support. Compared to 1999 when it ran second to PDI-P with 22.5 per cent, Golkar was well ahead of its main rival with 25.9 per cent. PDI-P's share fell drastically from 33.8 per cent in 1999 to 17.6 per cent, roughly the same as support for Megawati.\textsuperscript{46} Again, however, many either refused to answer or did not know how they would vote. LSI found 28.1 per cent uncommitted on party preference. The trend shown by LSI in regard to the PDI-P, however, was confirmed by an internal survey conducted by the party itself of 2500 voters in sixteen provinces in May and June 2003. It found that only 21.2 per cent would vote for the PDI-P in 2004.\textsuperscript{47}

The polls rank Megawati’s challengers somewhat differently. LSI put them in the following order: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (11.8 per cent), Akbar Tanjung (8.0 per cent), Abdurrahman Wahid (7.9 per cent), Hamzah Haz (7.8 per cent), Amien Rais (7.3 per cent), Yusril Ihza Mahendra (6.8 per cent), Nurcholish Madjid (5.5 per cent) and Jusuf Kalla (2.7 per cent).

IFES, two months earlier, listed Yudhoyono as the top challenger with 11.2 per cent, followed by the Sultan of Yogyakarta (8.7 per cent), Wahid (5.1 per cent), Amien (4.4 per cent), Yusril (4.1 per cent), Hamzah (3.4 per cent), Akbar (3.1 per cent), General Wiranto (3.0 per cent), Nurcholish (2.9 per cent) and Kalla (1.9 per cent).

The LSI survey also asked respondents how they would vote in the second round of the presidential election. It found that Megawati would win against any candidate but only narrowly if faced by Yudhoyono (2.7 per cent), Hamzah (2.9 per cent) or Yusril (4.0 per cent). Her margin over Amien Rais would be 6.6 per cent and over Nurcholish Madjid 11.4 per cent. Less threatening opponents would be Akbar Tanjung, who would lose by 21.5 per cent, Kalla by 24.8 per cent and Wahid by 27.0 per cent.\textsuperscript{48} However, these expectations rest on somewhat shaky assumptions. Many would not have given much previous thought to what was a very hypothetical question, and 35 per cent did not answer at all.

These polls suggest that one year before the presidential election, Megawati is still the leading candidate despite the fall in her own popularity and her party’s. Although the LSI poll indicated that Golkar has a significant lead over the PDI-P, it has yet to put forward a candidate who can match her popularity. Golkar’s general chairman, Akbar Tanjung, who has been dogged by corruption allegations, scored only 8 per cent in one poll, 3 per cent in the other. Support for another potential Golkar candidate, Kalla, was 3 per cent and 2 per cent. In the IFES poll, the Sultan of Yogyakarta was supported by 9 per cent and Wiranto by 3 per cent but the other three potential candidates presented to Golkar’s pre-convention in October 2003 did not register significant support. As noted above, the candidate whom the polls suggest might have the greatest potential, Yudhoyono, still lacks a strong party to back his bid.

Most parties will not form tickets until after the general election in April 2004. Parties nominating presidential candidates will seek vice presidential partners who can bring in additional votes, while those whose party’s legislative election results were not good are likely to seek alliances with parties whose candidates have better prospects. Until the tickets are known, polling will continue to involve a fair amount of guesswork.\textsuperscript{49}

In as far as any conclusion can be drawn at this stage, it seems that Megawati has a good chance to head the field in the first round but with far from sufficient votes to win outright. Assuming, that she

\textsuperscript{44} LSI poll, p. 54. See fn. 1 above.
\textsuperscript{46} LSI, p. 82. Nevertheless, many PDI-P leaders seem convinced that Megawati’s popularity is much higher than the party’s.
\textsuperscript{47} Jakarta Post, 23 August 2003.

\textsuperscript{48} LSI, p. 58.
\textsuperscript{49} The LSI survey asked about the vice presidency but only 48 per cent said the running mate could make a difference to their choice. LSI, pp. 58-59.
leads in the first round, the key question is who will come second and win the right to challenge in the second round. The polls suggest that no clear challenger has emerged and that several are in the running. The level of their support in the polls, however, is still so low that it is quite possible they could be joined by other potential second-round candidates. Most importantly, the polling also suggests that whoever enters the second round might have a good chance of winning.

V. POLITICAL CONTEXT

Before discussing the strategies parties might adopt in the presidential election, it is worth noting three issues that are part of the context for that election: the potential role of regional officials, especially governors, in influencing voting; the military’s possible role; and the possibility of violence from the activities of party-linked “security forces”.

A. GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS

During the New Order, governors and district heads played important parts in securing Golkar’s overwhelming electoral victories. In particular their control of government patronage enabled them to reward supporters and punish opponents. Following Soeharto’s fall in the context of economic crisis, the support of provincial and district governments, while not necessarily any longer decisive, could still make a difference.

Governors and district heads are not elected directly but by provincial and district legislative assemblies, which during the New Order were overwhelmingly dominated by Golkar. Although Soeharto was overthrown in 1998, governors and district heads elected with Golkar support before then remained in office for full five-year terms. One of the most striking phenomena of regional government in the new era was the not uncommon failure of PDI-P candidates to be elected governors or district heads even in provinces and districts where the party held the most seats in local legislatures. Such elections were often accompanied by accusations that PDI-P legislators had accepted bribes to vote for candidates from other parties, especially Golkar. So far only one PDI-P leader has been elected governor but he was not installed because he faces corruption charges. The PDI-P is well represented among the district heads (bupati) in Central and East Java, Bali, and, to a lesser extent, West Java while many districts outside Java and Bali are headed by Golkar-supported officials.

50 The government plans to introduce direct elections of governors and district heads along the same lines as direct election of the president. There is some resistance in regional and district legislatures among members who have benefited financially from indirect elections.
President Megawati apparently felt her re-election might be threatened if too many provincial governors aligned themselves with Golkar. Instead of fully backing PDI-P leaders seeking governorships, she intervened in several cases to support incumbent governors who had military or bureaucratic backgrounds and had originally won office as Golkar candidates. In other cases she supported new candidates who were retired military officers or Golkar-affiliated bureaucrats.

This strategy was first implemented at the re-election of Lt. General Sutiyoso as governor of Jakarta in September 2002. Megawati's support for him was particularly galling for her party because he was the military commander of the capital who carried out Soeharto's 1996 command to close PDI's national office, then occupied by her supporters. Some of those supporters had been killed or wounded. The PDI-P Jakarta leader, Tarmidi Suhardjo, rejected Megawati's offer to nominate him as deputy governor, defiantly stood for the top job, and was overwhelmingly defeated amid rumours that party members had been given big financial inducements to support Sutiyoso.

More cases followed in 2003. In Central Java, East Java, North Sumatra and East Kalimantan, the president supported re-election of incumbent retired military officers, and in Bali and East Nusa Tenggara she supported Golkar-affiliated civilian incumbents. In some cases the local PDI-P branch accepted these candidates together with financial contributions to PDI-P legislators, but in Central Java and East Kalimantan, angry local party officials nominated rebel candidates against the president's choices. In Bali an openly unhappy PDI-P candidate withdrew.

In some provinces, however, the president's interventions backfired. In West Java, Megawati's ex-military candidate was defeated by a Golkar-supported civilian. In South Sumatra the Megawati-backed ex-military incumbent lost, as did the incumbent in West Nusa Tenggara. In Lampung, the incumbent retired officer was defeated by a rebel PDI-P candidate, who was soon arrested and charged with corruption.

Megawati's interventions were partly motivated by desire to gain control over the patronage networks of provincial governors or at least by the need to prevent such networks falling into the hands of rival parties. From her point of view, it was better to back a retired soldier or bureaucrat who would feel obliged to the PDI-P than risk the victory of a fully-committed Golkar or other party candidate. Moreover, it was widely assumed that incumbent governors had acquired substantial wealth during their terms and would be willing to contribute substantially to the PDI-P in return.

Megawati's decision also reflected her probably realistic lack of confidence in the quality of potential PDI-P candidates. As noted, PDI-P members of regional legislatures have earned a reputation for corruption and lack of administrative capacity. Megawati's husband, Taufiq Kiemas, pointed out, “We don't have candidates with the experience needed to lead 35 million people in East Java or 30 million in Central Java”. Nor in many of the smaller provinces, he might have added. The party feared that if its own local leaders were elected to high regional offices, they would embarrass the party and thus undermine Megawati's re-election campaign. The Lampung case reinforced this concern.

The price for Megawati’s strategy, however, was growing unhappiness within the party. Nevertheless, the central leadership seemed confident local discontent could be compensated for by the financial support that accompanied the willingness of local legislators to vote for the president's preferred candidates.

B. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT?

2004 marks the end of the formal representation of the military and police in national and local legislatures. In exchange for their withdrawal, the initial draft of the election law permitted military personnel to vote for the first time since the 1950s. The military leadership, however, feared that participation of troops in elections might be divisive and lead to conflict among military backers of different parties. They were also concerned that parties would attempt to mobilise supporters from their ranks. In response to such concerns, the law now states in its transitional provisions that in 2004

51 Kompas, 30 July 2003.
52 Some questioned, however, just how reliable these governors were. For example, Governor Sutiyoso in Jakarta launched slum clearance programs that forced poor squatters from land needed for development projects. Many were former PDI-P supporters, who indicated they would vote for other parties in 2004.
military and police personnel will not exercise their right to vote.

While the military leadership declares its neutrality, retired officers are prominent in the main parties. General Wiranto and Lt. General Prabowo are among the remaining seven aspirants for Golkar's presidential nomination. General Yudhoyono is the candidate of the tiny PD but has also been approached by PKB and may be the retired general that Amien Rais has in mind for the vice presidency. The general secretaries of Golkar (Lt. General Budi Harsono) and PPP (Lt. General Yunus Yosfiah) as well as the chairman of PDI-P's Election Victory Committee (Major General Theo Syafei) are retired officers. At provincial and district levels, retired military and police officers often head Golkar branches and can be found in the PDI-P.

As the Golkar pre-convention drew closer in October 2003, the Indonesian National Military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) commander, General Endriartono Sutarto, felt it necessary to call on ex-military candidates not to request support from the military as an institution. His appeal was supported by Yudhoyono who, as a potential candidate himself, seemed to believe that elements in the military might be supporting Wiranto's campaign for the Golkar nomination. “I can feel it”, he said. “and for that reason, please protect the TNI”. The chief of staff of the army, Gen. Ryamizard Ryacudu, warned that any soldier who became involved in the election campaign would be dismissed but added, “I think it's OK if we pray for each other”.54

It seems highly unlikely that the military leadership would mobilise the TNI's extensive regional structure to campaign for a particular presidential candidate. First, this would be quickly exposed in the media and could backfire for the candidate. Secondly, the TNI has no particular reason to be dissatisfied with the likely winner, whether Megawati or a Golkar candidate. It is in its interest to maintain cordial ties with all the main candidates rather than risk backing a loser.

In the past, parties always competed for the support of military/police representatives in legislatures, where alignments have usually been fluid. But this will no longer be relevant after 2004 when the military and police will no longer have appointed seats. Parties will, nevertheless, still be interested in recruiting prominent retired officers, who often remain influential, especially in the regions. If there were intervention by military personnel in elections, it would most likely be on the initiative of individual officers at regional level. However, such support would probably be divided between candidates – as envisaged by the leadership when it demanded TNI neutrality.

C. PARTY-AFFILIATED “SECURITY FORCES”

The introduction of genuinely competitive elections has been accompanied by the growth of protection units affiliated with political parties. During the 1980s, Golkar often relied on the Pancasila Youth (Pemuda Pancasila) to intimidate opponents,56 while the two opposition parties also had youth organisations that helped to mobilise voters. These groups occasionally clashed. Today all major parties are supported by private guards, who wear military-style uniforms and are often given paramilitary training.

Golkar has the Golkar Party Youth Wing (Angkatan Muda Partai Golkar, AMPG) which includes some Pemuda Pancasila members. The PDI-P has formed “Task Forces” (Satgas) throughout the country. PPP's force is the Kabah Youth Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Kabah, GPK) while PKB has the National Guard (Garda Bangsa) and the PAN Youth Force (Barisan Muda PAN). Apart from these organisations, either directly affiliated or closely linked to the party, groups have been founded that perform similar functions but are not formally integrated into the party, such as the Indonesian Young Bulls (Banteng Muda Indonesia), with which the East Timorese militia leader, Eurico Guterres, and a brother of President Megawati's husband have been associated. Many local politicians have their own security units.

The main task of party-linked guards is to protect party offices and rallies during elections. The problem is they are largely made up of unemployed

56 Pemuda Pancasila was involved in the attack on Megawati's supporters at the PDI office on 27 July 1996. Pancasila refers to the five principles of the Indonesian nation found in the prologue to the constitution.

---

53 Koran Tempo, 6 October 2003.
youth often motivated by money, not commitment. In some regions they have been virtually taken over by criminal elements and are involved in protection rackets and extortion. In appreciation of their services in mobilising voters in 1999, some leaders have even been given seats in local assemblies. A senior adviser to Pemuda Pancasila claimed that in the Medan (North Sumatra) parliament the organisation is represented in Golkar, PDI-P and PAN.

These organisations increase the likelihood of violence in election campaigns. In late October 2003, when Golkar decided to hold its anniversary celebrations in Bali, now a PDI-P stronghold, a clash broke out between Golkar and PDI-P guards, and two Golkar supporters were killed. Usually such clashes are between parties competing for the same voters: Golkar and PDI-P, as secular-nationalist parties, for example, rather than PDI-P and a Muslim party. But the latter kind of clash is possible, with potentially wider consequences.

Concerned that the availability of such semi-criminal gangs-for-hire could easily lead to more widespread conflict, General Endriartono called for the dissolution of party-linked guards in November 2002. In interviews several party leaders acknowledge the dangers but say their party could not dissolve its guards if other parties failed to do so. It is likely that many party officials, especially at lower levels, also obtain financial benefits from the protection services provided by these organisations. The only party that seems to have insulated its guard from criminal infiltration is PKS. As one PDI-P member of the DPR pointed out, “If we held such big demonstrations as those of PKS, our guards would then extort free meals from restaurants along the way”.

VI. STRATEGIES

Parties have just one week after the announcement of the general election results to determine their presidential tickets. For the two likely to win most support in the general election, PDI-P and Golkar, the choice will be whether to form an alliance or confront each other over the presidency. The remaining three of the big five will have to decide whether to put forward their own candidates, seek alliances with one of the top two, or build an alliance among themselves. Several scenarios can be envisaged.

A. SCENARIO ONE: PDI-P WINS THE GENERAL ELECTION

If the PDI-P clearly emerges as the party with most support in the general election and a substantial lead over Golkar, the latter is likely to seek an alliance with it rather than nominate its own presidential candidate. Even if the margin is not so wide, Golkar will need to take into account the perceived “Megawati premium”: her support in the presidential election is believed likely to be higher than support for the PDI-P in the general election. The Golkar general chairman, Akbar Tanjung, has repeatedly indicated that Golkar would seek the vice presidency if it fails to outpoll PDI-P in the general election. He hopes the presidential election can be completed in the first round: “If PDI-P is number one, we will be number two, and yes, the vice president will be from Golkar”.

This is obviously PDI-P’s preferred scenario. However PDI-P leaders are not confident that a coalition with Golkar could win an absolute majority in the first round. They envisage a “three-legged coalition” including PKB or PPP. Golkar would be offered the vice presidency (or perhaps a new position of first minister) while the “third leg” would be awarded the speakership of the DPR and attractive cabinet posts. Akbar Tanjung and Jusuf Kalla of Golkar are the candidates most favoured by the PDI-P for vice president. Akbar could be expected to bring substantial strength to the alliance but only if his legal case has been successfully resolved.

57 Koran Tempo spoke to an “entrepreneur” in Jakarta who supplies parties with participants in rallies. He said the demonstrators are paid Rp 50,000 (U.S. $6) and supplied with the appropriate party t-shirt. The man showed t-shirts of parties that had availed themselves of his services. Koran Tempo, 2 November 2003.

58 Discussion with a Pemuda Pancasila “patron”, October 2003.

59 Kompas, 12 November 2002.

60 ICG interview, Jakarta, October 2003.

61 Koran Tempo, 10 April 2003.

62 ICG interview with Pramono Anung Wibowo, Deputy Secretary-General of the PDI-P, October 2003.
resolved. Kalla would be a safe choice. In regional terms, either Akbar (North Sumatra) or Kalla (South Sulawesi) would complement Megawati's strong support from Java. Megawati may prefer Kalla as less a threat than Akbar, who is seen as the epitome of the wheeler-dealer politician and who, if the circumstances were right, might challenge Megawati before her term expired. Akbar, however, may calculate that loyalty would pay off in PDI-P support for his presidential aspirations in 2009.

A PDI-P/Golkar alliance would be facilitated by their lack of fundamental ideological differences. Both are secular-nationalist and wary of pressures towards Islamisation. It is sometimes suggested that Golkar's approach since the fall of Soeharto has been influenced by the disproportionate number of its leaders who have a background in the Islamic Students Association (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, HMI). However, these leaders, including Akbar Tanjung, Jusuf Kalla and Fahmi Idris, have long worked with non-Muslims in Golkar and do not form an Islamic faction within the party. Indeed Fahmi Idris has recently been a prominent leader of an anti-Akbar faction.

On the other hand, the very similarities make the parties natural rivals for the same constituency. Neither is likely to win over many voters who previously supported Muslim parties. One PDI-P leader, Roy Janis, referred to the “allergy” PDI-P members in some regions have against cooperating with Golkar. For most PDI-P leaders, however, the electoral benefits of an alliance easily outweigh the drawbacks.

Megawati's choice of a Golkar running mate would not be unilateral but would be influenced by the preferences of Golkar, which in turn would be influenced by the general election results. If it opts for the vice presidency, it would propose leaders seen as suitable, such as Akbar Tanjung or Jusuf Kalla, or even one of its aspirants with a business background such as Aburizal Bakrie or Surya Paloh. It is unlikely that the ex-military candidates, Wiranto or Prabowo, would be interested in the vice presidency and equally unlikely that Megawati would be interested in them.

**B. Scenario Two: Golkar Wins the General Election**

If Golkar emerges as a clear winner in the general election or runs a close second, the calculations of all parties would be very different. If the result indicated that Golkar would have a good chance to win the presidency, it would be difficult for its supporters to be satisfied with the second slot. Its convention in April 2004 would then select a presidential, not vice-presidential, candidate. Even if Akbar Tanjung is cleared by the Supreme Court before nominations close, the party might not want a presidential candidate who would be such an easy target for opponents. At Golkar's pre-convention in October 2003, three other candidates showed substantial support: Wiranto and the two businessmen, Aburizal Bakrie and Surya Paloh. Support within the Golkar organisation is not the same as support among the entire population, however.

In making its choice, the Golkar convention would likely give additional weight to the prospects of particular individuals actually to win the presidency, apart from the normal “money politics” considerations. General Wiranto probably has a higher profile than the others but he also has bigger problems associated with his military background and accusations of human rights abuse. He was held responsible by a government-endorsed commission of inquiry into human rights violations in East Timor in 1999 for “crimes against humanity” due to his failure to “guarantee security”. Nevertheless, most Indonesians would probably not be affected by such accusations with regard to East Timor. Indeed Wiranto would probably be more vulnerable electorally to

63 There is some speculation that the government is deliberately delaying resolution of the appeal. As long as the case is hanging over Akbar, he will be inhibited from an all-out anti-Megawati campaign. It is speculated that he might be rewarded for cooperation with a not-guilty verdict and the vice presidency.

64 Koran Tempo, 2 May 2003.

65 Following big demonstrations against increased fuel prices in January 2003, the head of the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) and PDI-P member, retired Lt. General Hendropriyono, reported to cabinet that the demonstrators may have been supported by Wiranto. In response, the commander of the TNI, General Edriartono Sutarto, said “As the military chief, I can only appeal to retired military officers, who are former soldiers, to put national interests above personal ambition just like when they were still active in military service”. Jakarta Post, 24 January 2003.

charges of having failed to prevent the loss of East Timor.

In the years immediately following Soeharto’s fall, public opinion was very resistant to the prospect of a Soeharto-era general as president, but antagonism toward the military has declined. In his speech to the Golkar pre-convention in October 2003, Wiranto emphasised his role in facilitating Soeharto’s resignation and the relatively smooth transition that followed. A major theme was the need for national reconciliation.

The major concern in regard to Wiranto’s candidacy is probably his international acceptability. Would his election chill relations with the U.S. and other Western countries? Would he even be able to visit such countries? Questioned by a delegate at the Golkar pre-convention, Wiranto avoided a direct answer by arguing that the problem arose because under previous post-1998 governments Indonesia had lost international respect and lacked a strong bargaining position. Nevertheless, he acknowledged, Indonesia needed international support.

It is difficult five months before the choice needs to be made to assess the prospects of all potential Golkar candidates. Aburizal Bakri and Surya Paloh, despite their success in business during the crony-ridden New Order, still have to show that their lack of experience in government and politics more generally is not an insuperable disadvantage. Jusuf Kalla will need to shed his image as every presidential candidate’s ideal running mate. It appears that Prabowo Subianto’s candidacy might be intended in part to hurt his old rival, Wiranto, who was responsible for his dismissal from the army in 1998, and perhaps to lay the foundations for a bid in 2009. The Sultan of Yogyakarta’s popularity is largely limited to Yogyakarta and several provinces with Javanese transmigrants.

In confronting Megawati, Golkar would presumably look for a vice-presidential candidate from a Muslim party. Its strategy might revive the “Anyone but Megawati” (Asal Bukan Mega, ABM) campaign spearheaded by the Muslim-based parties that blocked her in 1999 and led to Abdurrahman Wahid’s election. A rational response for the PDI-P to protect itself would be to ally with a Muslim party. The PKB and PPP would be the obvious choices provided that the general election results did not persuade them to enter their own candidates. Given the rivalries within the PKB, it might also make sense to team up with its parent organisation, the NU. Apart from Akbar Tanjung and Jusuf Kalla, a senior PDI-P official told ICG that it was considering another three potential running mates: Hamzah Haz, Hasyim Muzadi and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

Both PKB and PPP are remarkably pragmatic about possible coalitions. A senior PKB leader told ICG that if the party did not contest the presidency itself, it would decide between PDI-P and Golkar on the basis of what they offered in cabinet positions and other benefits. Ideological affinity seems to be the last thing on party leaders’ minds.

C. SCENARIO THREE: GOLKAR’S NIGHTMARE

If Golkar does well enough in the general election to convince it to nominate its own presidential candidate, the PDI-P might respond by going much further than attempting to woo a Muslim party, especially if Wiranto were the Golkar candidate. One PDI-P leader said that Wiranto’s selection would be good for the PDI-P because it would be easier to build an alliance against him. An attractive option would be to revive the Scenario One strategy by offering the vice presidency to a disappointed Golkar candidate.

For example, Akbar Tanjung has never been close to Wiranto since the 1999 MPR session when both were rivals for the vice presidency. If the PDI-P could attract either him or Jusuf Kalla to its ticket with an offer of strong Golkar representation in the cabinet, it is quite likely that a substantial part of the party would go with him.
D. Scenario Four: PDI-P's Nightmare

PDI-P’s nightmare is a variation of the first scenario. If Golkar foregoes the presidency and joins the PDI-P ticket, the alliance might win 40 to 45 per cent of the votes in the first round, with several of the remaining candidates around 10 per cent each. Second place and the right to enter the second round would be a bit like winning a lottery – impossible to predict.

All three parties that seem to have a chance for second place – PPP, PKB and PAN – are Islam-based. Their most effective strategy would be to agree to support a single candidate, but which one? The declared candidates are Hamzah Haz for the PPP and Amien Rais; Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono could emerge as the PKB candidate, but that is uncertain. These leaders and their parties, however, have long been rivals and would not easily unite. In October 2003 representatives of these parties, together with the tiny PKS, which has already indicated likely support for Amien, met to discuss cooperation against Megawati. A PKB leader proposed, unsuccessfully, that they support the party among them with most votes in the 5 April general election. This was not entirely disinterested as PKB was the most successful in 1999.73

Amien Rais countered that Muslim parties should allow the first round of the presidential election to determine their candidate. It is generally believed his personal vote is likely to exceed his party's so his chances would be brighter if the choice is based on the presidential result. According to Amien, “If there is one candidate from any of these parties who passes into the second round of the presidential election, we will all support him”.74

If either Hamzah Haz or Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono came second and entered the run-off, he would be vulnerable to the argument that he had held key posts in the Megawati government and should be considered partly responsible for its failings. For Megawati, the most dangerous challenger might be Amien Rais who, as chairman of the MPR, has been prominent but not part of the government. He is a skilled political operator and formed the so-called Central Axis coalition that blocked Megawati's path to the presidency in 1999.

If Amien Rais were to win the second round lottery, he might be able to form a new anti-Megawati coalition. He undoubtedly would challenge her to a debate, expecting she would be reluctant to expose her lack of mastery over policy issues. Amien's Achilles heel is his past identification with sectarian Islamic causes but he has recently cultivated a more national image.

But can Amien win the lottery? In 1999 PAN and its ally, PK (now PKS) won 8.5 per cent, behind their rivals, PKB (12.6 per cent) and PPP (10.7 per cent). PKB may lose support in 2004 because of the Wahid government's record and party disunity, while PPP credibility may have been undermined by association with Megawati. Amien expects to poll more votes than his party and his position would be even stronger if he can persuade a senior retired soldier to be his running mate. Speculation centres on Yudhoyono, but since he leads Amien in the polls, why would he settle for the second job?

It seems unlikely Amien will reach the second round, but, if he did, Megawati could be more vulnerable than against Hamzah Haz or a PKB candidate. She would not, however, be defenceless. PPP and PKB leaders would probably be tempted by cabinet offers and other incentives. Nevertheless, an Amien challenge would worry the PDI-P. His victory would be unlikely but not impossible. He probably has better prospects of winning the second round than coming second in the first.

73 Kompas, 29 October 2003.
74 Jakarta Post, 27 October 2003.
VII. CONCLUSION

The 2004 elections cannot be expected to produce fundamental change. The general election will likely bring a result similar to 1999 when PDI-P and Golkar were the largest parties, though they may exchange places. The presidential election will probably return either Megawati or Golkar’s candidate. Both parties are secular-nationalist and operate essentially as patronage networks. Their similarity is illustrated by the ease with which they envisage a coalition. It would be unrealistic to expect either to tackle ubiquitous corruption or overhaul the legal system. An outsider candidate has only a slight chance and would have to work with a legislature dominated by the leading parties and the money politics on which they thrive.

Public confidence in democratic politics has been undermined by the elected politicians, nationally and regionally. Polls, media debate and anecdotal evidence point to disillusion with the democracy Indonesia has experienced for five years. Many ordinary people look through rose-tinted spectacles to the Soeharto era as a time of social peace and relative prosperity. Democratic institutions will come under increasing challenge unless elected government can address basic demands and aspirations. But at least the institutions are in place, and the spirit of reform has not entirely disappeared. The obstacles, however, remain enormous.

Jakarta/Brussels, 18 December 2003

75 In fact, of course, social conflict was not uncommon during the Soeharto era and the economic collapse of 1997 preceded the fall of the regime in 1998.
APPENDIX A

MAP OF INDONESIA