

EU CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES: AN UPDATE

I. OVERVIEW

In June 2001, ICG published a first report on EU crisis response capabilities,¹ which presented a snapshot of the institutions, policies and processes for conflict prevention and crisis management as they stood at mid 2001. It described the respective roles in external relations matters of the three key EU institutions, Council, Commission and Parliament, and the evolving machinery for implementing more coordinated strategies in the formulation of general policy positions, conflict prevention and conflict management.

With the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) still very much at the "work in progress" stage, the report drew attention to a series of evident problems in the EU's crisis response capability, among them the Union's manifest difficulty in successfully lining up the whole range of its external policy instruments in support of clear and unified political strategies. The report also suggested a number of ways forward, including the strengthening of tools at the cutting edge spectrum of conflict prevention and crisis management, as opposed to long-term peacebuilding efforts through aid and trade.

This briefing paper is an update, ten months on, of that ICG report. While no basic changes have occurred to the formal organisational machinery – as set out in the charts in the Appendices² – there has been since mid 2001 a significant increase in EU activity, mainly in the context of the response to terrorism post-11 September, and some further

evolution of process, particularly in the context of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) being declared operational.

This briefing summarises these various developments, and outlines the issues that remain to be resolved if the EU, as a collective entity, is to become a fully effective player on the international foreign and security policy stage. ICG will continue to maintain a watching brief on the EU's capability, and will return periodically to these issues in future reports and briefing papers.

II. POLICY COORDINATION GENERALLY: THE EU RESPONSE TO 11 SEPTEMBER

A. OVERALL RESPONSE

In a pace of response almost unprecedented within the EU, foreign ministers convened an emergency meeting the day after the terror attacks on New York and Washington to coordinate reactions, send a high-level delegation to Washington and prepare an extraordinary summit of EU heads of state on the threat of international terrorism. The summit, which took place in Brussels on 21 September 2001 under the auspices of the Belgian EU Presidency, announced that:

The European Council has decided that the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union....Moreover, the Union categorically rejects an equation of groups of fanatical terrorists with the Arab and Muslim world. The European Council reaffirms its firm

¹ ICG Issues Report No. 2, *EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management*, 26 June 2001.

² These charts reproduce, with minor modifications, Figures 2, 3 and 4 in the June 2001 report, op. cit.

determination to act in concert in all circumstances.³

The threat to both internal and external security posed by terrorism has rightly been stressed as a particular challenge for EU institutions that are often criticised for the incoherence of their complex arrangements. In their conclusions, the heads of state noted that the EU “will step up its action against terrorism through a coordinated and interdisciplinary approach embracing all Union policies”.⁴ For this purpose, a Plan of Action was adopted, which defined over 60 discrete objectives in the fight against terrorism, covering foreign policy, judicial cooperation, home affairs, and economic and financial policy. Each objective was matched by the identification of lead implementing bodies and clear timelines.⁵

EU responses to the newly dramatised threat of terrorism have included:⁶

Internal policy – the home front

Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)

Police and judicial cooperation, freezing of terrorist assets, common definition of terrorist crimes, common arrest warrant.

Civil protection

Measures to protect EU citizens in the event of biological, chemical or nuclear attacks.

External policy – contributing to the international coalition against terrorism

i) Direct: Military contributions to the war in Afghanistan; and Diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, and West and Central Asia.

ii) Indirect: Targeting the root causes of terrorism through EU aid and trade instruments.

So far as internal policy is concerned, most EU officials stress the achievements in Justice and Home Affairs, an area in which the EU also gets high marks from the U.S. over the last half-year.⁷ New measures such as the EU-wide definition of terrorist crimes⁸ and the common arrest warrant facilitating extradition procedures (not in force yet but close) represent concrete progress. Languishing in the pipeline for many months, these initiatives were pushed through with a new sense of urgency after 11 September and heralded as triumphs by the European Council in Laeken in December 2001.⁹

³ Conclusions of the Extraordinary European Council, 21 September 2001.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ The complete road map for the implementation of the Action Plan is reproduced in an accessible manner in Peter Ludlow, *A View from Brussels*, No. 14, op. cit., Annex II.

⁶ For more detail and excellent commentary, see ISIS Europe, *European Security Review*, No. 8, October 2001 (www.isis-europe.org).

⁷ ICG interviews with officials at the U.S. Mission to the European Union, November 2001 and April 2002.

⁸ See Official Journal C 332 E, 27 November 2001.

⁹ Italy's last-minute withdrawal of support presented a controversial obstacle to the common arrest warrant. Rome objected that the proposal ran counter to civil liberties, but many commentators believed the real concern was that the new instrument could cause complications if criminal charges were brought against senior political figures. The difficulty was compromised a few days before the Laeken Summit. Italy now needs to make constitutional changes to allow for the incorporation of the warrant into national law.

B. EXTERNAL POLICY RESPONSES

It is more difficult to gauge the impact of EU measures in the field of external policy, which is the chief concern of this paper. The scale of such measures is larger, and there is inherently less visible correlation between outputs and outcomes. There is also an element of incoherence to some of the actions that shows a common European foreign policy is still a work in progress despite an increasingly convergent analysis of priorities and problems.

1. Afghanistan

The EU played an important facilitative role, though generally just off centre stage, at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, which forged an agreement for an interim Afghan government among fractious anti-Taliban political groupings. An EU Special Representative, former NATO Assistant Secretary-General Klaus Klaiber, was subsequently dispatched to Kabul to coordinate the Union's humanitarian assistance,¹⁰ rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. The EU also organised and hosted a preparatory donors conference for Afghanistan in Brussels on 21 December, and became the country's largest donor (2.3 billion Euros over the period 2002-2006, which represents 25 per cent of total international pledges) at the Tokyo pledging conference in January 2002. As a civilian power, therefore, the EU reacted promptly and resolutely to the Afghan crisis.

The EU, as distinct from a number of its member states (most notably the UK), did not, however, play a military role in management of the Afghan crisis. By the time EU heads of state met in Laeken in December 2001, there had been some debate on EU participation in the international security force (ISAF) stipulated by the Bonn Agreement, for which the UK had been designated as lead nation. According to an account by an EU insider,¹¹ it was the Belgian Premier, Guy Verhofstadt, who suggested at Laeken that, since most EU member states would likely contribute to ISAF, the intervention could be cast as an EU action.

Comments by Belgian foreign minister Louis Michel at a press conference later that day (14 December 2001) were overly enthusiastic, however, causing the media to speculate that an "EU army" would be sent to Afghanistan. The reaction of the British media was particularly strident, leading Tony Blair to observe that some papers were suggesting "Belgians would be in charge of the British army".¹² EU heads of state quickly cut back their rhetoric, concluding that there could be no joint EU crisis management presence in Afghanistan. The conclusions of the Laeken Council, nevertheless, urged individual member states to "examine their contributions to [the ISAF] force" and, by engaging in this way, send a "strong signal of their resolve to better assume their crisis management responsibilities and hence help stabilise Afghanistan".

Thirteen EU member states¹³ did contribute troops to the 5,000-strong, eighteen-nation ISAF force, including, significantly, Germany, which after 11 September took another major step in its willingness to send troops abroad in peacekeeping-like situations. The future of ISAF is uncertain, however. The U.S., which, of course, has made the major contribution to the overall military effort in Afghanistan, is blocking the extension of both its size and mandate. Despite widespread unofficial appreciation of the risks to international policy in the country if the ISAF security blanket is not extended beyond the narrow confines of Kabul – including, reportedly, pleas from Klaiber – the UK, Germany and other EU member states have refused to challenge Washington or take independent action. London and Berlin have instead officially cited 'overstretch', to justify their own unwillingness to commit additional troops. There is still, therefore, marked reluctance on the part of EU member states to take military crisis management responsibilities commensurate to the weight of their contributions to humanitarian assistance and reconstruction and even to the size of their troop contributions to ISAF itself.¹⁴

¹⁰ Since September 2001 alone, the EU has provided 352 million Euros to Afghanistan in the form of humanitarian assistance.

¹¹ Peter Ludlow, *The Laeken Council*, European Council Commentary Volume 1, No. 1, Eurocomment, 2002.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹³ These are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. The only two missing are Ireland and Luxembourg.

¹⁴ For more on this issue, see ICG Afghanistan Briefing, *Securing Afghanistan: The Need for More International Action*, 15 March 2002.

2. Root Causes

After the attacks in New York and Washington, the EU embarked on a round of diplomatic activity aimed at rallying support for the international coalition against terrorism. Most notably, the EU sent a high-level Troika delegation¹⁵ to Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Syria in September 2001 and to Central Asia at the end of October. The High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, redoubled his efforts in the Middle East, working with the U.S., UN and Russia in an informal "Quartet" to open prospects for a political settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

In recent months, however, much of this activity seems to have settled back into business as usual. The EU's stated goal of 'reviewing its relations with third countries' with a view to strengthening the international anti-terrorist campaign and attacking terrorism's root causes has not yet produced much modification in relations with key states.

For instance, the much-debated Trade and Cooperation Agreement with Iran – which the EU sees as an instrument for promoting dialogue with the Islamic Republic while the U.S. government criticises it for being "too much carrot, too little stick"¹⁶ – was in the pipeline long before 11 September. The negotiations received fresh impetus through the need, from the EU's point of view, to bind Iran firmly into the anti-terrorist coalition but the agreement is still at best many months from finalisation.¹⁷ A similar agreement with Pakistan is currently before the European Parliament for approval. The EU incurred some criticism in early 2002 when that negotiation was

held up not for political or human rights reasons but for a disagreement over textile tariffs.¹⁸

Central Asia was identified as a dangerous breeding ground for terrorist organisations, hence a region of utmost strategic importance for the fight against terrorism. Yet, in a paper written in October 2001, EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana acknowledged that the EU would find it difficult to make more aid available to counteract the potentially explosive economic and social decline in the five Central Asian republics. Solana noted that the EU "should have no illusions about...the limited instruments available to us in supporting our objectives". He pointed at EU member states, adding that there were serious questions "as to the extent to which we are willing to make available sufficient resources to make a difference".¹⁹ In subsequent interviews with ICG, EU officials have dismissed even the appointment of a special envoy for the region – a relatively cheap method of demonstrating greater diplomatic interest that the EU has utilised in a number of other areas (e.g., the Middle East, the Great Lakes of Africa).

3. Middle East

After the rather slow beginnings of a CFSP characterised by "hand-wringing statements issued too late to be in any danger of influencing events",²⁰ the last three years have seen a welcome crystallisation of active engagement in two regions: the Western Balkans²¹ and the Middle

¹⁵ The Troika consisted of the Belgian Presidency representative, Foreign Minister Louis Michel, the High Representative for the EU's foreign policy, Javier Solana, and External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten.

¹⁶ ICG interview with staff at the U.S. Mission to the EU, Brussels, March 2002.

¹⁷ The European Commission received its negotiating mandate "for developing closer relations with Iran" from the Council of the EU on 7 February 2001. The intended agreement would include a political component covering issues such as human rights, democracy and terrorism. The finalisation of the agreement is to be "subject to continued monitoring of the Iranian progress in the fields of political, economic and social reform". Source: European Commission, http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/iran/intro/index.htm.

¹⁸ ICG interview with staff at the U.S. Mission to the EU, Brussels, March 2002.

¹⁹ See Suggestions by High Representative Javier Solana for a re-evaluation of EU policy towards the Central Asian countries, SN 4369/1/01, 26 October 2001.

²⁰ ICG interview with EU official, Council of the EU, 1 March 2002.

²¹ The EU's role in the Balkans is not further discussed in this briefing paper but has analysed in a number of ICG reports and briefing papers over the last ten months, including: ICG Balkans Report No. 112, *A Fair Exchange: Aid to Yugoslavia for Regional Stability*, 15 June 2001; ICG Balkans Briefing, *Milosevic in The Hague: What it Means for Yugoslavia and the Region*, 6 July 2001; ICG Balkans Briefing, *Macedonia: Still Sliding*, 27 July 2001; ICG Balkans Report No. 114, *Montenegro: Resolving the Independence Deadlock*, 1 August 2001; ICG Balkans Report No. 116, *Peace in Presevo: Quick Fix or Long-Term Solution?*, 10 August 2001; ICG Balkans Briefing, *Macedonia: War on Hold*, 15 August 2001; ICG Balkans Briefing, *Macedonia: Filling the Security Vacuum*, 8

East. The full range of EU foreign policy, aid and trade instruments, as well as appropriate financial and personnel resources, are applied to these areas of key concern, in marked differentiation with the rest of the world. While this may appear to contradict CFSP's global aspirations, EU officials privately acknowledge that such prioritisation is necessary, at least until CFSP has matured.²²

In the Middle East the EU has continued to spare neither money nor diplomatic energy since the terrorist attacks against the U.S. But the events of 11 September, while consolidating the Middle East's place at the top of the EU foreign policy agenda, did not change the primary challenge the EU faces in the region: either to work effectively with a U.S. policy that most consider inadequate or to speak and act effectively with a single independent voice.

The EU's increased engagement in the region, which predated 11 September and was fuelled partly by the vacuum created by the Bush administration's reluctance to become deeply involved, has resulted in countless declarations and meetings over the past months between Solana, External Affairs Commissioner Chris Patten, EU member state leaders and the main parties to the conflict.²³ Although many observers have talked

about an increasing convergence of views on the Middle East, member states (in particular the 'big three' - the UK, France and Germany) are still divided over both tactics and message.

The first difficulty in establishing a single, independent EU voice on the peace process is that some EU capitals (traditionally those closer to the U.S. and/or Israel) have tended to question the very value of having one. Several national initiatives have not succeeded in gaining EU-wide political support in recent months due to an anxiety in some quarters not to contradict the U.S. line. This is further complicated by the fact that the U.S. administration has been itself significantly divided. The nature of the crisis in the Middle East has meant that conflicting views on how to work with the U.S. – a problem rendered even more acute in the hypersensitive post-11 September environment – have translated into conflicting views on what an EU Middle East policy should look like.

The lack of a fully developed strategy has meant that the EU has so far not been able to acquire the diplomatic leverage and political clout commensurate to its substantial financial investment in peace in the region²⁴. This problem is not new for the EU (see discussion of EU action in Afghanistan) and is a symptom of the underdeveloped nature of CFSP in relation to the more traditional instruments of trade and aid.

ICG will continue to argue that the EU play a more substantial and cohesive role in developing, and encouraging the U.S. to embrace the political – as distinct from just security – track, which is now badly needed to bring Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations back on course.²⁵ If this does not happen, the EU is likely to find itself reduced to

September 2001; ICG Balkans Report No. 117, *Serbia's Transition: Reforms Under Siege*, 21 September 2001; ICG Balkans Briefing, *Croatia - Facing Up to War Crimes*, 16 October 2001; ICG Balkans Report No. 121, *Bosnia: Reshaping the International Machinery*, 29 November 2001; ICG Balkans Report No. 122, *Macedonia's Name: Why the Dispute Matters and How to Resolve It*, 10 December 2001; ICG Balkans Report No. 123, *Kosovo: A Strategy for Economic Development*, 19 December 2001; ICG Balkans Report No. 124, *A Kosovo Roadmap: I. Addressing Final Status*, 28 February 2002; ICG Balkans Report No. 125, *A Kosovo Roadmap: II. Internal Benchmarks*, 1 March 2002; and ICG Balkans Report No. 126, *Belgrade's Lagging Reform: Cause for International Concern*, 7 March 2002.

²² This is not to say that the EU is not active in other parts of the world. The Commission in fact runs aid programs in over 100 countries. It and the EU member states together represent the world's largest donor, accounting for 55 per cent of total aid provided by OECD states. Aid programs in other countries in danger of crisis are not, however, automatically and systematically backed by CFSP (foreign policy) instruments as they are in the Balkans and the Middle East.

²³ Solana spearheaded the EU's increased efforts in the region by taking part in the last round of the Taba peace talks in January 2001. He was also co-author of the

Mitchell Report, which laid out a road map for a political settlement.

²⁴ Over the past years, the EU has provided massive financial support to the Palestinians (now averaging about 250 million Euros per year) in an attempt to shore up the peace process. This has accounted for more than 50 per cent of total international assistance. At the same time, the EU is Israel's largest trading partner.

²⁵ While it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss EU foreign policy in the Middle East in detail, see ICG Middle East Report No. 1, *A Time to Lead: The International Community and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, 10 April 2002. A very useful short description of EU Middle East policy up to early 2002 can also be found in Steven Everts, *Shaping a Credible EU Foreign Policy*, Centre for European Reform, 2002, pp. 27-30.

the not very satisfying role of picking up the bill for damage done by Israeli tanks to EU-funded projects and infrastructure in the Palestinian territories, and other consequences of the failure of the international community and the main parties to bring back to life a meaningful peace process.

4. Evaluation

Undoubtedly, the impulse across Europe after the terrorist attacks of 11 September was to work out a common response. While tensions between national posturing and the need for a multilateral approach undeniably existed, Europeans also realised that only by acting together could they provide the assistance they desired to the U.S. in a time of need and influence the international campaign against terrorism. This said, there have been only limited changes within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, while overall the EU has both played to its strengths in the new global framework and exposed its traditional weaknesses.

A definite strength has been the emphasis on the need to tackle the root causes of terrorism and to maintain a dialogue – "constructive engagement" is its catch phrase – with sensitive states. This is consistent with the EU's long time approach to conflict prevention in general and to the politics of terrorism in particular. It provides something of a prudent counterweight to the muscular "Axis of Evil" doctrine enunciated by U.S. President Bush.²⁶ There is widespread scepticism among European governments about the utility of a military response as the primary means by which to respond to the wider challenge of terrorism and a belief that even when it is resorted to, it needs to be underpinned by specific measures to treat not only the symptoms but also the causes of the threat. The EU has a range of instruments – in aid, trade and diplomacy – which from this perspective are highly relevant to the security challenges dramatised by 11 September. It has used these creditably, though not innovatively, in recent months.

The events of 11 September have, however, also exposed the EU's lack of credible military capabilities. Against the backdrop of the U.S.-dominated campaign in Afghanistan, the EU's

diplomatic actions and preparation for a long-term "review of relations with third countries" were clearly secondary, however useful. By the time the Laeken summit was held, the military campaign against the Taliban had for all intents and purposes been won. But the uncomfortable question that dominated discussions then – and has still not been answered – was whether the U.S. would extend its military campaign elsewhere (to Iraq, for example), and what the Europeans should say and, if not beyond their current capabilities, do. The confusion at Laeken over an EU contribution to ISAF underscored the Union's lack of preparedness for the hard security sector of the crisis management spectrum. Ironically, the same summit declared the European Security and Defence Policy 'operational'. Operational for what will be discussed in the following section.

III. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT MACHINERY: ESDP DECLARED OPERATIONAL

A. BACKGROUND

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is a relatively new but closely monitored component of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)²⁷. While the latter was institutionalised in 1991, it was not until 1998 that the Union started seriously addressing its defence complement, partly because the Kosovo conflict was compounding what previous Balkan wars had already shown: Europe's military dependence on the U.S. At their summit in Cologne in June 1999, EU leaders laid the foundation for ESDP by agreeing that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO".²⁸

²⁶ President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002.

²⁷ ESDP emerged from the concept of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) that was first used at the NATO summit in Washington in April 1999 to refer to a future European pillar within the Alliance. It was then taken out of NATO, turned into an EU exercise with NATO support and re-christened ESDP at the EU Helsinki summit of December 1999.

²⁸ European Council (Cologne) Conclusions, June 1999.

At subsequent summits in Helsinki and Feira (Portugal),²⁹ EU leaders established a number of 'headline goals' for military and civilian crisis management capabilities. In a nutshell, these consist of: a Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 troops to be deployable within 60 days for a period of up to one year, by 2003 at the latest, as well as specific civilian capabilities in policing, civilian administration, rule of law and civil protection.³⁰ The Rapid Reaction Force is designed to carry out the so-called Petersberg tasks, defined as "humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making".³¹

Eager to build political momentum behind ESDP, EU leaders declared in December 2000 that "the objective is that the European Union should quickly be made operational in this area. A decision to that end will be taken by the European Council [heads of state summit] as soon as possible in 2001 and no later than at its meeting in Laeken".³² The political stakes in the run-up to that summit were, therefore, considerable, especially in the wake of 11 September.

B. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION

There are four key reference points against which progress towards ESDP operationality must be assessed.³³

- *The existence in Brussels of adequate institutional infrastructures and decision-making processes.* Most observers agreed that the EU machinery required for crisis management was already in place on the eve of Laeken. This ranged from the key decision-making body, the Council's Political and Security Committee (PSC), which is composed of ambassadorial-rank diplomats of the fifteen member states,

through to specialist units such as the EU Military Staff (EUMS), Military Committee (EUMC), Committee for the Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and an integrated civil-military Situation Centre.³⁴ The Council Secretariat had also been reinforced by a Police Unit. With the main ESDP machinery now in place, the Spanish Presidency plans to carry out a major civil-military exercise in May 2002, to test ESDP procedures and ensure that the various parts can work together effectively. The Commission will be associated with the exercise. The next exercise, in May 2003, will be carried out jointly with NATO.

- *Appropriate military capabilities, both in quantitative and qualitative terms.* In November 2001, a Capabilities Commitment Conference (CIC) struck a cautiously optimistic note, confirming the existence of a pool of more than 100,000 troops, around 400 combat aircraft and 100 ships, which satisfies the quantitative targets set by the Helsinki headline goal.³⁵ The same conference also made clear, however, that there were still serious deficiencies, of a qualitative nature, in the EU's strategic capabilities (command, control, communications and intelligence). In other words, the EU was assessed as unable to carry out complex crisis management operations without undue risk. A European Capability Action Plan was adopted to work towards addressing the shortcomings identified (see Section III for more detail).
- *Appropriate civilian crisis management capabilities in police, civilian administration, rule of law and civil protection.* A Conference on Police Capabilities, which also took place in Brussels in November 2001, declared the EU to be more or less on target to meet its goal of a 5,000-strong force to be ready by 2003. The other areas of civilian crisis management are, however, much less developed. A lot of work still needs to be done to fulfil the target of 200 rule-of-law

²⁹ In December 1999 and June 2000 respectively.

³⁰ For more detailed background on ESDP, see ICG report *EU Crisis Response Capability: Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management*, op. cit., pp. 6-11.

³¹ See Article 17.2, Treaty of the European Union (consolidated version).

³² European Council (Nice) Conclusions, December 2000.

³³ For a more detailed account, see Peter Ludlow, *The Laeken Council*, op.cit., pp. 80-88, and *European Security Review*, No. 8, op.cit.

³⁴ See the organisational chart of CFSP structures in the Appendices.

³⁵ See *European Security Review*, No. 9, op. cit.

officials by 2003. The Commission and the Council Secretariat are working together to develop a database, but, in the words of a Commission official, "it is extremely difficult to lay hands on this type of personnel – the UN and OSCE face the same problem".³⁶ Efforts to establish a pool of civil administrators are less developed still. On civil protection, the last of the four areas of civilian crisis management, assessment teams are working on extending the EU's internal provisions for civil protection – in cases of natural disaster or marine pollution, for instance – for use outside the EU. There is as yet, however, no common financing plan for civil protection operations, nor is the relationship clear between the Commission's mechanisms and those of member states.

- *Arrangements between the EU and NATO concerning EU access to NATO planning assets.* An agreement ensuring access to NATO planning assets is fundamental to the EU's crisis response capability. Blocked by Turkey for many months, a provisional deal was finally struck on 3 December 2001. On 10 December, however, four days before Laeken, the Greek government objected, citing national security interests. The deal has been on hold ever since, depriving the EU of the necessary strategic underpinning for complex operations.

Despite the chequered progress on meeting the Helsinki headline goals and, most significantly, without the agreement on access to NATO planning assets, EU leaders declared ESDP operational at Laeken in the following terms:

Through the continuing development of the ESDP, the strengthening of capabilities, both civil and military, and the creation of appropriate structures within it and following the military and police Capability Improvement Conferences held in Brussels on 19 November 2001, the Union is now capable of conducting *some* [emphasis added] crisis management operations. The Union is determined to finalise swiftly arrangements with NATO. These will

enhance the European Union's capabilities to carry out crisis-management operations over the whole range of Petersberg tasks.³⁷

C. PUTTING ESDP TO THE TEST IN BOSNIA AND MACEDONIA

The fact that ESDP was declared operational under clearly less than optimal circumstances has been widely criticised as a purely political manoeuvre. EU leaders were certainly in a tough spot at Laeken: Delaying ESDP further would have sent seriously wrong signals, particularly in the environment after 11 September. But attempting to use ESDP in a real world situation with inadequate capabilities would obviously carry a much greater risk.

A few days after the Laeken summit, High Representative Javier Solana tabled a proposal to put ESDP to the test, arguing that this was the best way to find out whether it was truly operational.³⁸ He suggested mounting two relatively modest operations in an area of strategic importance to the EU: an EU police force in Bosnia to take over from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), whose mandate runs out in January 2003, and an EU military force in Macedonia to take over from NATO's Operation Amber Fox, whose mandate is subject to renewal every three months.

1. EU Police Mission in Bosnia

EU foreign ministers accepted the first challenge, declaring on 18 February 2002 that the Union was available to take over the IPTF responsibility on 1 January 2003. Beneath this cordial language of offer was determination that the EU would indeed take over and not leave the mission to the other main contender, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Asked about the EU's comparative advantage, given that policing was a new field for Brussels, an EU official noted dryly that the Police Unit in the Council Secretariat now had seven staff while the OSCE equivalent had only four.³⁹

³⁶ ICG interview with EU official, European Commission, 28 February 2002.

³⁷ European Council (Laeken) Conclusions, Annex II, December 2001.

³⁸ Peter Ludlow, *The Laeken Council*, op.cit.

³⁹ ICG interview with EU official, Council of the EU, 7 February 2002.

There is considerable scepticism, even within the EU. One high-ranking official at the Commission remarked that the preparations for the police mission would place tremendous strain on resources not only in the Council but also in the Commission, which had to manage the contract and pay for the mission out of its already overstretched CFSP budget line (40 million Euros per year). “But”, noted the official, “when Council decides we’re ready, then we’re ready”.⁴⁰

Financing has thus far been the most difficult part of the undertaking. Start-up costs have been estimated at 14 million Euros for 2002, which will be paid out of the CFSP line in the Community budget. The running costs, thought to be 38 million Euros annually from 2003 until the presumed end of the mission in 2005, will be more problematic. The Community budget cannot cover the total costs, as this would leave little for any other foreign policy initiative (such as special envoys) in the present fixed financial framework (2000-2006). After much debate, the decision has been to follow the principle of meeting most costs “where they lie”, that is, in the contributing member state.

Once a solution – even if makeshift – was found for the financing question, the EU was remarkably quick to adapt or create structures to prepare for the new mission. Within a few weeks of the decision in principle to take over the IPTF, a line of command and modalities for coordination had been established. Sven Frederiksen, a Dane, was appointed Head of Mission/Police Commissioner, and will have operational command from 1 January 2003. The incoming international community High Representative in Bosnia, Lord Ashdown of the UK, will also be designated EU Special Representative, in charge of coordinating all rule-of-law aspects of the Dayton peace process. Frederiksen will report to Ashdown, who in turn will brief the Political and Security Committee in the Council and Solana. This management structure is designed to provide maximum coordination between the peace process and the EU police mission, as well as the EU’s overall Stabilisation and Association Process⁴¹ in Bosnia.

While the EU’s capacity to conduct such a mission is, of course, still totally untested, the operation will not require an armed or ‘executive’ policing component. Instead, the tasks will be, as they were when the UN ran the IPTF, to monitor, mentor and inspect the managerial and operational capacities of Bosnia's police, with a view of ensuring, by 2005, “that the Bosnian police services develop a professional, politically neutral and ethnically unbiased law enforcement system”.⁴²

In other words, the risks of EU failure are not high. A relatively small and manageable operation that by now enjoys solid political support, the police mission is in a sense the ideal test for the newly operational ESDP. As one close observer has argued, however, future ESDP missions cannot be expected to come together so smoothly.⁴³ Larger operations will inevitably present larger obstacles. The flexibility the EU has demonstrated with regard to the Bosnian mission is in reality *ad hocism* that has not established any firm principles or precedents for future cases.

2. REPLACING NATO IN MACEDONIA?

When first urged by Solana and the Spanish EU Presidency in early 2002, the proposal for the EU to take over from NATO Operation Amber Fox in Macedonia met with scepticism in Berlin and London, and disbelief at NATO’s Brussels headquarters. The 700-strong Operation Amber Fox was launched in September 2001 under a UN mandate. It is tasked with protecting EU and OSCE civilian monitors who oversee and help create conditions for implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, signed between Macedonia’s principal political parties in August 2001 (with considerable mediation by the EU, U.S. and NATO), and intended to head off civil war. Currently led by Germany, the operation's mandate has recently been extended to 26 June 2002.

After a campaign to rally all EU member states behind the proposal, EU leaders declared their willingness to take over the mission at the summit in Barcelona on 15-16 March 2002 “on the understanding that the permanent arrangements on NATO-EU cooperation would be in place by

⁴⁰ ICG interview with EU official, European Commission, 28 February 2002.

⁴¹ Launched in 1999, the Stabilisation and Association Process aims to help the five countries in the Western Balkans prepare for eventual accession to the EU.

⁴² Mission Statement, EU Police Mission.

⁴³ Jamie Woodbridge, ISIS Europe, *European Security Review*, No. 11, March 2002.

then".⁴⁴ The EU had already established a 'Crisis Action Team' in Brussels in February 2002 to assess the requirements of the mission and work on the modalities.

The *sine qua non* for the EU to take over Operation Amber Fox is access to NATO planning assets. Given that this agreement remains blocked by Greece-Turkey problems, with little prospect for quick resolution,⁴⁵ the EU may be putting the cart before the horse in its eagerness to demonstrate the operability of its crisis management capabilities.

The other major issue the EU will need to address sooner or later is whether Skopje is willing to give its consent to a change of command. NATO is still synonymous with U.S. military force in the Balkans, while the EU is associated with the failures in previous conflicts. This psychological element may be the make or break of any follow-on mission in Macedonia.⁴⁶

A complication of a more technical nature is that an EU mission in Macedonia would have to act in painstaking cooperation with NATO's KFOR (the troops in Kosovo) and KFOR Rear (the support troops in Macedonia, who are separate from Amber Fox). The three operations are closely integrated and to a certain extent even reliant on each other.

It is clear that, compared to the police mission in Bosnia, the risks are much higher for the EU in Macedonia. Failure would be a serious, perhaps irreparable, blow to ESDP, let alone to the stability of Macedonia and the region.

It is too early to speculate further, as much will depend on the development of the EU-NATO relationship, which is closer than it has ever been but includes a not inconsiderable dose of rivalry. NATO can be expected to be reluctant to hand over a successful operation in the Balkans at a time when its continuing relevance is still questioned in various quarters.⁴⁷

The question of the Macedonia mission goes to the heart of the identities of both the EU and NATO, and, therefore, to the heart of strategic relations in Europe. While the former attempts to assert untested crisis management capabilities in its backyard, the latter seeks to redefine itself in the context of the international fight against terrorism and its own enlargement to the East. It is beyond the scope of this paper to go further into this issue, but it is intriguing to note the speculative musings of one senior NATO official to the effect that the two organisations conceivably might eventually swap places, with the EU taking over most crisis response operations in Europe and NATO becoming a larger but looser and more political forum.⁴⁸

III. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CRISIS RESPONSE CAPABILITY

A. CONFLICT PREVENTION

1. Operationalising the Aid Link

A key element of the Göteborg Program for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts of the Swedish Presidency (June 2001) is the mainstreaming of conflict prevention into EU development policy, based on the (correct) assumption that a focus on poverty reduction alone does not automatically help to stave off or contain crises. Since early 2001, the Commission has been active behind the scenes doing just that, reworking Country Strategy Papers (CSPs)⁴⁹ to incorporate conflict prevention concerns.⁵⁰ A lead unit in this undertaking is the

significant role in the post-11 September "war on terrorism".

⁴⁸ Remarks of a senior NATO official at a roundtable discussion in Brussels, December 2001. Obviously much will depend upon the degree to which the U.S. remains closely engaged with military matters in Europe as well as the seriousness with which the EU pursues its ESDP objectives.

⁴⁹ The scale of this task is large: the Commission completed 150 Country Strategy Papers in the last eighteen months.

⁵⁰ Instead of coming straight from the geographical desks, these papers are now discussed in the framework of a new, inter-service 'Quality Support Group', which brings together experts on trade, human rights, economic development and conflict prevention, with the aim of coordinating EU instruments to achieve maximum results.

⁴⁴ European Council (Barcelona) Conclusions, March 2002.

⁴⁵ Solana travelled to Athens seeking progress in mid-April 2002.

⁴⁶ See CESD, *NATO Notes*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 27 March 2002.

⁴⁷ While NATO has made a successful transition from the Cold War not least through its effectiveness in the Balkans, it is sensitive to the fact that it has not had a

Commission's Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit,⁵¹ which has grown from one staff member in 2000 to fifteen in mid-2002. This unit has also worked on developing conflict indicators, which have now been disseminated to Commission delegations in third countries.

At present, the closest match between EU aid and conflict prevention objectives exists in the five countries of the Western Balkans, which are subject to a special regime⁵² of generous assistance aimed at stabilising them politically and economically, with the prospect of EU accession – the biggest carrot in the EU toolbox – at the end. In other areas of the world where the EU gives aid a similarly strong link between aid and conflict prevention does not exist. While the EU should not spread itself too thinly, many officials, including Commissioner Chris Patten himself, are in agreement that there is still plenty of room for improvement.

2. Spanish Presidency Proposals

For its part, the Spanish EU Presidency (1 January to 30 June 2002) has also taken the Göteborg Program forward. It published at the beginning of 2002 the first national plan for conflict prevention,⁵³ which focuses on Latin America (particularly Colombia), the Mediterranean, the Balkans and Africa. It has also proposed a common model of reporting to EU HQ by member state missions in third countries, in order to ensure a more even quality of information and the inclusion of early warning and conflict prevention criteria. While member states have so far been only moderately enthusiastic about this idea, it will likely gain currency in the next months.

The Spanish Presidency has also proposed a number of new mechanisms to help translate early

Many senior Commission officials have stated that this process makes for better strategies.

⁵¹ The Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Unit (A/4) is situated in the Commission's External Relations Directorate. The unit now also possesses a 'Crisis Room' for classified information. Since ESDP was declared operational, efforts have also been undertaken to make its communications more secure, both in Brussels and with Commission delegations in the field.

⁵² The Stabilisation and Association process. See above, also <http://europa.eu.int>.

⁵³ One of the recommendations in the Göteborg Program was that member states develop their own national policies on conflict prevention.

warning into early action. These will be debated at the May 2002 General Affairs Council (foreign ministers meeting). It suggests that the GAC have annual regional debates in addition to the global discussions on conflict prevention priorities that are currently held during the first session of each Presidency, and that better use be made of the regional working groups in the Council to prepare these debates.

The EU summit in Seville, which marks the end of the Spanish Presidency in June 2002, will evaluate the progress made to date on implementing the Göteborg Program and is also likely to review the EU's diplomatic instruments⁵⁴ relevant to conflict prevention in order to distil lessons from past experience.

B. CRISIS MANAGEMENT

1. Rapid Reaction Mechanism

The Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) is a relatively recent addition to the EU's crisis management toolbox. Launched by External Relations Commissioner Chris Patten in February 2001, it is a fast-disbursing funding mechanism designed to provide quick-impact stabilisers to help assuage the economic consequences of violent crises and thus facilitate crisis management. Much less time consuming than the Commission's cumbersome regular aid procedures, the RRM was used five times in 2001: twice in Macedonia, once each in Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and once to finance a mission to decide how to program conflict prevention action in Indonesia, Nepal and the Pacific.

In 2002, the RRM is likely to focus on Afghanistan, but there have already been other requests, including for input into the UN's Ethiopia/Eritrea mission, and perhaps also the Somalia peace process. The budget is small, only 25 million Euros for 2002, though this will rise to 33 million Euros per year by the end of the current financial framework in 2006. Commission officials, pleased with its initial success, see great potential for the RRM to become one of the EU's principal crisis management tools.

⁵⁴ These include Special Representatives, declarations, demarches. For more information, see ICG Report, *EU Crisis Response Capability*, op. cit.

2. Terrorism and ESDP

As discussed earlier, the events of 11 September have, on the whole, had only a limited impact on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. While they may have influenced the decision to declare ESDP operational at Laeken, they have had even less of a direct impact on ESDP itself. Speaking at a conference in February 2002, the Spanish Ambassador to the Political and Security Committee, Carlos Castajuana, stressed that the "relationship between terrorism and ESDP is very complex"; the Rapid Reaction Force was designed solely to carry out the Petersberg tasks, which by definition apply to crises outside the EU borders, while terrorism, he added, tends to strike internally.⁵⁵ This view may, however, be changing. Terrorism is now a priority feature on the agenda of the Political and Security Committee, and proposals have been floated to look at ways of extending the Petersberg tasks to include counter-terrorist actions and of including counter-terrorist units within the Rapid Reaction Force.

3. Responding to Zimbabwe

A prominent EU attempt at crisis management not related to 11 September or the EU's geographic priorities has involved Zimbabwe, particularly the run-up to the March 2002 presidential elections. To persuade the regime of President Robert Mugabe to return to the rule of law and end escalating violence that was becoming a threat to the stability not only of that country but also of the wider southern Africa region, the EU had a number of instruments at its disposal. These included reduction of aid, deployment of election monitors, diplomatic pressure, and the threat of either targeted personal and/or full economic sanctions. It did not use any of these strategically. Instead, for most of 2001, member states were divided about an appropriate course of action other than rhetorical objections to Mugabe's policies. This led to an unconvincing, lowest common denominator approach that in the end botched EU election observation while weakening the impact of targeted sanctions when, shortly before the elections, they were applied.⁵⁶ Many lessons for

EU crisis management can be drawn from the Zimbabwe experience, not least in terms of the sequencing of policy instruments.

This said, the EU did respond more quickly to the Zimbabwe crisis with concrete measures than the U.S., the Commonwealth, or the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the other main international players involved. It is an open question whether and how effectively the EU will remain involved in efforts to persuade the Mugabe regime to share power with the opposition or take other actions to defuse what remains a highly volatile situation in the wake of clear evidence that the March elections were, in effect, stolen.

4. Improving European Capabilities

It is indisputable that European defence budgets, which combined, depending on the year, represent between just over half and two-thirds of the amount the U.S. spends on defence, have not risen in line with the evolution of ESDP. As discussed above, quantitative and important qualitative holes still exist in EU military capabilities, and the political will to fill these has often seemed elusive.⁵⁷ To counteract this, the Capabilities Improvement Conference held in Brussels in November 2001 (see above) adopted the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP), which, however, is not a detailed plan for time-bound actions but rather guiding principles for EU military cooperation. These principles include: increased effectiveness of EU military capability efforts; a bottom-up approach to EU defence cooperation (commitments on a voluntary basis); coordination between member states and cooperation with NATO (essential to target specific shortcomings); and the importance of broad public support.⁵⁸

No. 40, *All Bark and No Bite: The International Response to Zimbabwe's Crisis*, 25 January 2002, and ICG Africa Briefing, *Zimbabwe: Time for International Action*, 12 October 2001.

⁵⁷ For instance, a number of member states have spent more than a year negotiating the financing and building of the Airbus A400M military transport aircraft, which is intended to respond to well-publicised EU shortcomings in military airlift. This showcase ESDP project ran into trouble late in 2001 when Germany declared it faced budgetary constraints and Italy announced it may carry out a strategic reassessment. The impasse was resolved in March 2002 but the affair cast doubts on the ability and willingness of EU states to cooperate in military affairs. See *European Security Review*, Number 9, op.cit.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Ambassador Carlos Castajuana, "Good Cops?", at a seminar held by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 14 February 2002.

⁵⁶ For a more detailed discussion of the international response to the Zimbabwe crisis, see ICG Africa Report

5. Relationship with NATO

As discussed above in the context of the decision to declare ESDP operational and the EU's ambitions in Macedonia, the relationship between the EU and NATO will be key to the development of ESDP. On a working level, contacts are good, and NATO is supportive of ESDP development.⁵⁹ For instance, the EU's high-level 'Headline Task Force' (HTF), which is charged with correcting the deficiencies in EU capabilities, regularly meets with NATO experts (in which case it is called 'HTF Plus') to seek advice from the Alliance.

At the political level, however, it is clear that a breakthrough on the agreement regarding permanent EU access to NATO planning assets is urgently required for further progress on ESDP to become possible. Yet it is unlikely that this issue will be resolved during the Spanish Presidency. Denmark, which takes over the six-month Presidency in July 2002, has an opt-out from ESDP, which means that Greece, otherwise in the Presidency only after Denmark, will chair all matters related to ESDP for a whole year, from 1 July 2002 until 30 June 2003. Given that Greece is currently blocking the NATO deal, a major advance in ESDP this year appears unlikely. One of the closest observers of EU events has observed that the way matters look now, "virtually the only development which might end the deadlock would be a breakthrough over Cyprus".⁶⁰ Such a breakthrough may or may not happen in time for Cyprus to join the first tranche of new entrants by the presently targeted 2004: past experience does not encourage optimism.

V. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA

In its report of June 2001, ICG raised a number of larger questions relating to the future of the EU as an international actor, the answers to which will play a major role in the development of the Union's crisis response capabilities. ICG's report also put forward a number of targeted recommendations on some lower level issues that could be more responsive to immediate resolution. Ten months on, progress in addressing both the larger goal, and the way of getting there, has been patchy, despite the generally increased level of activity in many areas. What is more, the high-level European Convention, launched on 1 March 2002 to work on areas of key importance to the 'future of Europe', is in danger of missing a singular opportunity – in terms of an overall EU effort – to address precisely these issues.

The European Convention under the chairmanship of former French President Valéry Giscard D'Estaing was set up to prepare for the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on institutional reform that will take place during the whole of 2004 to pave the way for the enlargement of the Union to the South and East. These two gatherings have both ambition and potential to produce a virtual revolution in the nature of the European Union. Nevertheless, foreign policy and defence have so far received only scant attention in the agenda of the Convention, which is concentrating on internal matters of organisation and decision-making. This is a mistake that should be rectified, as external policy will be instrumental in shaping the EU's identity, including the perception among citizens of its value, over the next years.

At the big picture level, those dealing with Europe's constitutional future should tackle the question of what kind of international actor, specifically, the EU is to be. Not only the general aims and objectives, but also the real limitations of the evolving European foreign policy project need to be discussed and defined with some precision.

In defining the EU's role as an international actor, EU leaders must address a number of key issues for the Union's crisis response capability: How will the EU, which until now has been exclusively a civilian power, make the transition to one that can use military force? How will the EU use force in a way that is acceptable to all member countries of

⁵⁹ See above, footnote number 27, p. 6.

⁶⁰ Peter Ludlow, *The Laeken Council*, op.cit., p. 86.

an enlarged Union, whose security traditions are not compatible in important respects? Will member states muster the political will to develop the ESDP project robustly or will they draw the line relatively narrowly to protect national prerogatives in the supremely sensitive fields of security and defence?

The evolution of the EU's relations with other key actors in crisis response, particularly NATO and the U.S., will be extremely important and also need attention. A few years ago it would have been inconceivable even to speculate about the EU and NATO 'swapping places' with regard to certain aspects of crisis management. Now, while still regarded as fanciful by many, the concept is one in play. The idea whose time has clearly come, however, is that a meaningful EU crisis response capability in the service of a unified EU external policy committed to multilateralism can usefully complement and at times counterbalance the U.S. penchant toward unilateralism. It is still for Europeans to produce both. Progress there is, but in insufficient measure as yet to justify confidence.

There are some more specific and immediate issues that also need attention. As it struggles to match expectations with results, the EU must ensure that policy from now on shapes institutions, rather than the reverse. Only if it manages to line up its diverse external policy tools in support of clearly defined strategies will it reap the rewards of diplomatic leverage and political clout that are determining factors in any crisis response scenario.

Some specific steps for action in this regard are the following:⁶¹

- The relationship of the offices of High Representative for CFSP (currently Javier Solana) and that of External Relations Commissioner (currently Chris Patten) needs to be clarified. While the arrangement between Solana and Patten has worked reasonably well because of the competence of the two individuals concerned and the mutual respect they share, a long term solution is needed to ensure greater coherence between the EU's aid, trade, diplomatic and crisis management instruments. One suggestion is that the two

offices eventually be merged – but this would entail a major reorganisation of responsibilities between the Commission and the Council.

- The CFSP/ESDP team in the Council should be given more resources. While the Commission has approximately 4,000 to 5,000 officials working on external policy, the Council has only about 250. Solana's Policy Unit, which is the primary source of advice on key CFSP concerns such as the Middle East, the Balkans and Afghanistan, has a permanent staff of around 35. And the yearly CFSP budget line, currently 40 million Euros, has been described as "woefully inadequate".⁶²
- The EU needs to develop clearer benchmarks for success in conflict prevention and crisis management.
- Analytical capacities for conflict prevention should be upgraded in the Council and the Commission, as well as in EU delegations and member state missions in the field.
- Parliaments should be more involved in CFSP/ESDP. This is part of two broader questions relating to what is sometimes called the EU's democratic deficit: how to provide the European Parliament itself efficiently with more of a role in the development and implementation of EU foreign policy; and how to involve national parliaments efficiently and more extensively in the overall work of the EU.
- Sooner or later, the EU must address the relationships of its various policies and structures dealing with the internal and external aspects of security. The traditional three-pillar division⁶³ may prove untenable in the long term. One example: all three EU pillars currently support some type of police operation, but each has a different mandate, aims and financing provision.⁶⁴

Brussels, 29 April 2002

⁶¹ Most of these points were made in the recommendations or conclusions of the June 2001 ICG report, op. cit.


⁶² ICG interviews with EU officials, 1 March 2002.

⁶³ First Pillar ('Community' competencies such as trade); Second Pillar (external relations); Third Pillar (justice and home affairs).

⁶⁴ Steven Everts, *Shaping a Credible EU Foreign Policy*, op. cit.

APPENDIX A


KEY STRUCTURES FOR CFSP



APPENDIX B


COMMISSION STRUCTURES FOR CFSP

Figure 3: Commission Structures for CFSP



APPENDIX C

COUNCIL STRUCTURES FOR CFSP



APPENDIX D

ICG BOARD MEMBERS

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Morton Abramowitz

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Kenneth Adelman

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Richard Allen

Former Head of U.S. National Security Council and National Security Advisor to the President

Hushang Ansary

Former Iranian Minister and Ambassador; Chairman, Parman Group, Houston

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*Supreme Court Judge, Canada;
Former Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia*

Oscar Arias Sanchez

Former President of Costa Rica; Nobel Peace Prize, 1987

Ersin Arioglu

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Alan Blinken

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Emma Bonino

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Maria Livanos Cattau

Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce

Wesley Clark

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Jacques Delors

Former President of the European Commission

Uffe Ellemann-Jensen

Former Foreign Minister of Denmark

Gernot Erler

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Mark Eyskens

Former Prime Minister of Belgium

Yoichi Funabashi

Journalist and author

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Former President of the Philippines

Michel Rocard

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Volker Ruhe

Vice-President, Christian Democrats, German Bundestag; former German Defence Minister

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William Shawcross

Journalist and author

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Eduardo Stein

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Pär Stenbäck

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland

Thorvald Stoltenberg

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway

William O Taylor

Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe

Ed van Thijn

Former Minister of Interior, The Netherlands; former Mayor of Amsterdam

Simone Veil

Former Member of the European Parliament; former Minister for Health, France

Shirley Williams

Former British Secretary of State for Education and Science; Member House of Lords

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