

TRANSFORMING SERBIA:
The Key to Long-term Balkan Stability

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The NATO intervention in Serbia and the indictment of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia have created openings within Serbian society and exposed cleavages within the regime that should be rapidly exploited to hasten Milosevic's departure and bring about genuine political change. The loss of Kosovo, the destruction resulting from the bombing, and the refusal of the international community to rebuild Serbia until Milosevic is out of power have occasioned widespread despair among Serbs who have come to view their country's future under its present leadership as a dead end.

In light of these altered circumstances, ICG has prepared the present assessment of the status of various forces within Serbian society. It suggests means by which the international community might consolidate its recent military success by fostering substantive political, economic, and social reform within Serbian society.

This paper furnishes an overview of the economic and political situation in Serbia and examines in detail the effect of recent events on the linchpins of Milosevic's power - his political network and its tentacle-like infrastructure, his circle of cronies, the military and police. The paper also looks closely at the ambiguous roles of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the ultra-nationalist right and at the state of the opposition and the movement to remove him from office. An appendix offers essential background and analysis of key opposition figures and groups.

There are many possible points of intervention where the international community, with help from Serbia's neighbours, can have an important impact if it acts now. The first priority is to increase the regime's isolation. To this end, the report recommends enforcing and expanding the EU travel ban and the seizure of all assets belonging to Milosevic, his top officials and intimates; co-operating more vigorously with the International Criminal Tribunal to secure more indictments and more arrests of those already indicted; maintaining the commitment to withhold all reconstruction assistance until Milosevic is out of power; and, once he is gone, gradually lifting international sanctions as Serbia's new government satisfies a set of predetermined conditions, such as governing according to the rule of law, respecting fundamental human rights and

freedoms, co-operating with the Tribunal, and making steady, verifiable progress toward genuine economic and political reform.

ICG also puts forward a series of measures designed to mobilise and sustain opposition to the regime – such as supporting local independent media and saturating Serbia with independent and foreign Serbian-language broadcasting; carefully monitoring those broadcasts for “stealth” infusions of ultra-nationalist propaganda; reaching far beyond Belgrade to tap the widest possible range of disaffected constituencies; supporting and show-casing the democratic model in neighbouring Montenegro; encouraging the Church to play a more active role in fostering a climate in which political change can take place; and, most immediately, supplying opposition forces with enough material and technical assistance to keep their movement alive.

After four wars supported and fought by countless ordinary Serbs, it should be clear that the removal of Slobodan Milosevic, who has been repeatedly elected by the Serbian people, will in no way solve all of Serbia’s problems. Nevertheless, it is a critical first step. Once Milosevic has gone, it may be possible for the people of Serbia to reflect upon their recent past and become involved in bringing about a more promising future.

That Serbia has no shining, untainted, democratic leader and the opposition forces there are flawed, fractious, and disorganised is a distressing testament to Milosevic’s success, through most of a decade, at strangling and isolating independent voices and thought. For much of that time, a passive international community assisted him, first, by refusing for years to intervene in his wars against Croatia and Bosnia, then, after finally winning a fragile peace for Bosnia, by refusing to respond to domestic oppression in Serbia and Kosovo, for fear of losing Milosevic as the security partner who had guaranteed that peace.

Now the international community, through its intervention on behalf of the people of Kosovo, has created an opportunity in Serbia that it cannot afford to pass up. Although a Western-style democracy is not likely to take root in Serbia in the near future, every successful eastern European democratic transition has required time and sustained effort to nurture a strong, principled, broad-based, democratic opposition capable of assuming power. The necessary investment, compared to the bill for the air campaign, is infinitesimal; the reward, of someday having a more democratic and tolerant Serbia at the heart of southeastern Europe, would be immeasurable.

Washington, D.C., 10 August 1999



TRANSFORMING SERBIA: **The Key to Long-term Balkan Stability**

I. INTRODUCTION: BOMBED INTO TURMOIL

NATO's defeat of Serbia has dramatically altered the Serbian political landscape. With Serb refugees from Kosovo and demoralised Yugoslav Army reservists flooding back into Serbia, the full blow of Kosovo's loss has begun to hit home. Slobodan Milosevic, the country's leader for close to a decade, has been indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague and a heretofore resigned and embittered population has awakened to see only continued misery and humiliating isolation in its future should Milosevic remain in power. Others – the cronies, party functionaries, and commanders dreading their own indictments – stand to lose everything if Milosevic goes and until now have felt they must cling to him if they are all to survive. The profound discontent on the part of most Serbs now seems directed at Milosevic himself, no longer at the West. However, momentum appears to be flagging, suggesting that the popular mood is one of frustration, exhaustion, and despair, rather than one hungry for political change.

These sentiments must be rapidly harnessed and focussed if a broad-based popular movement is to succeed in bringing about positive political change. Already splits have opened up in opposition ranks, the Serbian interior ministry has threatened to maintain order with force, and a defiant Milosevic has condemned the democratic forces as NATO-led and has set about buying off thousands of disgruntled soldiers and pensioners whose chief complaint is not having been paid. If he succeeds, the now mobilised Serbian citizenry could sink back once again, as after the Belgrade demonstrations of 1996-97, into its prior demoralised state. Alternatively, the current sense of mounting tension could provoke a new crisis, possibly a violent uprising, a diverting assault by Yugoslav forces on ethnic minorities in the Sandzak or Vojvodina regions, an attempt to mount a coup to head off a government-led independence bid in Yugoslavia's tiny democratic republic of Montenegro, or even civil war in Serbia itself.

The Kosovo conflict gave Milosevic an excuse to crack down further on civil institutions and free speech and force into hiding an already weak and atomised

opposition that, like the rest of the population, felt betrayed by the West because of the bombing. Opposition leaders complained loudly, before and during the air campaign, that the NATO action would only serve to rally Serbs around Milosevic and would set back by years the cause of Serbian democratisation. In fact, the bombing has had the opposite effect, setting back Milosevic and opening up space for democrats and new voices advocating political change finally to make themselves heard.

Although Western nations have now pledged tens of billions of dollars for rebuilding and strengthening the Balkans, Western leaders, among them U.S. President Bill Clinton, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and French President Jacques Chirac, have insisted that not a penny will go to Serbia as long as Milosevic remains in power. Given this approach, a number of questions arise. How can the Serbs rid themselves of their now indicted dictator? Who might serve as an acceptable, initial replacement? And how might the international community play a constructive role in effecting this transition and in laying the groundwork for a more democratic Serbia?

In this paper ICG attempts to help answer these questions by examining Serbia in the wake of the war and identifying ways in which the West can rebuild its relationships with the Serbian opposition and independent sector and encourage coalitions among actors representing a range of constituencies within Serbian society. In addition, the paper will suggest how the West might help engender a sea change in Serbian opinion – that is, recognising that the nation's self-interest lies in democratic transition and an end to international isolation and acknowledging Serbia's role in atrocities committed in Kosovo and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.

II. TOWARD OUSTING MILOSEVIC AND ENGENDERING SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL CHANGE

A prerequisite to any lasting political and economic reform in Serbia is Milosevic's removal from power. This in itself is a formidable task that neither Serbia's four wars, economic ruination, international pariah status, or destruction suffered as a result of NATO bombs has been able to accomplish. The grey and black market economies, as well as remittances from abroad, have probably helped the Belgrade regime to survive well beyond most informed predictions. More importantly, the Serbian people, whom Milosevic has managed to cut off from most objective sources of information, have elected him time and again. To date, many have been unwilling to abandon the Serb nationalist project that he helped to mythologise for them - that of living in an ethnically pure state in which the Serbian people will have finally been vindicated for their centuries of privation and suffering.

Milosevic's removal, however essential, is but the first step in a long, tough process of transforming Serbia into a more democratic, pluralistic state. After four

decades of communism and a fifth of authoritarianism and attempted genocide, the population of Serbia lacks the experience, tolerance, and confidence critical to successful, enlightened self-rule. One lesson from the war in Kosovo, fought on the heels of bloody wars in Croatia and Bosnia, is that until the Serbs' longstanding self image as unrivalled victims is shattered they will be unable to accept Serbia as the multiethnic society that it in fact is.¹ Only by coming to terms with the war crimes and ethnic cleansing perpetrated in their name can the Serbian people create a bulwark against future ultra-nationalism that will eventually enable them to build a sustainable democracy grounded in respect for human rights and the rule of law.

Much of the unhappiness publicly vented by ordinary Serbs since the bombing ended is over having lost the war, having lost Kosovo, having not been paid for fighting there, or having been sold out, by Milosevic, the Russians, or the soft Belgrade middle-class that was fed up with being bombed. Still, the excesses of the Kosovo war do appear to have rattled at least some of the Serbian public's capacity for collective denial so carefully nurtured by Milosevic for most of the last decade. At the very first opposition-led rally on 29 June in the city of Cacak, Alliance for Change leaders Milan St. Protic and Vuk Obradovic, a historian and retired general, respectively, voiced contrition and shame that crimes against humanity as were perpetrated in Kosovo could have been committed in their name.² Demonstrators followed suit, shouting, "U Hag, U Hag (To The Hague, to The Hague!)," each time Milosevic's name was mentioned.³ Some Church figures, too, have expressed remorse for war crimes, adding that the man responsible is not fit to lead the Serbian people.⁴

Such statements are the first hopeful signs that some Serbian leaders and their supporters are finally beginning to acknowledge at least some of the atrocities perpetrated against Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population. The next tough step will be to identify those who actually ordered and committed the crimes. This differentiation is an essential step toward breaking through most Serbs' refusal to acknowledge what has taken place and toward diminishing any equally crippling sense of collective guilt. At some point during this difficult journey, "nationalism" might no longer serve as a euphemism for racism and the insistence on creating a "pure" Serbian state by any means necessary. That moment remains a long way off.

¹ Indeed, with its estimated population of 10.5 million, including 1.8 Kosovar Albanians, 500,000 Slavic Muslims, 450,000 ethnic Hungarians, and 100,000 each of ethnic Croatians and Romanie, Serbia includes more substantial ethnic minorities than any other state within the former Yugoslavia.

² *Washington Post*, 30 June 1999; *Calgary Herald*, 2 July 1999.

³ *Glas javnosti* (Belgrade), 29 June 1999.

⁴ *Blic*, 1 July 1999.

III. SERBIA IN THE WAKE OF THE WAR

A. An Overview

Even before the NATO bombing, Serbia was in ruinous shape. Most factories had been idle for 10 years, except those producing military equipment; 400,000 people were out of work, and a brain drain had resulted in the loss to the Serbian economy of thousands of middle-class professionals and students. Milosevic had systematically sold off Serbia's precious natural resources to cronies in the name of privatisation.

After the bombing, the situation is more dire. Serbia's infrastructure is in ruins, its heating stations, power plants, water and sewage treatment facilities and military factories destroyed, with preliminary damage estimates ranging from \$4 to \$10 billion.⁵ Another million people are now estimated to be unemployed, not including the returning soldiers and Serbian police, many of whom are also homeless, having been evicted from Kosovo or having returned to find their barracks destroyed by NATO bombs. While Serbia's long-impoverished rural population, which comprises the majority, has been relatively unaffected and will likely continue to function within its subsistence, essentially barter economy, the overall picture could hardly be worse. The average *per capita* income is now \$48 a month, Central Bank reserves are down to a minimum, and increased inflation looms, as Milosevic is widely expected to print enough money to rebuild a few bridges and assuage the as-yet unpaid soldiers who fought in Kosovo. Some 155,000 frightened Kosovo Serb and Roma refugees have also fled into Serbia,⁶ where they have been kept out of Belgrade by Serbian police and steered into resettlement camps, joining the destitute ranks of Serb refugees from the Krajina and from Bosnia.

Growing cleavages and bitterness have arisen between rural Serbs who rue the effective loss of Kosovo and those urban Serbs who are relieved that the bombing has stopped; between soldiers furious at the spoiled elite for whom they believe Milosevic sold them out and those city dwellers who have had enough of the pampered security forces and their bloody wars; between those at least willing to hear about the crimes Serbs committed in Kosovo and those who remain in a defiant state of denial.

In polling data gathered in mid-June, Milosevic and the SPS still showed bedrock public support of almost 22 percent.⁷ Ominously for the president, however, 21

⁵ \$4.1b was estimated by G-17, a group of young Serbian economists (see Appendix); the \$10b figure was reported in *The Washington Post*, 20 July 1999.

⁶ As of 29 July, according to UNHCR News - Kosovo Crisis Update, 2 August 1999, another 23,000 Serbs and Roma are estimated to have sought refuge in Montenegro.

⁷ BETA News Agency, reporting an Institute of Policy Studies poll of 800 voters between 9-14 June. The poll was developed by Medium Research Agency, and was published in *Blic* on 22 June. Milosevic's showing represented a nine percent drop from a pre-war poll, and a drop of four percent from an earlier *Blic* poll taken between 1-3 June, while the bombing was still going on.

percent of those polled said they did not trust their leader (although some of those are likely to be hard-core nationalists feeling let down by the loss of Kosovo). With the war over, Milosevic has faced open criticism on an increasing number of fronts. Soon after the bombing ended, both the independent tabloid *Blic* and the Studio B television station owned by Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) head Vuk Draskovic began featuring opposition leaders who spoke out against the regime. The recently formed Alliance for Change coalition of opposition parties has staged a series of well-attended rallies in both opposition-held cities and Milosevic strongholds at which speaker after speaker pulled no punches in condemning the Yugoslav president and demanding his resignation. Thousands of Yugoslav army reservists have held demonstrations as well, demanding back pay for their service in Kosovo.⁸ Even the Serbian Orthodox Church, which stood by Milosevic throughout his wars in the name of achieving a Greater Serbia, issued a statement intended for priests to read to their parishioners on 4 July,⁹ that condemned his crimes and called upon the Yugoslav president to step down.

Some business cronies, too, of both Milosevic and his wife Mirjana (Mira) Markovic, may be having second thoughts about linking their fate and their fortunes to Milosevic. Several are known to have hastily dispatched families and funds abroad during the bombing,¹⁰ and some Serbia watchers believe that it was pressure from this moneyed quarter, tired of seeing its assets destroyed by NATO bombs, that forced Milosevic to accept a face-saving defeat.

The apparent coalescence of outspoken opponents from across the political spectrum at first appeared promising for those pressing for Milosevic's removal. But given the Yugoslav leader's instinct for self-preservation and his skill at manipulating chaos and even defeat to his ultimate advantage, this window of opportunity is likely to be quite narrow and short-lived. An earlier, equally committed force for change spent much of the bitter winter of 1996-97 in the streets of Belgrade, protesting Milosevic's refusal to recognise local election results, while the West stood by and did little to help them. Milosevic escaped on that occasion by allowing some of those who had been properly elected to assume office and by playing off against each other the most opportunistic opposition figures, namely, SPO leader Vuk Draskovic and Democratic Party (DS) President Zoran Djindjic. The broad-based though disparate opposition ended up retreating to the universities and trade unions, demoralised by how cheaply their leaders had sold them out.

A similarly devastating split featuring the same key actors occurred in mid-July 1999. Djindjic, still DS president and now a central figure in the Alliance for Change, called for Milosevic's immediate ouster, to be followed by the naming of a transitional government. Alliance supporters joined him and called for Milosevic to be turned over to The Hague Tribunal. But Draskovic, who until April was Milosevic's deputy prime minister and whose party still retains two members

⁸ *New York Times*, 8 July 1999.

⁹ *New York Times*, 29 June 1999.

¹⁰ ICG interviews with Serbian human rights monitors, 28 April, 15 June 1999.

inside the regime, declared on 18 July that Milosevic could remain in power “as a figurehead,” presiding over a technocratic federal government that would continue to rule both Serbia and Montenegro for a three-to-six-month period while the opposition musters sufficient support to stand for elections.¹¹ Draskovic urged that Milosevic be coaxed to step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution and a safe haven. The SPO leader, who previously denounced the Tribunal’s indictment of Milosevic as “very political and very stupid,” expressed no interest either in handing over his erstwhile superior to the Tribunal or in prosecuting him domestically. This early and fundamental disagreement between the two most visible opposition leaders reveals the difficulties involved in, first, uniting the Serbs against Milosevic and, second, encouraging a greater sense of political accountability among the country’s leaders.

One fear is that Milosevic, confident that his SPS can probably still muster a plurality, might call the bluff of those calling for early elections by staging “snap” elections as soon as possible. By exploiting his opponents’ lack of preparedness, Milosevic might even hope to win back the 14 cities and towns currently under opposition control. Early elections would force the opposition parties into a no-win situation: should they choose to boycott such patently rigged balloting, they would also stand to lose control of those municipalities.

A sign that Milosevic might be manoeuvring towards early elections was his recent move to quash opposition from within his own circle by demoting SPS Vice-President Milorad Vucelic, a former Radio/Television Serbia director and a relative moderate. Another, perhaps more significant sign is Milosevic’s newfound affection for Vojislav Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), a nationalist spin-off from the Democratic Party which, with Milosevic’s support, could pose a formidable challenge to Vojislav Seselj’s Serbian Radical Party (SRS).¹² Milosevic could expect that a strong DSS challenge might wound Seselj’s standing in the Serbian parliament and focus the campaign on the far right’s nationalist, anti-Albanian, anti-Western agenda. From Milosevic’s perspective, the more nationalist the tone of the campaign, the more the democratic opposition’s message – that political reform is key to Serbia’s regeneration – will be lost as parties are forced to compete on nationalist issues.

B. SPS and JUL: The Marital Stranglehold

Milosevic’s **Socialist Party of Serbia (Socialisticka Partija Srbije, or SPS)** and his wife Mira Markovic’s **Yugoslav United Left (Jugoslovenska Levica, or JUL)** constitute the hub of the political network through which the ruling couple has been able to maintain its grip on power. The SPS was founded by Milosevic in 1990 as a means of achieving political power while destroying the remnants of the League of Communists, which had been his stepping stone to his national political career. By retaining “socialist” in the party name, Milosevic could appeal to disaffected socialists and Communists while pressing a born-again,

¹¹ *New York Times*, 19 July 1999.

¹² see ICG #70, “Back to the Future: Milosevic Prepares for Life After Kosovo,” 28 June 1999.

ultranationalist ideology. This opportunistic combination proved attractive to both left- and right-wing constituencies, and the SPS has also been able to secure a solid base of support in rural Serbia, where the *zadruga*, or communal patriarchal social structures, are reinforced and promoted by a strong central authority and nurtured by calls to Serb patriotism.

The SPS, however, lacked much of the institutional support offered under Tito. This is where Mira Markovic entered the political fray and in 1993 forged her own coalition of die-hard Communist parties and associations gathered under the JUL banner that readily accommodated disgruntled Communist hard-liners, former nomenklatura, and *nouveau riche* whose fortunes were made in wartime profiteering. Those who could not stand Milosevic personally but were dedicated apparatchiks could easily co-operate with Ms. Markovic, whose attempt to create a leftist renaissance went so far as to revive calls for Tito's Brotherhood and Unity.

The SPS lost many members as a result of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, when Milosevic was seen as having betrayed the nationalist agenda. The SPS's exposed ideological bankruptcy afforded Markovic the opportunity to press her hard-line Marxist platform. Stripped of its initial ideological veneer, the SPS lost its parliamentary majority and in 1996 lost the control of 14 key municipalities. It now survives through an elaborate, far-reaching system of patronage, bribes, tight control of the state police, property, and media, and Milosevic's co-optation of potentially powerful rivals such as Vojislav Seselj and Vuk Draskovic, whom he has successfully manipulated into forging coalitions of convenience with the SPS.

Of late, Markovic, reportedly fed up with war and touting a new political agenda featuring "development and prosperity," has called for "a community of Balkan nations" as the sole way "to end tensions that exist between Balkan peoples [and] to release their energy for modern economic and cultural development." But Milosevic's powerful alter ego is not calling for a renewed, multiethnic Yugoslavia. Rather, she envisages her Balkan "community" as "the only way for all Serbs to live in one state and all Albanians in one state, and all Bulgarians in one state, and all Macedonians in one state, and so on."¹³

C. The Ultra-Nationalist Right

The most powerful ultra-nationalist leader after Milosevic is the **Serbian Radical Party (Srpska Radikalna Stranka, or SRS)** head, **Vojislav Seselj**, a genuinely dangerous, often armed, 45-year-old paramilitary leader whose militia's war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia should have secured his indictment years ago by The Hague Tribunal.¹⁴ He reportedly still controls paramilitary units believed to

¹³ BBC, 30 July 1999, quoting the Tanjug state news agency, quoting Markovic in an interview on Mexican television.

¹⁴ Seselj's Cetniks (Srpska Cetnika Pokret, also called "blackshirts") set the standard on 2 May 1991 with the first atrocity of the Croatian war when they brutally massacred 12 Croatian police in Borovo Selo, just outside Vukovar. The often drunk and outlandishly uniformed Seseljevici, as they were also

have committed some of the most horrific atrocities in the Pec region of Kosovo earlier this year.

Seselj's venomous attitude toward ethnic Albanians is well documented. In a 1995 SRO newsletter, he laid out a program for the expulsion and extermination of all Albanians, which included the following advice: "Important political figures should be eliminated by traffic accidents and jealousy killings or by infecting them with the AIDS virus when they travel abroad."¹⁵

Seselj's racism is rivalled only by his opportunism. As political protests against the regime gathered steam in early July 1999, he was quoted in a leading Belgrade tabloid upholding citizens' "legitimate right" to assemble and "to ask for Slobodan Milosevic's resignation."¹⁶ Until now the SRS leader has taken the constitutional line that Milosevic should be allowed to finish his term and that only if he called for early elections could he be forced to leave office. Seselj's reluctance to strike out unequivocally against Milosevic may be based on the belief that if he creates too much conflict between himself and the SPS he could alienate SPS voters whose support he may need in a future bid for the presidency. For now, however, it appears that he wants to keep his bets covered, protecting himself in case his current *padrone* is ousted, while at the same time positioning himself for a plum post in any Cabinet reshuffle in the event that Milosevic stays.

Milosevic reportedly plans to reward the Radicals with more ministerial positions. It is likely that Seselj, who alternately plays the roles of Milosevic's court jester, his deputy, and his ardent opponent while moonlighting as the vicious paramilitary leader who makes the Yugoslav president look moderate, will be rewarded for his loyal and effective theatrics with the post of deputy prime minister in charge of the security and police forces, a longtime ambition of Seselj's that would conveniently enable Milosevic to increase repression while distancing himself from its consequences.¹⁷

Aside from Milosevic, Seselj is possibly Serbia's most powerful politician. He controls 80 seats in the parliament, almost twice the number of Vuk Draskovic's SPO, the next most popular opposition party. That he is Milosevic's "official" opposition figure is clear from the fact that, before and during the bombing, only

known, allegedly went on to commit crimes in the Bosnian towns of Foca, Ustikolina, and Zvornik, that have been well-documented by the UN Centre for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch. Seselj's attitude toward ethnic minorities has remained unchanged. Following his November 1996 election as mayor of Zemun, a Belgrade suburb, he permitted and upheld the forcible expulsion of four Croat families. "We're not fascists, we're just chauvinists who hate Croats," he told a local paper after preventing a four-year-old Croat boy from entering a Zemun kindergarten. (from a classified U.S. State Department report.)

¹⁵ "Goals of Serb National Policy in Kosovo," *Velika Srbija*, 14 October 1995. The text continues: "Through adequate propaganda, such events can create the sense of an intolerable percentage of virus carriers, which could be used as an excuse to isolate large groups of Albanians and would promote a stereotype of Albanians as an infected people."

¹⁶ *Blic*, 9 July 1999.

¹⁷ V.I.P. Daily News Report, 8 July 1999.

Seselj was able to criticise Milosevic in the state-run media without fear of being arrested or shot.

Milosevic recently moved to undercut Seselj, however, while ensuring that political debate remains narrowed on nationalist issues by throwing some SPS resources at Kostunica's DSS (see above).¹⁸ By building up Kostunica's party, Milosevic hopes to keep any election debate as far away as possible from the democratic opposition's call for political, economic, and social reform and focus it instead on such questions as how to return a Yugoslav force to Kosovo and manipulate the Russian role there.

D. Political Animals: Milosevic's Inner Circle

Milosevic's indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal, together with the damage inflicted by NATO bombs on crony-controlled factories and refineries across Serbia and the European Union's blacklist banning the travel and freezing the assets of Milosevic and some 300 Belgrade officials and business associates have already forced some of these largely unsentimental opportunists to explore means of protecting themselves in the event of his ouster.

During the NATO bombing campaign, President Clinton signed a presidential "finding" which instructed the CIA to use electronic hacking to monitor and interrupt Milosevic's financial transactions and make it possible to freeze and seize his overseas bank accounts and those of his close associates.¹⁹ Although these accounts, many of which are registered under pseudonyms, have so far proved difficult to locate, the message nevertheless fed anxiety among many among Milosevic's cronies and spurred the realisation among some that future viability depends upon severing their ties.²⁰

There are some signs that the strain is already being felt. Minister-without-portfolio Bogoljub Karic, a construction tycoon, international banker, and alleged money launderer who has bought and traded companies for Milosevic since the 1980s, was recently turned back at the Hungarian border; in May he was barred from entering Cyprus with his family and enough baggage to last them a lifetime.²¹ Karic has recently stepped up efforts to distance himself from the regime. In mid-July he went so far as to publicly condemn the regime's "channelling of socially owned money to private pockets"²² and suggested in an interview that Serbia and Montenegro might finally be better off as separate nations.²³

¹⁸ For more on Milosevic's plans for Kostunica, see ICG #70, "Back to the Future..." 28 June, cited above.

¹⁹ *New York Times*, 18 June; *TIME*, 12 July 1999.

²⁰ Western government and non-government sources have told ICG that cronies have approached them to ask how they can be taken off the EU list. See also *VIP Newsletter*, 22 June 1999.

²¹ ICG interview with senior US administration official, 2 July 1999; *New York Times*, 12 July.

²² *Vecernje novosti*, 19 July 1999.

²³ *Reuters*, 19 July 1999.

In late June another close associate was detained at New York's JFK Airport, where he was hand-cuffed, debriefed, forced to turn over his documents for photo-copying and put on the next flight back to Belgrade.²⁴ Even Arkan, the indicted war criminal and close Milosevic associate whose given name is Zeljko Raznjatovic, has reportedly explored the possibility of seeking immunity from prosecution in Belgium, where he has a daughter.²⁵

Many other of Milosevic's associates have reasons to be angry. Jugopetrol and Serbian parliament president Dragan Tomic, who saw at least one of his refineries crushed by NATO bombs, is one of many who have suffered losses and are likely to be unwilling to risk further losses in the name of supporting the regime. These Milosevic intimates may yet be tempted to give their backing to a political alternative, as too might the military or police commanders currently controlling such cash cows as customs, licensing, and the flow and distribution of goods.²⁶ All of these officials might be quietly approached now by opposition leaders and pressed to turn on Milosevic. It will be difficult to persuade those who have been close to the regime to break ranks, and most will likely be reluctant to speak out openly for fear of retribution. The opposition might consider dangling the carrot of possible positions in a new government for those experienced technocrats and financiers willing to break with past policies. Both Vuk Draskovic of the Serbian Renewal Movement, Alliance for Change leader Zoran Djindjic and a group of young economists headed by Mladjan Dinkic and calling itself the G-17 have called for the regime's replacement by a technocratic government that could employ many of these people.²⁷ What is missing, particularly from Draskovic's plan, is any concern for the accountability of those who would play a role in any such government.²⁸ Western governments must make clear to both business partners and party moguls that there will be no safe haven for suspected war criminals and no deal for Milosevic except regarding how he should be transported to The Hague.

E. The Military

The 40,000 disgruntled Yugoslav army and Serbian police, security, and paramilitary forces some of whom have returned from action in Kosovo unpaid, unemployed, and, for many of those who had long been stationed in Kosovo, suddenly homeless, pose a threat to Milosevic that has the potential either to trigger a full-fledged civil war or, if properly harnessed, to boost and embolden democratic forces.

²⁴ ICG interview, see above, 2 July.

²⁵ MSNBC, 13 July; AP, 14 July 1999.

²⁶ One such corrupt official is Mihali Kertes, a commander in Milosevic's secret police and reportedly a major arms dealer during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia who has long held a lucrative monopoly on licensing.

²⁷ *New York Times*, 2 August 1999. See Appendix for more on these opposition groups and leaders.

²⁸ *New York Times*, 19 July 1999.

Adding to the soldiers' discontent, as soon as the peace deal was announced Milosevic moved to bolster the Serbian police and security forces at the army's expense. First he deployed his paramilitary thugs to all major Serbian cities in the event of demonstrations; then he announced that the army was in need of "professionalisation," downsizing, and a budget cut.²⁹

The top leadership, some members of which have been indicted along with Milosevic, has already closed ranks and affirmed its allegiance to the regime and, fearing arrest or further indictments, is likely to be impervious to outside influence. However, it appears that some officers, having witnessed the unceremonious sacking of two chiefs-of-staff and other high-ranking officials as soon as Milosevic came to mistrust them, gone unpaid for months at a time, and, finally, been offered up against an overwhelmingly powerful NATO force, have simply had enough. On 16 July Gen. Momcilo Perisic, former army chief-of-staff whom Milosevic ousted last November because he balked at the planned Kosovo operation, threw his weight behind the opposition and called for Milosevic's resignation. Perisic, whose own hands are by no means clean, having presided over the systematic destruction of Mostar, the bombardment of civilian targets, and the expulsion of non-Serbs from Dalmatia and eastern Herzegovina during the Bosnian war, has condemned the politicisation of the military and on 8 August launched his Movement for Democratic Serbia to help co-ordinate the currently disparate array of opposition forces.

Another former general who joined ranks with the opposition and has played a critical role since the war's end is Vuk Obradovic, leader of the small Social Democracy Party (SD), who resigned his commission in 1992 as part of an unsuccessful bid to become civilian defence minister. During the NATO bombing Obradovic stood out for his virtually unique public criticism of Milosevic from inside Serbia. "Slobodan Milosevic is finished," he declared on 3 June, as the bombing was still going on. "His political mission is over. The only question is how to organise post-Milosevic Serbia. Milosevic made fatal mistakes; the 10 years of his reign have been fatal. Now we are in a war with the whole world because of him."³⁰

Obradovic and other opposition leaders, have already singled out more active-duty and retired officers with whom they are exploring possible collaborations to effect political change.³¹ The estimated 23,000 desertions during the Kosovo war³² and the recent demonstrations in Kraljevo by thousands of demoralised

²⁹ Milosevic's policy of favouring the police over the military is pervasive. Police widows, for example, receive higher pensions than Yugoslav army widows, and a funeral allowance, as well. (*The Guardian*, 15 July 1999.) In another direct slight, new apartment buildings are being built to house police, although it was Yugoslav army barracks that were destroyed by NATO.

³⁰ *The Daily Telegraph* (Belgrade), 3 June 1999.

³¹ ICG interviews with Alliance member and senior U.S. administration official, 15 June and 2 July 1999, respectively.

³² Belgrade weekly *Nedeljni telegraf*, 7 July 1999. The number of deserters slated for prosecution amounts to roughly 20 percent of Yugoslavia's estimated total conventional force structure.

army reservists suggest that the discontent runs deep within army ranks, as well.³³

After the war ended, Obradovic led a 3 July opposition rally in the opposition-controlled city of Cacak, where he made a point of thanking the troops for escorting truckloads of protestors past police roadblocks to the demonstration site. "They are with us," he shouted. "And we are with them, and they know it."³⁴ Obradovic was also one of the only members of the military to demand publicly a full accounting of the crimes committed in Kosovo.

A good campaigner but as yet an unfamiliar face, Obradovic could become an important figure in a transitional government. He enjoys the respect of the military and is perhaps their best available role model. Moreover, as a military man, he is by definition a patriot. Since he therefore would not be as vulnerable on the nationalist flank as some of his more liberal colleagues, he might be able to help them deliver on such critical issues as letting go of Kosovo, accountability for Serbian actions there and political and economic reform.

F. The "Democratic" Opposition

The combined outrages, hardships, and injuries suffered by Serbs as a result of the Kosovo conflict brought to a head a plethora of saved-up grievances which are now being expressed by many who have never before dared to speak out. Opposition and Church leaders, army reservists, trade unionists, farmers, pensioners, and municipal assemblies have all called for Milosevic's resignation.³⁵

A series of provincial rallies calling for Milosevic's resignation has been spearheaded by the Alliance for Change, a loose coalition of a half-dozen opposition parties that was initially funded in part by Milan Panic, the former Yugoslav prime minister and ICN pharmaceutical executive who resides in Los Angeles. Alliance strategists have tapped a deep vein of discontent. The initial groundswell of support for their rallies, a petition campaign, and protests spontaneously generated by unpaid army reservists and others may have set the course for what Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic called "a long, hot summer" that many believe could lead to Milosevic's removal.

³³ However, it should be remembered that the army has been infiltrated with informers loyal to Milosevic and that many within the military elite with various financial schemes at stake are also susceptible to manipulation by the regime.

³⁴ *New York Times*, 30 June 1999.

³⁵ *New York Times*, 8 July 1999; Reuters, 1 July; *Times of London*, 2 July; Associated Press, Beta News Agency, 8 July; *New York Times*, 29 June.

In the month between 29 June and 28 July, demonstrations were held in 25 cities.³⁶ The most astonishing and sustained protests occurred spontaneously in Leskovac, the southern Serbian bailiwick of Milosevic known as the “Red South,” where 20,000 citizens, many of them army reservists, called for Milosevic’s resignation after turning out in response to a local television technician who had seized air time to denounce the local Socialist party boss.³⁷ In the days to follow thousands of reservists and angry civilians took to the streets to express their disgust with the Yugoslav president and his local henchmen.

By end July, 14 municipal assemblies had passed resolutions calling for Milosevic’s resignation.³⁸ Belgrade, with critical assistance from Vuk Draskovic’s SPO, defeated a similar motion.³⁹ The Alliance of Democratic Parties, which includes the Sandzak Coalition, the Sumadija Coalition, and the four democratic parties in the Vojvodina Coalition, recently announced that it would organise joint demonstrations and petitions calling for Milosevic to resign. On 15 July Vojvodina farmers announced that they would blockade roads, factories, and border crossings until he does.⁴⁰ The independent trade unions, in tandem with the Alliance for Change and other opposition groups, have called for a general strike. However, SPO leader Vuk Draskovic has already begun to play the spoiler. He seems intent on undermining Alliance support – and support for his chief rival, Alliance leader Zoran Djindjic – by organising competing rallies and insisting on an agenda that would neither force Milosevic from power nor bring him to justice. With each day, the popular momentum for change appears to be waning, as the opposition message becomes more diffuse and Milosevic reportedly prepares to print dinars so he can buy off protesting pensioners, teachers and the reservists who fought in Kosovo.

Now the opposition is hoping that a scheduled 19 August demonstration in Belgrade will furnish the rallying point necessary to unify the divergent forces in favour of political change. Draskovic, Djindjic, the Church, at least one student activist group, and Gen. Perisic, a newcomer to opposition ranks, have all agreed to attend the rally, which has been organised by a group of young economists known as G-17 (see Appendix).

The Alliance for Change and the smaller opposition parties are in dire need of sufficient funds to support the ongoing demonstrations, said to cost roughly 10,000 DM each, with a reliable supply of diesel fuel, posters, rental vehicles, cellular phones, desktop computers, and fax machines. In-kind assistance is

³⁶ Protest rallies were held in Cacak, Novi Sad, Leskovac, Uzice, Prokuplje, Nis, Subotica, Kragujevac, Kikinda, Kraljevo, Sremska Mitrovica, Vranje, Pirot, Sombor, Pancevo, Becej, Pozega, Soko Banja, Valjevo, Lucani, Zrenjanin, Posarevac, Vrbas, and Sabac, in that order.

³⁷ *New York Times*, 8 July 1999.

³⁸ In chronological order, resolutions were passed in Novi Sad, Pirot, Uzice, Nis, Sombor, Pancevo, Kragujevac, Kikinda, Pozega, Luceni, Sremska Mitrovica, Soko Banja, Cacak, and Becej.

³⁹ RFE/RL NEWSLINE Vol 3, No. 132, Part II, 9 July 1999.

⁴⁰ *Daily Telegraph*, 16 July 1999.

needed as well, in the form of training in such areas as party-building, media outreach, and platform design.

In contrast to its support for democratic movements in other parts of the world, the Clinton administration has consistently withheld material assistance for Serbia's opposition forces, in part because it has long sought a winner and has not known precisely whom to bet on and in part because, until the war in Kosovo, it has not wished to jeopardise its relationship with Milosevic, the guarantor of Dayton, which the administration views as one of its foreign policy triumphs.⁴¹

The lack of material support, compounded by Milosevic's effectiveness at outmanoeuvring his political enemies, has created the impression that the opposition is weak and unattractive. Since the bombing ended and the latest round of protests began, some of the boldest statements have been those made by previously unheard-from farmers and workers in central or southern Serbia, while many of those whom Western observers might have expected to spearhead the campaign to oust Milosevic – the intellectuals, the students, the NGO community – appear, at least so far, to have remained sidelined and mute.

The independent labor confederation **UGS Nezavisnost** is a multiethnic association of trade unionists that could be critical in channelling Serbian labourers' restless discontent into political activism. With its 13 affiliates and 180,000 members, Nezavisnost is well placed to reach out to previously untapped constituencies, including disgruntled members of the state-run unions. Its president, Branislav Canak, is a twice-dismissed foreign affairs commentator for Radio/Television Serbia and founder of the Independent Journalists' Union. Canak and his colleagues have tried to organise in factories across Serbia, but predictably have been stymied and worn down by the tremendous obstacles put up at every turn by the Serbian state bureaucracy and the recalcitrant management of state-run enterprises.

Despite its difficulties, Nezavisnost enjoys widespread respect, having been able to provide some solace and organising capacity to unemployed workers, unpaid pensioners, and fired journalists, and Canak himself has been unusually outspoken in his attacks on the regime. Not only has he criticised Milosevic for last year's crackdown on the independent media, he has spoken publicly about the Yugoslav president's use of war as a tool to further entrench himself in power. Canak recently warned that the window of opportunity for democratic change is a narrow one. "If we let Milosevic to stabilise [sic] after the NATO intervention, then he will rule forever. So we have to get him now."⁴²

Student unions, which played such a central role in the winter-long demonstrations of 1996-97, are expected to re-enter the political fray when the universities open. The students have been relatively quiet since the war ended, as they were throughout the NATO intervention. Because the regime's "state of

⁴¹ ICG interviews with former Clinton administration officials.

⁴² Interview on "The World," Public Radio International, early July 1999.

war” rendered them eligible for arrest or shooting on sight if they were believed to be avoiding conscription, many male students went underground or into exile. In addition, many students, like much of the democratic opposition, strongly opposed the bombing and felt betrayed by the West. Few openly condemned Serb atrocities in Kosovo, and some have evinced clear nationalist sentiments.⁴³ But as they have seen their colleagues emerge from hiding, more students are beginning to speak out against the regime. On 6 July students’ unions from four faculties at the University of Nis, perhaps emboldened by the protests in this opposition-controlled town, have called for “political and economic reforms,” as well as “liberation of state-controlled media” and “free and democratic elections by the end of the year.”⁴⁴ On 4 August the Belgrade student organisation **OTPOR (Resistance)** issued a manifesto echoing the call for free, internationally monitored elections and demanding that Milosevic be ousted and “held accountable for the policies he has conducted over the past 10 years.”⁴⁵

A discussion of how best to strengthen democratic forces in Serbia follows in Section IV of this paper. For an analysis of the opposition parties and civil society sector, please refer to Appendix (“Who’s Who”).

G. From the Pulpit: The Role of the Church

The Orthodox Church in Serbia has long provided crucial political support for the Milosevic regime and has rarely wavered in its defence of Milosevic’s political and military strategy. But the Church had close ties to the Communist regime that preceded Milosevic and to most Serbian governments dating back to the first kings in the 13th century. Indeed, the Serbian Orthodox Church, in contrast to non-Orthodox Catholic Churches elsewhere in eastern Europe, has historically assumed the secular role of defending the nation - and, by extension, the army and its commander-in-chief - in addition to its spiritual role of defending the faith.

The institutional links between Church and State have been strengthened over the past decade by a strategic alliance with Milosevic and other Serb nationalist politicians. By promoting Orthodox Christianity as an expression of Serbian patriotism, the nationalists have helped the Church to regain its popular appeal, as well as some of its properties, which had been confiscated by the Communist regime.⁴⁶ In this textbook exercise in mutual support, these politicians have also exploited their avowed Church allegiance to bolster their own nationalist credentials.⁴⁷ The alliance has worked: now, informal polls report, 12-14 percent of Serbs are regular churchgoers, and 65 percent of Serbs call themselves believers. More importantly, Serbs have come to regard their Orthodoxy as an

⁴³ ICG interviews with Serbian human rights monitor, July 1999.

⁴⁴ AFP, 7 July 1999.

⁴⁵ AP, reported on RFE/RL Newline, 5 August 1999. OTPOR’s manifesto is entitled, “Declaration for the future of Serbia.”

⁴⁶ from commentary by Andras Riedlmayer, editor, Justwatch@listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu, 9 July 1999.

⁴⁷ E.g., Arkan’s widely publicised, full-regalia Church wedding in February 1995 (*New York Times*, 4 July 1999). Arkan has proudly claimed Serbian Orthodox Patriarch Pavle as his “supreme commander.”

intrinsic part of their Serb identity, a circumstance in part created and shamelessly exploited by Milosevic.

While some Church leaders in Kosovo did depart somewhat from the official line during the recent conflict, granting safe haven to Kosovar Albanians in Decani and condemning gross human rights violations on both sides, the rest of the Church remained mute. Now that the war had ended, however, other voices of dissent are beginning to make themselves heard.

On 28 June Serbian Orthodox Church Patriarch Pavle called publicly for Milosevic to stand down for the good of the Serbian people and for a government of "national salvation" to take his place. The next day, in the 14th-century Gracanica monastery in western Kosovo, the patriarch obliquely declared Serbia's actions in Kosovo criminal,⁴⁸ and the Holy Synod, also in late June, issued its most far-reaching statement thus far, declaring that, "In our name a major sin was committed against Kosovars."⁴⁹

The belated willingness of at least a faction within the Church to lay down a marker on the side of human rights has raised false hopes that the Church could play a key role in mustering support for the democratic opposition from disaffected but still unheard-from constituencies, such as farmers, workers, teachers, skilled labourers, nurses, women's groups, etc. At a demonstration on 6 July in the opposition-held town of Uzice, Alliance for Change leader Zoran Djindjic was cheered by the crowd of 5,000 when he said he envisaged, that within 10 days, "each day at the same time all churches ringing their bells to send the message, 'It's time for you [Milosevic] to go.'"⁵⁰ But the Church appears to have been of two minds over the almost daily protests, and its silence in response to Djindjic's invitation has been resounding.

Recently the Church has met with a number of opposition groups and has agreed to participate in the Belgrade rally on 19 August, the religious holiday of *Preobrazenje*, or Transformation, at which a group of opposition leaders will call for a transitional government of experts mandated to serve one year, initiate economic and political reform, renew ties with the West, and negotiate Milosevic's resignation. This gesture by the Church might embolden discontented but wary citizens, as well as members of the clergy, to come out into the open and push for political change. But given the Church's inherent conservatism, its institutional allegiance to the national leadership and many Church leaders' continued reluctance to join hands with those who have spoken out against Milosevic and Serb atrocities in Kosovo, it is highly unlikely that the Church will play a central role in galvanising the public to get rid of Milosevic.

Nevertheless, Serb opposition leaders should continue to encourage those Church leaders who have dared to speak out against the regime to help create a

⁴⁸ *New York Times*, 29 June 1999.

⁴⁹ International Helsinki Foundation, unpublished paper, July 1999.

⁵⁰ Reuters, 7 July 1999.

climate in which political change can occur. The slated Belgrade rally will hopefully set a precedent for further clerical involvement. Once Milosevic is gone, Church leaders should be pressed to help the Serbian people embark upon the painful, years-long process of coming to terms with what the Church itself has called the crimes committed in their name. Still, it should be recognised that the current Church leadership is also unlikely to take the lead in this critical effort, particularly if Milosevic's replacement government does not make accountability a priority.

IV. FOSTERING A GENUINE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

A. **Where to Start?**

One of the difficulties of effecting a democratic transition in Serbia, say frustrated experts who have witnessed the process in other East European countries, is that a critical mass of Serbs themselves, unlike in Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Romania, for instance, have not stood up and said that they have had enough. Without the emergence of an indigenous anti-Milosevic consensus, monies thrust by the international community at Serbian democratisation efforts will be wasted.

The spectre of the coming winter could be a powerful motivator for political action: with little fuel, the lost jobs, ravaged infrastructure, new Serb refugees and returning, restless soldiers, people's misery and capacity for anger will only increase. But Milosevic could quickly dissipate this potential political energy, by promising, for instance, a guaranteed minimum wage that would pacify the currently restless and idled working class, thereby depleting in a stroke any momentum that might spur larger numbers of ordinary people to take to the streets.

Given Milosevic's control of the purse, his near-monopoly on the media, the fractious nature of the opposition and people's ingrained fear of speaking out, it will take a sustained, multi-pronged approach to unite, empower, and educate a critical mass of Serbs who are willing to fight for genuine political change.

B. **Blitzed by the Truth: Carpet-Bomb With Independent Media**

Milosevic's tight grip on the media, especially the electronic media, has made it possible for many Serbians to persist in denying the extent of the slaughter and devastation in Kosovo perpetrated by Serbian and Yugoslav forces. In the year leading up to and during the Kosovo war, as during Milosevic's earlier wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the media served as a critical weapon – propagating incendiary lies about the enemy; rationalising violence in the name of ethnic purity, sovereignty or counter-terrorism; suppressing reports of casualties and atrocities; and rewriting humiliating defeats as glorious victories. The degree to which the Belgrade regime has relied on its media to fuel its self-generated wars

was evident when, within a week of NATO's strike on a key Belgrade transmitter, a fully equipped, alternative military network had been mobilised to fill in the gap.

One serious misimpression on the part of some Western donors and Serbia-watchers has been that the independent media is also non-nationalist. Until Milosevic's ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo escalated in early 1998, neither Kosovo nor the treatment of ethnic Albanians there had received much recent attention. But once the conflict in Kosovo hit the front pages of Serbian papers, the editors of those independent publications still in business were either summarily replaced or themselves succumbed to the pressure to establish their nationalist credentials. As the conflict heated up in the autumn of 1998, some of these outlets appeared bent on outdoing each other in revealing their true nationalist, indeed racist, colours – which did not necessarily save them from being usurped or shut down.

The murder of editor and publisher Slavko Curuvija had an immensely chilling effect on his fellow independents, who should now be encouraged to resume their role as gadfly.⁵¹ Every possible step should be taken to protect those who are willing to take up this role, including arranging for publication to take place from Montenegro or a safe third country.

Soul-searching on the part of Western supporters of Serbian independent media has led to the tentative conclusion that too many resources may have been thrust precipitously upon too few players in an underdeveloped sector of a society that was neither willing nor able to sustain them. The result, in the case of the independent radio station B-92 and the larger independent network ANEM, both of which have been generously subsidised by Western governments and foundations, was the creation of a strong, independent broadcasting system in a country with no functional economy or rule of law. When the bombing campaign began, B-92's editors, led by the respected activist and journalist Veran Matic, felt betrayed by the West and besieged by all sides, and assumed a victimised, nationalist editorial posture which contributed little to people's understanding of why the West might be bombing Serbia or the horrors Serb forces were still committing in Kosovo.

Had Western funders "let a thousand flowers bloom," instead of uncritically supporting only one promising network, they might have been in a position to encourage other, smaller stations – which were cut out as a result of ANEM's effective monopoly on the independent broadcasters – to give voice to alternative points of view. Donors might now look outside Belgrade for promising local partners in such cities as Leskovac or in Vojvodina, where there are several independent outlets deserving support and encouragement.

⁵¹ Editor and publisher of *The Daily Telegraph* and the news weekly *The European*, Curuvija was murdered in November 1998, after having sharply criticised the regime in his publications. Although the killing is believed to have resulted from a personal falling-out between the publisher and Milosevic and his wife, by effectively silencing the independent press it also achieved another of the ruling couple's apparent objectives.

To bombard Serbia with the truth, particularly with a truth likely to be dismissed, at least initially, as Western propaganda, requires operating on many fronts simultaneously. A series of specific suggestions follows as to how and in what venues the independent media, opposition groups, and their backers in the international community might proceed.

1. Inside Serbia Proper

(a) Access to Studio B

While SPO leader and former Deputy Prime Minister Vuk Draskovic has recently allowed his influential Belgrade television station Studio B to air commentaries critical of the regime and to accommodate the revived and renamed independent radio network B2-92, he is nevertheless a completely unreliable partner. Within the formidable SPO organisation at the local level, however, are trustworthy political activists who might be willing to barter technical assistance or the promise of foreign exchanges for air time on Studio B, where footage of recent demonstrations and interviews with a wide range of opposition figures might encourage many who have not yet dared to voice their discontent.

(b) Low-brow and Local

Some analysts and opposition figures believe that the tabloids, particularly those outside of Belgrade, could be more influential on people who might actually vote for Milosevic or for one of the nationalist parties than the tiny independent press, with its small band of high-brow columnists and minimal circulation among like-minded Belgrade intellectuals. It has become clear that, particularly at the local level, the regime cannot control everything that appears in each publication. Even the censors are believed to have lost heart as a result of the Kosovo war; since the peace was announced, some criticism of the government and interviews with opposition politicians have appeared in *Blic*, Belgrade's *New York Daily News* or *France-Soir* equivalent, which has a relatively wide circulation of roughly 200,000.

2. From Montenegro

Montenegro should be encouraged to continue functioning as a central publishing and broadcasting centre for all of Yugoslavia. Independent TV and Serbian language radio stations should now be broadcast out of Podgorica, as well, adding a new Radio Free Serbia to the already existing Radio Antena Montenegro.

3. From Kosovo

Although Kosovo has effectively become a NATO protectorate, one of the areas overlooked by the overwhelmed peace-keeping forces has been the

immediate establishment there of local Serbian language broadcasting capable of reaching all of Serbia.

With relays from Kosovo well-integrated with those in Serbia proper, electronic media should be broadcast from the bridgeheads outside Pristina and near the Montenegrin border. Belgrade will surely do its best to tar such programming as pure "NATO-Nazi" propaganda; but the chance to inform Serbs as to current realities in Kosovo should not be lost. KFOR and the new UN civilian administration should ensure that NATO's media centre succeeds in getting information to Serbs regarding the widespread demonstrations inside Serbia and the sorry plight there of Kosovar Serb refugees and army reservists. The Kosovo Church might be tapped to prepare cultural and religious programming that would let Serbs know that at least their spiritual leaders have not abandoned them. Finally, dismissed or unemployed Serb journalists might be recruited to run independent stations and publications based both in Montenegro and in Kosovo.

4. From third countries

Broadcasting systems in willing third countries should continue to transmit independent news and cultural programs in Serbian language into Serbia. Hungarian radio and television should be broadcast from Szeged, a city less than five kilometres from the Yugoslav border, into Vojvodina, where an estimated 22.5 percent of the population is ethnic Hungarian.⁵² Accurate reporting in their native tongue might embolden this beleaguered ethnic minority population, which has finally begun to speak out against the silent abuses they, too, have suffered for years. News out of Zagreb should be broadcast into Vojvodina as well, to the tens of thousands of Krajina Serb refugees still living in Serbia against their will.

Journalists at independent publications should be put in contact with their counterparts from these and other emerging democracies, such as Poland or Romania, to exchange ideas and techniques for reporting in post-Communist countries.

Other regional Serbian language press might be useful, though not ideal, in furnishing a somewhat different view of recent events. The Bosnian weekly news magazine *The Reporter*, published in the Republika Srpska capital, Banja Luka, is perceived to have an impact among Serbs in Serbia proper.⁵³ *Panorama* is another RS publication worth disseminating,

⁵² From CIA estimates, based on extrapolations from the total population of Serbia; Deutsche Welle estimates only 17.5%, and many Serbs believe the true number is believed to be between one-fourth and one-third. Because the last reliable census took place in 1991, more accurate figures are difficult to find.

⁵³ *The Reporter's* impact in Serbia may be due to its excessive coverage of events and personalities in Serbia, rather than of those inside the RS.

although some analysts claim that Serbian Serbs take a dim view of anything coming out of the RS.

5. The importance of careful monitoring

To avoid repeating a mistake made in Bosnia, all Western-supported independent media in the former Yugoslavia should be fastidiously monitored for content and quality control. In the Republika Srpska as well as in Croatian-controlled central Bosnia, for example, an hour of hate-mongering, ultra-nationalist programming will suddenly spew forth, preceded and followed by hour upon hour of apparently innocuous light entertainment. Similar problems have been experienced in relation to pirate broadcasts which are harder to monitor and more adept at getting past the censors. An international monitoring centre in Kosovo might be set up to address this matter in a more vigilant fashion.

6. Broadcasting foreign programs

With the war over, the international community must operate on the presumption that Serbs' interest in the truth will outweigh their profound mistrust of any information issuing from lead NATO countries.

The United States Information Agency (U.S.I.A.) has now encircled Serbia with transmitters capable of flooding the state with 24-hour news programming. Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE), Deutsche Welle, Agence France Presse, and the BBC are already broadcasting into Serbia. More airtime should quickly be made available to those Serbian broadcasters willing to risk being stigmatised for using Western transmitters.

The U.S.I.A. should now turn its attention to revitalising VOA's Serbian language service, which is still largely dismissed inside Serbia as unappealing, old-fashioned, American or NATO propaganda. According to recent surveys, RFE is far more popular among Serbian listeners than VOA, although even RFE is said to have a geriatric, 1950s feel to its programming. Listened to by workers, peasants, and intellectuals, RFE should be available anywhere in Serbia and its programming, too, should be refreshed. Taking a cue from Milosevic's strategy of using popular culture to get his message across, both RFE and VOA should, with the help of Serbian journalists, devise entertaining programs with likeable, identifiable hosts and popular guest artists who can subtly, through humour, satire, or rap, perhaps, begin to impart the truth of the Serbian condition.

C. Seizing the Political Agenda

One of the reasons for the disappointing progress of the Serbian opposition has been its compulsion to try to out-Milosevic Milosevic. The Yugoslav president repeatedly sets the agenda squarely on the nationalist track, and the democrats knock themselves out attempting to prove how Serb they are. It is a battle they are doomed to lose to Milosevic and his ultra-nationalist outriders. The Serbian opposition has failed repeatedly to recognise Milosevic's tricks before falling prey to them. Moreover, many political parties have no coherent program beyond ousting Milosevic and setting a date for elections. From now on, the democrats should set their own agenda and let Milosevic scramble to outdo them at their own game.

With evidence of Serbia's recent defeat apparent in the face of every Kosovar Serb refugee, there will be a temptation within the opposition to harp on Milosevic's having lost Kosovo. But it will be hard for a weak and sundry opposition to build a firm alliance on that sensitive issue. Instead, the opposition needs to develop a coherent, attractive, forward-looking program. Alliance for Change leaders' early attempt to focus on political change as the key to economic reform and reconstruction might be a promising way to get people thinking about who they can count on to create jobs and to get their schools, power lines, and bridges rebuilt. In addition, opposition leaders might continue to engage people in directly addressing their immediate needs, as a means of drawing them out of their isolation toward a constructive involvement in building their own future.

D. Reaching Beyond Belgrade

It is long past time to push out beyond Belgrade in the effort to cultivate a serious democratic opposition. Certainly leaders of the opposition and independent sector in Vojvodina, Sandzak, and Sumadija have long been fed up with what they consider to be the squabbling Belgrade "democrats" and have complained bitterly that self-interested party heads there have repeatedly failed to address their critical, local concerns. In the wake of the Kosovo war, the balance has clearly shifted. With organised and spontaneous protests occurring across Serbia, the Belgrade opposition appears to need its provincial counterparts more than local opposition leaders need Belgrade. Still, with Belgrade finally willing to cough up more resources and provincial organisers able to provide the manpower, both groups have realised that collaboration has become critical to their movement's success and their own survival.

Some American and European officials and NGOs have also been disappointed by some of their close partners within the Belgrade intelligentsia, who felt unjustly punished by the bombing and refused to address the matter of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo, as if the Western alliance's decision to engage in the former had not

been motivated by the need to stop the latter.⁵⁴ They find the political and intellectual elites in Belgrade to be somewhat cut off, both from the pulse and the groundswell now taking place in the rest of the state, and insist it is critical to reach into central and southern Serbia, into the technical, rural, and trade unionist constituencies, and to encourage smaller parties representing local interest groups to join forces with larger, state-wide opposition groups.

Nezavisnost, Serbia's largest independent trade union confederation (see Section IIIf), is one organisation outside the conventional party structure that already has local offices throughout much of the state and is attuned to the needs of ordinary Serbs. Nezavisnost is quite strong in the Novi Sad area, which took much bombing damage and where the union group might co-ordinate re-training programs for idled workers. Yugoslav Action, a consortium of nearly 60 NGOs (see Appendix) which has formed an alliance with Nezavisnost, can also be helpful in this regard. The group has plans to operate short-term retraining, education, and war trauma counselling programs that would make use of the expertise offered by trade unionists, local NGOs, and hopefully their counterparts from third countries (see Section V).

If and when Milosevic is removed from power and opposition figures find themselves catapulted into office, they will actually have to run a government. In anticipation of this daunting task, opposition leaders might reach out now to moderate, relatively uncompromised technocrats within the SPS and JUL party structures who, after close to a decade in power, possess useful expertise. These least tainted of Milosevic's cronies, whose financial management skills and connections could prove useful, are likely to care more about their assets than about their friendship with an indicted war criminal.

V. DEFINING A ROLE FOR THE OUTSIDE WORLD

A. Isolation or Constructive Engagement?

On 10 June 1999 President Clinton, in a televised address from Washington, delivered a message to the Serbian people. "I know you too have suffered from Mr. Milosevic's wars," he told them. "As long as he remains in power, as long as your nation is ruled by an indicted war criminal, we will provide no support for the reconstruction of Serbia. But we are ready to provide humanitarian aid now and to help to build a better future for Serbia, too, when its government represents tolerance and freedom, not repression and terror."⁵⁵

Both Clinton and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who made an equally unequivocal statement, understand that any assistance to a Serbia still ruled by

⁵⁴ In a recent funding appeal from a consortium of independent broadcast media that includes Kosovo-based stations, the hardships described all had to do exclusively with the suffering of the independent Serbian sector as a result of NATO's intervention. Kosovo was never mentioned in the solicitation.

⁵⁵ *New York Times*, 11 June 1999.

Milosevic would, in some manner, be controlled by Milosevic. However, others insist that any further isolation of an already cut-off populace would be counter-productive. Milosevic thrives on isolation, they argue; it is one of the foundations of his rule. Depriving Serbia of international assistance, insist subscribers to this view – which include French, German, Austrian, Italian, Greek, Finnish, Slovak, and Russian leaders, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and leaders of the Serbian opposition – will only encourage the Serb people's collective paranoia and their carefully inbred myth that they are Europe's great victims. After all, the Allies rebuilt a flattened, captive Germany after World War II, when so many Germans enthusiastically committed war crimes of a far greater magnitude. After NATO's bombing campaign, an allied refusal of assistance would only strengthen the hand of Milosevic and nationalists and could induce a Weimar-like climate in Serbia that will be difficult to resolve without further conflict.

There are some differences, however, between the respective situations in Germany and Serbia. Germany had capitulated unconditionally, had lost its sovereignty, and was compelled to endure the difficult process of de-Nazification before massive assistance began.⁵⁶ Moreover, the Weimar republic which the West initially failed to assist had been a struggling democracy, whereas Serbia remains a dictatorship.

For weeks the Alliance for Change has advocated targeted assistance for opposition-held cities and towns so that local leaders can prove to their constituents that democracy can deliver. "We're not asking for help ousting him, that is our job," said Social Democracy Party head Vuk Obradovic. "But we need to show the people something real, something they can see with their own eyes."⁵⁷ Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic, who returned on 4 July from wartime exile in Montenegro, has visited several European capitals to make the case that local governments already in opposition hands should be able to prove to their constituents that they can deliver not only heating oil or re-strung telephone lines, but a future in which Serbia can enjoy constructive partnerships with other European nations.

This approach was adopted by several European capitals and has prevailed as well in Washington, which announced on 13 July that it will deliver humanitarian assistance only to areas under opposition control.⁵⁸ But any direct assistance to opposition mayors or non-government organisations must be well enough advertised that citizens will know where it comes from, and carefully structured so that Milosevic sees none of it. The Yugoslav president made clear in his first public post-war outing, by presiding over the reconstruction of a highway bridge in Aleksinac,⁵⁹ that he intends to take credit for any and all rebuilding that gets done.

Attempts to bypass Belgrade are problematic. The Austrian government recently promised to rebuild a key bridge in the opposition-controlled city of Novi Sad only

⁵⁶ German sovereignty was restored only in 1949, with the creation of the Federal Republic.

⁵⁷ *Washington Post*, 6 July 1999.

⁵⁸ Reuters, 13 July 1999.

⁵⁹ *New York Times*, 16 June 1999.

to find its efforts stymied by Milosevic, whose government denied visas to the advance team of engineers.⁶⁰ The opposition should seize on, and publicise as widely as possible, any more attempts by Milosevic to abort or co-opt targeted international assistance, so as to expose the Yugoslav president's hollow commitment to see his nation rebuilt.

B. Third-Country Intermediaries

NGO expertise among Serbia's neighbours could prove to be very helpful in expediting a democratic transition inside Serbia. First, NGOs in Eastern Europe have all lived through – and to varying degrees, helped to occasion – the sort of struggle that Serbia must go through now. These NGOs have a lot of knowledge to impart, about everything from breaking up a monolithic media, letting the world know about gross human rights violations, and organising political parties founded on liberal democratic principles, to revamping educational and health care delivery systems once a credible opposition is finally in charge.

Partly because the independent sector in other Eastern European countries has been through the same transformative process – from being outsiders to becoming the government itself – NGOs from neighbouring countries may encounter less resistance from Serbs who have little interest, at least right now, in being advised by Western democracies. Finally, because the international community has refused to commit anything but humanitarian assistance to a Milosevic-led Serbia, it would be appropriate and convenient for the West to course its support for democratisation through those interested neighbouring countries who would be the primary implementers. Given the interest of most Balkan nations in a stable and conflict-free region, and their eagerness to be considered part of Europe and, at least in the case of Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Macedonia, to earn admission into NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, neighbouring countries would probably be more than willing to lend their support to this critical international effort.

Different countries should be tapped to contribute in their particular areas of expertise. For example, Western donors might approach human rights organisations in Poland and Bulgaria, as well as Bulgarian NGOs that specialise in economic reform and democratisation experts in Slovenia, to design programs that can start up almost immediately. Credible NGOs in Romania, Bosnia & Herzegovina and even Croatia, which has yet to complete its own democratic transition, should also be invited to share their experiences, on how to cultivate opposition within the military, how to combat nationalist control of the media and how to sustain a vibrant university culture under an authoritarian regime.

These countries, with the help of the international community, might begin to create ample travel opportunities for interested Serbs. Technical, cultural, or student exchanges, as well as seminars or conferences held in any of these above-mentioned countries could enable a growing number of Serbs to catch

⁶⁰ *New York Times*, 3 July 1999.

glimpses of functioning societies beyond their claustrophobic borders. Conferences exploring issues of accountability might also be more successful if held outside Serbia.

VI. TOWARD REJOINING THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS

A. **International Assistance: Waiting in Escrow**

The West should stand firm on its commitment not to deliver a cent in reconstruction assistance into Milosevic's hands. However, donor nations and the EU in particular should let the Serbian people know that they will not be excluded from the Stability Pact now being designed to strengthen the south Balkans and to help the emerging democracies there become full-fledged partners in Europe. The prospect of eventual European integration should be used as a magnet to draw the Serbs out of their solitary misery toward a more prosperous future.

The people of Serbia should be told that the same assistance will go to Serbia as to all other south Balkan states. Serbia's share will go into an escrow account, to be made available at such time as individuals committed to protecting universal human rights and the rule of law are running the country. The Serbs should be shown the cheque so they cannot claim that once again they alone have been singled out for unique punishment.

B. **Lifting The Sanctions – Step By Step**

The international community should encourage the people of Serbia to recognise that their fate is in their own hands. Western assistance awaits Serbs' willingness to sign on to a set of specific conditions. As each condition is met, certain restrictions on the flow of assistance will be lifted, from the first ban on reconstruction funds to the final, so-called outer wall of sanctions, which were enacted by the U.S. Congress at the end of the Bosnian war to deny Yugoslavia access to international financial and lending institutions. The roadmap begins after Milosevic is gone.

In Poland and South Africa, successful opposition leaders Lech Walesa and Nelson Mandela, respectively, asked the international community to give them a roadmap that would help them to find their way toward entering the community of democratic, law-abiding nations. These astute populist politicians wanted strict economic and political reforms imposed upon them because they knew that, given the dangerous and inhospitable political climates in their respective countries, they would not be able to propose and carry out those sorely needed reforms alone. Western diplomats in regular contact with Serbian opposition leaders should make clear that, for their purposes, sanctions are far from a punishment; rather, in knowing hands, as in the cases of Poland and South Africa, they can be an invaluable tool to effect a desired result.

There should be no mystery about what needs to be done to open the wellsprings of Western assistance. The specifics of which sanctions are to be linked to the fulfilment of which conditions must be worked out, and the series of steps should be made clear to all the Serbian people.

Even more important than the order in which restrictions are lifted, however, is the unflagging commitment of the international community to keep to the roadmap. Milosevic excels at exploiting ideological cleavages among his adversaries, whether within the professional military, the opposition or the Western alliance. There must be no cracks in the international resolve to see this transition through to its successful denouement. European stability now depends not so much on Milosevic, but on the determination of Europe's democratic leaders to win the peace as they have won the war.

Conditions:

The key conditions to be met before any steps can be taken to end Serbia's isolation are Milosevic's removal from office and his replacement with a credible government predicated on democratic principles, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights and committed to genuine political and economic reform. Once these conditions have been satisfied an immediate aid disbursement of a predetermined amount should be released out of Serbia's designated share of Stability Pact monies.

In addition, the following immediate steps should be taken:

- Western nations should re-open their embassies, including their defence attaché sections;
- The European Union and its members' legislative bodies should send high-level delegations to assess the new government's policies, economic and electoral reform programs, degree of stability and willingness to implement the Dayton Peace Accords and to co-operate with The Hague Tribunal;
- Donor nations should obtain a commitment from the new government to turn over all indicted war criminals to the Tribunal within six months and to detain and try those responsible for crimes committed in Kosovo, Bosnia and Croatia;
- The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development should begin discussions on both financial and technical assistance and debt rescheduling, with agreement and actual disbursement subject to the apparent commitment to and progress on economic reform, co-operation with the Tribunal and respect for democratic principles and human rights;
- Government assets held in Western countries should be unfrozen;
- Foreign investment and trade should resume, predicated on the immediate eradication of the payment bureaux and commitment to reform the tax and investment codes;

- The OSCE should establish a democratisation mission and various national political party foundations and institutes should resume full party-building and training operations in-country; the OSCE should also begin discussions regarding eventual Yugoslav membership;
- The EU should convene an international conference to discuss possible mechanisms for instituting a re-education, or de-Nazification program that can help Serbs to learn about, acknowledge, and reckon with the crimes committed in their name;
- The UN Secretary-General's office should open discussions with the new government regarding Yugoslavia's succession to the seat formerly occupied by the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- The Council of Europe should open talks with the new government regarding Yugoslavia's membership;
- NATO should also begin discussions with Yugoslavia regarding the necessary pre-requisites for entry into the alliance's Partnership for Peace program;
- Dates should be set for municipal and parliamentary elections.

Assistance from the above-mentioned international financial institutions and memberships in the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe, and Partnership for Peace should be granted only upon certification that the new government in Belgrade has:

- Committed itself to substantial political and economic reform programs, including electoral reform, elimination of the payment bureaux and changes in the tax and investment codes;
- Shown itself to be in compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Agreed to co-operate with the International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague by arresting and surrendering indicted war criminals;
- Released all Kosovar Albanian prisoners currently held in Serbian prisons, adequately identified all prisoners still detained inside Kosovo, and allowed uninhibited access to those prisoners by the International Committee of the Red Cross;
- Successfully negotiated the division of assets and liabilities and all other succession issues resulting from the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
- Agreed to govern according to fundamental democratic principles, including the rule of law, both domestic and international and the respect for the human rights of all citizens, regardless of their ethnicity.

The comprehensive arms embargo and the asset freeze and travel ban on Milosevic, his senior officials and those military, police, and paramilitary

commanders responsible for the atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo should remain in place indefinitely.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The international community must be realistic in its approach to Serbia. Neither democratic governance nor an acknowledgement of the horrific acts committed in Serbia's name is going to be achieved overnight. A long, arduous process is called for, involving education, acknowledgement, and, ultimately, reconciliation, in which appropriate sectors within the international community can and should play a facilitating role.

Still, the popular expressions of frustration and despair evidenced in the recent demonstrations could mark the tentative beginning of a process of transformation. While Serb nationalism is not about to disappear, for the present, at least, enthusiasm for any more nationalist adventures seems to have been exhausted. Ordinary people are hungry for peace and a normal life. Many wish to be part of Europe again, not to further entrench their isolation by picking another fight.

This hunger must be exploited now, or all the efforts of the international community to create a space for the democratic opposition and civil society will come to nothing. Western governments must move rapidly to support independent media and the under-funded opposition, if they are to withstand Milosevic's attempts to mute, arrest, splinter, and co-opt them.

In determining which forces to support, the international community should recognise that Vuk Draskovic, despite his democratic pretences, is potentially as dangerous a political presence as Vojislav Seselj. Both men, in their roles as puppet opposition figures, have long assisted Milosevic in creating the democratic veneer he has used to legitimise himself internationally. While Seselj is clearly an indictable ultra-nationalist who would find few Western backers, Draskovic also has an ultra-nationalist past, served as deputy prime minister in the regime, and currently has two SPO party leaders participating in the Milosevic government.

There exist very limited choices in Serbia today: Milosevic; Seselj; Draskovic; a technocratic, transitional government likely to negotiate Milosevic's departure and to eschew questions of accountability; and the Alliance for Change. While there is reason for concern about the Alliance's internal rifts, its leaders' lack of experience and the apparently flagging attendance at its protest rallies, the coalition is nevertheless the only credible force capable of appealing to ordinary people with an agenda that rejects the ultra-nationalism of the current regime.

At this point, even a small amount of support will make a tremendous difference in the coalition's ability to sustain its momentum. By continuing to withhold assistance, the West runs the risk that it will have little leverage over the direction the opposition takes with regard to its agenda, its leaders, and its strategic

partners. Already bitter that their ostensibly pro-Western orientation has earned them nothing in the past, opposition figures are likely to resent being abandoned again, at this critical juncture, and will feel vindicated in their long-held suspicion that, in fact, the international community prefers to continue dealing with Milosevic.

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Action is needed on three fronts if the nascent forces for change are to be harnessed and a real transition process initiated:

- **Measures to isolate Milosevic and his inner circle** – through Tribunal indictments, financial pressure, travel restrictions, sanctions, and exploiting cracks in the military and security forces.
- **Measures to mobilise public opposition to the regime** – through carefully channelled support and technical assistance for opposition parties and civil society organisations, support for independent media, and contact with Church leaders.
- **Measures to reduce Belgrade's influence in Montenegro and Kosovo** – through substantial support for the Djukanovic government in Podgorica and Montenegrin civil society, a formal NATO security guarantee to protect Montenegro from an attempted seizure by Belgrade, and sending the message that Kosovo is now an international protectorate and that the current regime will play no part in determining Kosovo's future.

MEASURES TO ISOLATE MILOSEVIC AND HIS INNER CIRCLE

1. Indictments

- The international community must find ways to build on and exploit the indictments issued by the International Criminal Tribunal. Western governments must do everything possible to constrain indictees' movements and to facilitate or engineer their timely arrest. These governments should expedite the transfer to the Office of the Chief Prosecutor all information – including classified information – that could be of use in preparing both the cases against the current list of indictees and indictments of such key destabilising figures as Vojislav Seselj as well as other top army, police and paramilitary commanders.
- NATO-led forces in Kosovo and in Bosnia must be vigorous in arresting indicted war criminals of all ethnic backgrounds.
- All indictees must be listed immediately with Interpol, so they can be stopped in any attempt to flee to nations offering asylum.

- Countries which continue to trade with Yugoslavia or Serbia, or to engage in any way, whether for diplomatic or business purposes, with Milosevic or his alleged partners in crime should be reminded by the Tribunal and by the UN Secretary-General that they do so in violation of international law. Access to international lending institutions and membership in international organisations should be denied any country that does not comply with orders of the UN Tribunal.

2. Financial Pressure and Travel Restrictions

- Action is needed to locate and seize the assets of Milosevic and his cronies – believed to be held in Cyprus, Switzerland, Greece, Russia, China, and possibly Beirut, London, and Tokyo.
- Leaders of UN member states should be reminded of their obligation under international law to co-operate with the UN-mandated Tribunal, which has ordered assets of the five top indicted officials to be frozen.
- Western governments and intelligence agencies should swiftly pool information regarding the location of both indictees' and cronies' bank accounts and commit the resources necessary to freeze them and to effect their seizure.
- The Russian, Chinese, Greek and Cypriot governments should be pressed to locate and block any bank accounts of Milosevic and his circle of intimates. In the case of Cyprus, it should be made clear that future membership in the EU is contingent upon its co-operation in isolating the Belgrade regime in every possible way.
- Western intelligence services should exploit contacts between businesses in their own countries and Serbian business partners to transmit a clear message to Milosevic's associates that further assistance and investment will not be forthcoming until Milosevic has gone.⁶¹
- The neighbouring governments of Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Bosnia, Greece, Albania, and Macedonia, should encourage their own business leaders to transmit the same message to their Serbian counterparts.
- The governments of all UN member states should comply with the EU ban on travel for Milosevic, his family and 300 of his closest cronies.

⁶¹ The German foreign affairs ministry, in particular, has had reliable information regarding Serbia's biggest industrial and financial players; this information should be widely shared and publicized, so that the cronies themselves feel the heat.

- Allied nations should be wary of undermining their own efforts by hiring crony-controlled firms to rebuild Kosovo and service the international organisations there.
- Both the travel ban and the freezing of assets should be manipulated on a rolling basis to reward and punish the people closest to Milosevic who might prove susceptible to personal and financial pressure. The names of cronies or top officials who co-operate with the Tribunal or distance themselves from the regime in verifiable ways might be provisionally removed from the list, while the names of others, such as the SPO leaders currently serving in the government, should be added.

3. Sanctions

- The international community must uphold its commitment not to rebuild Serbia until Milosevic is out of power. Humanitarian assistance should be coursed through such Church-run organisations as the International Orthodox Christian Charities rather than through the UNHCR, which is required, by UN mandate, to deal with the government, or the Yugoslav Red Cross and Commission on Refugees, both of which are reportedly corrupt and have become regular cash cows for the regime.
- Future humanitarian assistance from Western governments should be conditioned upon the immediate and unconditional release of all Kosovar prisoners held inside Serbia. The UN Security Council should consider issuing a resolution addressing this critical issue, in which Serbia stands in flagrant violation of international law.
- Western governments should practice patience in re-establishing diplomatic relations with Belgrade. Any diplomatic re-entry lends credibility to Milosevic's glib assurances that little by little, Western nations, loath to be cut out of the profits to be had on contracts to rebuild what they criminally destroyed, will re-engage with a Serbia ruled by someone with whom they have cut deals in the past. All discussion regarding the delivery of humanitarian assistance can be handled long-distance, either through the foreign ministry or the international non-government organisations operating inside Serbia.⁶²
- No international sanctions should be lifted until after Milosevic and his regime are gone. Even then, the international community should not rush in with a full package of assistance and economic overtures. Instead, a pre-announced set of conditions (such as those described in Section V) should go into effect, to help the new Serbian government

⁶² At least some of the governments which have re-opened their Belgrade embassies have painstakingly avoided seconding new ambassadors or making other moves that would necessitate the presentation of credentials, formal ceremonies, or any prolonged series of interactions with the regime. (ICG interview with Austrian embassy official, 15 July 1999).

chart a course toward re-integration with its neighbours and with the rest of Europe.

- Any new government's access to the international financial institutions should be contingent on its verifiable co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal.
- The EU should appoint an international co-ordinating council, in anticipation of Milosevic's departure, to determine precise conditions for the eventual lifting of sanctions, to work with the new government once it is in place, to exert discipline where necessary, flexibility where deserved.
- Sponsors of the Balkan Stability Pact should follow through on their current plan of building up Kosovo as a protected model of a democratically governed entity and rewarding Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania for their co-operation during the NATO action and their commitment to political and economic reform. The EU should take the lead in the pact's design and implementation and should continue to reiterate to the Serbian people that their assistance flow will begin when Serbia is governed according to the rule of law and respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms.

4. Exploiting Cracks Within the Military and Security Forces

- Those Yugoslav army commanders and reservist leaders who have already broken with the regime should be encouraged to urge sympathetic colleagues to join the ranks of the opposition, if on no other grounds than that the army will not be modernised or treated as well as the state security forces as long as Milosevic remains in power.
- The West should be prepared to exploit the private reluctance of disaffected army commanders to send troops to take Montenegro. NATO member nations should stop withholding their commitment to the Montenegrin government to respond with force should Belgrade attempt to seize power in Montenegro and should announce that NATO forces will arrest all commanders caught participating in such a venture.

MEASURES TO MOBILISE PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME

5. The Opposition

- Western countries should engage immediately in serious party-building activities and commit significant technical and financial support that can help the opposition to mount a convincing case for democratic and economic reform.

- However, the West must not fall into the trap of attempting to pick a winner. Now is the time when new leaders are likely to come forward from trade unions, student groups, peasant parties and the corps of army reservists, all of whom could play a significant role in helping to rid Serbia of Milosevic.
- Labour federations in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere should assist Nezavisnost and other trade unions in mobilising workers from both state-run and private factories and in creating outreach re-training and education programs in co-ordination with those Serbian NGOs already engaged in such work (See Appendix). Polish labour organisations in particular might provide some insight and practical suggestions as to how to effect peaceful, democratic change.
- Serbia's NGO community is in critical need of discreet contact, technical support, training, and travel, possibly through foreign exchanges or conferences organised with the help of their counterparts in neighbouring countries.
- The international community should resist lending any significant support to Vuk Draskovic, notwithstanding his recent claims to have allied himself with Serbia's democratic forces. Instead, the opposition and its Western backers should seek out those local SPO party leaders and organisers, including many former student activists, who are more committed to democratic principles than to their party or its opportunistic leaders.

6. Media

- Opposition leaders and Western donors must look beyond Belgrade and reach out to other constituencies through mainstream and provincial media.
- Assistance to Serbian independent media should no longer be too concentrated; rather, it should be directed in smaller sums at a far broader range of news organisations, so as to give voice to a wider spectrum of views and reach a range of constituencies.
- The tabloids with their large circulation should be supported, as should key papers in opposition-run cities and towns. In selecting its local partners, the international community should never assume that "non-government" means "non-nationalist."
- Every effort should be made to seek out and support reliable independent media outlets and individual journalists.

- Voice of America and Radio Free Europe should expand the number of independent broadcasters given access to the U.S.I.A. “ring of transmitters” now surrounding Serbia. Both Radio Index and Radio Pancevo, at such time as the latter is permitted to resume broadcasting, have good track records and would be good candidates.
- The foreign broadcasting services should update and upgrade their Serbian language programming to appeal to younger audiences and to minimise its chances of being dismissed as Western propaganda.
- The international community and independent Serbian media should make use of the international presence in Kosovo to produce fresh, accurate, Serbian language programs broadcast from Kosovo and relayed across Serbia.
- Serbian journalists and Western actors should take advantage of democratic rule in Montenegro to publish and support independent papers and magazines that can be disseminated across Serbia. A Radio Free Serbia, possibly staffed by fired or unemployed Serbian journalists, should be transmitted from Podgorica, and foreign broadcasting should be continuously beamed in. Ample airtime should be allotted to those local Serbian language broadcasters willing to use Western transmitters there.
- Western donors must take a far more activist role in monitoring the product of their local partners throughout the former Yugoslavia to guard against “stealth nationalism,” or surprise infusions of ultra-nationalist vitriol. Toward this end, the UN civilian authority in Kosovo might consider setting up an international monitoring centre there.

7. The Church

- Given recent history and the Serbian Church’s vested interests, it is unlikely that Orthodox priests will play a lead role in pressing for political change. Nevertheless, Orthodox and other religious communities abroad should reach out to their Serbian brethren and encourage them to play their part in creating a more open climate in which political change is possible. The Pope, in particular, should be encouraged to discuss with Patriarch Pavle precedents for clerical involvement in propitiating national movements toward governments grounded in respect for human rights.
- Once Milosevic has been removed, Orthodox Church leaders should be enlisted to help the Serbian people move toward a public reckoning of crimes committed in their name. International religious leaders should begin, now that the Church has taken the first steps toward distinguishing itself from those who perpetrated these crimes, to

impress upon Serbian Church leaders how critical their involvement could be in this important, long-term effort.

MEASURES TO REDUCE BELGRADE'S INFLUENCE IN MONTENEGRO AND KOSOVO

8. A Formal Security Guarantee for Montenegro
 - NATO should formally commit to protecting Montenegro in the event of an attempt by Milosevic to seize the republic or depose Djukanovic.⁶³
9. Support for the Djukanovic Government and civil society
 - Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic should continue to be supported and rewarded with a significant package of material and technical assistance for his republic, which should be developed and showcased as the only democratic and ethnically tolerant part of Yugoslavia.
 - Djukanovic should be encouraged to further strengthen his coalitions both within Montenegro and with his democratic colleagues in Serbia.
 - Montenegro's independent sector – civil society groups, NGOs, and the independent media – should continue to be strongly supported.
10. Reconsideration of Montenegro's relationship to Serbia
 - In light of Milosevic's apparent refusal to grant Montenegro greater autonomy and the Montenegrin government's 5 August adoption of a platform that would replace the FRY with a more loosely bound "Association of States of Montenegro and Serbia," the international community should support Podgorica in its efforts to determine its own political future.
11. Rethinking Kosovo's relationship to Serbia
 - To put additional pressure on Belgrade and the Serbian people, the international community should reconsider the extent to which it protects Serbia's authority over Kosovo. There is no reason for the international organisations working in Kosovo to use Serbian currency or banks, to adhere to Serbia's civil or criminal codes, or to hire Serbian state policemen or judges who have participated in ethnic cleansing or the enforcement of Belgrade's vicious apartheid there. A growing

⁶³ A formal security guarantee would only confirm the message that British Foreign Minister Robin Cook says has already been delivered: "We have warned Milosevic that we are watching very carefully what happens in Montenegro, and we are determined to make sure the democracy in Montenegro survives." (Deutsche Presse Agentur, 24 June 1999.)

awareness of Kosovo's irreversible loss may help to persuade the Serbian people that their current leaders' policies are anathema and their Greater Serbia project has failed.

APPENDIX

WHO'S WHO IN THE OPPOSITION

1. THE BIG PLAYERS: PARTIES WITH VIABLE NATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

(a) Vuk Draskovic and the Serbian Renewal Movement (*Srpski Pokret Obnove*, SPO)

The charismatic, opportunistic Draskovic has proven an unreliable partner in the past for Serbian reformists and could single-handedly undermine the current momentum for democratic change. The SPO leader has demonstrated time and again that his own interests supersede any professed commitment to coalition co-operation.⁶⁴ As the self-declared "king of the streets," Draskovic led the opposition during the heady winter of 1996-97 but then was co-opted by Milosevic in 1998 to serve as deputy prime minister. He was sacked from that post during the bombing when he criticised Milosevic for not calling a halt to the conflict.

Draskovic's nationalist stripes date back at least to the 1980s, when, in collusion with the Serbian interior ministry and Vojislav Seselj, he helped to set up government-funded, paramilitary "volunteer" units that would later, during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, carry out war crimes for the regime without directly implicating Milosevic or the Yugoslav Army.⁶⁵ Indeed, it was the SPO militia, Srpska Garda, which boasted of having savagely raped and tortured civilians in the village of Gacko during the Bosnian war.⁶⁶ Draskovic never spoke out against Serbian abuses of the ethnic Albanian population of Kosovo and his racist books and articles helped to lay the intellectual groundwork for the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.⁶⁷

While the SPO has established an extensive infrastructure throughout Serbia proper, Draskovic's power base is concentrated in Belgrade. The SPO runs the town, where some 20 percent of Serbia's population and 40 percent of its educated middle class live. He also controls Studio B, the most widely viewed private

⁶⁴ The Clinton administration has reportedly decided as well that Draskovic is too much of an "opportunist" to be a trustworthy democratic alternative at this time (*New York Times*, 12 July 1999).

⁶⁵ During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia Draskovic called for "the peaceful transfer of populations" between countries, making clear his support for ethnic cleansing in pursuit of a Greater Serbia.

⁶⁶ Final Report of the UN Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992); Annex V, The Prijedor Report; paras 159, 197, 276, and 305; Helsinki Watch, War Crimes in BiH, vol II, pp. 80-81. Draskovic was arrested in June 1993 for his participation in anti-Milosevic demonstrations; the Srpska Garda, consequently incapacitated, was disbanded in late 1994.

⁶⁷ A new film made from Draskovic's 1982 best-selling novel *No' (The Knife)*, a thinly veiled, anti-Muslim screed, has been the number one draw at the box office in the wake of the Kosovo war. (www.independent.co.uk/atp/INDEPENDENT/FOREIGN_NEWS/P13S3.html; *New York Times*, 20 July.)

television station in Belgrade and a critical venue for any would-be opposition. While recent Studio B broadcasts have been little more open-minded than those prepared by the state, Draskovic has allowed some opposition figures to appear on his station and has recently opened the studio to the independent radio station B2-92. The relative objectivity of Studio B's broadcasting in the weeks to come will provide some indication of which way this consummate self-server believes the political wind is blowing.

In the aftermath of the NATO bombing campaign, when the Alliance for Change announced its plans to hold a series of demonstrations in central and southern Serbia, Draskovic refused to join ranks, insisting that the time had not yet come to take to the streets. However, the spontaneous groundswell of public discontent forced him to change his mind and he attempted, with lacklustre results, to mobilise the SPO organisation for an 8 July rally in Leskovac.⁶⁸

On 13 July Draskovic announced that the SPO would indeed work toward Milosevic's resignation and would, like his rival Zoran Djindjic, a key Alliance figure, hold a rally in Kragujevac, but on a different day. Had Draskovic not been so intent on outshining Djindjic, the combined SPO-Alliance turn-out might have sent a concerted message, both to Milosevic and to all fearful or undecided Serbs, that an inexorable momentum was building to force the Yugoslav president from office. Instead, the well organised 17 July SPO rally of some 20,000 eclipsed the Alliance's turn-out two days prior and confirmed many Serbs' suspicions that the opposition factions remain incapable of working together.⁶⁹

The SPO, which controls 45 out of 250 seats in the Serbian parliament, at first appeared to have gained support in the wake of the war, far outstripping any other opposition party with its 15 percent showing in opinion polls.⁷⁰ While political analysts estimate Draskovic's bedrock constituency at closer to half that number, Alliance leaders nevertheless believe they need his support to mount Belgrade rallies strong enough to withstand possible disruption by Milosevic's security forces or obstructionist hard-liners supporting Seselj's SRO. But on 18 July Draskovic staked out a position irreconcilable with professed Alliance goals.

Rejecting the politics of "hatred and revenge," the SPO leader vowed to coax Milosevic into a graceful, gradual retirement in exchange for immunity from prosecution and extradition.⁷¹ The Alliance, which includes some of Serbia's most principled and high-minded individuals, may be unable to make common cause with Draskovic's current posture and unfortunately would then have to proceed

⁶⁸ According to reports, the protest petered out soon after the SPO got involved. http://www.independent.co.uk/atp/INDEPENDENT/FOREIGN_NEWS/P1651.htm/

⁶⁹ *New York Times*, 18 July 1999; *Daily Telegraph*, 16 July 1999.

⁷⁰ *New York Times*, 11 July 1999; BETA News Agency, 21 June, citing polling data taken by the Institute of Policy Studies (Belgrade) between 9-14 June. Draskovic performed less well, however, when people were asked whether they trusted him: only 10 percent of those polled said they did, which, while reduced from his popularity showing, still put Draskovic in second place only to Milosevic's 15.6 percent.

⁷¹ *New York Times*, 19 July 1999.

without the SPO's formidable organisational strength. Alliance figures should quickly reach out to regional SPO offices, where local party leaders with less to lose than Draskovic are reportedly far less inclined to endorse his latest stance.

Draskovic, who values Western support, has recently made some effort to curry favour abroad. In a recent Studio B interview, apparently hoping to impress Western listeners while taking direct aim at Seselj, Draskovic became the first opposition leader to call for a period of "de-Nazification" to take place in Serbia.⁷² He has also recently sought to ally himself alongside the Western-backed government of Milo Djukanovic in Montenegro, indicating that it should fall to the Montenegrin president to select the leaders of any transitional federal government.

(b) Zoran Djindjic and the Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka, DS)

Djindjic is a 47-year-old philosopher, former mayor of Belgrade and founder in February 1990 of the New Democratic Party, forerunner of the current DS. During the war in Bosnia he travelled to Pale to show his support for then-Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, on whose behalf he later campaigned and whom he subsequently supported in his power struggle with Belgrade. Djindjic has never apologised for his prolonged association with the now indicted Karadzic, which has compromised him in the eyes of many in the West.

However, after the Dayton Peace Accords put an end to the Bosnian war, Djindjic toned down his nationalist rhetoric and focused instead on replacing Milosevic's regime with a democratic government and market economy predicated on the rule of law. Yet Djindjic has hardly renounced his nationalist streak. At Easter 1997 he joined 59 other Serb intellectuals in signing a Church-sanctioned "Declaration to Stop Genocide Against the Serbian People."⁷³

While the DS had always been anti-Milosevic, it had never worked particularly well with the rest of the opposition. In 1996, together with SPO leader Draskovic and Vesna Pesic's tiny Civic Alliance, Djindjic's party forged a coalition called Zajedno (Together), which won important municipal elections. But personal rivalry between Draskovic and Djindjic broke Zajedno apart, much to the severe disillusionment of the tens of thousands of Serbs who for three months conducted exhilarating daily street protests that seemed destined to bring down the regime. Djindjic earned Draskovic's enmity when, in 1997, he and Pesic boycotted the election for president of Serbia in which Draskovic, suddenly deprived of DS support, came in a poor third.⁷⁴ Draskovic soon paid him back by voting with Milosevic's Socialists to oust Djindjic as mayor of Belgrade.

⁷² *Financial Times*, 10 June 1999.

⁷³ "The Radicalisation of Serbian Society," Belgrade Helsinki Committee, 1997.

⁷⁴ More damaging than Draskovic's loss was the boost Djindjic's boycott gave to Seselj's candidacy. If Djindjic had remained allied with Draskovic, it is unlikely that the right-wing nationalist would have been able to garner the popular support that has entrenched him as a player to be reckoned with.

On Kosovo, Djindjic has taken a pragmatic stance by denouncing both the Belgrade regime and the "terrorist" activities of the "so-called" KLA. After calling for Milosevic's ouster, and following the assassination in Belgrade of a leading independent publisher, Djindjic fled to Montenegro, incurring the disdain of many who thought he should have stuck it out with them throughout the bombing. While he and Djukanovic spoke out against the regime during the war, Djindjic's first statement when the war ended was an expression of concern for the safety of Kosovar Serbs. He made no mention then, nor did he at any time before the NATO intervention, of the Serbian-sponsored atrocities against Kosovar Albanians.

While the DS participates in coalition governments in 23 Serbian municipalities, it has been hamstrung by a persistent lack of public support – the Party's showing in the polls remains at roughly three percent.⁷⁵ Djindjic's arrogance, coupled with his weak public support and lack of leadership experience, have led some Western government officials, particularly in Washington,⁷⁶ to be wary about his prospects. The British and other European governments, however, remain more bullish. For all his faults, Djindjic is a good campaigner who before the war engaged in a lot of party-building that expanded the DS into a dynamic grass-roots organisation with many active party branches. He is the Alliance's most dynamic and polished figure and may be the best leadership choice available.

(c) Milo Djukanovic

President Milo Djukanovic of Montenegro is viewed by some Western observers as the most promising candidate to lead a future democratic Yugoslavia. He is certainly the most visible example anywhere in the former Yugoslavia of a politician who has put democratic rhetoric into action and his relatively successful, multiethnic government could serve as a model for Serbia.

Unfortunately, Djukanovic, who has been heavily courted of late by senior members of the Clinton administration,⁷⁷ is neither a Serb nor Serbian, and Serbia watchers believe that whoever is going to rescue the Serb people from the ruinous state in which they have allowed themselves to be buried must be "one of their own." Indeed, many Serbs view Djukanovic – who gave safe harbour to fugitive Serbian media, politicians, and draft-dodgers and openly criticised Milosevic – as a traitor. In a recent Belgrade poll of 800 voters, Djukanovic came in second to Milosevic of those *least* trusted, and fourth, behind Milosevic, Draskovic, and Seselj, of those who were trusted the most.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ BETA News Agency 21 June, reporting polling data taken 9-14 June. Eight percent of those polled said they did not trust Djindjic, which gave him a slightly higher 'untrustworthy' rating than Seselj; he did not make the list of those most trusted.

⁷⁶ ICG interview with senior U.S. administration official.

⁷⁷ President Clinton himself met with Djukanovic in Ljuljana on 23 June, and a White House visit for the Montenegrin democrat is being planned (Reuters, 24 June; ICG interview with senior U.S. official).

⁷⁸ BETA News Agency, 21 June, reporting an Institute of Political Studies poll taken 9-14 June.

Trained in economics, Djukanovic was part of the new coterie of young Communist leaders who in 1989 replaced the old Communist leadership and agreed to hold multiparty elections at the end of 1990. A former *protégé* of Milosevic, in Belgrade he is disparagingly dubbed, "Milo Marlboro," for having allegedly controlled the lucrative cigarette smuggling business through Montenegro's port of Bar.⁷⁹

Despite his somewhat shadowy past and his not being a Serb, Djukanovic's rising star has proven attractive to Djindjic and Draskovic. He has also been intimately involved in Alliance for Change strategy sessions, which have been held in conjunction with the coalition's Montenegrin counterpart, "For a Better Life," an effective, multiethnic consortium forged and run by Djukanovic himself.

2. SMALLER PARTIES

(a) The Civic Alliance of Serbia (Gradjanski Savez Srbije, or GSS)

One of the smallest and most liberal opposition parties, founded in 1992 and headed by **Goran Svilanovic**, human rights scholar and activist, conscripted army reservist, and one of many dismissed members of the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law. Born in Kosovo, Svilanovic is unusual among Serb democrats for his open defence of the rights of all ethnic minorities. However, he has been known to make ardent anti-Albanian statements and has advocated cutting off Kosovo to prevent Albanians from taking over Serbia proper. Svilanovic has authored two books and numerous legal articles, consulted for the Soros-funded Forced Migration Project and headed the Council for Human Rights at the Center for Anti-War Action, a Belgrade-based NGO.

Vesna Pesic, the former Civic Alliance leader, is now a member of the GSS Board of Directors. Pesic was a voice in the wilderness supporting the NATO action against Yugoslavia. The GSS has been consistently anti-war since the start of conflict in Yugoslavia, but beyond its genuinely liberal and anti-nationalist positions, the party lacks a coherent program. It forced a split with the Social Democratic party that further set back the effort of opposition groups to put their differences aside and coalesce around a set of key social and economic issues. Although Pesic has been a favorite in U.S. policy circles, she has enjoyed very little public support. The GSS received only two percent in a mid-June poll, putting it in last place of all parties mentioned and underlining its weakness beside the SPS's 22 percent.⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Some who closely follow Serbia's criminal capitalist rackets are convinced that Djukanovic also trafficked in other illegal products. (ICG interviews with Western reporters and regional human rights monitors.)

⁸⁰ BETA News Agency, 21 June, reporting an Institute of Political Studies poll of 800 voters taken 9-14 June.

(b) The Social Democracy Party (Socijal Demokratija, SD)

The Social Democratic Party was founded in May 1997 and is led by **Vuk Obradovic**, the retired army general described above, who criticised Milosevic during the war and was one of the first to call for his resignation.⁸¹ Since the war, Obradovic has been one of few Serbs to call for justice with regard to the atrocities perpetrated against Kosovar Albanians. "Those who committed these crimes in Kosovo must be brought to justice," he insisted in a recent interview. "Their first and last names must be known, and they cannot hide behind the regime. This must happen, not because you in the West want it, but because we in Yugoslavia need it. We need to know and we need to cleanse ourselves of this evil."⁸² Despite Obradovic's apparent integrity and courage in speaking out, the two-year-old SD has yet to build a public following, rating a poor 2.5 percent in a mid-June poll.⁸³ Nevertheless, the respected former general should be encouraged to continue voicing his clear moral position, which is so critical to Serbia's eventual recovery.

(c) The Christian Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska Hriscanska Stranka Srbije, or DHSS)

A centre-right party founded in May 1997 and headed by **Vladan Batic**, a Belgrade attorney and co-ordinator for the Alliance for Change. The DHSS has local organisations in close to 100 Serbian cities and towns, and Batic has emerged in recent weeks as a compelling leader and Alliance spokesman. During the 30 June demonstration in Cacak, he shouted into the mike as if to Milosevic, "Go Away! Go to Cuba and study Stalinism there!"⁸⁴ It should come as no surprise that Batic has recently been tarred in the state-run press as a traitor and anti-Serb war criminal.⁸⁵

(d) The Social Democratic Union (SDU)

Led by University of Belgrade psychologist **Zarko Korac**, the SDU is an extremely liberal splinter group that used to be allied with Vesna Pesic's Civic Alliance. Prof. Korac, a former parliamentarian, mentored the students who formed OTPOR (Resistance), an agitprop group of thoughtful student activists many of whom remain in exile or are only now emerging from underground. Korac makes no secret of his opposition to Milosevic,⁸⁶ on the other hand he firmly opposed the bombing. "It's wrong," he told an interviewer. "You are not bombing Milosevic. You are bombing me and my 85-year-old Jewish mother."⁸⁷

⁸¹ Pancevo Radio, 15 June 1999.

⁸² *Calgary Herald* (Canada), 2 July 1999.

⁸³ BETA News Agency, 21 June, reporting an Institute of Political Studies poll taken 9-14 June 1999.

⁸⁴ *New York Times*, 30 June 1999.

⁸⁵ Batic would seem to have established his Serb nationalist credentials when, along with Djindjic, DS mayor of Nis Zoran Zivkovic, Patriarch Pavle, and 57 others, he signed the "Declaration to Stop Genocide Against the Serbian People."

⁸⁶ He wondered aloud, to *The New York Times* (28 January 1998) "whether Milosevic was not the devil incarnate."

⁸⁷ *Salon*, 28 March 1999, "Outlaw Nation?", by Laura Rozen.

While none of these parties has been strong enough on its own to challenge Milosevic politically, their co-operation in the Alliance for Change is a hopeful sign that the democratic opposition might overcome internal differences and play an effective post-war role. It suggests that replacing Milosevic with a civilised democratic government has now become a priority for the party leaders, at least some of whom have pooled their resources to achieve that goal.

(e) The Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska Stranka Srbije, or DSS)

Led by the anti-charismatic **Vojislav Kostunica**, a law faculty graduate and one of the strongest intellectual proponents of Serb nationalism, the DSS is one of at least four organisations spun off from the Democratic Party (DS). Kostunica's ideological focus has been the Kosovo question, and the DSS leader has emerged as a key force behind the resonant claim that "Kosovo is Serbia." Since NATO's action against the FRY Kostunica has abandoned much of his criticism of the Milosevic regime and has instead targeted NATO countries and the West in general, which he insists are unabashedly advancing ethnic Albanian interests and are colluding to tear Kosovo from the FRY. It is this rekindled ultranationalism that has won Kostunica favour with the state-run media, which appears to be fashioning the DSS into a voter alternative to the far-right Radicals, in an apparent attempt by Milosevic to take Radical party leader Seselj down a notch (see Section IIIc above). Kostunica's party received 5.3 percent in a mid-June voters' poll,⁸⁸ which put it well above Djindjic's DS, Obradovic's SD, and Svilanovic's Civic Alliance (GSS). A recent DSS press release condemned the regime's lack of "both reason and morality" and called for Milosevic's resignation solely on the grounds of his not having paid the army reservists.

(f) The Democratic Alternatives Party (Demokratska Alternativa, or DA)

A social democratic party founded in July 1997 and headed by Nebojsa Covic, a former SPS mayor of Belgrade and one of the few Milosevic associates to have split with him over matters of principle. A somewhat lacklustre politician, Covic joined the Alliance for Change but then suddenly quit the coalition. The DA forged an early alliance with the Peasant Party of Serbia and the Party of Pensioners, and won a parliamentary seat in the September 1997 elections. Yet despite having 150 local branches across Serbia, Covic's party lacks infrastructure and any agenda beyond deposing Milosevic. Covic himself is said to have little capacity for introspection; neither he nor his party has ever addressed Serbian war crimes in Bosnia or in Kosovo. Because he has strong ties both to the Church and inside the SPS, he might be a decent 'compromise candidate' for a transitional government, as he is relatively untarnished, he has been out of the spotlight and it would be difficult for Milosevic to attack him directly.

⁸⁸ BETA News Agency, 21 June, reporting an Institute of Political Studies poll taken 9-14 June.

(g) League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina

Led by **Nenad Canak**, a true liberal who has worked vigorously to organise across sectoral boundaries and is largely responsible for the effective coalition-building that is occurring among opposition forces in Vojvodina, the Sandzak, and Sumadija. Canak is one of few in the opposition for whom accountability is a *sine qua non* of democratic governance. Vojvodina itself is fertile ground for an industrious opposition. One of the richest provinces in the former Yugoslavia, it is also one of Serbia's most multiethnic regions, with large numbers of Hungarians and Croats who have long opposed the regime.

3. OTHER OPPOSITION MOVEMENTS AND ACTIVISTS

(a) G-17 and Mladjan Dinkic

Dinkic is the most visible member of this group of 17 young economists, which has called, along with Draskovic, the Church, Perisic, and some factions within the Alliance for Change, for a transitional government of experts willing to endorse what they call "a pact of stability for Serbia." This Stability Pact, to be distinguished from that announced on 31 July by Western donors, includes economic reform, the speedy renewal of ties with the West, and internationally monitored elections. The G-17, which also advocates the unconditional lifting of sanctions, was one of the most vociferous anti-Milosevic groups to have opposed NATO's "illegal" intervention. Its economists have since described the material destruction from the bombing as worse than that suffered by Rotterdam, Warsaw, or Coventry during World War II.

(b) Yugoslav Action Group

A consortium of nearly 60 NGOs, many of which have long track records of opposing Serb nationalism, ethnic cleansing, and Milosevic's wars. Some of these organisations went to extraordinary lengths to work across borders in collaboration with Kosovar Albanians. Yugoslav Action is led by **Miljenko Dereta**, a former film director who also heads **Civic Initiatives**, a Belgrade-based NGO committed to promoting democratic values, particularly among Serb youth. Before the bombing Yugoslav Action, with the help of Civic Initiatives, had built up a network of 200 small NGOs that collaborated on a number of worthwhile education and re-training projects. When the NATO intervention began, these NGOs condemned the bombing and ran for cover. Dereta and others are now trying to piece together the coalition and expand its horizons, through collaborations with the trade union confederation UGS Nezavisnost, student groups, and interested NGOs from neighbouring countries.

(c) New Democracy (Nova Demokratija, ND)

More a political movement than a party *per se*, ND is an NGO-like alliance of grassroots organisations and business people that originated in central Serbia around 1990. Currently led by **Dusan Mihajlovic**, it professes, in his words, to seek "a

different model of political and social life in Serbia. We are for strengthening the democratic institutions and procedures which would control and limit anyone's power." With a Muslim secretary-general, a Jewish spokeswoman, and branch offices in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Belgrade, the organisation appears almost unique in being totally devoid of nationalist rhetoric. On the atrocities committed in the recent war, Mihajlovic recently said, "We must have both the strength and the courage to face the truth about the events in Kosovo and the capability to turn all criminals over to justice. Without that, there is no moral and spiritual reconstruction. The same goes for the Hague indictees."⁸⁹ Mihajlovic is also a realist, however, who believes that no transitional government can succeed without the participation of reformists within the SPS and JUL.

(d) Humanitarian Law Center and Natasa Kandic, director

Established in 1992 and run by human rights lawyer and journalist Natasa Kandic, the Humanitarian Law Center is the most important human rights monitoring organisation in the FRY. With offices in Belgrade, Podgorica, and Prishtina, HLC's multiethnic, highly trained staff produces reports unrivalled in eastern Europe for their accuracy and high quality. Last November, as Serbian atrocities were occurring on a daily basis, Ms. Kandic had the crust to convene an international conference on war crimes in Belgrade attended by human rights scholars and activists from all over the world and all over the former Yugoslavia. The HLC might play an important role in helping Serbs - and Serbia's ethnic minorities, as well - begin to come to terms with their recent history and engage in the difficult processes of confrontation and reconciliation.

(e) Dragoslav Avramovic, former World Bank economist, Yugoslav Central Bank governor, and designated frontrunner for the Alliance for Change.

Avramovic was chosen by Alliance leaders and endorsed as well by Vuk Draskovic as a credible, uncontroversial figure to head an opposition ticket. The retired banker, who will be 80 in October, is a reluctant conscript, but recently has become more visible, speaking out on a range of issues, from panicking cronies to Yugoslavia's destitution. While people remember him positively for having broken hyperinflation in 1994,⁹⁰ he did remain in the Milosevic government throughout the Bosnian war, and, as an old-school, romantic nationalist, is unlikely to take the lead in assuming political responsibility for Serbia's past crimes. Nevertheless, he was ousted by hard-liners in May 1996, and is now openly critical of the regime. Long out of the public eye and unlikely on his own to excite the youth vote, Avramovic's is more a symbolic candidacy than a long-term solution, offering what one U.S. diplomat called "the message of a future with full stomachs and full wallets."⁹¹ He was the designee carefully chosen by the international community to represent Serbia's future at the 31 July Stability Pact conference in Sarajevo.

⁸⁹ Nova Demokratija press conference, 9 July 1999.

⁹⁰ At its peak Milosevic was printing five-billion dinar notes.

⁹¹ ICG interview with senior U.S. State Department official, 2 July 1999.

(f) Milan Panic, former Yugoslav prime minister

The former prime minister and California-based pharmaceuticals tycoon Milan Panic has been one of the visionaries behind the Alliance for Change and reportedly furnished \$US 2 million in seed money. Panic, who fled communist Yugoslavia and whose wife is Catholic and daughter is a practising Muslim, is a pragmatist who has never been lured into the trap of trying to outflank Milosevic on nationalist issues. A long-time critic of Milosevic – he is one of few Serbs who has dared to call the Yugoslav president a war criminal – Panic has no interest in running for office again.⁹² He prefers instead to operate off-stage and to offer his resources, advice on economic reform and privatisation, and his connections both to international investors and bankers and to policymaking circles in Washington.

(g) Milan St. Protic, intellectual and leader of the Alliance for Change

Respected University of Belgrade law professor, Serb patriot, and president of “Defense,” a non-party political organisation of prominent intellectuals formed after the Serbian parliamentary elections in October 1997. In an unusual display of remorse from a pillar of the Serb intellectual community, Protic told 6,000 demonstrators at the first anti-Milosevic rally on 29 June in Cacak that, “This regime shamed us and made us ashamed of ourselves. They did evil against those who live by our side, and they never asked us. Now we have to apologise to the whole world – not for what we did, but for what was done in our name.”

⁹² In his 1992 bid for the Serbian presidency Panic received 36% of the vote, despite widespread fraud that ensured Milosevic’s victory.