Beogradske Reforme Zaostaju: Razlog Za Međunarodnu Zabrinutost
Beogradske Reforme Zaostaju: Razlog Za Međunarodnu Zabrinutost
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  1. Executive Summary
Report 126 / Europe & Central Asia

Beogradske Reforme Zaostaju: Razlog Za Međunarodnu Zabrinutost

Duže od jedne decenije Srbija je bila pokretačka snaga nestabilnosti na Balkanu.  Posle obaranja Slobodana Miloševića 5. oktobra 2000. postojale su nade da će Srbija brzo pristupiti reformama spoljne politike Savezne republike Jugoslavije (SRJ) koja je prouzrokovala tu nestabilnost.  Ova nadanja su se do danas u bitnoj meri izjalovila.

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IZVEŠTAJ

Duže od jedne decenije Srbija je bila pokretačka snaga nestabilnosti na Balkanu.  Posle obaranja Slobodana Miloševića 5. oktobra 2000. postojale su nade da će Srbija brzo pristupiti reformama spoljne politike Savezne republike Jugoslavije (SRJ) koja je prouzrokovala tu nestabilnost.  Ova nadanja su se do danas u bitnoj meri izjalovila.

Ipak, SRJ je stavila sebi u cilj da stigne svoje susede integracijom u evro-atlantske institucije i političke tokove.  Ona posebno želi da napravi značajan pomak tokom 2002. u tri glavna spoljnopolitička cilja:  pristupanje Savetu Evrope (SE);  članstvo u NATO Partnerstvu za mir (PzM); i zaključivanje Sporazuma o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju (SAA) sa Evropskom unijom (EU).

Ovi ciljevi potvrđuju rado očekivanu preorijentaciju SRJ u pro-evropsku, trans-atlantsku perspektivu.  I pored toga, Jugoslavija posle Miloševića još uvek predstavlja značajnu prepreku regionalnoj stabilnosti, otvoreno se suprotstavljajući važnim politikama i standardima koje međunarodna zajednica predstavlja ili primenjuje na licu mesta.

Regionalnu nestabilnost pogoršava i odbijanje ili nesposobnost savezne vlade da sarađuje sa Međunarodnim haškim tribunalom za bivšu Jugoslaviju (ICTY), podrivajući time ciljeve međunarodne zajednice u Bosni i na Kosovu, kao i odbijanje da rešava problem same Crne Gore u vezi federacije.  Iza ove veoma vidljive politike i postupaka krije se četvrti, veliki problem:  nerekonstruisane oružane snage SRJ,  koje - bez civilne kontrole ili nadzora nad budžetom - vrše uticaj na stranu i domaću politiku, sprečavaju reforme i suprotstavljaju se polaganju računa za ratne zločine.

Ovaj izveštaj razmatra sve ove probleme osim jednog.  (Sledeći izveštaj baviće se odnosom Beograda i Crne Gore.) On procenjuje njihov uticaj na regionalnu stabilnost, i identifikuje ih kao posledice ideološkog nacionalizma, pozadinskog otpora kadrova iz doba Miloševića, kao i institucionalne inercije.

To su sve činioci koje su reformisti u Srbiji žele da savladaju, ali to ne mogu bez međunarodne podrške.  Preuranjeni prijem SRJ u evro-atlantske institucije pre će oslabiti nego ojačati reformski tabor.  Trebalo bi povući značajno priznavanje regionalne uloge Beograda sve dok on na delu ne potvrdi svoju angažovanost u stabilizaciji regiona.  SRJ se do tada ne može smatrati garantom regionalnog mira i stabilnosti ili pouzdanim partnerom u okviru bilo kakve zajedničke bezbednosti.  Međunarodna zajednica mora da zahteva od SRJ isto toliko visoke standarde za uključivanje u međuvladine strukture koji su s pravom zahtevani od Hrvatske i Bosne još od 1996. godine.  NATO, SE i EU bi trebalo da pokrenu ove probleme kod odgovarajućih jugoslovenskih struktura i da zahtevaju njihovo rešavanje.  Isto tako bi i američka administracija i Kongres trebalo da se suoče sa - i preduzmu korake - realnošću da se SRJ ne pridržava uslova ustanovljenih pod predstojećim rokom od 31. marta 2002. i da stoga nema opravdanja za sertifikaciju njene podobnosti za dalju donatorsku pomoć SAD.

Ako se postupi drugačije to će ojačati opstrukcionističke snage unutar Srbije, oslabiti  politiku moći međunarodne zajednice nad Beogradom, potkopati susede Jugoslavije i učiniti jeftinim članstvo u odgovarajućim međunarodnim institucijama.

Beograd/Brisel, 7. mart 2002.

Executive Summary

For more than a decade Serbia was the driving force behind much of the instability in the Balkans.  Following the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic on 5 October 2000, it was hoped that Serbia would promptly reform the external policies of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) that had caused such disruption. To date, these hopes have been substantially disappointed.

Nevertheless, the FRY has set its sights on catching up with its neighbours by integrating into Euro-Atlantic institutions and political processes. In particular, it wants to make significant progress during 2002 towards three major foreign policy goals: accession to the Council of Europe (CoE); membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP); and negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union (EU).

These objectives confirm the FRY’s welcome re-orientation to a pro-European, trans-Atlantic outlook.  Nevertheless, post-Milosevic Yugoslavia still presents significant obstacles to regional stability, openly opposing important policies and standards represented or implemented on the ground by the international community.

Regional instability is exacerbated by the federal authorities’ refusal or inability to cooperate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), undermining of international community goals in Bosnia and Kosovo, and reluctance to address Montenegro's concerns about the federation itself. Looming behind these highly visible policies and practices is a fourth, massive problem: the FRY's unreconstructed armed forces, which – lacking civilian control or budgetary oversight – influence foreign and domestic politics, block reforms, and oppose accountability for war crimes.

This report examines all but one of these problems. (Belgrade’s relationship with Montenegro will be considered in a future report.) It assesses their impact on regional stability, and identifies them as the consequences of ideological nationalism, rear-guard resistance by Milosevic-era cadres, and institutional inertia.

These are all factors that Serbian reformers want to overcome but cannot without international support. Premature FRY admission to Euro-Atlantic institutions is more likely to weaken the reform camp than to strengthen it. Such significant endorsement of Belgrade's regional role should be withheld until it has confirmed by deed its commitment to help stabilise the region.

Until then the FRY cannot be viewed as a guarantor of regional peace and stability or a reliable partner in any collective security framework. The international community must hold the FRY to the same high standards for inclusion in intergovernmental structures that have rightly been required of Croatia and Bosnia since 1996. NATO, the CoE, and the EU should raise these problems with their Yugoslav counterparts and require solutions. So, too, the U.S. administration and Congress should face – and act on – the reality that the FRY is not in compliance with the conditions established under the impending 31 March 2002 deadline and there is, therefore, no justification to certify its eligibility for further U.S. donor aid.

To do otherwise would strengthen obstructionist forces inside Serbia, reduce international community leverage over Belgrade, undermine Yugoslavia’s neighbours, and cheapen membership in the international institutions involved.

Belgrade/Brussels, 7 March 2002

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