How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
Report 165 / Europe & Central Asia

Rešavanje kosovske podele u Mitrovici

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REZIME

Medjunarodna zajednica je pravilno objavila da konačni status Kosova ne sme uključivati podelu njegove teritorije. Medjutim, ova objava nije u dovoljnoj meri praćena odgovarajućim aktivnostima. Politika Beograda kojom se traži neki oblik podele je već daleko dogurala u nepokornoj Mitrovici i oblasti severno od Mitrovice, te je potrebno uložiti velike bezbednosne, političke i finansijske napore da bi se situacija spasila. Treba odmah izgraditi kapacitete, a sa njihovom primenom treba početi čim Kontakt grupa objavi da podržava budućnost Kosova kao funkcionalne, uslovno nezavisne države u okviru sadašnjih granica.

Teritorijalni integritet predstavlja ispravnu politiku, zato što bi podela mogla da dovede do dalje razmene stanovništva unutar Kosova, kao i do nestabilnosti u drugim krajevima Balkanskog poluostrva, naročito u susednoj Makedoniji. Medjutim, podela je i dalje otvoreno pitanje, čemu prilično doprinosi i to što u Mitrovici, u kojoj se Kosovo sve izraženije deli na reci Ibar, misija UN (UNMIK) i bezbednosne snage NATO-a (KFOR) nisu izvršili svoje zadatke. U severnoj Mitrovici i okolnim zajednicama sve do granice, gde se nalazi možda i trećina svih preostalih Srba na Kosovu, Beograd vrši uticaj preko paralelnih struktura vlasti, uključujući i prisustvo policije koje je u suprotnosti sa Rezolucijom 1244 Saveta bezbednosti UN.

Rešavanje pitanja Mitrovice na početku procesa rešavanja konačnog statusa zasniva se na pretpostavci da je sudbina čitavog Kosova unapred poznata. Vreme je da države članice Kontakt grupe prestanu da govore o rešavanju pitanja konačnog statusa kao o procesu koji je otvoren za različite vrste ishoda. U stvari, iza zatvorenih vrata medjunarodni koncenzus polako dobija oblik. Njegovo obelodanjivanje na samom početku procesa i učvršćivanje u Mitrovici bi doprinelo uspešnom ciklusu stabilnosti Mitrovice razvoju dogadjaja dovelo bi u opasnost realizaciju tog koncenzusa.i predvidivosti dogadjaja. Prepuštanje

Uprkos šestogodišnjoj pat poziciji, Mitrovica ipak nije zatvorena za promenu koja bi uvećala šanse za ujedinjeno Kosovo. Medjunarodna zajednica treba da uloži više resursa i energije kao podršku jasnom, artikulisanom programu kompromisa za maksimalne zahteve obe strane period odredjivanja statusa, koji bi imao funkciju zamenika. Prvi korak u tom procesu treba da bude imenovanje specijalnog komesara za Mitrovicu za specijalnog predstavnika generalnog sekretara UN i ovlašćenje da bude koordinator tih aktivnosti.

UNMIK i KFOR moraju brzo da povrate bezbednosnu inicijativu severno od reke Ibar kroz povećano prisustvo svojih snaga i agresivniji pristup pod vodjstvom specijalnog komesara. KFOR treba izričito da stavi Mitrovicu i severni deo Kosova u centar svojih primarnih operacija i da se shodno tome prestrukturira. Ilegalne policijske stanice Beograda treba ukloniti iz severnog Kosova, a specijalni komesar treba da pregovara o smeni pristalica opstruktivne tvrde linije koji se nalaze na čelu regionalne bolnice i univerziteta. Treba sačekati sa planovima za stavljanje krhke, etnički podeljene komande regionalne policije u Mitrovici pod lokalnu upravu sve dok specijalni komesar ne obezbedi održiv albansko-srpski bezbednosni koncenzus za severni deo Kosova koji će pomiriti teritorijalni integritet i strah Srba da će biti nadjačani.

Uz bolju kontrolu bezbednosne situacije, okvir rešenja, koje treba realizovati sa više odlučnosti i jačim osećajem hitnosti, mogao bi uključiti formiranje novog opštinskog organa vlasti za severnu Mitrovicu, čime bi se osigurala bezbednost i odgovornost za rešavanje pitanja povratka Albanaca, kao i formiranje centralne administrativne oblasti koja bi obuhvatala sadašnju opštinu Mitrovica i novu severnomitrovačku jedinicu koja bi mogla biti sedište zajedničkog gradskog odbora za prijem sredstava iz donacija za razvoj grada.

Strateški je potrebno podstaći Srbe na severu Kosova - i u Beogradu - da sve više razmišljaju o tome kako severna Mitrovica može postati središte aktivnosti na obezbedjivanju usluga za sve Srbe na Kosovu. Šira svrha ujedinjenja u okviru ove centralne oblasti mogla bi se ogledati u prebacivanju sedišta dva ili tri ministarstva iz glavnog grada u ovu centralnu oblast, u sličnom preseljenju Vrhovnog suda, u mogućnosti otvaranja televizijske stanice na srpskom jeziku koja bi pokrivala celu teritoriju Kosova, kao i u nekim elementima centralne vlasti na Kosovu kojima bi se obezbedio autonomni sistem obrazovanja, zdravstvene zaštite i drugih službi socijalne zaštite za Srbe širom Kosova. Medjunarodna zajednica i vlada Kosova treba da nastoje da u odredjenom vremenskom roku u ovaj sistem uključe paralelne strukture Beograda nudeći srpskoj vladi odgovarajuća sredstva i zagarantovanu saradnju.

Bez formalnog priznavanja statusa entiteta prema modelu iz Bosne i Hercegovine, srpskom severnom Kosovu treba ponuditi suštinsku autonomiju, uključujući prenos ovlašćenja na opštine, slobodu dobrovoljnog udruživanja opština, kao i koordinaciju i resurse koji bi se realizovali kroz predložena srpska odeljenja ministarstava u vladi Kosova. Albance treba uveriti da bi podrška učešću u ovim inicijativama novih održivih opština sa većinskim srpskim stanovništvom iz drugih krajeva Kosova umanjila pritisak da se izvrši podela duž Ibra.

Ukratko, da činjenice na terenu u Mitrovici, pa čak i novo nasilje, ne bi uništile izglede da se pronadje stabilno rešenje za pitanje konačnog statusa Kosova, medjunarodna zajednica treba da uloži više napora i kreativnosti da promeni strateško razmišljanje Srba i uveri Albance da postoji potreba da učestvuju u konstruktivnoj ponudi. Tvrdnja da nema podele se, nažalost, ne može ostvariti sama od sebe.

Priština/Beograd/Brisel, 13. septembar 2005.

The international community has properly decreed that Kosovo's final status must not involve division of its territory. But this declaration has not been followed by sufficient action. Belgrade's policy of pursuing some form of partition is far advanced in the restive northern city of Mitrovica and its hinterland, and a major security, political and financial effort is required to save the situation. Capacity should be built immediately, and its implementation should begin once the Contact Group has declared its support for Kosovo's future as a functional, conditionally independent state within its present borders.

Territorial integrity is the correct policy because partition could provoke further population exchanges inside Kosovo and instability elsewhere in the Balkans, especially in neighbouring Macedonia. But division remains a live issue, not least because in Mitrovica, where Kosovo is increasingly divided at the Ibar River, the UN mission (UNMIK) and NATO-led security forces (KFOR) have failed to carry out their mandates. In north Mitrovica and the neighbouring communities up to the border, an area that contains perhaps a third of all Kosovo's remaining Serbs, Belgrade exerts its influence through parallel government structures, including a police presence that contravenes UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

Settling Mitrovica early in the final status process pre-supposes foreknowledge of Kosovo's overall destination. But it is time for Contact Group member states to stop talking of final status as a process open to a wide range of results. In fact, behind closed doors international consensus is taking shape. Making that manifest near the outset, and cementing it in Mitrovica, would contribute to a virtuous circle of stability and predictability. Letting Mitrovica drift would risk making realisation of that consensus unlikely.

Despite the six-year standoff, Mitrovica is not impenetrable to transformation that would increase the chances for a unified Kosovo. The international community should put more resources and energy behind a clear, articulated program of compromise between each side's maximum demands. A first step should be the appointment of a Special Commissioner for Mitrovica for the status determination period, with the rank of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and power to coordinate the effort.

UNMIK and KFOR must quickly regain the security initiative north of the Ibar by increasing force levels and assertiveness, under the Special Commissioner's direction. KFOR should explicitly make Mitrovica and the north its primary operational focus and restructure accordingly. Belgrade's illegal police stations should be removed from north Kosovo, and the Special Commissioner should negotiate the replacement of the obstructive hardliners who head the regional hospital and university there. Plans for devolving the brittle, ethnically divided Mitrovica regional police command to local control should be delayed until the Special Commissioner can secure a viable Albanian-Serb security consensus for the north that squares territorial integrity with Serb fears of being overwhelmed.

With the security situation under better control, the framework of a solution that needs to be pursued with greater commitment and sense of urgency could include creation of a new municipal authority for north Mitrovica, which should furnish both the security and accountability for addressing Albanian returns, and creation of a central administrative district shared between the current Mitrovica municipality and the new north Mitrovica unit that could house a common city board to receive donor funding for the city's development.

The strategic need is to encourage the Serbs of north Kosovo -- and Belgrade -- to think increasingly of north Mitrovica becoming the hub of an effort to provide services for all Kosovo's Serbs. The central district's broader uniting purpose could be reflected by hosting two or three ministries relocated from the capital; the similarly relocated Supreme Court; possibly a Kosovo-wide Serbian-language television station; and some elements of Kosovo central government that would accommodate an autonomous, Kosovo-wide system of education, healthcare, and other social services for Serbs. Both the international community and Kosovo's government should aim to incorporate Belgrade's parallel structures into this system within a specified time frame by offering matching funds and a guaranteed cooperative role for the Serbian government.

Without conceding it formal entity status on the Bosnia-Herzegovina model, the Serb north should be offered the substance of autonomy, including devolved powers for municipalities, freedom for municipalities to associate on a voluntary basis, and the coordination and resource role made possible through the proposed Serb units of Kosovo's government ministries. Albanians should be persuaded that support for participation in these initiatives by viable new Serb-majority municipalities elsewhere in Kosovo would dampen pressure for division on the Ibar line.

In short, if facts on the ground in Mitrovica and even new violence are not to destroy the prospect of a stable final status settlement for Kosovo, the international community needs to work harder and creatively to change Serb strategic thinking and get Albanians to recognise the need to participate in a constructive offer. The no-partition dictum is, unfortunately, not self-executing.

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 13 September 2005

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

Online Event to discuss Crisis Group's report "Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue", in which we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

Thirteen years after Kosovo broke away from Serbia, the two countries remain mired in mutual non-recognition, with deleterious effects on both. The parties need to move past technicalities to tackle the main issues at stake: Pristina’s independence and Belgrade’s influence over Kosovo’s Serbian minority.

In this conversation, we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue (Online Event, 28th January 2021)

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