How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue
Report 161 / Europe & Central Asia

Kosovo: Ka konačnom statusu

  • Share
  • Save
  • Print
  • Download PDF Full Report

REZIME

Vreme na Kosovu ističe. Status quo se više neće moći održati. Kao što se pokazalo kroz smrtonosne nerede u martu 2004. godine, kosovski Albanci su isfrustrirani zbog svog nerešenog statusa, ekonomske situacije i problema suočavanja sa prošlošću. Albanska većina očekuje da međunarodna zajednica ove godine započne proces ispunjenja njihovih aspiracija za nezavisnost Kosova. Ukoliko to izostane, oni (Albanci) bi mogli da preduzmu jednostrane korake. U takvim okolnostima, a imajući u vidu dosadašnji očajan odnos kosovskih Albanaca prema manjinama, kosovski Srbi bi mogli da pozovu oružane snage Srbije da ih zaštite, pa bi region ponovo mogao da zapadne u nemire.

Tokom 2005. godine ćemo videti suštinski napredak ka konačnom statusu Kosova koji će konsolidovati mir i razvoj, ili postoji opasnost da se Kosovo vrati sukobima i prouzrokuje regionalnu nestabilnost. Ovaj izveštaj, nastojeći da popuni praznine ostavljene rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti br. 1244 na kraju sukoba iz 1999. godine, ukazuje kako bi se mogao postići napredak.

Kao prvi korak, šestočlana Kontakt grupa treba što pre da izda saopštenje kojim se precizira vremenski okvir za rešenje pitanja statusa, kao i četiri ključna pravila: 1) zaštita manjinskih prava na Kosovu je pitanje od koga će progres najviše zavisiti; 2) Kosovo se neće vratiti pod vlast Beograda; 3) neće će se dozvoliti podela Kosova; 4) neće biti podržano ujedinjenje Kosova sa Albanijom, odnosno sa bilo kojom susednom državom ili teritorijom. Generalni sekretar Ujedinjenih nacija treba da imenuje specijalnog izaslanika, koji bi otpočeo konsultacije o sadržaju sporazuma o rešenju o konačnom statusu i procesu kojim bi se ono implementiralo.

Sredinom 2005. godine UN treba da proceni opredeljenost vlade Kosova za demokratiju, dobro upravljanje i poštovanje standarda ljudskih prava. Ukoliko ta ocena bude pozitivna, specijalni izaslanik bi trebalo da pripremi nacrt teksta sporazuma -- "Sporazum o Kosovu" - kao i detalje u vezi sa medjunarodnom konferencijom koja bi ga podržala.

Ukoliko nova vlada Kosova želi da svoje ljude povede ka željenom cilju - nezavisnosti, na Kosovu mora da postojati potpuno uvažavanje i zaštita kosovskih Srba i drugih manjina. Skupština Kosova, uz međunarodnu pomoć, mora odmah otpočeti pripremu nacrta ustava koji će potpuno zadovoljavati navedene uslove, a čiji će tekst, ukoliko ga prihvati pomenuta medjunarodna konferencija, činiti deo predloženog "Sporazuma o Kosovu". Namera Sporazuma, zajedno sa novim ustavom, bi bila da stvori uslove za prihvatanje Kosova kao punopravnog člana medjunarodne zajedice.

Imajući u vidu sve što se dogodilo u prošlosti, kao i nepoznanice u vezi sa budućim ponašanjem, bilo bi celishodno da Sporazum i novi ustav (izmedju sebe) uspostave odredjene limite -- važne po sadržaju, ali malobrojne i relativno ograničene u dometu -- u vezi slobode delovanja nezavisnog Kosova, a naročito:

  • Kosovo bi se eksplicitno obavezalo da se ne može ujediniti sa Albanijom, niti bilo kojom drugom susednom državom ili teritorijom, osim u kontekstu EU integracija;
     
  • Postojao bi određeni broj sudija imenovanih od medjunarodne zajednice u višim sudovima Kosova, kao i odredjenih medjunarodnih instanci koje bi imale ingerencije da osiguraju da se odredjena ključna pitanja vezana za manjinska prava i ostale dogovorene obaveze rešavaju pred ovim sudovima;
     
  • Kosovo bi omogućilo prisustvo medjunarodnih posmatrača -- "Kosovsku posmatračku misiju" - koja bi izveštavala širu medjunarodnu zajednicu i predlagala odgovarajuće mere ukoliko Kosovo ne bi izvršavalo svoje obaveze.

Medjunarodnu konferenciju pod predsedavanjem UN bi trebalo organizovati pre kraja 2005. godine, a njoj bi prisustvovali predstavnici članica Kontakt grupe, EU, Beograda i kosovskih partija na vlasti i u opoziciji. Početkom 2006. godine referendumom gradjana Kosova bi se odobrio ustav, a to bi označilo stupanje na snagu "Sporazuma o Kosovu". Da bi se Sporazumu pribavio pun zakonski i politički efekat, bilo bi poželjno da ga podrži Savet bezbednosti UN. Ukoliko se de iure nezavisnost Kosova ne postigne uz saglasnost Srbije ili rezolucijom Saveta bezbednosti, ona bi trebalo biti priznata od strane cele medjunarodne zajednice, ili bar od onih njenih članova (uključujući SAD i zemlje EU) koji su spremni da to učine.

Mora se razmotriti mogućnost da Srbija -- a moguće je i Rusija -- odbiju da saradjuju u delu, ili celini ovog plana. Medjutim, predloženi proces ne bi smeo biti taoc takve mogućnosti: situacija na terenu na Kosovu je isuviše krhka, a status quo neodrživ na previše načina da bi se dozvolilo da medjunarodna zajednica neograničeno odugovlači sa pitanjem konačnog statusa. Dok se legitimne srpske zabrinutosti moraju potpuno uvažiti, naročito one vezane za status srpske manjine na Kosovu, Beograd se mora upozoriti na samom početku pregovora da "voz napušta stanicu sa vama, ili bez vas" i treba ga podstaći na aktivno učešće u postizanju najboljih rešenja.

Samodopadljivost je predugo vodila politiku prema Kosovu. Mogućnost za obnovu sukoba je vrlo realna. Medjunarodna zajednica, naročito zemlje članice Kontakt grupe, moraju rešiti da li će ponovo preuzeti inicijativu za rešavanje kosovske situacije, ili će dopustiti da stvari izmaknu kontroli, sve dok neke nove neprijatne činjenice na terenu ne budu nalagale da se njima pozabave. Plan koji je ovde izložen zahteva političku hrabrost, kao i energiju. No, alternativa je gora.

Priština/Beograd/Brisel, 24. januar 2005.

 

Executive Summary

Time is running out in Kosovo. The status quo will not hold. As evidenced by the deadly rioting in March 2004, Kosovo Albanians are frustrated with their unresolved status, the economic situation, and the problems of dealing with the past. The Albanian majority expects the international community to begin delivering this year on its independence aspirations. Without such moves it may act unilaterally. In such circumstances, given the dismal record of Kosovo Albanians with regard to minorities, Kosovo's Serbs may call upon Serbia's armed forces to protect them, and the region could be plunged into new turmoil.

Either 2005 sees major progress on a future status solution that consolidates peace and development, or the danger is that Kosovo will return to conflict and generate regional instability. This report, seeking to fill the blanks left by Security Council Resolution 1244 at the conclusion of the 1999 conflict, shows how that progress might be made.

As a first step, the six-nation Contact Group should issue as soon as possible a statement spelling out a timeline for the resolution of the status issue and four crucial ground rules: that the protection of minority rights in Kosovo is the issue on which progress will most depend and that neither Kosovo's return to Belgrade's rule, nor its partition, nor any possible unification of Kosovo with Albania or any neighbouring state or territory will be supported. At the same time, a Special Envoy should be appointed by the UN Secretary-General to begin consultations on the content of a settlement accord and the process by which it should be implemented.

In mid-2005 the UN is due to assess the Kosovo government's commitment to democracy, good governance and human rights standards. If the assessment is positive, the Special Envoy should prepare a draft settlement text -- the 'Kosovo Accord' -- and the details of an international conference to endorse it.

If Kosovo's new government is to lead its people to the independence destination they desire, there must be complete respect and protection for Kosovo's Serb and other minorities. The Kosovo Assembly, with international assistance, must immediately begin to draft a constitution, fully satisfying these concerns, the text of which would, if accepted by the international conference, form part of the proposed Kosovo Accord. Overall the object of the Accord, together with the new constitution, would be to create the conditions for acceptance of Kosovo as a full member of the international community.

It would be appropriate, given everything that has happened in the past and the uncertainties about behaviour in the future, for the Accord and constitution, between them, to set some limits -- important in content, but few in number and relatively limited in scope -- on an independent Kosovo's freedom of action, in particular:

  • Kosovo would be explicitly committed not to unify with Albania, or any neighbouring state or territory, other than in the context of EU integration;
     
  • there would be a number of internationally appointed judges in Kosovo's superior courts, and certain international parties would have the standing to ensure that certain key matters relating to minority rights and other agreed obligations can be brought before those courts;
     
  • Kosovo would accommodate an international monitoring presence -- the 'Kosovo Monitoring Mission' -- to report to the wider international community and recommend appropriate measures if Kosovo were to backslide on its commitments.

Before the end of 2005 the international conference should take place, under UN chairmanship and attended by representatives of the Contact Group members, the EU, Belgrade, and Kosovo's government and opposition parties. In early 2006, approval of the constitution by Kosovo's citizens in a referendum would trigger the coming into effect of the Kosovo Accord. Desirably, to give it complete legal as well as political effect, the Accord would also be endorsed by the UN Security Council. Kosovo's de jure sovereignty, if not achieved by Serbian agreement or Security Council resolution, should be recognised by the whole international community, or at least such of its member states (including the U.S. and EU members) as are prepared to do so.

It has to be contemplated that Serbia -- and perhaps Russia as well ­-- will refuse to cooperate with part or all of this. But the proposed process should not be held hostage to that eventuality: the situation on the ground in Kosovo is too fragile, and the status quo too unsustainable in too many ways, for the international community to allow its future status to be put on indefinite hold. While legitimate Serbian concerns should be taken fully into account, particularly about the status of Kosovo's Serb minority, Belgrade should be cautioned from the outset that "the train is leaving, with or without you", and encouraged to participate fully in achieving the best possible terms of settlement.

Complacency has guided policy on Kosovo for too long. The potential for renewed violence is very real. The international community, in particular the member states of the Contact Group, must decide whether to regain control of the agenda or allow matters to slip until unpleasant new facts are created on the ground that they will have to deal with. The agenda set out above requires political courage as well as energy. But the alternative is worse.

Pristina/Belgrade/Brussels, 24 January 2005

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

Online Event to discuss Crisis Group's report "Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue", in which we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

Thirteen years after Kosovo broke away from Serbia, the two countries remain mired in mutual non-recognition, with deleterious effects on both. The parties need to move past technicalities to tackle the main issues at stake: Pristina’s independence and Belgrade’s influence over Kosovo’s Serbian minority.

In this conversation, we discussed what currently stands in the way of a new status quo and what it will take to relaunch the process with the Pristina elections in view.

How to Relaunch the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue (Online Event, 28th January 2021)

Subscribe to Crisis Group’s Email Updates

Receive the best source of conflict analysis right in your inbox.