How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
Report 177 / Europe & Central Asia

Status Kosova:odlaganje nosi rizik

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Rezime

Proces rešenja konačnog statusa Kosova ima sve veće šanse da propadne ako se odluka odlaže za 2007. godinu. Šestočlana Kontakt-grupa koja je do sada sponzorisala proces, moraće da, bar minimalno, potvrdi vremenski okvir za isporuku paketa koji izaslanik UN Marti Ahtisari treba da predstavi krajem januara, i SB mora da usvoji rezoluciju koja bi nasledila 1244 (iz 1999. godine) čime bi omogućila UN misiji na Kosovu da obavi transfer nadležnosti kosovskoj vladi i raskrčila put novim telima EU. Združenim snagama, SAD i EU moraju da pokažu političku volju za priznavanje nezavisnosti Kosova i da odbace ideje Srbije i severnog dela Kosova o podeli.

Ponašanje nekih ključnih faktora je teško predvideti. Rusija može da odbije koncenzus u Kontakt-grupi i time blokira odluku Saveta bezbednosti; neke članice EU ne spore mogući ishod. Dalje, neizvesno je da li će se Srbija suprotstaviti ozbiljno ili simbolično, ali je izvesno da će podržati nameru srpskog severa da u potpunosti raskine s nezavisnim Kosovom. Ipak, dve trećine kosovskih Srba koje žive severno od Ibra, još uvek ne planiraju da napuste Kosovo: da li će im Beograd narediti da odu s Kosova ili će im dozvoliti da se uklope u nove državne poslove? Drugo pitanje je da da li će SAD i EU ponuditi praktična rešenja koja bi podržala njihova teoretska zalaganja o odbacivanju podele kao mogućeg rešenja.

Pravac u kome se stvari sada kreću nudi mnogo mogućnosti za nestabilnost. Savet bezbednosti će, prvenstveno zbog Rusije, prihvatiti najuže formule za kosovsku nezavisnost. Ahtisari će morati da liši svoj predlog svih simboličnih i nekih funkcionalnih elemenata nezavisnosti kako bi SB odobrio taj predlog.

Uprkos upornom poricanju međunarodnih zvaničnika, rešenje može više podsećati na Dejtonski (Bosna) nego na Ohridski sporazum (Makedonija). Povlastice koje se imaju na umu za posle-statusni period za predstavnika međunarodne zajednice rastu pa se, s druge strane, predviđa transfer ovlašćenja manjeg obima na Vladu Kosova. Albansko-srpski rascep i bojazan od kasnijeg egzodusa ili ugnjetavanja uticali su da Ahtisari ubrza skiciranje decentralizacije koja, umnogome, odvaja kosovske Srbe od Prištine i nastavlja da održava uticaj Beograda. Postoji nada da ta namera potpomaže mirnoj i stabilnoj tranziciji. Cena toga su komplikovana institucionalni angažmani koji će morati da se razmrse kada pristup EU bude na dnevnom redu.

Relativna kosovska stabilnost tokom prethodne godine ne bi trebalo da zavede međunarodnu zajednicu da pomisli da Kosovo može da uredi obe strane. Kosovo je bilo dominantno pitanje u sprovođenju srpskog ustavnog procesa koji je imao za cilj potkopavanje planova međunarodne zajednice za Kosovo, pomažući konsolidaciji beogradske retrogradne izborne prakse i ideologiji Miloševićeve ere. Ahtisari je 10. novembra pristao da odloži predstavljanje predloga nakon što je Beograd odlučio da održi parlamentarne izbore u Srbiji 21. januara 2007. godine.

Za sada je bitno da ne dođe do daljih zastoja. Dalja odlaganja u Beogradu neće shvatiti kao priliku za saradnju već kao mogućnost da se osujeti proces. Društvena i politička krhkost kosovskih Albanaca daju Beogradu poslednju šansu da promeni ishod. Pored toga, odlaganje procesa dalje u 2007. ozbiljno će testirati sposobnost kohezije kosovskih Albanaca. Političari su obećali nezavisnost 2006. godine i oni su bez ikakve vizije o periodu nakon toga. Ti političari su osrednje sposobni za precizno sprovođenje složene koreografiju za koju je međunarodna zajednica predvidela da će proizvesti nezavisnost.

Sve što su kosovski Albanci prisiljeni da duže čekaju, veće su i šanse da će se diskreditovati, preduzimajući unilateralne korake za ostvarenje nezavisnosti. Međunarodna podrška bi u tom slučaju nestala, kao što je to bio slučaj posle martovskih nemira 2004. godine. Time bi se, praktično, okončalo nastojanje da se Srbi sa severa Kosova zadrže na multietničkom Kosovu i dovelo bi do toga da se mnogi od njih isele iz južnog dela Kosova. Umesto konačnog zatvaranja pitanja o granicama zapadnog Balkana donošenjem uređenog rešenja za Kosovo, novo, nestabilno područje bi bilo otvoreno.

Priština/Brisel, 10. novembar 2006. godine

Executive Summary

The Kosovo final status process risks breaking down the further the decision is pushed back into 2007. The six-nation Contact Group that has sponsored the process must at minimum deliver timely endorsement of the settlement package that UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari should present before January’s end, and the UN Security Council must pass a resolution superseding 1244 (1999) to allow the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to transfer its responsibilities to Kosovo’s government and pave the way for new international bodies being readied by the EU. Acting together, the U.S. and the EU need to show the political will to recognise Kosovo as independent, and fend off partition moves from Serbia and the Serb north of Kosovo.

How some key actors will behave remains unpredictable. Russia may refuse consensus in the Contact Group and block decisions in the Security Council; not all EU member states are at ease with the likely outcome. While it is uncertain whether Serbia will offer serious or only token resistance to Kosovo independence, it will certainly support the Serb north’s bid to break completely with independent Kosovo. But the two thirds of Kosovo Serbs south of the Ibar River are not as yet planning to leave: will Belgrade urge them to flee Kosovo or allow them to come to terms with the new state of affairs? Another question is whether the U.S. and EU will put resources behind repeated verbal commitments not to allow partition.

The direction in which matters seem to be moving offers much potential for instability. Due primarily to Russia, the Security Council will likely endorse only the narrowest of formulas for Kosovo’s independence. Ahtisaari will have to strip his settlement package of all symbolic and some functional elements of independence to get it through the Council.

Despite international officials’ denials, the settlement taking shape may resemble Bosnia’s Dayton Agreement more than Macedonia’s Ohrid. The prerogatives contemplated for the projected post-status International Community Representative are growing, and a less complete transfer of power to Kosovo’s own government is being envisaged. Kosovo’s deep Albanian-Serb cleavage, and fears of the latter’s exodus or suppression, have prompted Ahtisaari to craft decentralisation provisions that largely insulate most Kosovo Serbs from Pristina and give Belgrade continuing influence. The hope is that this will aid a peaceful, stable transition. The price will be difficult institutional arrangements that it may be necessary to disentangle later for EU accession purposes.

Kosovo’s relative stability over the past year should not encourage the international community to imagine it has the luxury of finessing both sides. It has already indulged a Serbian constitutional process intended to undermine the international community’s plans for Kosovo, helping thereby to consolidate Belgrade behind retrogressive electoral practices and ideologies of the Milosevic era. Ahtisaari agreed on 10 November to delay presentation of his proposal after Belgrade set a definite 21 January 2007 date for parliamentary elections.  

It is important that no further slippage takes place. Further delay would be taken in Belgrade not as a cue to cooperate with an orderly Kosovo process but as a further opportunity to wreck it. Kosovo Albanian social and political fragility offer Belgrade a last opportunity to change the outcome. And delay much into 2007 would severely test Kosovo Albanian cohesion. Politicians have promised their constituents independence this year and have articulated no vision for the period after. They have marginal capacity to implement precisely the complex choreography the international community envisages as producing independence.

The longer the Kosovo Albanians are forced to wait, the greater the chance they will discredit themselves with unilateral independence moves or riots. The pendulum of international support and sympathy would then swing away from them, as after the March 2004 riots. That would virtually finish prospects for retaining the Serbs of the north in a multi-ethnic Kosovo and see many leave the south. Instead of finally closing the question of western Balkan borders with an orderly Kosovo settlement, a new destabilising chapter would be opened.

Pristina/Brussels, 10 November 2006

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

Online Event to discuss Crisis Group's report "Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue", in which we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

Thirteen years after Kosovo broke away from Serbia, the two countries remain mired in mutual non-recognition, with deleterious effects on both. The parties need to move past technicalities to tackle the main issues at stake: Pristina’s independence and Belgrade’s influence over Kosovo’s Serbian minority.

In this conversation, we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue (Online Event, 28th January 2021)

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