

Indonesia: Jemaah Islamiyah's Current Status

I. OVERVIEW

In late March 2007, arrests by Densus 88, the police counter-terror unit, netted seven detainees in Central and East Java (an eighth was killed); a huge cache of explosives and weaponry; and documents that seemed to suggest a new military structure for Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the region's largest jihadist organisation. The arrests followed directly from information obtained from operations in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in late January.

Wildly differing assessments of JI's state in the aftermath of the March raids suggest a more systematic stock-taking is in order. What remains of the organisation today? What are its aims, and funding sources? Where are its strongholds? Who are its leaders? What is its relationship with other jihadist organisations at home and abroad? Crisis Group believes JI retains a solid core that probably totals more than 900 members across Indonesia. It likely is not growing but it retains deep roots and a long-term vision of establishing an Islamic state.

While the organisation of its military wing may have changed – but the materials found in March raise more questions than they answer – JI's strength remains rooted in a territorial command structure, with a five- or six-person religious study circle as the basic building block. Its administrative hierarchy has been largely reduced to what was once Mantiqi II, the division that covers Indonesia, making the head of Mantiqi II (Nuaim alias Abu Irsyad) in effect the JI leader, whether or not he formally carries the title of amir.

It is not clear what has happened to Mantiqi III, the "training" division whose component geographic parts – East Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Sabah and Mindanao – covered the transit routes from Indonesia to the Philippines as well as the conflict area of Poso. Some two dozen JI members remain in Mindanao (as do several smaller groups of non-JI Indonesians), and several Mindanao veterans made their way to Poso over the last two years. But it is possible that these areas have been brought under a central command and no longer report to a separate division.

JI is in a building and consolidation phase which for the most part means that it is unlikely to be interested in large, expensive operations that could further weaken its support

base. Major attacks have been the approach favoured by Noordin Mohammed Top, leader of a JI splinter group. But operations that can be both religiously justified and popular enough to attract new recruits cannot be ruled out. For many, opposition to bombings like the 2004 Australian embassy attack and the 2005 Bali bombings (Bali II) is based less on principled opposition to killing civilians than a sense that tactically, the costs outweigh the benefits. Military training to build capacity to take on Islam's enemies remains an essential element of the JI program.

This briefing is based on a careful reading of the documentary evidence together with interviews with Indonesian officials and individuals close to the radical network.

II. A NEW MILITARY STRUCTURE?

On 23 January 2007, Wiwin Kalahe, one of the most wanted men in Poso, turned himself in to the police.¹ Suspected of involvement in a string of JI murders in the area, he turned out to have a wealth of information about JI safehouses in Java, because he had stayed in several after fleeing Poso temporarily in July 2004 following the killing of an Indonesian soldier's wife. After his surrender in January, police took him back to Java and asked him to point out these locations.² They were put under surveillance, and the waiting paid off.

¹ For related reporting on Indonesia see Crisis Group Asia Report N°127, *Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge*, 24 January 2007; Asia Report N°103, *Weakening Indonesian Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso*, 13 October 2005; Asia Report N°92, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, 22 February 2005; Asia Report N°74, *Indonesia Background: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, 3 February 2004; Asia Report N°63, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003; Asia Report N°43, *Indonesia Background: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*, 11 December 2002; and Asia Briefing N°20, *Al-Qaeda in South East Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia*, 8 August 2002 (as corrected 10 January 2003).

² Crisis Group interview, Indonesian police official, 16 April 2007.

On 20 March 2007 police followed two men on a motorcycle, Agus Suryanto, 39, and Sarwo Edi Nugroho, 40, from Agus's house in Muntilan, Central Java to a small store in Sleman, Yogyakarta where three others were waiting: Akhyas alias Sutarjo, Sikas and Amir Ahmadi. The two groups were each carrying a box, and as they exchanged them, the police moved in. Agus was shot and killed as he tried to flee; Sarwo Edi was wounded. The box they were carrying turned out to contain two M-16 rifles, a revolver, a pistol and about 100 rounds of ammunition. The other three men were arrested, and in their interrogation, police learned that Akhyas had stored explosives at Sikas's house in Sukoharjo, Solo.

The next day, Sikas led police to a cache that included over 2,000 bullets, twenty kilograms of TNT and close to 700 of potassium chlorate, 200 detonators, a few guns and sixteen small pipe bombs. He told police he had been storing the material on the instructions of Abu Dujana, one of Indonesia's most wanted men, who is frequently – and erroneously – reported to be the current amir (leader) of JI. Two days later, police arrested Saiful Anam alias Mujadid alias Brekele, 26, in Temanggung, Central Java. Another of Poso's most wanted men, he is suspected of being a perpetrator of the May 2005 bombing in Tentena market that killed 22 people. Almost simultaneously, police in Surabaya arrested Maulana Yusuf Wibisono alias Holis or Cholis, and five days later, Achmad Syahrul Uman alias Doni alias Khoirul.³ It later transpired that Akhyas in Sukoharjo had supplied explosives to Maulana in Surabaya, who in turn got them to Poso.

All the men were said to be part of a new JI military structure, depicted in a hand-drawn diagram that police released to the media in mid-April. It had a *qoid sariyah* (sariyah leader) on top, with four units called *ishoba* under him. According to the arrested men, Abu Dujana was the *qoid*, and the *ishoba* were based in Solo, Jakarta, Semarang and Surabaya. The latter two were headed respectively by two of those arrested, Sarwo Edi and Maulana. The detainees named the *ishoba* heads for Jakarta (Dani) and Solo (Gulam alias Tanmin), but both remain at large.

The significance of the diagram is not clear, particularly because the structure covers only Java, and the term used is *sariyah*. According to Indonesian police, this concept of the *sariyah* was first discussed in August-September 2006 and then announced by Abu Dujana to a JI meeting in Sukoharjo, Solo in December as a reality. However, elsewhere the term has been used to mean a sub-section of a larger military organisation. In JI's 1996 organisational guidelines (PUPJI), it denoted a level beneath the *wakalah*, thus covering something less than a province, or in military

terms, a unit below a battalion.⁴ In his 2005 testimony, Bali II plotter Subur Sugiarto said that JI's structure had changed the previous year, and *sariyah* had become equivalent to a *kabupaten* (district) – thus even smaller than envisaged in PUPJI.

Around the same time, in 2004, a document – *Serial Jihad IV* – began circulating among those close to Noordin Mohammed Top. Apparently translated from the Arabic, it is a manual for urban guerrilla warfare with specific guidelines for setting up a “super-secret”, small urban hit squad. The basic unit is a *thoifah* consisting of a leader and his deputy, who oversee the necessary planning and training; a data collection unit of not more than four people with good communication and computer skills to gather basic intelligence and survey possible targets, including photographs; a logistics unit to purchase, rent or otherwise acquire the necessary equipment and facilities, prepare documents, and acquire bombs, poison or other weapons of choice; and finally the executors.⁵ Such a *thoifah*, the document suggests, is a combat cell (*fi'ah muqotilah*). Four of these make a *kirdas*, and four *kirdas* make a *sariyah*, which operates in a territory that covers about 50 sq. km.⁶

Outside Indonesia, the Arabic plural of *sariyah* (*saraya*) is used by some jihadist groups. Meaning brigades or platoons, it appears in the name of the military wing of Islamic Jihad in Palestine, *saraya al-quds* (the al-Quds brigades). It is also used by a number of Iraqi jihadist groups which in 2006 reputedly joined the Mujahidin Shura Council established by al-Qaeda in Iraq, such as *saraya ansar al-taweed* (the tawhid partisans brigades). Again, the usage suggests that a single *sariyah* is unlikely to represent a full military organisation.

Given that the diagram found in March only applies to Java, there are three possibilities for JI's use of the word:

- It is a new term for a geographic division larger than a *wakalah* but smaller than the old *mantiqi*. If so, it would suggest that the old Mantiqi II has been redivided (for example, Sumatra, Java and Sulawesi each being one *sariyah*), and Abu Dujana is the head for Java, still reporting to an amir.

⁴ Crisis Group Report, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia*, op. cit., p. 11.

⁵ “Risalah Ke-Empat: Jihad (Perang), Serial Jihad IV”, pp. 4-6, not dated, author and publisher unknown, but almost certainly translated from the Arabic. The text begins: “Alhamdulillah Sheikh Usamah bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organisation have abandoned their peace with kafirs with the explanation they made announcing war, accompanied by several explanations about jihad operations. They also invited kafirs to become Muslims, via a cassette that was broadcast a month before. On this basis we are continuing the jihad begun by the al-Qaeda organisation which is active on the field, not behind the screen...”

⁶ Ibid, p. 7.

³ “Menggulung Teroris di Daerah Basis”, *Gatra*, 4 April 2007, pp. 88-92.

- It is a purely military structure, separate from the standard administrative divisions that focus on religious outreach and education, but one of several such units in the overall organisation.
- It is a special forces unit to augment existing military capacity with branches in Java but perhaps elsewhere as well.

Jl's history would suggest that the third is the most likely but the men arrested in March apparently were either unable or unwilling to explain very much about the structure or how it worked; they only spoke about their own unit, with some knowledge of the other Java-based leaders. Sarwo Edi, the Semarang *ishoba* head, was a former mathematics teacher and long-term Jl member who had trained in Mindanao under Abu Dujana. He told reporters his role was to train cadres; that he had 24 men under him; and that they had planned to continue Jl's struggle through kidnappings and assassinations.⁷ All the arrested men appear to have been in regular communication with Abu Dujana but also knew that he reported to someone higher.

The *sariyah* had apparently never been activated for specific operations (*amaliyah*) since it was established in late 2006. Military training had taken place in January 2007 on Mt. Sumbing, Temanggung, but while the cadres had discussed possible targets, they appear not to have progressed very far with concrete plans.

If the *sariyah* turns out to be equivalent to a special forces unit, it would be the latest in a series of not very successful efforts to form one. Around 1995, Jl's central command authorised its military operations head Zulkarnaen to establish a *laskar khos* (special forces). According to a former Jl member, it gave members a sense that they were superior and did not need to attend religious training sessions or other organisational meetings. Members were allowed to amass their own weapons, making control even more difficult. Zulkarnaen did not coordinate with Mustofa, who was head of training (*tadrib*), and there was no effort to match training to operational needs. After May 2000, *wakalah* heads complained that Zulkarnaen was poaching people from cells without informing them to build a special unit for Poso.⁸ The same accusations were made against Hambali, who tapped men for the Christmas Eve 2000 bombing and subsequent actions without informing their superiors.

In a meeting of senior Jl leaders on 17 October 2002, Nasir Abas suggested that military functions be unified under a single person on the central command responsible for

military affairs (*tajnid*), who would have subordinates in charge of training and operations, so that military capacity could be developed more systematically. Abu Rusdan, then caretaker amir, supported the idea, but the only person who decided to move forward with it was Nuaim (Nu'im) alias Abu Irsyad, head of Mantiqi II. He put together a *laskar khos*, composed of two or three people from every *wakalah* who had had training in either Afghanistan or Mindanao. Training began in early 2003, with members divided into three groups: intelligence, logistics and engineering. By June police had arrested many of the participants, including the main trainer, Adi Suryana alias Qital, the military chief for Mantiqi II.

Since then, the only military operations carried out by the Jl mainstream – as opposed to the Noordin group – have been in Poso. They have involved a systematic campaign of bombings and targeted assassinations, financed in part by armed robberies. It was designed not only to avenge past Muslim deaths and shock the government into addressing unresolved justice issues, as the perpetrators claimed, but also to keep a local jihad going so as to aid recruitment.

The steady stream of Jl *ustadz* (Muslim teachers) going up to Poso from Semarang and Solo since 2003 indicates that the violence there has been directed from Java. We now know from the Poso detainees that one of the senior Jl figures in Central Sulawesi since 2000 was a medical doctor from Surabaya, Agus Idris, who was in communication with Abu Dujana, with whom he may have worked in Mindanao. Ustadz Rian alias Riansyah alias Eko alias Abdul Hakim, an Afghan veteran from Solo, turned up in Poso in late 2004 and was killed in a police operation there on 11 January 2007. He too had been in contact with Abu Dujana. And two local Poso recruits were sent sometime in 2005 to study bomb-making with Agus Suryanto, the man killed in March, also an Abu Dujana protege.⁹

One explanation that fits these facts is that Mantiqis II and III may have been fused sometime after 2004, leaving the Mantiqi II head, Nuaim alias Abu Irsyad, as de facto amir of the streamlined organisation. Abu Dujana, who trained in Afghanistan in 1989 and became an instructor in Mindanao ten years later, may have been appointed military coordinator in place of, or in collaboration with Zulkarnaen, and in this capacity been responsible for

⁷ "Abu Isa Akui Kirim Bom ke Poso melalui Cholis", *Media Indonesia*, 17 April 2007; "Labirin Misteri yang Terserak", *Kompas*, 30 April 2007.

⁸ Crisis Group interviews, Jakarta, 26 April 2006.

⁹ Agus Suryanto, it turned out, had been a bomb-making apprentice of the late Dr Azhari Husin, Noordin Mohamed Top's operational partner. Press reports, including a multi-part *Tempo* feature on 15 April 2007, have suggested that Taufik alias Upik Bulaga and Icing, the two Poso recruits, studied directly with Azhari, but this is inaccurate. Azhari was killed in a shootout with police in November 2005.

sending Mindanao-trained *ustadz* to Poso. It would explain the close coordination between central Java and Poso, including that JI operatives in Poso were getting some of their explosives from the cache in Sukoharjo. His experience in Poso might have been an incentive to try yet again to develop a special force. It would have been perfectly in keeping with JI's doctrine of jihad to keep a military unit and arsenal at the ready, even if not for immediate use. But it would also make sense for someone of Abu Dujana's stature and reported administrative capabilities to be given control of JI's most important region, Java, for tasks beyond military affairs. The conundrum may only be sorted out when Abu Dujana, Zulkarnaen and Nuaim, or one of the three, is arrested.

Nuaim and Abu Dujana are said to be opposed to the kind of bombings undertaken by Noordin Top, and there is no indication that the explosives stored in Sukoharjo were to be used for "Bali III". But attacks on local kafirs and anti-Islamic (*thoghut*) officials were something that even the most vocal anti-Noordin leaders could support in the appropriate circumstances. Sarwo Edi, the Semarang *ishoba* head, told an Indonesian journalist that they had planned to target Satya Wacana, a well-known Christian university in Salatiga, a Central Java town between Semarang and Solo, if Muslims in Poso were attacked on Idul Fithri 2006, the holiday following Ramadan.¹⁰ But Poso JI members assert that they *were* attacked on 22 October, the eve of Ramadan, when police clashed with Muslims in the Tanah Runtuh complex, the local JI base. An assault on a prominent Christian university in retaliation, even though it had nothing to do with Poso or with the police, would have been seen as legitimate by many, if not most, JI rank and file.

In sum, whatever the new *sariyah* structure is, it is unlikely to be the military wing of JI per se, simply because JI's reach is so much broader than Java. This leads directly into the broader question of what is left of JI.

III. ESTIMATING JI'S SIZE AND STRENGTH

Trying to estimate JI's current size is necessarily something of a guessing game but it is clear that the organisation retains a committed membership, spread across the Indonesian archipelago from Aceh to Flores. The following analysis is based on information from JI's geographic subdivisions (*wakalah*) and interviews suggesting relative size of those units. Repeatedly, for example, Crisis Group was told that the Solo *wakalah* is the largest; that Central

Java and East Java follow; and that Lampung comes fourth. If it is known that Lampung in 2003 had 150 members, it can be assumed Central and East Java had more. If an educated guess can be made about Central Java's strength, the figure for the Solo *wakalah* will be higher. It is far from an exact science but such calculations help in arriving at rough figures.

It is another guessing game entirely to take figures from 2004 or 2005 and estimate whether membership is falling or rising. But it is known that extraordinary loyalty – and occasionally fear – engendered by the oath-taking process (*bai'at*) binds new members to their teachers. The men administering the oath are not just higher in the organisational hierarchy; they are also people with religious and jihadi credentials. Bonds are not easily broken, even after three or four years of no contact with fellow JI members. Individuals may become inactive but they rarely take a conscious decision to leave the *jama'ah*, and if a superior asks a favour, it is very difficult to say no. The hundreds of arrests since the first Bali bombs may have disrupted the organisation less than originally assumed, although ideological differences over tactics and strategy are profound.

Most JI members do not agree with the actions of Noordin Top, the man responsible for the major bombings in Jakarta and Bali since 2003, although many feel an ongoing obligation to help him hide from police. But rejection of his tactics does not make the JI mainstream "moderate" in any conventional sense of the term. Its cost-benefit analysis may have militated against hitting Western targets on Java, but it clearly supported the Poso violence. Noordin-style attacks generated public outrage and were also expensive. The Australian embassy attack in September 2004 cost about \$7,800; the assassination of the head of the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church in October 2006 cost about \$20.¹¹

The mainstream is not necessarily opposed to bomb attacks in principle. If Muslim casualties could be avoided, religious justification were clear and benefits outweighed disadvantages, many would drop their objections. That JI retains such a large membership and is still recruiting should be a matter of concern, even as some leading figures in the anti-Noordin faction are quietly embraced (and sometimes funded) by officials anxious to encourage divisions in the organisation.

The fact remains that JI's focus is on jihad and on the use of military tactics to achieve its objective of establishing a community where Islamic law can be practiced. If it were interested in non-military tactics, it could join with

¹⁰ "Dari Sebuah Corat-coret", *Tempo*, 15 April 2007, p. 36.

¹¹ "Pembunuh Pendeta Kongkoli Diupah Rp.200,000", *Sinar Harapan*, 29 January 2007.

PKS or other legal parties interested in working through a democratic political system. But JI believes fundamentally that non-Muslims, Muslim apostates and other anti-Islamic forces seek to destroy Islam and will have to be confronted with physical force if a true Islamic community is to be established. That confrontation can also help expand the mass base. In this respect, many JI leaders saw ongoing jihad areas like Poso in Central Sulawesi as beneficial, whereas there is nothing to suggest that the Bali bombings or the Australian embassy attack had any recruitment value.

Factors that may determine the strength of JI in different areas include:

- the existence of JI religious boarding schools (*pesantren*); a concentration of schools is likely to produce a stronger base and more opportunities for recruitment;
- the history of Darul Islam/JI in the area; the JI structure in Lampung, which builds on a DI base going back to the 1970s, is likely to be more difficult to dislodge than in Poso, where the *wakalah* was only set up in late 2002 (that said, DI's strong influence in West Java has made it harder for JI to penetrate);
- the extent of overlapping ties among members, since the local structure is likely to endure when individual members have family and business connections that reinforce organisational ones;
- success of campus-based recruitment, including at secular universities; and
- the degree to which recruiting takes place in prison and the activities of JI prisoners once released.

Of all these factors, the most important may be the schools. Numbering about twenty, mostly on Java, they are important as administrative centers and the bases from which religious outreach takes place. The rise and fall of their enrollment may be the best guide to JI's institutional health. Student intake at Pesantren al-Mukmin in Ngruki reportedly fell dramatically in the year after Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's arrest but reportedly has climbed following his release.

The following sections address each of the nine *wakalah* administered by Mantiqi II – Central Java, Solo, East Java, Lampung, Jakarta, West Java, northern Sumatra, central Sumatra and West Nusa Tenggara – as well as the three in Sulawesi, in what used to be Mantiqi III and which now may have been brought under the same administration as the others.

In JI's organisational structure, the *wakalah* were divided into progressively smaller sub-units: *sariyah*, *katibah*,

qirdas, *fi'ah* and *thoifah*, each roughly corresponding to a military unit. But in practice, many *wakalah* had only two or three subdivisions, and according to a former JI member, only Solo was large enough to have the full complement.

A. CENTRAL JAVA

The Central Java *wakalah*, based in Semarang, was from the outset one of the most important and second only to Solo in size. It was part of JI's heartland; much of the region was old Darul Islam territory, and its leaders were prominent on the JI central command. Its territory included an important JI school, Pesantren al-Muttaqien in Jepara, whose head, Sartono, was one of the early *wakalah* heads (1998-2002). In July 1999, the *wakalah* had five *katibah*: Pati (including Kudus and Jepara); Semarang; Kedu (including Temanggung, Sleman and Magelang); Pemalang (including Pekalongan, Brebes and Tegal); and Purwokerto (including Banyumas and Cilacap). Testimony of JI prisoners arrested in 2005 suggests there was no major change in that basic structure over the intervening six years.

A June 1999 document on *dakwah* (religious outreach) development for the *wakalah* gives some baseline figures.¹² Each *katibah* had or was looking to appoint regional coordinators for its territorial subdivisions. At the time, it had 25 in place, some of whom covered more than one area, and seven vacancies. The presence of a regional coordinator was evidence of a well-developed structure that could sustain a range of activities, including charitable foundations (*yayasan*) that provided some of the basic operating expenses for the organisation.¹³ The *wakalah* also had a roster of 54 preachers and teachers, each of whom would have been involved in recruitment and most of whom were involved directly in leading *halaqah* (study circles).¹⁴ By 2000-2001, some on the list had been sent to Ambon and Poso. Some, like Ust. Sahl, ended up staying in Poso to build up the JI structure there; others, like Subur

¹² "Laporan Perkembangan Da'wah wal Irsyad", Wakalah Jawa Wustho, Robi'ul Awwal 1420H/Juni 1999M, found in a cache of documents in Semarang, July 2003. It was later introduced as evidence in the trial of Ade Suryana alias Qital.

¹³ The foundations listed were As-Salamah in *katibah* Pati (but probably based in Kudus); al-Ishlah and Amalush Sholihin for the two *katibah* in Semarang; al-Istiqomah and al-Husna in *katibah* Kedu; al-Furqon in *katibah* Pemalang; and ar-Ridho and al-Muaddib for *katibah* Purwokerto.

¹⁴ The document says that there were 43 *mubaligh* (preachers) and 44 *mu'alim* (teachers) but there was significant overlap among the names listed, and the figure of 54 *da'i* (preachers) seems to be the combined total.

Sugiarto, who went to Ambon, returned to Central Java.¹⁵ But the document noted a major weakness of JI preachers was that most lacked advanced degrees and therefore had little legitimacy in the eyes of the public.¹⁶

The document also noted that recruiting was more successful in rural than in urban areas. To improve results in the latter, leaders were to concentrate on schools and campuses, with particular focus on setting up university-based *dakwah* organisations.¹⁷ The document suggests total membership was at least several hundred in 1999, and it probably peaked in 2000-2001, when the Ambon and Poso conflicts were at their height and before the Bali bombs frightened some away. Trends in different *katibah* suggest today's figure may be in the 150-200 range.

One question is how far the support network extends beyond the membership. While a definitive answer is impossible, one example is a broader forum of Islamic organisations, FORKIS (Forum Aktivis Islam Semarang) that JI came to dominate. Some of its non-JI members agreed to provide logistic assistance to Noordin in 2005 when requested to do so, and there are undoubtedly other organisations, workplaces, and family networks where non-members are drawn into JI support whether or not they know about – let alone agree with – the organisation's aims.

1. The Semarang *katibah*

We have more information about the Semarang *katibah* than any other because of recent arrests. As of late 2004 or early 2005, it was divided into at least two *qirdas*, headed by Agus Nasrollah and Budi Setyanjaya for West and East Semarang respectively; one account mentions a third, for North Semarang, but this may be a reference to a unit that was active earlier and faded away.¹⁸ All were under Ustadz Hadi Syuro, a former DI leader who became the *katibah* head. The *qirdas* were further subdivided into *fi'ah*, with West Semarang alone having three. Subur Sugiarto, who played a major role in the Bali II planning, led one seven-member *fi'ah* there through the beginning of 2005; he then left JI and took the whole *fi'ah* over to Noordin. It was not because the arrests had shaken his faith in the organisation or he realised his

interpretation of jihad was wrong but because he felt JI had grown stale and insufficiently militant.¹⁹

The loss of that *fi'ah* and the arrests that followed Bali II would have hurt the Semarang operations but not enough to throw them into disarray. They had been hit, after all, by a bigger blow in July 2003, when police discovered a major warehouse of weapons and documents. *Pengajians* (religious discussion groups) and religious outreach nevertheless continued, almost as though nothing had happened.

This resiliency is illustrated by the experience of Sarwo Edi Nugroho, one of those arrested in March 2007. He joined Darul Islam in 1986, sided with the faction that became JI in 1993 and was formally inducted into the organisation by Ustadz Hadi Suryo. In 1999, he was sent to the Philippines in a group of twenty for six months of training, then returned to Semarang. After the October 2002 Bali bombings, he (and presumably some others in Semarang) moved away for safety but never dropped ties to JI or distanced himself from the movement. Instead, he temporarily moved a little closer to the JI nerve center of Solo-Yogyakarta. When he was arrested in March, he was military commander for the Semarang area and had been involved with DI and JI for just over twenty years. Neither the July 2003 nor November 2005 arrests of prominent Semarang-based figures deterred him from active involvement.

Financially, the Semarang *katibah* appears to have been assisted by the business activities of its better-off members. Budi Setyanjaya, the head of the east Semarang *qirdas*, also headed a cleaning service company, CV Permalat Perakasa, that employed JI members and made periodic donations to the organisation.²⁰ Recruitment in Semarang appears to have taken place more through mosques than through schools, although Ustadz Hadi Suryo, the *katibah* head, also served as director of Pesantren Baitussalam in Semarang.

With arrests, attrition and loss of Subur's cell, Semarang JI membership may be down to some 30 to 35, but no one should doubt that a solid core remains and may be strengthened as prisoners are released from jail.

¹⁵ Both were operating out of Semarang. Ustadz Sahl appears in the 1999 document as a *muballigh* named Atho'illah. Subur Sugiarto appears as a *mu'alim*.

¹⁶ "Laporan Perkembangan Da'wah wal Irsyad", op. cit., p. 13.

¹⁷ Ibid, Section III, "Mad'u dan Perkembangannya", p. 12.

¹⁸ Testimony of Subur Sugiarto in the case of Sunarto alias Ustadz Sahl alias Ustadz Athoillah (date is cut off from photocopy but about February 2006). There was definitely a North Semarang *katibah* in 1999 but only one of the Semarang detainees in 2005 makes reference to it.

¹⁹ Testimony of Adhityo Triyoga alias Suryo alias Cahyo, 16 February 2006 in case dossier of Subur Sugiarto.

²⁰ Budi Setyanjaya ran CV Permalat cleaning service (sometimes seen as CV Permalat Perakasa) and employed at different times several JI members including Sri Pujimulyo Siswanto, Wawan and Joned (the first two arrested after Bali II). Bambang Tetuko, a *wakalah* official, was on the company's board of directors. See testimony of Sri Pujimulyo Siswanto, op. cit., p. 34.

2. Pati

The Pati *katibah* likely has at least as many members as Semarang and perhaps more, since its territory includes the al-Muttaqien school in Jepara and the city of Kudus, where a top JI leader, Thoriquudin alias Abu Rusdan, is based. The *pesantren* is known as a girls' school where many JI men find wives but it also takes a few male students, most of whom appear to be carefully selected.²¹ Some of the senior JI figures associated with it are Ust. Abdul Manaf, possibly a member of the central command, who is one of the school's founders, and Taufik Ahmed alias Abu Arina head of the *katibah* and close friend of Abu Rusdan, who teaches there. Several JI members from the Kudus area were inducted at the school under Taufik's supervision in the late 1990s.²²

The head of the Central Java *wakalah* as of 2003, Farah alias Abu Askhari, was based in Kudus, as was Para Wijayanto, another senior figure in the *wakalah* structure as of 2003-2004; both are civil engineers. Abu Rusdan's release and return to Kudus in late 2005 would have given the *katibah* a major boost, especially given his popularity on the conservative lecture circuit. JI may not be growing in the Kudus-Jepara area but it is unlikely to be shrinking, and a program of systematic consolidation is almost certainly in place under Abu Rusdan's direction. An educated guess at the membership would be 50 to 60.

3. Pemalang

The Pemalang *katibah* includes the city of Pekalongan, which featured prominently in Bali II planning. Noordin drew in some Pekalongan-based JI members but the area has otherwise not featured prominently in JI's development. One well-known Pekalongan resident, Said Sungkar, appears regularly on the fringes of the organisation's activity, although he is not believed to be a member. He is known as the "king of honey", which he reportedly supplies to the fast-growing business of Islamic medicine in which many JI members are involved.

²¹ Al-Muttaqien Jepara alumni include Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah, involved in the lead-up to the embassy bombing, released in early March 2007; Abdullah Zaini alias Jessy Panda, Indonesian national arrested in Malaysia and extradited to the Philippines for trial; Mustaghfirin, arrested in an April 2006 police raid in Wonosobo, believed to be in communication with Noordin; Mira Augustina, wife of Omar al-Faruq, the man who escaped Baghram prison in Afghanistan and was shot in Iraq; and the wife of Abdullah Sunata, a top KOMPAK leader. Mas Selamat Kastari, head of the Singapore *wakalah*, sent his child to the school; the sister of David Pintarto, of the Karachi al-Ghuraba group, was studying there in late 2003.

²² Taufik was arrested in December 2003 but released after a few days.

B. SOLO/SURAKARTA

The Solo *wakalah* is by all accounts JI's largest, but there is surprisingly little information on its structure. It is where JI's headquarters were based from 1999 until at least late 2002, and most of the organisation's best-known schools are in its territory, including Pesantren al-Mukmin (Pondok Ngruki) in Ngruki, Sukoharjo, founded by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir; Darusy-Syahada in Boyolali; Ulil al-Bab in Karanganyar; Isykarima in Tawangmangu; and Mahad Aly, also known as Universitas an-Nur in Solo city. The *wakalah* was led in 2002-2004 by Ichsan Miarso, head of al-Alaq publishing, which produces some of JI's key texts, such as the twelve-volume set of Abdullah Azzam's writings. It is not clear who succeeded him.

The *wakalah* reportedly includes a *katibah* in the districts of Solo, Sukoharjo, Klaten, Boyolali, Sragen and Wonogiri. Though the *wakalah* also covers Yogyakarta, where the Indonesian Mujahidin Council is based, JI has never been particularly strong there, perhaps because it was where the salafi movement was based, represented by Ja'far Umar Thalib, one of JI's bitterest opponents.

The schools in the Solo area mean that new members are constantly being added, especially with many second-generation JI members now enrolled. Some of JI's top leaders are associated with these schools. In addition to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, they include his sons, Abdul Rohim and Rosyid; Abdul Rohim alias Abu Husna, the younger brother of former Mantiqi II head Abdullah Anshori alias Abu Fatih, who teaches at Mahad Aly; and Afif Abdul Majid and Mustakim alias Muzayin Atik, two other Ngruki teachers. Zulkarnaen, the near-mythical head of JI military operations, has probably been based in or around Solo for much of the past five years.

Solo appears to be a hub of economic activity as well. The Association of Islamic Publishers (Serikat Penerbit Islam, SPI) brings together at least five publishing houses with links to JI, including al-Alaq and Jazera Press, which published Imam Samudra's best-seller, *Aku Melawan Teroris* [I Fight Terrorists].²³ The publishing houses have a tie-in to Islamic medicine; the outlets that sell the books often market the medicine, mostly herbal capsules and honey-based products. At least one small garment factory also adds to the organisation's income.

Despite the arrests in late March 2007 of key members of a Sukoharjo cell, the release of several top members of the Solo *wakalah* earlier in the year are likely to aid consolidation efforts. They include Herlambang, a man who worked closely with Zulkarnaen; Lutfi Hudaeroh

²³ Others have translated the title as "Me vs. The Terrorists", a more colloquial rendering which seems closer to the author's style.

alias Ubeid, who served as Noordin Moh. Top's courier prior to the Australian embassy bombing; and a close associate of Ubeid's named Bagus Budi Pranoto alias Urwah – who was originally from Kudus and who is described as a preacher in the 1999 document from the Central Java *wakalah*. Ubeid's brother runs an SPI publishing house, with an office across the street from Pondok Ngruki.

If it is true that Solo is the largest *wakalah*, exceeding East Java and Lampung, a membership of over 300 is not unthinkable; some ex-JI members put the number far higher.

C. EAST JAVA

East Java is said to be the third largest *wakalah*. Cholily, an East Java JI member arrested for helping prepare the Bali II bombs, notes that in 2000 a meeting of the *wakalah* in Surabaya was attended by about 100, meaning total membership was certainly larger. As late as 2005, the *wakalah* was divided into six *qirdas*: Malang, Surabaya, Sidoarjo, Tulungagung, Lamongan and Magetan. It had its own charitable foundation, Yayasan Abna'ul Ummah, and several members ran businesses that seemed to contribute to the organisation's financial support, such as a headscarf factory.²⁴ As long as Usman bin Sef alias Fahim, its head through 2004, was in charge, the *wakalah* could be counted on to support Noordin Top's program, and parts of it likely still constitute a support base. Fahim was arrested in June 2004, accused of hiding Noordin, sentenced to three years in prison and released in late 2006.

1. Surabaya

In Surabaya, from at least 1997, JI activities were centred around the Darussalam Institute where Fahim and his successor, Son Hadi, were based, but several Surabaya mosques, notably al-Ikhsan, also hosted regular JI *pengajians*, suggesting the presence of more than one cell.²⁵ Fahim also ran the charitable foundation Abna'ul Ummah, where a few JI members worked. The ease and efficiency with which the *wakalah* heads have been replaced since Fahim's arrest attest to an institutional depth sufficient to

overcome arrests and/or defections of members and permit a degree of regeneration.²⁶ But each successive head has been less experienced than his predecessor, suggesting that the number that can be called on to fill vacancies is dwindling.

2. Malang

The story of JI's Malang base suggests current weakness but also an ability to bounce back. Malang is a university town, and many of the recruits were students who left there when they graduated. One of those involved in the Bali II plot, Abdul Aziz alias Ja'far, began attending a JI *pengajian* with five others in 1994, when he was a student at the National Technical Institute (ITN) in Malang. After a year, the leader of the group invited him to Surabaya, where he was inducted into JI by Fahim. He then took part in a short training course (*dauroh*) after which he was told that he was now a *murobbi* (religious instructor) and should return to Malang to start his own *pengajian* group. In 1997, before he had graduated, he returned to his home town of Pekalongan, Central Java and eventually joined a JI *pengajian* there.²⁷

In 1997, just as Abdul Aziz was getting ready to leave Malang, another student, Cholily, began taking part in a *pengajian* at the state teacher training college there.²⁸ Two years later, he and four others, three of them students at Brawijaya University in Malang, were inducted into JI, also by Fahim.²⁹ The group constituted a *fi'ah* (cell) and reported to Abdul Rozak, head of the *qirdas*, the next level up in the hierarchy. Cholily, who also took part in the planning for Bali II, was arrested in November 2005. He said during his interrogation that the three Brawijaya students moved away after they graduated in 2000 or 2001, and Abdul Rozak left town after the Australian embassy

²⁴ Crisis Group Asia Report N°114, *Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin's Networks*, 5 May 2006.

²⁵ References abound to the importance of the Darussalam Institute (sometimes seen as Darussalam Foundation) to JI in East Java. For examples, see testimony of Machmudi Hariono alias Yoseph Adirima alias Yusuf alias Slamet, 18 July 2003, and testimony of Son Hadi bin Muhadjir, 19 August 2004 in case dossier of Usman bin Sef alias Fahim. Machmudi's training in Mindanao was arranged through this foundation in January 2000.

²⁶ Fahim was arrested in June 2004 and replaced by Son Hadi. Son Hadi was arrested in July 2004 and replaced by Ahmad Basyir. Basyir was arrested in March 2006 and replaced by Ahmad Sahrul, arrested in March 2007.

²⁷ Testimony of Abdul Aziz alias Ja'far, 4 January 2006. The leader of the *pengajian* was Fahmi Himawan, then secretary of the Malang *katibah*. The *dauroh* instructors were Qital, Son Hadi, Salman and Abu Fida, all senior figures in the *wakalah*.

²⁸ These colleges were called IKIP (the Indonesian acronym for Institute for Teacher Training and Education) until 1999; they then were designated "state universities". IKIP Malang, now the State University in Malang, is one of the best in the country.

²⁹ Testimony of Moh Cholily alias Hanif alias Yahya Antony, 16 November 2005 in case dossier of Cholily, pp. 3-4. Munfiatun, the woman who married Noordin Moh Top in mid-2004, had been a student at Brawijaya University, where she was a classmate of the future wife of Achmad Hasan, another East Java JI member. The women may also have been involved in JI activities in Malang.

bombing in September 2004, leaving Cholily as the only JI member in Malang.³⁰

But this is highly unlikely. He may not have known about other cells but there were probably at least two or three others. Abdul Aziz refers to Ahmad alias Abu Hadid, and Fahi Himawan as the head and secretary of the Malang *katibah*, and Cholily mentions Abdul Rozak as the head of the Malang *qirdas*. JI would be unlikely to have a *katibah* structure with only one *qirdas*, which in turn had only one *fi'ah*. The real figure in Malang may have been closer to ten, but it is also possible that Cholily's arrest put a temporary halt to activities.

In trying to assess JI's current strength in East Java, one consideration is the extent to which recruiting continues in Malang's colleges and universities. It was clearly productive in the past but aggressive campus recruiting by PKS and Hizb ut-Tahrir may have diminished the scope for JI, which has never had very much success in the university community outside Solo and Malang.

3. Lamongan

Lamongan is an important component of the East Java *wakalah*, in part because it is home to two JI-affiliated schools, Pesantren al-Ikhlâs in Paciran and Pesantren al-Islam, the home base of Bali I bombers Amrozi, Mukhlâs and Ali Imron. Al-Islam is a place where some senior JI leaders have taught, sent their children or found their wives. Ali Imron and Mukhlâs may be competing for influence there from their places of detention. A series of cassette tapes of Mukhlâs's jihadist teachings, recorded while he was in Kerobokan prison in Bali, probably around early 2005, were produced and marketed in Lamongan. Mukhlâs has since been moved to a prison on Nusakambangan, off the south coast of Java, where security is said to be tighter, but communication with the outside still takes place. At the same time, Ali Imron, the "repentant bomber", has been quietly trying to persuade fellow detainees, and colleagues at al-Islam, that the thrust of his brother's arguments is wrong, and there is no religious justification for attacks on civilians who have not themselves attacked Muslims.

If Ali Imron's thinking prevails, it might help reduce the militancy of the East Java *wakalah*. But paradoxically, it might also aid JI's reconsolidation efforts by bringing al-Islam into line with the anti-Noordin approach of the JI mainstream.

4. Released Prisoners

The East Java *wakalah* has seen a number of its top leaders arrested, most for assisting Noordin Top and his late partner, Azhari Husin, to hide from police. But because most of those caught were not directly involved in violence, their sentences were relatively light and many have been released. These include:

- ❑ Usman bin Sef alias Fahim, from Surabaya, former head of the East Java *wakalah*, who helped hide Noordin;
- ❑ Syaifudin Umar alias Abu Fida, from Surabaya, a religious teacher;
- ❑ Adi Suryana alias Qital, from Surabaya, an Afghan and Mindanao veteran involved in the 2003 special forces training;
- ❑ Ashari Dipo Kusuma, from Lamongan, a teacher at al-Ikhlâs who helped hide arms after Bali I; and
- ❑ Yudi Lukito Kurniawan alias Ismail, from Surabaya, a Mindanao veteran.

Son Hadi, Fahim's successor as *wakalah* head, is due for release soon.

All former prisoners will be under some form of surveillance, at least for a while, and may not want or be able to resume their former activities. But loyalty to the organisation whose leaders they are sworn to obey may trump any other consideration; no one should assume released prisoners will shy from efforts to bring JI back to organisational health.

D. JAKARTA

In 1999, the *wakalah* for the greater Jakarta area had about 100 members, divided between two *katibah*, one in Bekasi, one in the capital; those *katibah* still existed in early 2004.³¹ Some JI members left to join Khilafatul Muslimin, a non-violent Lampung-based group working for restoration of the caliphate that has a Bekasi branch; at the height of the Ambon and Poso conflicts, others may have left to join KOMPAK. Recruiting continued, however, and the net loss, at least through 2004, may not have been significant. Arrests in 2003 included a few members of the *wakalah*'s ten-person military unit, including its head, Ahmad Sofyan alias Tamim, now released, but not enough to disrupt the structure. Since Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's June

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 46-47.

³¹ Testimony of Muhaimin Yahya alias Zaid in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, 30 March 2004; and chart prepared by Indonesian police on structure of *wakalah* Jabotabek circa 2003 in case dossier of Lutfi Fadillah.

2006 release, activities in the Bekasi area have intensified, particularly large rallies (*tabligh akbar*) at the al-Azhar mosque in Kalimalang, but it is not clear these necessarily benefit JI. The Jakarta leadership from the outset has emphatically opposed Noordin Top's activities. No one from this *wakalah*, for example, helped the Australian embassy bombing; that Noordin had to go outside the JI structure to find field operatives is testament to the lack of cooperation in Jakarta.³²

E. WEST JAVA

JI never developed the strength in West Java as elsewhere in Java, in part because of the presence of jihadi groups with a solid local base. In Bandung, with some of the country's premier universities, JI seems to have lost out among students to PKS and other organisations. In the Banten and Sukabumi areas, the Darul Islam splinter group, Ring Banten, predominates. JI's influence is strongest near the Central Java border, in part because of its schools in the Cirebon-Indramayu area. One of the most important – Pondok al-Hussein in Jatibarang, Indramayu – was established by Muhammadiyah, the eminently respectable, nationwide Muslim modernist organisation with several million members. After being taken over in effect by JI *ustadz*, it was recovered by Muhammadiyah in 2004, and the JI teachers moved to the smaller Nurul Hadid school in Cirebon.³³ An al-Hussein teacher set up a small *pondok* of his own with about ten students elsewhere in Jatibarang. Pesantren al-Muttaqien, in Gronggong, Cirebon (not to be confused with the school of the same name in Jepara), is another JI-affiliate in the area, with its own network of members. Without the schools, JI membership in West Java would be negligible, but it could reach 40 to 50. In 2003, the head of the West Java *wakalah* was Abdul Gofar, a teacher at al-Muttaqien.

³² See Crisis Group Report, *Terrorism in Indonesia*, op. cit.

³³ Al-Hussein had been at Muhammadiyah school and gradually became "infected" by salafi jihadist doctrine. The local Muhammadiyah organisation became concerned, and in a process which probably deserves close study, reasserted control over the school in 2004, forcing out some of the hardline teachers. The al-Hussein alumni network remains strong, however, as witnessed by some of the recent arrests. Salahudin al-Ayubi, arrested in the Wonosobo raid of 28 April 2006, was a teacher there at the same time as Maulana Yusuf Wibisono, arrested in late March 2007 in Surabaya. One of their students, Saiful Anam alias Mujadid alias Brekele, became a mujahid in Poso and is suspected of involvement in the bombing of the Tentena market in May 2005 that killed 22 people. Lutfi Hudaeroh alias Ubeid conducted occasional *dauroh* (training sessions) at al-Hussein, and a participant in one of those sessions was Salik Firdaus, a Bali II suicide bomber.

F. LAMPUNG

Lampung has been a JI stronghold from the beginning, just as it was a Darul Islam base earlier, but very little is known about its activities.³⁴ The most complete account comes from the interrogation deposition of a witness at Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's second trial. Utomo alias Abu Faruk alias Zakir, an East Java native and Afghan veteran, served as *wakalah* head from 1997 at least through 2004, when he testified, and perhaps to this day. Utomo's ties are to Abu Rusdan and those most associated with the non-bombing faction of JI.³⁵ The Lampung *wakalah* had five *qirdas* in Rajabasa and Telukbetung (Bandar Lampung); Gedung Tataan and Kalianda (south Lampung) and Metro (central Lampung), with a total membership in 2004 of about 150.³⁶ He said JI's public identity was as the *pengajian* group in the al-Mabrur Mosque in Way Lunik Panjang. Nothing in Utomo's testimony suggests a major decline after Bali I or even the Marriott bombings, in which several Sumatra-based JI members were implicated.

JI has at least two affiliated schools in Lampung and probably more. Pesantren Ulul Albab in Sukarame, Bandar Lampung, is headed by Agus Supriyadi, a Saudi-trained scholar of Islamic law; he is mentioned by another JI-Lampung official as attending a meeting of all *wakalahs* in Mantiqi II in Puncak, Bogor in August 2000.³⁷ The school is highly reputable and Agus Supriyadi himself a popular preacher. In October 2006, the local newspaper, *Radar Lampung*, featured a whole page on a social event during Ramadan when hundreds of the newspaper's sales agents from around Lampung gathered to break the fast and turned over a cheque to Agus Supriyadi to assist in strengthening religious education at Ulul Albab.³⁸ A second school is al-Muhsin in Metro, central Lampung.

At least three *wakalah* members have Mindanao training. In early 2003 they were sent to Java as prospective members of a Mantiqi II special forces unit. One, Samuri Farich Mustofa, a Klaten, Central Java native, led the *wakalah's* military unit. He was arrested in Java in June 2003 and served just over two years of a three-year sentence.

³⁴ See Crisis Group Report, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia*, op. cit., for a discussion of the importance of Lampung.

³⁵ Utomo alias Abu Faruk joined Darul Islam in 1985 at the invitation of Abdullah Anshori alias Abu Fatih. He went to Afghanistan in 1986, in the same group as Abu Rusdan, who appears to have remained a close friend. In 1995, he met Abu Rusdan in Kudus and agreed to join JI. Testimony of Utomo alias Abu Faruk, 12 April 2004 in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, pp. 2-3.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 6.

³⁷ Testimony of Samuri Farich Mushofa alias Ari alias Arman, 13 April 2004, in case dossier of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, p. 8.

³⁸ "Karyawan Radar Group, Agen, dan Pengecer Buka Puasa Bersama", *Radar Lampung*, 15 October 2006.

G. NORTHERN SUMATRA

In 2003, at the time of the Marriott bombing, the northern Sumatra *wakalah* was based in Medan, headed by Abu Hanifah (a Mindanao veteran from the same graduating class at Ngruki as Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, a legendary Indonesian JI operative who escaped from a maximum security prison in Manila only to be tracked down and killed in Mindanao in October 2003), and had three *qirdas*, in Banda Aceh, Medan and Tapanuli respectively. The Aceh *qirdas* had four cells in Samahani and Saree, Aceh Besar; Takengon, Central Aceh; and Kuala Simpang, Aceh Tamiang. The seven cells under the Medan *qirdas* were in Padang Bulan; Labuhan; Stabat on the Aceh border; Tanjung Kenas, Deli Serdang; Kotacane; Pematang Siantar; and Kabanjahe. The Tapanuli *qirdas* included cells in Batang Toru, Lumut, Sipirok and Natal.³⁹

Little is known about any of these cells or whether they still exist, although Abu Hanifah is believed to remain the *wakalah* head. Most of those in Tapanuli and the Medan area are likely to have some link back to Ngruki. One of the men sentenced in the Marriott bombing, Masrizal alias Tohir, went to high school in Sipirok, Tapanuli in 1989, then transferred to Ngruki in 1990; that same year, a Ngruki graduate was assigned to undertake religious outreach in Sipirok, and several of his fellow students followed suit. Toni Togar alias Indrawarman, from the Medan-based *wakalah* involved in the first JI bombing on Indonesian soil in May 2000 as well as other operations, graduated from Ngruki the same year that Masrizal entered. A Ngruki yearbook from 1995 that shows where some alumni were assigned for postgraduate practice teaching lists Pesantren Salman al-Farisi in Tanjung Harapan, in what used to be Deli Serdang, as a destination for several graduates.⁴⁰

Stabat, where another of the north Sumateran JI cells was based, is interesting because the siblings of several leading JI members attended *pesantrens* there. Muhamad Ikhwan alias Ismail, who helped in the planning of the Marriott bombing and whose family was based in Dumai, had a brother and sister at a *pesantren* (not named) in Stabat, while another brother attended Pesantren al-Islam in Lamongan. Likewise David Pintarto, a member of the al-Ghuraba group in Karachi and whose siblings also seemed drawn to JI schools, had a sister at Pesantren Ibdurrohman in Stabat. If a JI cell continues to function there, it is likely to be *pesantren*-based.

The Aceh cells are particularly noteworthy because so few Acehnese ever joined JI. One reason is that many who had been involved in Darul Islam chose to join the more secular GAM in 1976; those who remained loyal to Darul Islam were by definition anti-GAM and thus more likely to be pro-government. One of the few who went to Afghanistan with other Java-based Darul Islam recruits and became a JI member in 1993 was Raja Husein alias Marzuki, now reportedly based in Lampung and actively preaching against the Noordin-Mukhlas line. An Acehnese named Muntohar appears on the lists of JI trainees in Mindanao in 1999 but his whereabouts are unknown.

Given the sketchy information about cells in north Sumatra and Aceh, it is almost impossible to estimate numbers. One can assume that the total would be well below Lampung, which was traditionally more of a base. At a minimum of three persons per cell and with fifteen cells in 2003 and an administrative structure in Medan, a current total around 40 would be a conservative guess. Some individuals may have left but there is also likely to have been some new recruiting, so there is no reason to believe that the number has fallen substantially below the 2003 total.

H. CENTRAL SUMATRA

Pekanbaru is the base for the Central Sumatra *wakalah*, headed by Paiman Achmad as of 2003. Building on a long-established Darul Islam base, it almost certainly had cells in Dumai, Batam, Bukittinggi, Padang Panjang and Bengkulu, among other places, but we have no specifics on its *qirdas* or *fi'ah*. Several Riau-based JI members were drawn into the Marriott operation, in part because they had ties to JI's Pesantren Lukmanul Hakiem in Johor, Malaysia and knew Noordin Moh Top directly.⁴¹ Because Abu Dujana, the man near the top of Indonesia's most wanted list today, also taught for years at Lukmanul Hakiem, the central Sumatra *wakalah* probably deserves more scrutiny than it may be receiving.

The *wakalah* has been in existence since the mid-1990s. Masrizal alias Tohir notes that after he was inducted into JI at Pondok Ngruki around 1994, he was introduced to Paiman Achmad as the *wakalah* head for central Sumatra. After graduating, Masrizal was sent back to Riau to work with Paiman as a *da'i* (preacher) for the *wakalah*.⁴²

³⁹ "Organisational Structure of Jama'ah Islamiyyah", police diagram, in case dossier of Solihin alias Rofi, 2003.

⁴⁰ Panca Jiwa Pondok (a yearbook for alumni of Pesantren al-Mukmin's teacher training program), 1995. Deli Serdang was split into two new districts in 2003 and the *pesantren* is now in the district of Serdang Bedagai.

⁴¹ See Crisis Group Report, *Terrorism in Indonesia*, op. cit.

⁴² Testimony of Masrizal bin Ali Umar alias Tahir, 17 April 2004. He went to Mindanao for training in 1998-1999, then taught at Lukmanul Hakiem in Johor for two years.

I. WEST NUSA TENGGARA

JI has long had a presence in East Lombok, with a few Ngruki alumni in western Sumbawa and eastern Flores. In 2003, the head of the Nusrat (Nusa Tenggara Barat) *wakalah* was Abdullah alias Yazid, and there is no reason to believe this has changed. JI has periodically done military training in Korleko, east Lombok, the area where Abu Jibril, a close associate of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, was born.⁴³ JI-affiliated schools in the *wakalah* include Pondok Pesantren Hasan Al-Banna (now Pesantren Ibnu Masud) and one in Dompu, Sumbawa. It is known that some efforts to recruit students from universities in Mataram have been made through a campus-based *dakwah* program.

In April 2006, a Singapore JI member, Mohamed Abdul Rashid bin Zainul Abidin, was arrested in Tongo, Sekongkang, West Sumbawa, where he had been quietly teaching in a *pesantren* after fleeing Singapore in December 2001.

There is no information on the *qirdas* or *fi'ah* in eastern Indonesia but total membership may be less than 25.

J. CENTRAL SULAWESI

JI had one *wakalah* in Central Sulawesi before the first Bali bombs and added two in late 2002, one in Poso and one in Pendolo, near the border with south Sulawesi. As

noted above, these fell under Mantiqi III, a structure which may no longer exist.⁴⁴

We know the most about Palu, from documents found in 2003. At the time, there were three *qirdas*, each with two *fi'ah*, for a total membership of 45, not counting the *wakalah* command structure overseeing it all (probably at least another five).⁴⁵ In April 2003, a few top leaders were arrested for harbouring JI colleagues fleeing Java in the aftermath of the Bali bombs; two, Firmansyah and Nizam Khaleb, were released in early 2007. The arrests were a body blow but recruitment reportedly shifted to the prison where those leaders were detained. Further arrests took place in May 2006 and early 2007, netting a man named Abdul Mu'is, responsible for the assassination of a senior Protestant leader in Palu in October 2006 and information about others. These arrests may have shaken the organisation again but there is no reason to believe the Palu *wakalah* has dissolved.

The Poso *wakalah* is a different story. Under the leadership of Hasanuddin, sentenced in March 2007 to twenty years in prison for masterminding the beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls, it actually grew between late 2002, when he was appointed, and early 2006, when he was arrested. A steady stream of *ustadz* from Java, who held religious study sessions across Poso and neighbouring districts, brought in new recruits. Based at a *pesantren* in the Tanah Runtuh complex in the Gebangrejo neighborhood of Poso, the *wakalah* was almost certainly larger than Palu's, particularly because JI saw Poso as having potential to become a secure base for establishment and expansion of an Islamic community.⁴⁶ Those opposed to bombings of Western targets saw violence in Poso as serving the purpose of establishing that base, playing on the deep sense of injustice among Poso Muslims and other grievances left over from the conflict.

The January 2007 raids by the counter-terror police may well have smashed the Poso operation, especially because it relied so heavily on Javanese who have since fled the area – and because the religious indoctrination by those

⁴³ Fihiruddin Moqthie bin Abdul Rahman alias Abu Jibril was born in Tirpas-Selong village, East Lombok on 17 August 1957. As a student he was active in the Kolombo Mosque, Yogyakarta in the 1980s. He helped Ba'asyir and Sungkar organise small study groups (*usroh*) committed to living by Islamic law in Jakarta in 1984 and 1985. In 1986 he fled to Malaysia, where he joined Sungkar and was active in recruiting JI members in Singapore and Malaysia. He trained in Afghanistan briefly and helped organise mujahidin to fight in North Maluku in 2000-2001. He was also believed to have helped organise JI's al-Ghuraba cell in Karachi, Pakistan, in which his son was involved. Abu Jibril was arrested and detained in Malaysia on 30 June 2001. Released and deported to Indonesia in May 2004, he was detained on arrival and released on 27 October 2004 after serving a five-and-a-half month sentence on immigration and forgery charges. On 8 June 2005, his house in Pamulang, Banten, West Java was searched after a small bomb exploded harmlessly in his yard; most people believed the bomb was planted as an excuse for the search. Abu Jibril's son now runs the ar-Rahmah Media company; his brother, Irfan Awwas, is secretary of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), an organisation committed to the establishment of Islamic law that has been misleadingly described as JI's political front. While some JI members are involved, most notably Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who heads it, many in JI were unhappy with its establishment and shun any association with it.

⁴⁴ Some media accounts based on interviews with police suggest that Mantiqi III is intact and led by Agus Idris. While there is no question that he is the senior JI figure in Central Sulawesi (or was until he fled the area after police operations in January 2007), the transit routes through Malaysia and the main JI training camps in Mindanao have been sufficiently disrupted to raise serious questions about the utility of keeping Sulawesi in the same division as Sabah and the southern Philippines.

⁴⁵ Qirdas Abu Bakar Assidiq had two leaders and two seven-man cells; Qirdas Umar bin Khattab had three leaders, and two cells with three and four men respectively; Qirdas Utsman bin Afan had five leaders and two seven-man cells.

⁴⁶ Crisis Group Report, *Jihad in Central Sulawesi*, op. cit.

ustadz does not seem to have sunk in very deeply among many of the young local recruits. But because the old grievances remain, the possibility of new recruitment or re-recruitment in the area will remain and Poso should not be written off as solved.

The much smaller *wakalah* in Pendolo included the town of Palopo in south Sulawesi within its ambit but was probably no more than ten people. A key member, Mujadid alias Brekele, was arrested in central Java in March 2007; his capture may lead to the arrest of others and perhaps the dismantling of the Pendolo structure.

If one estimates the three central Sulawesi *wakalahs* had a combined total of well over 100 people in 2003 and probably more by 2005, the combination of deaths, arrests and flight in late 2006-early 2007 has probably only temporarily stilled activities. With tensions created by post-conflict problems, decentralisation and corruption, this area deserves ongoing attention.

K. EAST KALIMANTAN

The East Kalimantan coast, from Samarinda through Takaran, Nunukan and the Malaysian port town of Tawau in Sabah, has had a small JI presence and a larger support network since the mid-1990s, which grew substantially during the conflict in Poso. East Kalimantan was also a major route for Indonesians going through Sabah to Mindanao for military training, although two non-JI organisations, KOMPAK and Darul Islam, had their own networks up the coast. This area probably contributes ten to fifteen people to overall JI strength but to Crisis Group's knowledge it has never had a *wakalah* as such.

L. THE PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA AND BEYOND

The JI structure in the Philippines is murky but new information reinforces previous Crisis Group analysis that the mainstream JI members who ran the Hudaibiyah *wakalah* under Mantiqi III and whose primary alliance was to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have little to do with the "fugitives" working with the Abu Sayyaf Group.⁴⁷ The latter, about nine in all, includes two JI men with major U.S. government bounties on their heads, Dulmatin and Umar Patek; Asep alias Darwin, who fled to Mindanao after the 2001 Atrium Mall bomb in Jakarta; and a few KOMPAK people, including Dulmatin's brother-in-law, Hari Kuncoro. All went to the Philippines not for training or to help build a JI structure there but rather to escape justice for acts of violence in Indonesia. A Malaysian, Zulkifli bin Hir alias

Marwan, also wanted by the U.S., was once a part of that group but is reportedly no longer with it.

A dozen or more "structural" JI members, active in the *wakalah* or who went for training and could not find a way back, are reportedly under MILF protection but inactive – the MILF's price for sheltering them as it negotiates with the Philippines government and tries to avoid the stigma of terrorist links. They are reportedly under strict orders not to engage in any violence and are considered integrated with MILF forces. The MILF is serious enough at the most senior levels about rejecting terrorism that it reportedly has provided information on the whereabouts of the "fugitives" to Philippines authorities.

Not much is known about the remnants of the JI *wakalah* in Sandakan, Sabah, which was an important way station for Indonesians, Malaysians and Singaporeans going to Mindanao. Two Darul Islam streams also had bases in Sabah and together controlled another route to the Philippines.⁴⁸

The JI structures in two other countries, Singapore and Australia, seem to have been effectively smashed in late 2001 and late 2002 respectively.⁴⁹

M. UP OR DOWN?

Altogether then, the most conservative estimate of JI strength would put it around 900. This would be less than half the estimated strength of Mantiqi II in 1999, when the Central Java *wakalah* estimated inducted members at 2,000 with a support base of 5,000, and it may be low.⁵⁰ That does not mean that there are 900 ready to engage in terrorism, and there are undoubtedly multiple factions even within the mainstream that disagrees with Noordin Top. But the induction ceremony and stress on loyalty do mean many members are likely to follow their leaders' instructions, particularly if there is a strong religious

⁴⁸ One of the Indonesians arrested in the March 2007 raids – Amir Achmadi from Sukoharjo, Solo – had recently returned from Sarawak, according to press reports, more pious than he had left. It may be a fact of no consequence but it does underscore that no one has looked very closely at West Kalimantan or Sarawak as sources of radical activity.

⁴⁹ Singapore had been part of Mantiqi I but after the wave of arrests in late 2001 and heightened vigilance since, there is no reason to believe that any structure remains. Australia was known as "the other mantiqi", sometimes referred to as "Mantiqi IV", and was home to about 30 JI members, but as a result of raids by Australian authorities and the return of the reported leader, Abdul Rahim Ayub, to Indonesia in October 2002, JI ceased to have any organised presence there. Other jihadist groups, however, periodically surfaced.

⁵⁰ "Laporan Perkembangan Da'wah wal Irsyad", op. cit.

⁴⁷ See Crisis Group Report, *Terrorism in Indonesia*, op. cit.

rationale; identifying and assessing the ideological orientation and intentions of the leaders is, therefore, crucial. In the medium term, the JI security threat in Indonesia is likely to be at least as high – probably higher – for Indonesian officials (especially police and prosecutors) and symbolic non-Muslim targets than for Western interests. Remembering that violence in Poso served JI's organisational interests, it is important to watch for areas of communal tension, such as those thrown up by *pemekaran*, the decentralisation-driven carving up of the country into new provinces, districts and subdistricts.

IV. BEYOND JI: A CHECKLIST

JI has never been the only organisation in Indonesia influenced by the ideology of salafi jihadism. Others include:

- Noordin's group, which he has variously called Anshar el-Muslimin, Thoifah Muqotilah, and al-Qaeda for the Malay archipelago (Tanzim Qoedatul-Jihad Untuk Gugusan Kepulauan Melayu). It is the only group in Indonesia at present which self-consciously follows the al-Qaeda line. The Bali bombers, Aly Ghufron alias Mukhlas and Imam Samudra, continue to exert an influence through their writings, and it probably retains some sympathy in more militant JI circles. But we are likely talking about a handful of people, and if Noordin attempted no attack in 2006, it may be that he is being protected by JI at the price of no bombings. That said, the exact nature of the relationship JI leaders like Nuaim and Abu Dujama have with Noordin is not clear, and there may be other factors at play.
- Ring Banten, the Darul Islam splinter based in West Java that worked with Noordin on the Australian Embassy bombing. Kang Jaja, the group's leader, is known to have been protected by Hasanuddin, head of the Poso *wakalah*, in 2004; he now may be back in Java. Family, business and regional loyalties among members help keep the group intact, and there is almost certainly regular communication with JI. (One Ring Banten member, now detained, started a group in Kemayoran, Jakarta that continues to meet and seems to bring together a few dozen alumni of the JI school, Darusy-Syahada.)
- Mujahidin KOMPAK, the loose network of KOMPAK-funded veterans of the Ambon and Poso conflicts. The group has no organisational structure but a few text messages or mobile phone calls can quickly bring a dozen or so men together. Its affiliate in Poso, Mujahidin Kayamanya, is apparently trying to rebuild after being decimated by arrests. It is

virulently anti-Christian, particularly interested in exploiting local communal conflict and continues to have at least a handful of members in Mindanao.

- Jama'ah Tauhid wal Jihad, based in Bandung. It was founded by Aman Abdurahman alias Abu Sulaiman, a salafi imam arrested in March 2004 for leading a bomb-making class in Cimanggis (Depok), outside Jakarta. At the time few had heard of him but his excellent Arabic language skills put him in demand as a translator of jihadist tracts by the Jordanian al-Maqdisi and Egyptians Aiman Zawaheri, Abdul Qadir bin Abdul Aziz and others. These are now being published by JI-linked publishers in Solo and Jakarta. His group was originally called al-Muwahidun and seemed to have some links to Darul Islam and Ring Banten through an Ambon and Poso veteran, Nazaruddin Muchtar alias Harun, arrested for involvement in the May 2005 attack on police in Loki, West Ceram, Maluku. The name change may have been around 2005. Website material overlaps that on Noordin-linked sites and focuses heavily on *thoghut* governments as the main enemy of Islam.
- Small cells with no organisational affiliation. A November 2006 bombing in Jakarta at an A&W fast food restaurant is often overlooked, as it caused no serious damage and injured only the bomber, Muhammed Nuh, now on trial in Jakarta. But it is significant precisely because Nuh appears to have become committed to suicide bombing from his readings and internet browsing. Manuals with step-by-step instruction on how to form jihad cells have been circulating for two years. One, "*Serial Jihad IV*", referred to above, may be a translation from an article in *Sawt al-Jihad*, the online al-Qaeda magazine. A second, "*Sel Tauhid*" (Tauhid Cell) is translated from Arabic, and its author appears to be Syrian. It reflects the basic thinking of the Spanish-Syrian jihadi intellectual, Abu Musab al-Suri, that a war against the U.S. and its allies is best conducted by autonomous cells working toward the same goal.⁵¹

The importance of these groups is that they may be able to attract experienced jihadis unhappy with the JI mainstream, thereby adding depth and professionalism to what otherwise would be fairly amateur efforts. If Subur Sugiarto could bring one JI cell over to Noordin in early 2005 and form two others by August 2005 in the lead-up to Bali II, it suggests recruitment is not that difficult.

⁵¹ Craig Whitlock, "Architect of New War on the West", *The Washington Post*, 23 May 2006. Al-Suri, whose real name is Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, is currently in U.S. custody.

V. CONCLUSION

We will have to wait for more arrests and more information from those detained in March for definitive answers to questions about JI's current status. It is resilient but not invulnerable, and while it continues to recruit, the organisation as a whole may be shrinking. People have left for different reasons. In some cases, like Subur Sugiarto's, it may be because a more militant wing finds JI too cautious and bureaucratic. Others, particularly released prisoners, may be co-opted, if only temporarily, by government officials hoping to infiltrate and divide the organisation. One alumnus of a JI *pesantren* said that he realised he had graduated with no useful skills, and the only occupation open to him, outside petty trade, was teaching in another JI school. If schools are critical to JI's regeneration, then dissatisfaction with restrictions inside and opportunities outside may ultimately do more damage to the group than arrests.

The Indonesian police get high marks for their work in identifying and tracking down criminals. Now the government needs to pay much more attention to prisons: what goes on inside, communications with the outside, visitors and the materials they bring in. More attention to pre- and post-release programs is required. The creation of a "super-maximum" security prison is not the answer to halting terrorism as long as many prison officials are corruptible or simply inadequately informed about their inmates. Indeed, if all prisoners accused of terrorism are locked up together, under current circumstances many are likely to emerge more radical than when they went in. It is not only because prisons are poorly managed; it is also because many people charged under the terrorism law are not hardcore ideologues but young men who could benefit from a structured rehabilitation and work-release program. The last thing Indonesia needs is for these men to be exposed in prison to the likes of the Bali I bombers.

Ji reaches from one end of the Indonesian archipelago to the other and has a proven capacity to adapt and regenerate. There is nothing to suggest that it is growing but its roots run deep. JI and its various splinters and mutations will continue to be a security threat for the foreseeable future.

Jakarta/Brussels, 3 May 2007