Kosovo: Nema dobre alternative za Ahtisarijev plan
Kosovo: Nema dobre alternative za Ahtisarijev plan
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

Kosovo: Nema dobre alternative za Ahtisarijev plan

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Rezime

Debata o Kosovskom statusu dostigla je svoju ključnu tačku. Savet bezbednosti Ujedinjenih nacija razmatra elemente nacrta rezolucije koja bi razrešila budućnost Kosova, i koja u narednim nedeljama može biti stavljena na glasanje. Najbolji način da se obezbede regionalna stabilnost i mir, ali i da se Kosovo jednom izvuče iz osmogodišnjeg limba, koje prati i umorna, privremena administracija UN i nerazvijena ekonomijom, jeste donošenje rezolucije koja bi bila utemeljena na planu Specijalnog izaslanika UN Martija Ahtisarija. To bi zamenilo Rezoluciju 1244 SB iz 1999. godine, definisalo unutrašnje rešenje i mehanizme zaštite manjina, dalo mandat novom međunarodnom prisustvu i utabalo put nadgledanoj nezavisnosti.

Ahtisari je sredinom marta 2007. godine predstavio svoj plan - u formi „Izveštaja“ i podužeg, „Sveobuhvatnog predloga“ - Generalnom sekretaru, koji ga je, 26. marta, uz punu podršku, prosledio Savetu bezbednosti. Ovo je usledilo nakon četrnaestomesečnih pregovora - koje je Savet najavio Rezolucijom 1244, dajući mandat „političkom procesu osmišljenom tako da odredi budući status Kosova“ - koji nisu uspeli da dovedu do kompromisa između Srbije i Kosovskih Albanaca.

Ahtisarijev plan je kompromis koji Albancima nudi mogućnost nezavisnosti, Srbima veća prava, bezbednost i privilegovane odnose sa Srbijom, a Srbiji šansu da jednom zauvek raskrsti s prošlošću i ostvari svoju evropsku budućnost. Taj plan je najbolji recept za stvaranje multietničkog, demokratskog i decentralizovanog društva i u skladu je sa projektom EU o multietničnosti na Zapadnom Balkanu koji bi, kao krajnji rezultat, trebalo da zemlje regiona dovede do članstva u EU. EU je ionako najveći donator na Kosovu i planira da preuzme najveći deo obaveza u post-statusnoj civilnoj misiji. Na kraju krajeva, Kosovo je Evropski problem i to će i ostati dok se ne razreši.

Alternative ne obećavaju. Prisiljavanje Kosovskih Albanaca na državno zajedništvo sa Srbijom dovelo bi do obnove nasilja. Beograd je ponudio vrlo malo mimo toga da Kosovo ostane u sastavu Srbije. Beograd, takođe, nije uradio ništa u proteklih osam godina da pokuša da integriše Kosovske Albance, niti im je ponudio smislenu i konkretnu autonomiju. Umesto toga, on je pokušavao da utvrdi temelje etničke podele Kosova i podelu duž reke Ibar, koja teče kroz Severni deo Mitrovice. Beograd je to radio odlažući usvajanje rezolucije SB u nadi da će odlaganje inicirati nasilnu reakciju Albanaca, pa samim tim i povoljne uslove za podelu. Podela ne bi samo uništila plan o multietničkom Kosovu - ona bi destabilizovala i susedne države.

Sprovođenje Ahtisarijevog Sveobuhvatnog plana za buduće rešenje Kosovskog statusa dovešće do ozbiljnih izazova. Ključ mirne tranzicije leži u sveobuhvatnoj decentralizaciji koja nudi put do sigurnog ulaska srpske zajednice u novu Kosovsku državu, posebno većine Kosovskih Srba koji žive južno od Ibra. Ahtisarijev plan sadrži dobro osmišljene ambigvitete u vezi sa ovlašćenjima i trajanjem misije EU koja će nadgledati sprovođenje rešenja i tako obezbeđivati da međunarodna zajednica zadrži završnu reč tokom godina stvaranja države.

Iz Zapadnih zemalja dolazi jaka podrška za usvajanje rešenja koje bi u potpunosti bilo zasnovano na Ahtisarijevom planu. Ipak, potrebno je uraditi sve kako bi se postiglo još veće jedinstvo u Savetu, i najbitnije, izbegao ruski veto.

Rusija se suprotstavila brzim vremenskim okvirima, kritikovala Ahtisarijev plan i opomenula da Kosovo može stvoriti međunarodni presedan. Pored toga, ona je nabacila i mogućnost veta na nacrt koji ne uzima njen stav u obzir. Međutim, kompromisno rešenje može biti postignuto, posebno ako se dodaju dodatni elementi uslovljavanja kao što su: period od dve godine pre revizije mandata međunarodnog nadzornika i naglašavanje potrebe za većim napretkom u domenu manjinskih prava. Rezolucija koja to omogućuje i odobrava Ahtisarijev predlog, ali ne podržava eksplicitno nezavisnost Kosova, može prikupiti neophodnu podršku.

Priština/Beograd/Njujork/Brisel, 14. maj 2007.

Executive Summary

The debate on Kosovo’s future status has reached a crucial point. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has begun to consider elements of a draft resolution to determine the entity’s future, which could be put to a vote in the coming weeks. The best way of ensuring regional peace and stability and lifting Kosovo out of an eight-year-long limbo, with a tired, temporary UN administration and an undeveloped, low-growth economy, is a resolution based squarely on the plan of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. This would supersede UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999), define Kosovo’s internal settlement and minority-protection mechanisms, mandate a new international presence and allow for supervised independence.

Ahtisaari presented his plan in mid-March 2007 – in the form of a short “Report” and a lengthy “Comprehensive Proposal” – to the Secretary-General, who forwarded it to the Security Council, with his full support, on 26 March. This followed fourteen months of negotiations – a process the Council had authorised with Resolution 1244 mandating “a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status” – which failed to forge a compromise between Serbia and Kosovo Albanians.

The Ahtisaari plan is a compromise that offers Kosovo Albanians the prospect of independence, Kosovo Serbs extensive rights, security and privileged relations with Serbia, and Serbia the chance to put the past behind it once and for all and realise its European future. It is the best recipe for the creation of a multi-ethnic, democratic and decentralised society and fits within the European Union’s multi-ethnic project for the Western Balkans, which ultimately offers the prospect of accession. The EU is already the largest donor in Kosovo and plans to assume the lion’s share of responsibility for the post-status Kosovo civilian mission. Ultimately, Kosovo is, and will remain until resolved, a European problem.

The alternative is bleak. Forcing Kosovo Albanians back into a constitutional relationship with Serbia would reignite violence. Belgrade has offered little beyond proposing that Kosovo remain an integral part of the Serbian state. It has done nothing over the past eight years to try to integrate Kosovo Albanians or to offer them meaningful and concrete autonomy arrangements. Instead it has tried to establish the basis for an ethnic division of Kosovo and partition along the Ibar River, which runs through the northern city of Mitrovica. It has done so by trying to delay the adoption of a Security Council resolution in the expectation that this would trigger a Kosovo Albanian overreaction, including violence, and so create the conditions for such partition. Partition, however, would not only destroy the prospect of multi-ethnicity in Kosovo but also destabilise neighbouring states.

Implementation of Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement will pose significant challenges. The key to a peaceful transition lies in its extensive decentralisation measures, which offer a way to secure buy-in to a new Kosovo state by its Serb minority, especially the majority of Kosovo Serbs who live in enclaves south of the Ibar. The Ahtisaari Proposal is wisely ambiguous with regard to the powers and duration of the EU mission that will oversee this settlement, ensuring that the international community will retain the final word in Kosovo through its formative years of statehood.

There is strong support from the major Western countries for the adoption of a resolution based on the full Ahtisaari plan. But it is also important to exhaust all reasonable opportunities to achieve the greatest unity possible within the Council, and most importantly, to avoid a Russian veto.

Russia has opposed a quick timetable, strongly criticised the Ahtisaari plan, raised concerns about the international precedent Kosovo may create and hinted that it might veto a draft that does not take its position into account. Nonetheless a compromise solution may be possible and should be attempted, possibly with the inclusion of additional elements of conditionality in the two-year period before review of the international supervisors’ mandate, and the reaffirmation of the need for more progress on minority rights standards. A resolution which does this and endorses the Ahtisaari Proposal but does not explicitly support Kosovo’s independence may achieve the necessary support.

Pristina/Belgrade/New York/Brussels, 14 May 2007

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

Online Event to discuss Crisis Group's report "Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue", in which we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

Thirteen years after Kosovo broke away from Serbia, the two countries remain mired in mutual non-recognition, with deleterious effects on both. The parties need to move past technicalities to tackle the main issues at stake: Pristina’s independence and Belgrade’s influence over Kosovo’s Serbian minority.

In this conversation, we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue (Online Event, 28th January 2021)

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