
MONITORING THE NORTHERN IRELAND CEASEFIRES:

LESSONS FROM THE BALKANS

I. OVERVIEW

This briefing compares the mandate of the Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland (IMC) with those of two recent European examples of the monitoring and enforcement of compliance with peace agreements: the unsuccessful Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) of 1998-1999, and the much more fruitful mission of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1995. It attempts to identify lessons from those earlier experiences that may help the IMC carry out its mission in the context of carrying forward the Good Friday peace process.

The IMC in Northern Ireland has two significant advantages over the Kosovo mission. The broader range of sanctions available enables it to recommend penalties appropriate to the seriousness of the violation, creating a more sophisticated deterrent, and it enjoys direct links to military and police intelligence on both sides of the Irish border. However, like the KVM, it is not fully accepted by some key local political actors. The IMC should establish lines of communication with all political parties and paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland as a matter of priority.

The Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina has many tasks, but among them is the power to impose sanctions on those local actors it deems to be obstructing the implementation of the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, including measures similar to those which the IMC in Northern Ireland may recommend. The exercise of OHR's powers has had a generally positive effect on the Bosnian political situation, and the IMC has similar potential in Northern Ireland. However, it is important that the procedure by which it exercises those powers is as open and transparent as possible.

In both Kosovo and Bosnia, the crucial question was not so much the efficacy of the procedures for monitoring the security guarantees given by the parties, but the presence or absence of the political will to sustain a peace process: lacking in Kosovo in 1998-1999, but increasingly visible in Bosnia. The IMC's success or failure will depend on the wider political picture in Northern Ireland, over which it has little influence and no control.

II. NORTHERN IRELAND

In the 1996-1998 negotiations which led to the 1998 Belfast Agreement (the Good Friday Agreement), all participants had to subscribe formally to the "Mitchell Principles" – named after former U.S. Senator George Mitchell, who had chaired a three-member International Body whose report set them out as formal recommendations in February 1996.¹ The principles were effectively commitments by the parties, who pledged to:

- ❑ resolve political issues by democratic and exclusively peaceful means;
- ❑ disarm totally all paramilitary organisations;
- ❑ agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission;

¹ The other two members of the International Body were a retired Canadian General, John de Chastelain, who remains engaged in the decommissioning process in Northern Ireland, and former Finnish Prime Minister Harri Holkeri, now Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Kosovo. The three members of the International Body were also co-chairs of the 1996-1998 negotiations. Senator Mitchell served as the first Chairman of the International Crisis Group from 1995 to 2000.

- renounce for themselves, and oppose any efforts by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations;
- abide by the terms of any agreement reached in all-party negotiations and resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree, and;
- urge that “punishment” killings and beatings stop and take effective steps to prevent such actions.

During the course of the negotiations, two parties (Sinn Fein and the Ulster Democratic Party) were excluded for a number of weeks after the British and Irish governments agreed that they had breached the Mitchell Principles when the paramilitary organisations with which they were associated (respectively the Irish Republican Army and the Ulster Freedom Fighters) were responsible for fatal shootings.

The Belfast Agreement of 1998² committed ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive to take a pledge of office that included “commitment to non-violence and exclusively democratic and peaceful means”. Ministers could be excluded from office for twelve months by the Assembly, provided there was sufficient support from both Nationalist and Unionist members.³

The British government also committed to reducing the security forces deployed in Northern Ireland to “levels compatible with a normal peaceful society”, to removing security installations, to revoking emergency powers and to (unspecified) “other measures appropriate to and compatible with a normal peaceful society”.

All participants, without specifying those parties which were linked to paramilitary groups, committed “to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations...and to use any influence they may

have, to achieve the decommissioning of all paramilitary arms within two years”.

There were no specific provisions for monitoring either the implementation of the security commitments entered into by the British and Irish governments, or the activities of paramilitary groups. In addition, the paramilitary groups themselves were not parties to the agreement, so the commitments on the decommissioning of illegally held weapons were entered into only by the political parties. A separate Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), chaired by Canadian General John de Chastelain (who had been a co-chair of the negotiations), was set up to deal directly with the paramilitaries.

The questions of progress on decommissioning and whether or not particular paramilitary groups’ ceasefires were still intact became increasingly contested. In particular, allegations in October 2002 that the IRA had been using Sinn Fein’s offices in the parliamentary buildings at Stormont near Belfast to gather intelligence caused a political crisis which resulted in the suspension of the Assembly.

In this context, two Northern Irish political parties⁴ urged that an external monitor be appointed to evaluate reports on the paramilitary ceasefires. The British and Irish governments announced in May 2003 that a four-member commission would be set up and published an agreement on 4 September 2003, subsequently ratified by both parliaments, to establish the IMC, which was formally constituted on 7 January 2004. Its members are Richard Kerr, a former deputy director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency; John Grieve, former head of the London Metropolitan Police’s anti-terrorist squad; Lord Alderdice, the outgoing presiding officer of the Northern Ireland Assembly; and Joe Brosnan, a retired senior Irish civil servant.

The IMC’s mandate is to report regularly to the British and Irish governments on a) activity by paramilitary groups; b) security normalisation; and c) claims by parties represented in the Northern Ireland Assembly that individuals or political parties have breached the terms of the 1998 Belfast Agreement (specifically, the pledge of office taken by ministers in the Northern Ireland Executive). It

² Full text at <http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreement.htm>.

³ The specific requirements for “cross-community support” on this and other issues within the Assembly are that those voting in favour should include either a) a majority of members present and voting, including both a majority of the Nationalist members present and voting and a majority of the Unionist members present and voting; or b) 60 per cent of members present and voting including 40 per cent of the Nationalist members present and voting and 40 per cent of the Unionist members present and voting.

⁴ The Alliance Party of Northern Ireland and the Ulster Unionist Party; the idea had been circulating since the summer of 2002, that is, before the October 2002 crisis.

can also recommend “any remedial action” against individuals or parties whom it finds in breach of the pledge of office. Specific sanctions envisaged by the legislation establishing the IMC include censure, reduction of public funding for political parties, reduction of salaries for ministers, and exclusion from office of ministers for a (renewable) period of between three and twelve months; presumably other less drastic measures could also be recommended.

The IMC’s recommendations are put to the Implementation Group, a body composed of representatives of parties in the Northern Ireland Assembly. If the Implementation Group agrees that the recommended action is appropriate, a motion is put before the Assembly. Should the Implementation Group fail to reach consensus or its motion fail to pass, the British Government has authority to apply and enforce any sanctions consistent with the Commission’s recommendations.

The establishment of the IMC has not been welcomed by all parties. Sinn Fein has declared that it will not cooperate with the new body, which it considers outside the terms of the Belfast Agreement. On the other hand, the Democratic Unionist Party and other anti-Belfast Agreement Unionists have opposed the new commission because they believe it will not be tough enough on the paramilitaries.

The issues involved in monitoring ceasefires and security commitments in post-conflict situations are not new or unique to Northern Ireland. It is, however, relatively unusual to have a body external to the conflicted sides which is charged with both monitoring and recommending sanctions. Two recent examples of such bodies, one a failure, the other relatively successful, can be found elsewhere in Europe: in Kosovo and Bosnia.

III. KOSOVO

The failure of the 1998-99 Kosovo Verification Mission has some interesting lessons for Northern Ireland, though the mandate,⁵ mission⁶ and

⁵ The “Agreement on the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission” between the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was signed on 16 October 1998, available at <http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Kosovo/Kosovo-Documents3.htm> (and endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1203 on 24 October 1998,

composition of the KVM were very different from those of the IMC in Northern Ireland.

Conflict between the paramilitary Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the forces of the Yugoslav Army, the Serbian Ministry of the Interior and their allied paramilitaries had escalated during the spring and summer of 1998. Concerned by reports of widespread violence against civilians by Yugoslav and Serbian forces, the UN Security Council (Resolution 1199 on 23 September 1998) demanded that Belgrade withdraw its security units, accept international monitoring and allow return of refugees and access for humanitarian agencies. Backed by the threat of a NATO bombing campaign, U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke persuaded Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic to agree on 16 October 1998 to the deployment of the KVM.

The KVM was a 1,400-strong field mission tasked with monitoring and reporting violations of a ceasefire and of human rights.⁷ It reported to the Permanent Council of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Security Council and the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Its options for recommending sanctions, however, were limited. The KVM did make its findings available to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) so that violations of international humanitarian law could be investigated and prosecuted. This was a rather indirect and drawn out penalty, however, and

available at <http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/321/21/PDF/N9832121.pdf?OpenElement>).

⁶ To verify compliance by all parties in Kosovo with UNSC Resolution 1199 and military aspects of the verbal agreement reached between Yugoslav President Milosevic and the senior U.S. diplomat Richard Holbrooke (ceasefire, reduction of Yugoslav force levels to January 1998 strength), and report instances of progress and/or non-compliance to the OSCE Permanent Council, the UN Security Council and other organisations; reports also to be provided to the authorities of the FRY. Operationally, this meant receiving weekly information from FRY/Serbian military and police in Kosovo and periodic updates from the relevant authorities concerning allegations of abusive actions by military or police personnel and status of disciplinary or legal actions against individuals implicated in such abuses; and monitoring and reporting roadblocks/emplacements unrelated to crime or traffic control and requesting their removal.

⁷ The head of mission was Ambassador William G. Walker of the United States. The KVM was supplemented by a NATO air verification and extraction element (Operation “Eagle Eye”).

did not appear to serve as a very effective deterrent. The only other sanction available to the KVM was the ultimate (if implicit) threat of NATO military intervention in the case of a complete failure to maintain (let alone verify) the ceasefire.⁸

The KVM was an unquestionable failure. Less than five months after its deployment, fighting had escalated to a point that it had to be extracted by NATO, which began its bombing campaign four days later. There were three key reasons for this failure.

First, the mission had the formal consent of only one of the two parties to the conflict. The Kosovo Albanians had never been brought into the process. The FRY government had at least formally agreed to the conditions laid out in Resolution 1199. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was never asked to participate in these discussions, nor was there any attempt to bring the Kosovo Albanian paramilitary groups into the 16 October agreement establishing the KVM.

Kosovo Albanian leaders expressed reservations about both these agreements to UN personnel in Kosovo.⁹ The KLA perceived the monitoring agreement between the OSCE and the FRY as preserving and thus legitimating the status quo (as it included no provision for exploring future independence),¹⁰ and its political leadership openly stated that it felt itself to be outside the agreement.¹¹ Kosovo Albanian paramilitary groups took advantage of the partial withdrawal of Yugoslav security forces to take control of new territory, establish checkpoints and launch attacks.¹² The problems caused by KLA exclusion from the KVM demonstrate the potential for a process to unravel in the absence of consent by all parties.

Secondly, there was never a genuine ceasefire to verify. Despite the fact that the FRY government formally agreed to a ceasefire and its verification, its security forces continued to target ethnic Albanian

civilians systematically. Although the security situation stabilised somewhat in the weeks following the Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement, Serbian police continued to destroy villages and forcibly displace civilians. There were also regular reports of shelling and exchanges of gunfire, and guerrilla attacks on police and military installations persisted.¹³ Both sides continued to lay mines. Reports of arbitrary executions and extra-judicial killings were common but access for the KVM to investigate was often denied.¹⁴ The security situation deteriorated steadily for the duration of the mission and, after diplomatic pressure was also deemed to have failed at the Rambouillet talks on the future status of Kosovo,¹⁵ NATO resorted to direct military intervention.

Thirdly, the verifiers had no physical means of enforcement. The fact that they were unarmed (and had no armed back-up) made them less credible and less able to prevent violations.¹⁶ On 15 January 1999, Yugoslav security forces murdered 45 ethnic Albanian civilians in Racak. This was only one of a series of massacres that the KVM verifiers were unable to prevent. What was unusual was that Racak occurred while verifiers were actively patrolling in the area.¹⁷ The level of trust and consent from both sides plummeted after this widely reported affair.¹⁸

⁸ It could also request that illegal roadblocks be dismantled.

⁹ Leaders claimed that although the majority of the Kosovo Albanian paramilitaries would respect the ceasefire, they could not guarantee adherence by smaller splinter groups. See "Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to the Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998) of the Security Council", 12 November 1998, p. 3, paras. 9-10.

¹⁰ Alex J Bellamy and Stuart Griffin, "OSCE Peacekeeping: Lessons From the Kosovo Verification Mission", *European Security*, Vol. 11, N°1, (Spring 2002), p. 13.

¹¹ Bellamy and Griffin, op. cit., p. 13.

¹² "Report of the Secretary General", op. cit., p. 3.

¹³ For a full account see the reports prepared by the Secretary General respecting UN Security Council Resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998) and 1203 (1998), 12 November 1998, 24 December 1998, 30 January 1999 and 17 March 1999; and the OSCE report, "Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told", Vienna, December 1999, available at <http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr>.

¹⁴ "Report of the Secretary General", 12 November 1998 op. cit., p. 8, paragraph 37.

¹⁵ The peace conference at Rambouillet, near Paris, collapsed on 19 March 1999 when President Milosevic refused to allow NATO to guarantee the proposed accords.

¹⁶ The NATO partnership (complementary Operation Eagle Eye) did go some way to enhancing the KVM's credibility and reducing security risks to verifiers.

¹⁷ ICG interviews with KVM verifiers revealed that they had intercepted Serb police radio communications during the killing. The unarmed monitors would have needed armed (NATO) back-up to prevent the massacres. ICG Balkans Report N°59, *Kosovo: The Road to Peace*, 12 March 1999, p. 5.

¹⁸ The KVM itself was also vulnerable to violence. Verifiers were harassed and intimidated by Serbian police. For example, Serb border patrols detained 21 verifiers at the Macedonia-Kosovo border for more than 24 hours on 26 February 1999, and would not permit them even to return to Skopje. A week earlier, two verifiers were beaten by Serbian police when they refused to step out of their KVM vehicle. See ICG Report,

The lessons of Kosovo are fairly clear. The IMC starts with two significant advantages over the KVM. The broader range of sanctions available should enable it to obtain the imposition of penalties appropriate to the seriousness of the violation, creating a more sophisticated deterrent. And it has been established with direct links to military and police intelligence on both sides of the Irish border, and (presumably) more widely as well.

But as with any verification or peacekeeping operation, the result in Kosovo depended upon the general political environment. The KVM's failure came at least in part because it was not seen as an independent and important actor in the wider political scene.¹⁹ Despite its distinguished personnel, the IMC also begins with its activities suspect in several quarters; it will be important for it at least to establish communication with all interested parties, as a precursor to gaining their confidence.

IV. BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

In Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH), the Office of the High Representative has, since 1998, sanctioned individuals and political parties deemed to be in violation of legal commitments made under the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) or to be obstructing its implementation. In addition, individuals and political parties found to have broken the rules of the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) were sanctioned by the OSCE until November 2001, when the PEC ceased to exist, and the OSCE's responsibility for managing elections was handed over to the newly created Election Commission of BiH.

The OSCE and NATO also played a role in the demilitarisation of BiH and its neighbours, controlling the movements of the local armies and overseeing a regional arms reduction process; however this concerned only conventional forces, not paramilitaries, and will not be discussed further here because it was largely unrelated to implementation of the political aspects of the peace agreement.

The OHR derives its powers from the original 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement and two subsequent

documents. The relevant section of the DPA gives OHR "final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement".²⁰ In 1997, a meeting of the Peace Implementation Council²¹ in Bonn issued an extended interpretation of OHR's role. The so-called Bonn powers allowed the High Representative to take "actions against persons holding public office or officials...who are found by the High Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its implementation".²² The Peace Implementation Council's 1998 Madrid Declaration went one step further, stating that those barred "from official office may also be barred from running in elections and from any other elective or appointive public office and from office within political parties".²³ This latter declaration empowered both OHR and the OSCE-run Provisional Elections Commission and Election Appeals Sub-Commission.

Aside from the above, however, there are no legal criteria which must be met, nor is there a strict legal process which OHR must follow before selecting and imposing sanctions. OHR does have internal guidelines on when and how to apply sanctions, but these have no legal basis;²⁴ ultimately, anything goes as long as the target of the sanctions can be plausibly accused of obstructing the DPA. This has resulted in criticism that the sanctioning process in BiH is undemocratic and lacks transparency.²⁵ At the same time, OHR's extensive powers have been instrumental in helping to prevent local officials from obstructing refugee returns,²⁶ and of course the expense of setting

²⁰ Article V of Annex 10.

²¹ The Peace Implementation Council was set up in 1995 to monitor and support the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. It includes 42 countries and numerous other international agencies involved with the process.

²² Section 2(c) of Article XI.

²³ Section 4 of Annex X.

²⁴ ICG telephone interview with OHR official, 18 November 2003.

²⁵ See Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin, "Travails of the European Raj", *Journal of Democracy*, 4 July 2003 at <http://www.balkanpeace.org/rs/archive/jul03/rs227.shtml>; also ICG Balkans Report N°52 *To Build a Peace*, 15 December 1998, p. 13, and ICG Balkans Report N°146, *Paddy Ashdown and the Paradoxes of State Building*, 22 July 2003.

²⁶ ICG telephone interview with OHR official, 18 November 2003 and ICG Balkans Report N°137, *The Continuing Challenge Of Refugee Return In Bosnia & Herzegovina*, 13 December 2002.

Kosovo: The Road to Peace, op. cit., p. 3. KVM vehicles were also fired on, for example in Stimlje on 5 November 1998. See "Report of the Secretary General", op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁹ Bellamy and Griffin, op. cit., p. 18.

up what would effectively be a parallel judicial system to adjudicate OHR rulings could be enormous. The result leaves OHR extraordinarily strong: able to decide, not merely recommend, extensive sanctions and with rather little oversight.

In the capacity of final interpreter of the DPA, OHR is authorised to impose sanctions on any individual holding public office or any political party, as long as it considers the individual or party to be obstructing the implementation of the Agreement. From 1998 to November 2003, the High Representative removed 100 public officials from their jobs.²⁷

The use of sanctions in BiH has raised – and continues to raise – a number of legal and political issues, many of which are likely to come up in one form or another as the Northern Ireland Commission begins its work.

Although the agreement between the governments of the UK and Ireland sets out fairly specific monitoring tasks for the commission, the latter's authority to report on claims that parties or individuals are in breach of their pledge of office is a somewhat hazy concept which could leave the commission vulnerable to accusations similar to those levelled at OHR. It is, therefore, important that the IMC develop and publish detailed procedures and criteria governing the sanctioning process.

An unrelated criticism of OHR is that it has little ability to enforce many of its own decisions because it has no armed forces under its command.²⁸ The Northern Ireland Commission's sanctioning powers flow directly from the intergovernmental agreement, and sanctions are ultimately enforceable by the UK government, so this is less likely to be a problem.

There are almost no limits on OHR's selection of appropriate sanctions. Since 1998, successive High

Representatives²⁹ have removed elected officials from office, including the president of the Republika Srpska and a number of ministers, mayors, and municipal leaders; banned individuals from running for office; fired judges, bureaucrats, and heads of public companies; fined political parties;³⁰ frozen bank accounts;³¹ and even barred individuals from holding office within political parties.³² The OSCE, meanwhile, has struck candidates from party lists, levied fines, removed elected officials and entire municipal councils, and decertified political parties.³³

As discussed above, OHR's virtually unlimited powers and opaque decision-making process have undermined its credibility in the eyes of some Bosnian commentators. In contrast, the IMC in Northern Ireland will have power only to recommend actions against political parties and individual members of the Assembly. Although this limits its authority and could thus reduce its ability to deter

²⁹ There have been four High Representatives: former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt (December 1995-June 1997); former Spanish foreign minister Carlos Westendorp (June 1997-July 1999); Austrian diplomat Wolfgang Petritsch (August 1999-May 2002); and British politician Lord Ashdown (May 2002-present).

³⁰ For example, in August and September 2003, Lord Ashdown fined the Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ) for failing to issue instructions to unify ethnically segregated schools. See Julia Geshakova, "Back to School – Officials taking steps to end ethnic divisions", RFE/RL, 29 August 2003 at <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2003/08/29082003162725.asp> and the OHR's official decision at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/mo-hncantdec/default.asp?content_id=30911.

³¹ On 7 July 2003, Ashdown froze the accounts of fourteen friends and family members of Radovan Karadzic who were believed to have helped the former Bosnian Serb leader and Hague War Crimes Tribunal indictee avoid capture.

³² The Peace Implementation Council's 1998 Madrid Declaration specified, in Section 4 of Annex X, that the High Representative could bar individuals from office within political parties in order to "end the practice whereby officials removed [from public office] are re-assigned to political party positions". The first use of this power was in early 1999, when Carlos Westendorp banned Drago Tokmakcija, former deputy mayor of Drvar, from holding political party offices. He had been dismissed in April 1998 from his duties as deputy mayor, but had been acting as head of the HDZ in Canton 10. See the OHR decision at http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalsdec/default.asp?content_id=264.

³³ Information about the Provisional Election Commission (PEC) and the Election Appeals Sub-Commission (EASC) during the 1996-2001 period can be found on the OSCE Mission to BiH website at <http://www.oscebih.org/>.

²⁷ See list of decisions at <http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalsdec/archive.asp>.

²⁸ OHR's responsibilities for civilian implementation were deliberately separated from the NATO-led military aspects of the Dayton Agreement, with serious consequences for the coherence of the international mission. In some cases, officials who have been stripped of their jobs by the OHR have remained in office long after their official removal. See ICG Balkans Report N°80, *Is Dayton Failing?*, 28 October 1999, pp. 108, 119, 127, 132; and ICG Balkans Report N°66, *Kosovo: Let's Learn from Bosnia*, 17 May 1999, p. 3.

non-compliance,³⁴ the more clearly limited and defined powers may in fact enhance the commission's credibility as an actor whose capabilities are known and understood by all parties.

The overall impact of the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia has been positive. Certainly by establishing that there are definite standards of behaviour expected of local politicians, OHR has succeeded in bringing those standards about, assisted by a general improvement in the political environment of Bosnia and neighbouring states since 1999. While the IMC may well become a contributing factor to improving the political atmosphere in Northern Ireland, it will only be able to do so if there is forward momentum in the process as a whole.

Brussels, 23 January 2004

³⁴ For example, the IMC could face a situation in which obstruction by lower level officials or party members (who are outside the Assembly and therefore not subject to the commission's sanctioning mandate) is not easily linked to a specific individual in the Assembly. The only option would then be to sanction an entire party, which the IMC may be reluctant to do if the incident or obstruction in question is relatively minor.

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
DPA	Dayton Peace Agreement
EASC	Election Appeals Sub-Commission
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Community
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IICD	Independent International Commission on Decommissioning
IMC	Independent Monitoring Commission for Northern Ireland
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PEC	Provisional Election Commission
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council