

KOSOVO: THE ROAD TO PEACE

CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND A
"WHO'S WHO" OF KEY PLAYERS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

While last spring saw conflict erupt in Kosovo's central Drenica region when Serbian security forces attacked and killed residents of the villages of Prekaz and Likoshan, this spring brings the possibility of peace. The proposed deployment of a 28,000-strong international force for Kosovo will dramatically and immediately halt the sporadic low-intensity battles between Serbian security forces and ethnic Albanian rebels that have displaced 300,000 people. This peace will allow refugees to return to their homes, and provide the day-to-day sense of security on the ground that will enable Kosovo's transition to self-government.

Since the October 1998 cease-fire, fewer than 1,000 unarmed civilian verifiers in Kosovo have won over the trust of much of Kosovo's population, assisted displaced people, helped communities get water, heat and electricity turned back on, negotiated the release of kidnapped people, monitored court trials, intervened in disputes, and provided Kosovo's population with an underlying sense that the international community is engaged. However, these monitors have lacked the muscle to enforce the cease-fire, and have been forced at times to witness killings, mass displacements, and even massacres.

What 1,000 unarmed monitors could not do alone, 28,000 armed international forces should be able to easily accomplish. The international force proposed for Kosovo, with its overwhelming firepower and troop strength, will provide the security necessary for peace to take root, and will enable Kosovars to confidently rebuild their lives and communities. What is more, the ratio of NATO troops to local combatants in Kosovo will be more than three times higher than it was in Bosnia, where not a single NATO soldier has been killed by a hostile act, despite the alarms put out by governments about the danger of the assignment¹. In addition, the vast majority of Kosovo Liberation Army soldiers are not full-time soldiers but irregulars who are eager to go back to their farms; and the majority of the Serbian security forces in Kosovo are to quickly withdraw from the province under the Rambouillet agreement, leaving only 2,500 active soldiers in all of Kosovo.

Given these facts, as well as because the overwhelming majority of Kosovo's population dearly want NATO troops to come, NATO's task in Kosovo will be easier than in Bosnia, where three and a half years of war killed 200,000 people and displaced more than a million. In Kosovo, the

¹ In Bosnia, 60,000 NATO-led forces were deployed to disarm approximately 500,000 fighters from the warring factions (Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims). In Kosovo, western analysts estimate there are 35,000 Kosovo Liberation Army soldiers – all but 7,000 part-time irregulars; analysts estimate there are 30,000 Serbian security forces and paramilitary police. Therefore the proposed 30,000-strong NATO force for Kosovo would face approximately 75,000 local combatants, many of them already decommissioned.

dimensions of the conflict are smaller: some 2,000 people have been killed in one year of fighting that has displaced 300,000.

Drawing on lessons learned from the international community's efforts to implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, this report aims to highlight key issues international actors in Kosovo should keep in mind as they implement the peace plan for Kosovo.

It is essential that the NATO-led peace force for Kosovo interpret ambiguities in its mandate in favour of a robust NATO role, so that the work of unarmed civilian agencies is not obstructed by hostile local parties. In particular, ICG urges NATO to actively back up the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) as it attempts to oversee the conduct of the 2,500 Serbian police permitted to stay in Kosovo for up to two years.

The experience of many people who worked in Bosnia in the immediate post-conflict period has convinced them that if NATO had chosen to take a more forceful approach there, and had moved more quickly to support the international civilian agencies as they worked to fulfil their tasks, key aspects of the peace process that have stalled in Bosnia would have succeeded long ago. The reluctance of NATO commanders in Bosnia to undertake what they originally considered "policing" duties led to an enforcement gap in which ethnic cleansing continued, war criminals flourished, tens of thousands of Serbs fled the Sarajevo suburbs, and a million refugees were prevented from returning to their homes because of continued ethnic hostility and violence. These setbacks haunt the Bosnian peace process to this day and have contributed to a situation which prevents NATO forces from withdrawing from Bosnia.

With those lessons in mind, and with the knowledge of the Kosovo conflict and its history, ICG recommends that NATO and the international community focus on five key areas of the Kosovo peace process:

- ICG strongly recommends that NATO and the OSCE KVM strictly enforce the rapid withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo. These forces have been responsible for the vast majority of the killing, destruction, and war crimes committed in Kosovo over the past year and have stayed on in Kosovo in massive numbers in violation of the October 1998 cease-fire agreement.²
- NATO should move to close the enforcement gap by actively assisting civilian agencies such as the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission in implementing key tasks they cannot do on their own, such as overseeing the 2,500 Serbian police allowed to stay in Kosovo for up to two years while a new ethnically representative Kosovo police force is recruited and trained.
- NATO, the OSCE KVM, and international NGOs should take a proactive role in protecting human and minority rights. In this regard, they should work closely with Kosovo Serb

² R. Jeffrey Smith reported in the *Washington Post* ("NATO, Serbs Came Close to Conflict", 4 March 1999): "Recent movements by Yugoslav forces have alarmed Western officials, who fear they could spark additional fighting. Fifteen Yugoslav army companies, averaging about 100 soldiers each, have deployed in more than a dozen Kosovo towns in what Western officials say is a violation of an agreement reached last October between Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic and U.S. Army Gen. Wesley Clark...to restrict army deployments to six major cities...The Belgrade government has [also] bolstered its special Interior Ministry police units in Kosovo with an undetermined number of additional men... It also has moved in additional armored personnel carriers and double-barreled Praga 30mm anti-aircraft guns, a weapon typically used here to fire at civilians' homes".

leaders to develop a strategy for preventing an exodus of Kosovo's Serb minority, and should secure the release of and amnesty for all ethnic Albanians still in detention on charges related to "terrorism".

- NATO should discourage an atmosphere of continued violence and revenge killings by actively assisting the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) by escorting Tribunal investigators, protecting alleged war crimes sites, and arresting and transporting war crimes suspects to The Hague.
- Until NATO and the OSCE KVM have created a secure environment in Kosovo, post-conflict assistance programs will not succeed and elections should not go forward.

Pristina - Washington, 12 March 1999



KOSOVO: THE PERILOUS ROAD TO PEACE

CRITICAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES AND A "WHO'S WHO" OF KEY PLAYERS

I. INTRODUCTION: "LESSONS LEARNED AT A COST"

A. **Kosovo Update: Facts on the Ground, September 1998 – 8 March 1999**

Since the start of Kosovo's long hot summer of 1998, all players in the conflict have continued to perfect their roles: Serbian attacks on villages continued; the KLA beefed up its forces and equipment; and the international community continued to look the other way.³ But then Slobodan Milosevic launched a major fall offensive, creating a humanitarian crisis and goading the international community into threatening NATO airstrikes against Serbian military targets if he did not stop the violence. In October, Milosevic signed a cease-fire agreement with US envoy Richard C. Holbrooke, in which the Yugoslav President also promised to draw down the numbers of Serbian troops to February 1998 levels, to release and grant amnesty to all ethnic Albanian detainees and to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in its efforts to pursue war crimes investigations in Kosovo.

None of these promises were kept: in particular, the fighting continued to escalate, with daily cease-fire violations committed by Serbian troops. In spite of a NATO activation order authorising a punitive Alliance response to any violations of the October agreement, the international community did nothing, making a mockery of both the cease-fire agreement and the NATO threats. The 15th January massacre in the southern Kosovo village of Racak galled the international community into quickly organising a peace conference in Rambouillet, France. Attendance at the conference - under threat of NATO action - was mandatory. The primary objective of the international community was to get a substantial NATO force into Kosovo that would be mandated to enforce a peace, supervise the withdrawal of all but 5,000 Serbian security forces, disarm the KLA and oversee a three-year transition to an autonomously governed province.

Inside the richly appointed, 14th-century chateau, there ensued 18 difficult days of negotiations and stonewalling. Both NATO and the Kosovo Serbs were shut out of the talks; Milosevic yielded nothing; the Albanian delegation was hijacked by its hard-line

³ For additional information, see "Kosovo's Long Hot Summer: Briefing on Military, Humanitarian and Political Developments in Kosovo" published by the International Crisis Group, 2 September 1998. The report is available on-line at <http://www.crisisweb.org>.

military wing; and American negotiators seriously underestimated Albanian concerns about being forced to disarm and being guaranteed a referendum on independence at the end of three years. On 23 February, the Albanian delegation announced its willingness to sign the agreement, pending consultation with various Albanian constituencies back in Kosovo. In particular, KLA representatives wanted approval from certain recalcitrant KLA factions and the KLA political representative and legendary dissident, Adem Demaci. Within days of the Albanian delegation's announcement of its intention to sign the peace agreement, Demaci announced his resignation from the KLA, removing the chief obstacle to Albanian acquiescence to the agreement. Once the Albanians sign, negotiators intend to take the agreement to Belgrade and to press hard for Milosevic's signature, again under threat of NATO bombing. At this writing, international mediators anticipate a peace agreement signed by both sides before the end of March. This paper addresses immediate security concerns for Kosovo in the post-agreement, post-conflict phase.

B. Achieving Real Security: A Robust NATO Role in Post-Conflict Kosovo

The main obstacle to peace in Kosovo is the presence of more than 30,000 paramilitary Serbian police and Yugoslav troops, who have shelled villages, committed massacres, and killed 2,000 Kosovo Albanians in the course of the past year.

By vigorously enforcing the withdrawal of Serbian police and soldiers from Kosovo, NATO forces will make it possible for some 300,000 currently displaced ethnic Albanians to return to their villages and begin repairs. It will also make way for the creation of a new civilian police force in Kosovo that will better represent the ethnic make-up of the Kosovo population and which will receive training from the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) in democratic policing and in respecting civil and human rights.

But a real atmosphere of security in Kosovo will never be realised, and the entire peace process could derail, if the NATO-led force in Kosovo does not support unarmed civilian agencies such as the OSCE KVM in their tasks. Of particular concern is oversight of the 2,500 Serbian police permitted under the peace agreement to remain in Kosovo for up to two years.

The Serbian police, armed with air defense artillery, armoured personnel carriers, and assault weapons, have long since grown accustomed to brutally abusing Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population and are hostile to reform.

The peace plan for Kosovo charges the NATO-led peace implementation force with overseeing the phased withdrawal of the Yugoslav army, Serbian police, special forces and paramilitary units, and for disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army. However the plan calls for the unarmed OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission to assume responsibility for the oversight of the 2,500 Serbian police permitted to remain in Kosovo after 120 days into the peace process.⁴

⁴ "By K-Day + 120 days, further drawdown to 2,500 MUP [Serbian Ministry of Interior police]. The head of [OSCE] KVM after consultations with the KFOR [commander] shall have the discretion to extend this deadline for up to...K-Day + 180 days to meet operational needs. 3) Transition to communal police force shall begin as Kosovar police are trained and able to assume their duties. The Head of KVM shall organize this transition between MUP and communal police." *Draft Military Annex*, Article VI, Section 1, Subsection C, no. 2, 3, (23 February 1999).

ICG urges the NATO-led peace implementation force for Kosovo to interpret ambiguities in its mandate in favour of a robust NATO role. In particular, NATO muscle must be available to back up the OSCE's authority over the Serbian police and should regard the success of the OSCE KVM's mission as central to its own.

The experience of many people who worked in Bosnia during the immediate post-conflict period has convinced them that if NATO had chosen to take a more forceful approach there and had moved more quickly to back up the international civilian agencies in their tasks, key aspects of the peace process that have stalled in Bosnia would have succeeded, including refugee returns to minority areas.

By interpreting its role as a vigorous one, NATO will help accelerate the process by which de-militarised, civil society takes hold in Kosovo and NATO troops can ultimately withdraw.

II. CLOSING THE ENFORCEMENT GAP

A. **Reining in the Serbian Police: Why NATO Needs to Take Charge**

Taking control over the Serbian paramilitary police in Kosovo is key to transforming the current climate of fear, killing, and retribution into one of security, accountability and justice. The Serbian police cannot be controlled without the robust participation of NATO forces.

NATO troops must vigorously assist the OSCE KVM as it attempts to regulate the behaviour of the 2,500 Serbian police allowed to stay in Kosovo for up to two years. On their own, the unarmed OSCE verifiers will lack the credible authority needed to succeed in this task. ICG believes that the continued presence of thousands of Serbian police pose the largest threat to the success of the Kosovo intervention.

Serbian police have proven themselves highly resistant to reform, hostile to western verifiers, and capable of committing war crimes and atrocities against civilians. Only the superior firepower of NATO will cow the Serbian police into compliance.

B. **Learning from Mistakes in Bosnia**

The NATO force for Kosovo should learn from mistakes made by the NATO-led force in Bosnia. Chiefly, the reluctance of the NATO-led implementation force for Bosnia (IFOR) to help the unarmed International Police Task Force (IPTF) exert control over the local Bosnian Serb Ministry of Interior police led to continued ethnic cleansing, the inability of refugees to return to their homes, and the further ethnic partition of Bosnia.

"The challenge of asserting international control over MUPs [Ministry of Interior police] in the Republika Srpska reflects many of the difficulties associated with implementation of Dayton. Throughout the first 18 months of the peace process, Bosnian Serb police obstructed implementation by hindering freedom of movement for non-Serbs, preventing return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes...and provoking the

international community...with threatening incidents... **The unarmed IPTF was powerless to deal with MUP strong-arm tactics and obstructionism.** (emphasis added)⁵

Until NATO forces intervened to assert control over the Bosnian Serb MUP police, the "MUPS in the Republika Srpska flouted Dayton by carrying long-barrelled rifles, grenades, and... continuing 'ethnic cleansing'...[The MUPs] played a key role in coercing the exodus of Serbs residing in the Sarajevo...suburbs."⁶

The Serbian MUP police in Kosovo and the MUP police of the Republika Srpska are trained in the same obstructionist techniques and share a culture steeped in ethnic violence and corruption. NATO should be prepared to use force to exert control over the Serbian police in Kosovo.

C. Legacy of Abuse: The Record of the Serbian Police In Kosovo

For the past decade of direct rule from Belgrade, Serbian police in Kosovo - the notorious **MUP (*Ministarstvo Unutrašnjih Poslova*, or Ministry of Interior police)** - have used harassment, beatings, torture, and terror to control a population that is overwhelmingly non-Serb. The brutality of the Serbian police has made them the most disliked instruments of Serbian repression among Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority and has in turn influenced the behaviour of the Kosovo Liberation Army.⁷

An OSCE KVM report on the activities of the MUP near the town of Shtimle captures the police's sinister behaviour towards the Kosovo Albanian community:

"MUPs are intimidating people in the area, saying that if they talk with OSCE personnel they could/would be shot...MUPs are trying to intimidate people into not going into shops/markets in Shtimlje and Urosevac to buy food. They are trying to contain them in their villages. When people do go into town the MUPs are registering (creating databases?) of vehicle plates for future use against them. MUPs are occupying the mental hospital in Shtimlje - firing provocatively into suspected KLA positions to try to draw return fire... and then turn it into a propaganda issue...MUPs switch their personnel around... and sometimes [wear] plain clothes so the officers are not recognised readily

⁵ Michael Dziedzic and Andrew Bair "International Police Task Force in Bosnia," in *Policing the New World Disorder*, Washington DC: National Defense University, 1998, p.297.

⁶ *Ibid*, Bair and Dziedzic.

⁷ "In Kosovo, police often beat people without ever officially charging them... use threats and violence against family members of suspects...Torture and other cruel forms of punishment, which are prohibited by law, continue to be a problem...Police...extract 'confessions' during interrogations that routinely include...beating ...[with] their fists, nightsticks, and... electric shocks... Confident that there would be no reprisals,...police often beat persons in front of their families." Source: Federation of American Scientists' Intelligence Resource Program: www.fas.org/irp/serbia/mup.htm, compiled by John Pike. According to local and international human rights groups, more than 1,000 Kosovo Albanians were seriously injured as a result of Serb police torture in 1998, and seven died directly as a result of police torture. For more information on human rights abuses, see "Human Rights in FR Yugoslavia 1998," by the Humanitarian Law Center (Belgrade) (www.hlc.org.yu). The Pristina-based Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) also provides weekly updates on the human rights situation of Kosovo Albanians; available on-line at www.albanian.com/kmdlj.

as MUPs. This facilitates their campaign to blame KLA...[and] also covers any killings [the MUP] do.⁸

Over the past year of conflict, the methods of violence used by the Serbian police have escalated to the point of war crimes and other violations of international humanitarian law.

On 15 January 1999, Serbian security forces massacred 45 ethnic Albanian civilians, including one woman, two children, and dozens of old men, in the village of Racak, in apparent retaliation for the killing of three Serbian policemen the week before. Two days later, Serbian forces returned to Racak and removed 40 of the bodies from the mosque where their families had planned to mourn them. The Yugoslav authorities then blocked Louise Arbour, the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, when she attempted to come to Kosovo to investigate the killings.⁹

D. The Limits of Persuasion: Unarmed OSCE Verifiers Unable to Halt Serbian Police Violence

Racak is only the most recent in a series of massacres committed by Serb police and soldiers over the past year. But what is most significant about Racak is that it occurred while OSCE verifiers were deployed and patrolling actively in the area.¹⁰

The inability of the OSCE verifiers to deter the massacre at Racak is the starkest illustration of why the unarmed OSCE verifiers alone lack the ability to force compliance by the Serbian police and require NATO back up.

Serbian police have also begun to step up their harassment and intimidation of the verifiers. Serb border patrols detained 21 OSCE verifiers at the Macedonia-Kosovo border for over 24 hours 26 February, and would not permit them to even return to Skopje. A week before, Serb police beat up two OSCE verifiers near Podujevo, when the verifiers refused the policemen's order to step out of their KVM vehicle.¹¹ The OSCE reported 24 February that their mission had suffered nine incidents of serious police harassment in the past four days.

There are also increasing reports of the formation of a new network of Serbian "Self-Defense" (Samo-Odbrana) militias created under the slogan "If Milosevic won't protect us, we will protect ourselves." Its base is reported to be Caglavica, 10 km south of

⁸ OSCE KVM weekly report, 7 January 1999.

⁹ According to Western sources quoted by the *Washington Post*, wiretaps indicate that a cover up of the Racak massacre was ordered by the top Serbian police chief, Serbian Interior Minister Gen. Sreten Lukic, and Yugoslav deputy prime minister Nikolai Sainovic. Source: R. Jeffrey Smith, "Serbs Try to Cover Up Massacre: Kosovo Reprisal Plot Bared by Phone Taps," *Washington Post*, 28 January 1999. According to the article, Sainovic told Lukic, "go in hard."

¹⁰ Interviews conducted in Kosovo 21 January 1999 with US verifiers who asked not to be identified, who were able to monitor Serb police radios in the area of Racak during the killing.

¹¹ Source: Radio B92 internet news report, 22 February 1999. The *New York Times* reported 23 February 1999 that "When the [OSCE] monitors refused to [get out of their car], the [Serbian police] officers punched them several times and pulled them from their vehicles....[An OSCE spokeswoman said, 'It was a very violent act of aggression...[The Serbian officers] were either incredibly undisciplined or under orders.'"

Pristina. Observers say the militias are armed with bazookas and rocket propelled grenades, weapons of much higher caliber than those distributed to Serbian civilians by the Serbian police.¹² Unarmed verifiers alone cannot be expected to deal with this dangerous development.

E. Creating a Safe Space for Post-Conflict Assistance

As the mere act of signing an agreement does not constitute the end of any conflict, Kosovo will not be able to move towards peace until the key military and security components of the agreement have been implemented. Only after NATO has established a secure environment can Kosovo's displaced begin to return and the civilian implementation aspects of any agreement start. This has been clearly demonstrated with Bosnia's NATO-led Stabilisation Force, which is meant to provide a safe space within which civilian implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords may be successful. In Kosovo, the international community should recognise that civilian implementation cannot begin until this space has been secured.

In order to begin building a culture of accountability among the Serbian MUP, the OSCE KVM should compile a database of the name, rank, company, and if possible photographs of the 2,500 Serbian MUP police permitted to stay in Kosovo. Knowing the international community has that information on file should discourage police abuse of civilians, and further atrocities and will enable a future vetting process. The Serbian Ministry of Interior should be required to provide the OSCE KVM a complete list of personnel in Kosovo. NATO should immediately remove those Serbian police found in Kosovo who are not in that database or who continue blocking implementation of the civilian components of an agreement.

F. Secure Environment as Essential Prerequisite to Elections

ICG strongly recommends that the international community hold off from conducting elections in Kosovo until: all but 2,500 Serbian police and 2,500 Yugoslav army soldiers have been withdrawn from Kosovo; those who remain are under the firm control of NATO and the OSCE KVM, and a real atmosphere of security has taken hold. If the experience in Bosnia can serve as any guide, Kosovars who feel under threat when they go to the polls will be likely to elect hard-line militants who will be unfriendly to the peace process.

III. PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS

A. Preventing the Exodus of Kosovo's Serbs

Many analysts believe that the greatest threat to Kosovo's Serbs comes not from the Kosovo Albanians, as one might expect, but from Slobodan Milosevic.

As his refusal to appoint a single Kosovo Serb to the Yugoslav delegation to the Rambouillet peace negotiations suggests, Milosevic is preparing the same fate for the

¹² Interview with Italian *La Stampa* journalist Guiseppi Zaccaria, in Pristina, Kosovo 23 January 1999.

200,000 Kosovo Serbs to which he condemned the Serbs in the Croatian Krajina and the Sarajevo suburbs: refugee status.

Kosovo's top Serbian Orthodox religious leader, Bishop Artemije of Raska and Prizren, told reporters that the Belgrade delegation to the talks does not represent Kosovo's Serbs. The delegation "represent[s] only two parties: Milosevic's Socialists and his wife's neo-communists. If we had confidence in them, we would not be here. The only possible solution is for Serbia to become democratic. And that cannot happen while Milosevic is in charge. We want a solution that will prevent a Serbian exodus from the province."¹³

In addition to their fear of being betrayed by Milosevic, the Serbs do have grounds to be afraid of the Kosovo Liberation Army. While the KLA has primarily targeted its attacks against Serbian policemen and Yugoslav soldiers, it has also kidnapped and killed civilians, the overwhelming majority of whom are Serb.

According to the state-run Serbian Media Centre in Pristina, the KLA carried out 1,600 attacks on Serbian police in 1998, resulting in 150 police killed and more than 250 injured. The Media Centre reports 300 Serbian civilians kidnapped by the KLA, 100 released, 40 killed, and the rest still missing. The Humanitarian Law Centre has confirmed the KLA's responsibility for the kidnapping of 42 Serbs and Montenegrins in 1998.¹⁴ The Serb authorities say that the KLA killed 34 Kosovo Serbs and Albanians in Glodjane on 9 September and buried them in a mass grave. The authorities also accuse the KLA of killing several Serb civilians near Klecka village and burning the bodies.¹⁵

In January 1999, the KLA kidnapped eight Yugoslav army soldiers who had made a wrong turn in northern Kosovo. After weeks of negotiations, the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission managed to secure their release, in an unofficial exchange under which the Yugoslav government released some 30 ethnic Albanians arrested while illegally crossing into Kosovo from Albania. That incident has been followed by several more tit-for-tat kidnappings and killings between the KLA and Serbian government forces and civilians.

NATO, the OSCE KVM, and international NGOs should coordinate immediately with Kosovo Serb leaders on providing security for, and preventing the unnecessary flight of, the majority of Kosovo Serbs who would like to stay in their homes. The OSCE and the NGOs should maintain a heightened, 24-hour presence in areas heavily populated by Serbs to provide reassurance and to signal their commitment to Serbs choosing to remain in Kosovo. The KLA must be warned that any acts of violence against Kosovo Serbs will be severely punished.

International organisations should work with Kosovo Serb leaders to develop a media campaign encouraging Kosovo Serbs to stay and making clear that violence against any of Kosovo's ethnic groups will be severely punished. International organisations should move now to counteract possible outside attempts to frighten Kosovo Serbs into leaving

¹³ "No Room in the Chateau for Artemije," RFE/FL, 19 February 1999.

¹⁴ Humanitarian Law Center, "Human Rights FR Yugoslavia 1998." In addition, the HLC reports that another 64 Serbs and Montenegrins, eight Roma, and one Muslim in Kosovo went missing in 1998, in unclear circumstances.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, HLC.

- either by hysterical media propaganda (likely to come from Serbian state media), or by "terrorist" acts designed to provoke flight and to look as if they were committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army.¹⁶

NATO and the OSCE KVM should explore the possibility of jamming broadcast media, seizing transmitters, and taking other measures to block propaganda encouraging Kosovo Serbs to flee. Experience in Bosnia indicates that NATO should deploy a fire brigade and bomb squad to areas of Kosovo heavily populated by Serbs to prevent widespread destruction of property.

B. Amnesty

Human rights monitors say over 1,200 Kosovo Albanians are currently in pre-trial detention or serving jail sentences on charges of either "aiding" terrorists or belonging to a terrorist organisation (widely understood to mean the Kosovo Liberation Army).¹⁷

This directly violates a central provision of the 13 October 1998, cease-fire, under which all people involved in crimes related to the Kosovo conflict, with the exception of those committing war crimes, were to receive amnesty. That amnesty has never been honoured.¹⁸

Human rights officials who monitor the trials say that Kosovars are being convicted on the basis of bogus, illegal, and discredited evidentiary techniques, including "confessions" obtained by police torture, the "paraffin glove" test or, sometimes, no evidence at all.

¹⁶ During the March 1996, transfer of the Sarajevo suburbs from control of the Bosnian Serbs to the Muslim-led government, hardline Serb separatists used the local media to wage a propaganda campaign to terrorize Bosnian Serbs into fleeing. The media campaign was followed by rampaging gangs of Serb hooligans who ransacked the suburbs, set houses and apartment buildings on fire, and threatened to kill Bosnian Serbs who planned to stay. Most Bosnian Serbs succumbed to the pressures and fled to Serb-held Bosnia.

¹⁷ One international human rights monitor provides the background to many of the arrests: "During the clashes of last summer, thousands of villagers in central and western Kosovo fled to the forests with their families...as the KLA was retreating from those areas following a major offensive conducted by the Yugoslav security forces, hundreds of villagers were arrested by the MUP and charged with supporting or being a member of the KLA. More than circumstantial evidence for this was hard to find, however. Now, after some five to seven months in pre-trial detention, these persons face charges of terrorism and supporting a criminal organization...physical evidence is lacking in most cases. Courts are handling cluster cases with often more than a dozen defendants with no proven connection....According to the Milosevic-Holbrooke agreement, none of these 'political trials' were supposed to take place at all, as a general amnesty was stipulated then." Marcus Brand, OSCE KVM human rights officer, unpublished memo, 16 February 1999.

¹⁸ One of the more outrageous cases of phony charges of "aiding terrorists" involves Fatime Boshnjaku, an employee of the local charity, Mother Theresa Society. While distributing humanitarian relief provided by the US-based NGO Mercy Corps International to ethnic Albanian displaced people in the western Kosovo village of Sheremet, Boshnjaku was detained by Serbian police, and charged 12 July with "aiding" terrorists. Though Boshnjaku had done nothing illegal, and had notified the Serbian police the day before delivering the humanitarian relief to the village, Boshnjaku spent seven months in pre-trial detention. After several delays, Mrs. Boshnjaku was tried in Djakovica municipal court 17 February, found guilty, and sentenced to 7 months in prison, which she had already served. Source: interviews with OSCE KVM human rights officers in Djakovica and Pec, the Humanitarian Law Center and Mercy Corps International.

Hundreds of Kosovars were sentenced to prison on terrorism-related charges in the first few weeks of February alone.¹⁹

In addition, OSCE human rights monitors report that Serbian police have begun to systematically arrest internally displaced people (IDPs) in the south-western town of Djakovica. The police say the fact that these people are refugees from towns that saw fighting this past year is a sign of their possible terrorist activities. One human rights officer said three IDPs, including one 16-year-old boy, were arrested in Djakovica 17 February and badly beaten while in police custody. After they were released, OSCE KVM human rights monitors went to their homes and took photographs of their injuries, for which the police arrested them again, and questioned them about why they talked with the OSCE.²⁰

C. Access

A significant obstacle to the monitoring and enforcement of human rights in Kosovo to date has been the refusal of the Yugoslav authorities to grant international verifiers access to detention facilities, hospitals, mental hospitals and other facilities where police torture and mistreatment are alleged.

NATO should immediately insist upon unhindered access for OSCE KVM monitors and NATO forces to all such facilities, including hospitals, prisons and other detention facilities in Pristina, Gnjilane, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pec, Prizren Lipljan, and Istok in Kosovo, and Nis (military prison), Sremski Mitrovica, Leskovac, Vranje, Zajcar, Belgrade and Prokupje. Other unofficial sites of suspected detention and mistreatment of prisoners, including the Feronikl factory near Glogovac, should be inspected by international verifiers as soon as possible and on an ongoing basis, to prevent continued mistreatment, and to free those illegally detained.

D. War Crimes: Time to Exercise "The Hague Option"

Despite the massive violations of international humanitarian law which have occurred in Kosovo over the past year, there is no clear leadership from the US or its European allies on the issue of war crimes. Indeed, as the conflict has worn on, it has become clear that the authority of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, as well as the backing of the international community, has been weakened. Milosevic, aware that he is a possible target of the Tribunal, continues to refuse to accept the jurisdiction of the court, to allow Tribunal investigators in, or to turn over indicted war crimes suspects living in Serbian territory.

The interim agreement as it was negotiated at Rambouillet was so vague on the issue that the Tribunal was forced to lodge a formal protest with negotiators. It would thus be fair to say that international humanitarian law has also become a victim of Kosovo.

But there can be no sustainable peace for Kosovo until human rights for all its citizens are protected and serious human rights violations are punished. As Racak is only one in

¹⁹ Source : Kosovo Information Center (KIC) report, 5 February 1999. The Kosova Information Center, close to Rugova's LDK, provides a daily news bulletin, available on-line at <www.kosova.com>.

²⁰ Interview with OSCE KVM human rights monitor, Djakovica, 17 February 1999.

a series of massacres and other grave crimes against civilians, it is imperative that the Tribunal be at the heart of any solution. Concerns that the pursuit of justice will destabilise the region are short-sighted; experience has shown that only when individual criminal responsibility for war crimes has been judiciously ascertained can real stability, peace, and reconciliation begin to take root.

Following nine years of wartime atrocities that have stained the region with blood, and after a series of empty threats from NATO and the international community, it is high time to seriously pursue the war crimes option in Kosovo.

Racak can be the starting point. Strong evidence indicates that the attack was orchestrated by Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic and carried out by Serbian Interior Minister General Sreten Lukic.²¹ Other high-ranking officials and members of the Lukic family have indeed been implicated in many of the region's other horrific crimes, including attacks in Bosnia, in 1992 and 1995, on Visegrad and Srebrenica, respectively.²² That these men remain at large is symptomatic of the impunity which pervades the Balkans and which the international community has seen fit to tolerate.

The United States and its allies must pursue an aggressive investigation of Sainovic and Lukic and then assist the ICTY in building a case leading up the chain of command to Milosevic, by turning over intelligence to the Tribunal.

It is said that the only thing that frightens Milosevic is that one day he may be brought to justice for his many crimes. An indictment would not only isolate him as an international pariah, it would embolden the growing domestic opposition to his regime, which has been reluctant to speak out against Kosovo for fear of engendering a nationalist backlash. Indeed, an indictment against Milosevic may provide the international community the vehicle it needs to marginalise Milosevic and his hard-line deputies and to nurture instead a progressive government that will be more stabilising for the region.

At the very least, while policymakers are undecided over which direction they should go in Kosovo, the active pursuit and apprehension of indicted war criminals in both Bosnia and Kosovo should be a top priority for the Tribunal and for NATO. Activism on this score will make it clear to Milosevic and other potential spoilers that implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord will not be held hostage to the outcome of the conflict in Kosovo. Vigorous pursuit of the war crimes option will also remind Milosevic that, contrary to what he believes, he does not hold all the cards.

The ICTY must also assume an aggressive role in pursuing evidence of war crimes in Kosovo.²³ Tribunal officials should not be thwarted in their investigations by FRY or Serbian authorities- as was the case following Racak- but should enter Kosovo through Montenegro, which has offered to issue visas. The Chief Prosecutor must also be

²¹ "Serbs Tried to Cover Up Massacre" *The Washington Post*, 28 January 1999, p. A1.

²² For additional information on the role of Lukic family in the Bosnian war, see Chuck Sudetic's *Blood and Vengeance: One Family's Story of the War in Bosnia*, published by W.W. Norton & Company, New York, NY, 1998.

²³ Sources indicate that the Tribunal did not even hire Albanian interpreters until well after the violence in Kosovo had escalated. In addition, the only analyst on the Kosovo investigating team does not read any of the local languages.

actively engaged in ensuring that the Tribunal is not sold down the river during negotiations.

Inside Kosovo, members of the OSCE KVM must continue to be instructed to pass any relevant information regarding war crimes and other crimes against humanity- committed by either party to the conflict - to the Hague. Likewise, any independently obtained intelligence reports which could prove valuable to the ICTY must be passed on.

Once implementation of any agreement begins, NATO troops should actively assist the ICTY by providing escorts to Tribunal investigators, securing sites of alleged war crimes, and arresting indicted war criminals. NATO should also ensure the access for ICTY officials anywhere in the former Yugoslavia.

Too many innocent lives have been lost in the Balkans while criminal networks- with Milosevic at the helm- remain at large. It is not too late to break this culture of impunity. The international community, including the ICTY, the OSCE KVM, and NATO, can still reinvigorate the notion that justice is central to any lasting peace.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Civilian components of any agreement - including post-conflict assistance programs and conducting credible elections - cannot begin until the security aspects have been successfully implemented. Drawing on lessons learned from the international community's efforts to implement the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia, ICG recommends that the following steps be taken so that the Kosovo peace process begins on the right track:

Enforcing the Withdrawal, Disarmament and Cooperation of Military Forces

- The scheduled withdrawal of Serbian police and Yugoslav soldiers from Kosovo must be strictly enforced according to the timeline prescribed in the peace agreement.
- The NATO-led peace implementation force for Kosovo should interpret ambiguities in the security annex of the peace agreement in favour of a robust NATO role. NATO should move to close the enforcement gap that will arise when unarmed civilian agencies such as the OSCE KVM meet resistance from the local parties. This will permit the entire peace process to succeed and will facilitate NATO's timely withdrawal from Kosovo.
- It is essential that NATO step up patrols in areas where the KLA is being forced to disarm, in order to prevent any attacks that might erode confidence in the demilitarisation process. NATO should dismantle all checkpoints in Kosovo controlled by Serbian government forces and the Kosovo Liberation Army to promote freedom of movement for the civilian population.
- The international community should create incentives for the KLA to disarm by offering early training in community policing and other civil administration tasks to

- those KLA commanders, regiments and community leaders who are most cooperative with the peace process.
- Lack of compliance by Serb government forces in Kosovo should be linked to their freedom of movement. Acts of violence committed by those on Belgrade's payroll should result in severe restrictions on their freedom to patrol and conduct training exercises. NATO should carry out swift, consistent, and meaningful punishment of acts of violence and provocation perpetrated by both the Serbian police and the Kosovo Liberation Army.
 - In addition, NATO and the OSCE KVM patrol teams should report sightings of paramilitary police and other people suspected of carrying out violence in Kosovo. Both NATO and the OSCE KVM should maintain databases of people suspected of war crimes, persistent harassment of villagers, etc. which should be shared with the Hague Tribunal. The rapid response to and reporting of military and paramilitary abuses will signal the standard of behaviour NATO is prepared to tolerate and can prevent continued obstruction of the peace process.

ICG strongly recommends that the international community hold off from conducting elections in Kosovo until all but 2,500 Serbian police and 2,500 Yugoslav army soldiers have been withdrawn from Kosovo, those who remain are under the firm control of NATO and the OSCE KVM, and a real atmosphere of security has taken hold.

Protecting Kosovo's Serbs

- NATO, the OSCE KVM and international NGOs should assist Kosovo Serb leaders in providing security for and preventing the unnecessary flight of Kosovo Serbs. International organisations should try to maintain a heightened 24-hour presence in areas heavily populated by Serbs while working with Kosovo Serb leaders to develop a media campaign encouraging Kosovo Serbs to stay. NATO should make clear to all parties that violence against any of Kosovo's ethnic groups will be severely punished.
- NATO and the OSCE KVM should explore the possibility of jamming broadcast media, seizing transmitters, and taking other measures to block propaganda encouraging Kosovo Serbs to flee. Experience in Bosnia indicates that NATO should deploy a fire brigade and bomb squad to areas of Kosovo heavily populated by Serbs to prevent widespread destruction of property.

Guaranteeing Human Rights

- The implementation mission should demand the immediate release of all 1,200 Kosovo Albanians in pre-trial detention or serving prison sentences on charges related to "terrorism." The OSCE KVM Human Rights Division maintains a database of those charged and tried on such crimes, which can be used to ascertain those who should receive amnesty.
- NATO and the OSCE KVM should demand immediate access to all facilities in Kosovo, including hospitals, police stations, military and police bases, courtrooms

and detention facilities and should conduct ongoing inspections of these facilities to deter mistreatment of detainees and secure the release of those illegally detained.

- The OSCE KVM should compile a list of the name, rank, company and commander of all personnel working in detention facilities and found on the premises of the sites listed above. Those personnel should be warned that they are now being closely monitored and that any suggestion of torture or serious mistreatment of detainees will be passed on to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The OSCE KVM should provide concrete, written instructions to law enforcement and justice system personnel on how to treat those in their custody.
- The active pursuit and apprehension of indicted war criminals in Bosnia and Kosovo should be a top priority for the Tribunal and for NATO. Activism on this score will make it clear to Milosevic and other potential spoilers that implementation of the Dayton Peace Accord will not be held hostage to the outcome of the conflict in Kosovo. NATO troops should assist the ICTY with escorts, securing sites of alleged war crimes, and arresting indicted war criminals in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The United States and its allies must aggressively assist the Tribunal in preparing indictments against those responsible for violations of international law and in building a case leading up the chain of command to Milosevic.

APPENDIX 1

"WHO'S WHO" OF KOSOVO'S CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE

A. KEY KOSOVO ALBANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES AND PERSONALITIES

LDK (*Lidhjes Demokratike te Kosoves*) - Democratic League of Kosovo

Working out of a modest one-story white building in Pristina that houses Kosovo's PEN writers' club, the LDK and its president Ibrahim Rugova have led Kosovo Albanians' peaceful resistance to Belgrade since Milosevic revoked the province's autonomy in 1989. But when fighting broke out in Drenica in February 1998, critics of Rugova's peaceful (passive) resistance coalesced around the Kosovo Liberation Army and more radical Kosovo Albanian political parties, including the LPK and the new United Democratic Front (see below).

Ibrahim Rugova

53, president of LDK. Sorbonne-educated professor of Albanian literature, known as the "Gandhi" of Kosovo for his decade long passive resistance to Serbian rule. Elected president of self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo in 1992, re-elected in 1998. Moved in February 1998, to purge top LDK ranks of those who disagree with his policies, including former political prisoners. Faces increasing criticism from militant Kosovars who support armed resistance and for his resistance to sharing power.

Edita Tahiri

LDK's foreign affairs specialist, a 43-year-old engineering graduate who speaks English.

LBD (*Levizja e Bashkuar Demokratike*)- United Democratic League:

Formed in the spring of 1998, a coalition of three opposition political parties. Headed by 62-year-old literary critic and writer, **Rexhep Qosja**, the United Democratic Movement is reported to have close ties to the KLA and contains frustrated former members of Rugova's LDK. Qosja is reported to favour the idea of 'Greater Albania.' His party is considered by some to be right-wing.

The parties allied in the United Democratic Front (LBD) are: Mr. Qosja's former party, the "New LDK," the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo (PPK) headed by Bajram Kosumi (see below), and UNIKOMBI, headed by Ukshin Hotti, a political prisoner currently in jail.

Hydajet Hyseni

45-year-old journalist, former vice-president of LDK, was among several former political prisoners pushed out of the party's top ranks by Rugova in February 1998; now top leader of LBD. As student leader in 1981, Hyseni led protests against the Serbian regime.

PPK (*Partia Parlamentare e Kosoves*) - Parliamentary Party of Kosovo

Formerly headed by Adem Demaci (see below), now under the leadership of **Bajram Kosumi**, 38, the PPK has joined the United Democratic Movement coalition. Kosumi, a former political prisoner, is considered one of the brightest politicians in Kosovo and is discussed as a potential future Kosovo president.

Mehmet Hajrizi

50, secretary of the United Democratic Movement, teacher and former LDK vice-president.

LPK (Levizja Popullore e Kosoves) - Popular Movement of Kosovo

Formed in 1982, the LPK has consistently advocated that violence and armed resistance are the way to achieve independence. Has looked to the Irish Republican Army as a model of how to use violence to achieve political ends. Some top-ranking KLA members are said to come from the LPK.

OTHER KEY KOSOVO ALBANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES:

Adem Demaci

64, called the “Nelson Mandela” of Kosovo because of the 28 years he spent as a political prisoner in Yugoslavia, was named the “general political representative” of the KLA following the October 1998 cease-fire. However, Demaci resigned the post 2 March 1999, under pressure from the US, which was worried that Demaci was urging the KLA to oppose the Rambouillet peace agreement, and because he was supporting a hardline militant faction of the KLA. Demaci, widely respected for his role as a political dissident, especially by student groups, made clear in his resignation speech that he considers those who sign the internationally-backed peace agreement traitors to the idea of an independent Kosovo. Although suffering from diabetes, and sidelined by the KLA, Demaci has vowed to remain politically active.

Fehmi Agani

66, former vice-president of LDK, and one of its four founders; considered the “brains” behind the party. Ally of Rugova. Well-respected by most of Kosovo’s political factions.

Bujar Bukoshi

51, physician, who serves as the “prime minister” of Kosovo’s government-in-exile in Germany. Funnel money from the Kosovo Albanian diaspora to the province for its parallel health and education systems. Reported to have helped fund the FARK, a rival military organisation to the KLA. Some KLA senior officials have threatened Bukoshi if he doesn’t release more government funds to them.

Veton Surroi

37, son of a former Yugoslav diplomat posted to Latin America, Surroi is the publisher of Kosovo’s leading Albanian-language newspaper, *Koha Ditore*. A longtime political activist, founder of the Parliamentary Party, internationally well connected, active in human rights. Seen as a unifying figure in Kosovo’s factionalised political scene who played a critical role in trying to help broker the Rambouillet agreement.

Blerim Shala

35, editor-in-chief of the political weekly magazine *Zeri*. A political moderate, Shala had urged Kosovo Albanian negotiators to accept an earlier draft peace plan put forward by US envoy Christopher Hill which would have provided Kosovo at least as much autonomy as it had under the 1974 Yugoslav constitution. Attended the Rambouillet negotiations as part of the ethnic Albanian negotiating team.

Hashim Thaqi

The 29-year-old Kosovo Liberation Army rebel leader known by his nom-de-guerre "Snake," Thaqi emerged at the Rambouillet peace talks as the new *de facto* leader of the Kosovar Albanians. Upon return from Rambouillet, was nominated from among a group of Kosovar politicians to serve as prime minister of a provisional government which should govern until elections are held. Thaqi earned a political science degree from a Swiss university and is known for his love of literature. He is one of five KLA leaders who serve in the rebel army's political directorate. In the summer of 1998, Thaqi was convicted in absentia by Yugoslav courts for his KLA activities and sentenced to 22 years in prison.²⁴

Jakup Krasniqi

40s, former political prisoner, and former member of the LDK government in Kosovo's central Drenica region, Krasniqi became the Kosovo Liberation Army's spokesman in July 1998 and also serves as one of five members of KLA political directorate. Was part of the Kosovo Albanian negotiating team at Rambouillet.

Upon their return from the Rambouillet peace talks 23 February 1999, the three major planks of the Kosovo Albanian delegation - the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) led by Hashim Thaqi, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) led by Ibrahim Rugova, and the United Democratic Front (LBD) led by Rexhep Qosja - announced that they would form a provisional government for Kosovo. Local news reports said that the provisional government would have a mandate to govern until elections were held. KLA political directorate member Hashim Thaqi is reported to have been chosen the prime minister of the provisional government.

Albin Kurti

20s, Kosovo Albanian student leader who's served as an interpreter and spokesman to Adem Medaci. The prominence of student leaders such as Kurti and the Kosovo student movement (Students Independent Union of the University of Pristina, UPSUP) in Kosovo politics is in part testament to the youthfulness of Kosovo's population. 45% of Kosovars are under 18, and 70% are under the age of 30.

B. THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY

Over the past year of conflict, the armed rebel movement the **UCK (*Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves*)** or **Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)** has transformed itself from a highly decentralised, uncoordinated farmers' rebellion led by a few hundred core members into a more professional, trained guerrilla movement reported to include 7,000 trained military members and some 35,000 irregulars. The KLA has also transformed Kosovo's political landscape, becoming a major political force in its own right, and challenging the pacifist politics of Kosovo Albanians' long-serving leader, Ibrahim Rugova.

It remains to be seen what role the KLA will play in a post-conflict Kosovo. At Rambouillet, its political leaders attempted to forge a role for the movement as the nucleus of Kosovo's future ethnically-representative police and security forces.

²⁴ Source: *Washington Post*, Balkans Special Report online.

As of this writing (March 1999), the KLA still lacks an entirely centralised command and control. Western military analysts suggest that the KLA's failure to completely centralise its command structure is due to the logistical difficulty the KLA leadership has had in moving freely about the province while Kosovo's key roads and telecoms were under the control of the Yugoslav security forces.

But over the past year, the KLA has developed a clearer, more stable organisational structure that includes a General Staff of 18 members, most of them reported to be ex-Yugoslav National Army (JNA) officers, many of whom are reported to have fought with the Bosnian Muslims. The KLA political wing is directed by five members, of whom the 29-year-old political science graduate **Hashim Thaqi** has emerged the leader. Other political directorate members include **Sokol Bashota**, **Rame Buja**, **Xhavit Haliti** and KLA spokesman **Jakup Krasniqi**.²⁵

Beneath the General Staff, the KLA is divided into seven regional commands.²⁶ Regional commanders include Naim Maloku in Dragobilje; "Remi," the nickname of the 27-year-old former law student who commands the Llap region, based in Podujevo; Shaban Shala, the former vice chairman of the Council for Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, in Drenica; and Ramush Haradinai, commander of the Dukagjin zone, and former French foreign legionnaire. The rebels are reported to be equipped with "automatic rifles, high-powered sniper rifles with telescopic sights, rocket-propelled grenades, and anti-tank weapons...bought in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, and smuggled into Kosovo from Albania" and Macedonia.²⁷

On 22 February, the Kosovo Albanian opposition politician Adem Demaci declared the 28-year-old KLA commander of the Drenica region, **Sulejman "The Sultan" Selimi**, the supreme commander of the rebel army.²⁸ Selimi and his 27-year-old uncle **Rexhep Selimi** are two of the original founders of the KLA. In an interview with the Kosovo Albanian weekly *Zeri*, Rexhep Selimi said his activities with the KLA began as early as 1993. Rexhep Selimi is famous among Kosovars for appearing in military uniform at a funeral for the activist teacher Halit Geci on 28 November 1997, in Lausa, Drenica - the first public sign that the long-rumoured KLA in fact existed.²⁹

²⁵ Biographies of the KLA political directorate members, compiled from news reports (Reuters, AP, BBC, and the *New York Times*) and interviews in Kosovo. **Rame Buja**: once a member of the presidency of the LDK, also spent time in prison. Now serves as KLA's director of civilian affairs. Has a degree in Albanian literature and is viewed by Western diplomats as a relatively open-minded and flexible. **Xhavit Haliti**: early member of the KLA with close ties to the ethnic Albanian diaspora in Switzerland and Germany. **Sokol Bashota**, rebel commander, reported to run the KLA's information directorate, and to support signing peace agreement.

²⁶ According to the KLA, regional commanders include those of Drenica (Glogovac, Srbica, Malishevo, Klina), Shala (Kosovska Mitrovica), Dukagjin (Pec, Prizren, Decan, Djakovica), Llap (Podujeva), Nerodine (Urosevac/ Ferizai), and Pashtrik.

²⁷ Source: "Kosovo Rebels No Ragtag Army," Tom Hundley, *Chicago Tribune*, 10 February 1999.

²⁸ Source: Radio B92, quoting the Pristina-daily *Kosova sot*, 22 February 1999. "[Sulejman] Selimi, who was born in Ovcarevo village, was one of the founders of the UCK and served as the commander of the Drenica region".

²⁹ Source: *Zeri*, issue 1691, 23 January 1999. Available in English on-line at www.xs4all.nl/~pressnow/zeri/zer1691.html in English.

The KLA organisation also includes civil administration and military police wings, as well as a KLA Information Service that runs a Web site out of Switzerland (www.kosovapress.com) and an FM radio station in Kosovo called "Kosova e Lire" (Free Kosovo).

The KLA is funded by Kosovo Albanian diaspora donations to "Homeland is Calling" funds in several European countries, the US, and Australia. Key KLA diaspora figures include the Geneva-based **Bardhyl Mahmuti**, who serves as a kind of international spokesman for the KLA; and the mysterious **Azem Syla** (a.k.a. *Daja I Madh*, or "The Old Uncle"), who is reported to go between Germany, Albania and Kosovo procuring weapons and equipment for the rebel army. **Ibrahim Kelmendi** runs the "Fatherland is Calling" fund in Germany, and is believed to fund the Dukagjin-based KLA commander, Ramush Haradinai.

C. SERB AND YUGOSLAV POLITICAL PARTIES AND PLAYERS IN KOSOVO

Father Sava

The Internet-savvy head of the Serbian Orthodox monastery in Decani, western Kosovo. A voice of tolerance and moderation in the midst of conflict.

Bishop Artemije Radosavljevic

Of Raska-Prizren, head of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo.

Momcilo Trajkovic

President of the Kosovo **Serbian Resistance Movement**. Over the past year, the party has increasingly allied itself with the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo in criticising Milosevic for his mishandling of the Kosovo conflict. Trajkovic and his colleagues were shut out of the negotiations at Rambouillet by Milosevic.

Rade Trajkovic

Leader of the Kosovo branch of **Serbian Radical Party** (Srpska Radikalna Stranka).

General Sreten Lukic

Head of the Serbian Ministry of Interior police in Kosovo; his deputy is Miroslav Mijatovic. Lukic is accused by western sources of ordering the cover up of the Racak massacre.³⁰

Nikola Sainovic

50, Yugoslav deputy prime minister who serves as point person for Kosovo for international community. Delegate from Milosevic's Socialist Party. Denies accusations that he ordered the Racak massacre and its cover-up.

General Colonel Dragoljub Ojdanic

Commander of the Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavija, VJ).³¹

³⁰"Serbs Tried to Cover up Massacre. Kosovo Reprisal Plot Bared by Phone Taps," R. Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 28 January 1999.

³¹ According to the *Washington Post* ("NATO, Serbs Come Close to Conflict," 4 March 1999): "Under an accord last October, the Yugoslav army can have up to 10,000 troops inside Kosovo and 15,000 interior police forces. These forces were to be restricted to six towns -- Pristina, Pec, Prizren, Urosevac, Mitrovica and Gnjilane. Now, some units located outside the six towns: *North of Podujevo*: the Yugoslav army 11th armored brigade (about 6,000 troops), plus 60 tanks and 50 armored personnel carriers are deployed; *Central region*: Lapusnik: one

Major-General Nebojsa Pavkovic

Commander of the Yugoslav Army's Third Army, based in Pristina.

Bajram Haliti

Kosovo Information Secretary (a Roma loyal to Belgrade government).

D. KEY INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS

Christopher Hill

US Ambassador to Macedonia, has served as the main international negotiator on Kosovo since fighting began in 1998. The 46-year-old Rhode Island native is due to become US charge d'affaires in Belgrade.³²

Wolfgang Petritsch

European Union envoy to Kosovo, Austrian diplomat.

Richard C. Holbrooke

Former US Asst. Secretary-of-State for European and Canadian Affairs who brokered the Dayton Peace Accords that ended Bosnia's war in 1995. Negotiated an October, 1998, cease-fire agreement for Kosovo with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Nominated to be US ambassador to UN.

William Walker

US diplomat who heads the OSCE KVM mission. Following comments Walker made naming Serb forces responsible for the massacre of 45 ethnic Albanians at Racak in January, 1999, Milosevic declared Walker *persona non grata* and ordered him expelled from Serbia. Under international pressure, that expulsion order was suspended, and Walker was permitted to remain.

Gabriel Keller

French diplomat who serves as Walker's deputy at the OSCE KVM.

General John Drewienkiewicz

British general in charge of operations for the OSCE KVM mission.

Lt. General Michael Jackson

British NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps commander, to head the 28,000-strong proposed NATO-led peace implementation force to Kosovo (KFOR).

tank company; Komarone: two tank companies; Volujak: one tank platoon (one-third of a company); Dulje: one infantry company; * *Northern region*: Bajgora: one tank company; Vuciturn: two infantry comp; Podujevo: two infantry comp. *Southern region*: Junik/Decane: one tank comp., Djakovica: two infantry comp., Zjum: two tank platoons (equal to 2/3 of a company), Djeneral Jankovic: one engineering/demolition platoon, Djeneral Somanja: one tank comp." (one company equals about 100 troops).

³² Source: *Washington Post*.