Briefing / Europe & Central Asia 22 Јул 2014 2 minutes

Promenljivi politički pejzaž Srbije

PREGLED

Boris Tadić je 11.jula 2004. inaugurisan kao prvi predsednik Srbije od decembra 2002. godine. Birači su 27.juna izabrali Tadića u drugom krugu izbora sa 53% glasova, ispred ultra-nacionaliste Tomislava Nikolića iz Srpske radikalne stranke (SRS)^[fn]U prvom krugu je glasalo 47,7% biračkog tela, a 48,7% u drugom. Izbori u prethodna tri puta (29. septembar i 13. okobar 2002, 8. decembar 2002, i 16. novembar 2003.) nisu uspeli zbog nedovoljnog odziva birača. Naknadne promene izbornog zakona su eliminisale zahtev za pragom od 50% birača i omogućili da ovi izbori uspeju.Hide Footnote . Tadićeva pobeda sugeriše da neznatna većina biračkog tela želi da vidi Srbiju na pro-evropskom reformskom kursu. Sa druge strane, ispoljena snaga Radikala ukazuje da je srpsko biračko telo duboko podeljeno, i da pro-reformski kurs ne treba uzeti "zdravo za gotovo", posebno ako potraju ekonomske teškoće. Što je najznačajnije, tri kandidata sa najvećim brojem glasova u prvom krugu predsedničkih izbora dolaze iz partija koje nisu deo vlade i ne podržavaju je u parlamentu.

Posle izbora, Tadić je ukazao da će podržati vladu premijera Vojislava Koštunice, pri čemu bi se smanjio uticaj Socijalističke partije Srbije (SPS). Sa druge strane, ovlašćenja predsednika su mala po pitanjima dnevne politike, te Tadićev izbor možda neće obavezno značiti i realnu promenu srpske politike. Izbori ostavljaju manjinsku vladu Srbije vrlo ranjivom, izloženu pritisku nacionalističke desnice, kao i pro-evropskog centra. Predstojeći lokalni izbori i pokrajinski izbori u Vojvodini -- zakazani za septembar -- se od strane Vlade doživljavaju kao krucijalni test za moguće prevremene parlamentarne izbore.

Uprkos Tadićevoj pobedi, srpska vlada izgleda nevoljna da obnovi saradnju sa Sudom za ratne zločine u Hagu (Međunarodni krivični sud za bivšu Jugoslaviju -- ICTY). Osim retorike i stalno rastućeg međunarodnog pritiska, nije sigurno da li će bilo ko, koga traži ICTY, biti uhapšen ili izručen pre septembarskih izbora. Reforma zakonodavstva je u zastoju, odnosi sa manjinama u etnički mešovitoj pokrajini Vojvodini su se vidno pogoršali i postoji mogućnost za njihovo dalje pogoršavanje.

Na ovim predsedničkim izborima, srpsko biračko telo ispoljilo je veću sofisticiranost i signaliziralo da nije više opsednuto politikom nacionalizma. Ekonomija je dominirala u predizbornoj kampanji - ni Kosovo, ni ICTY nisu igrali značajniju ulogu u predizbornoj retorici. I prvi i drugi krug su pokazali duboku razočaranost procesom tranzicije i sa politikom uopšte. Ali pojava novog lica iz redova oligarhije -- nekadašnjeg Miloševićevog satrapa Bogoljuba Karića - kao rastuće moćne političke snage uputila je snažnu poruku istrošenoj beogradskoj političkoj eliti o mogućim populističkim trendovima u budućnosti.

Beograd/Brisel, 22. juli 2004

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I. Overview

On 11 July 2004, Boris Tadic was inaugurated as Serbia's first president since December 2002. Voters chose Tadic in the second round of the election, on 27 June, by a vote of 53 per cent over the ultra-nationalist Tomislav Nikolic of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS).^[fn]In the first round, 47.7 per cent of the electorate voted and 48.7 per cent in the second round. Three previous elections (29 September and 13 October 2002, 8 December 2002, and 16 November 2003) were annulled due to insufficient voter turnout. Subsequent changes in the election law removed the requirement for a 50 per cent voter turnout and made it possible for this election to succeed.Hide Footnote Tadic's victory suggests that a slim majority of the electorate wants to see Serbia on a pro-European reform course. However, the Radicals' strong showing demonstrates that Serbia's electorate is deeply divided, and a pro-reform course should not be taken for granted, particularly if economic difficulties continue. Most importantly, the top three vote-getters in the first round of the presidential election came from parties that were not part of the government and did not support it in parliament.

Since the election, Tadic has indicated that he will support the government of Premier Vojislav Kostunica, thereby reducing the influence of the Socialist Party (SPS). However, the office of president holds little authority over day-to-day policy-making, and Tadic's election may not necessarily translate into real change for Serbian politics. The election leaves Serbia's minority government highly vulnerable to pressure from the nationalist right as well as the pro-European centre. Upcoming country-wide municipal elections and provincial elections in Vojvodina -- both scheduled for September -- will be seen by the government as a crucial test for possible early parliamentary elections.

Despite Tadic's election, the Serbian government appears reluctant to restart cooperation with the war crimes tribunal in The Hague (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia [ICTY]). Rhetoric and ever-increasing international pressure aside, it is uncertain if anyone sought by the ICTY will be arrested or transferred prior to the September elections. Reform legislation has stalled, and relations with minorities in the ethnically mixed Vojvodina province have worsened noticeably and could be subject to further deterioration.

In this presidential election, Serbia's electorate demonstrated increased sophistication and signalled that it is no longer obsessed with the politics of nationalism. The economy dominated the election debate -- neither Kosovo nor the ICTY played a significant part in the campaign rhetoric. Both the first and second rounds of the election signalled broad disenchantment with the transition process and with politics as usual. But the emergence of a new face from the oligarchy -- one-time Milosevic crony Bogoljub Karic -- as an increasingly powerful political force sends a powerful message to Belgrade's self-absorbed political elites of possible populist trends in the future.

Belgrade/Brussels, 22 July 2004