The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion
The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Внимавајте на македонската криза..може да прерасне во нова балканска трагедија
Внимавајте на македонската криза..може да прерасне во нова балканска трагедија
Report / Europe & Central Asia 2 minutes

The Macedonian Question: Reform or Rebellion

In late February, violence flared in Albanian-inhabited villages in northern Macedonia close to the border with Kosovo. In mid March, the violence spread to Macedonia’s second largest city, Tetovo.

Executive Summary

In late February, violence flared in Albanian-inhabited villages in northern Macedonia[fn]The use of the term Macedonia in this report is purely a convenient terminology.  It recognises that historically “Macedonia” is a geographical expression – not the name of a state.  It does not pre-judge any opinion on the use of “FYROM” or “Republic of Macedonia” as the correct name of the state.Hide Footnote  close to the border with Kosovo. In mid March, the violence spread to Macedonia’s second largest city, Tetovo.  The rebels claimed to be defending themselves against Macedonian security forces, i.e. their own government, and to be fighting for Albanian national rights in Macedonia.  The coalition government in Skopje promptly raised the alarm, blaming Kosovo Albanian elements for exporting rebellion to Macedonia, and calling for the NATO-led forces in Kosovo (KFOR) to seal the border. The rebels claimed they were local Albanians, numbering 2,000 and recruiting dozens of volunteers from the surrounding area every day.

The international community reacted unanimously with high-level affirmations of support for Macedonia and its elected government, identifying the rebels as a few hundred “terrorists”. On 21 March, the government gave the rebels a 24-hour deadline to lay down arms and/or leave the country, or face a full-scale offensive. The offensive began on 25 March. Four days later, the government announced that the military operation had successfully pushed all the terrorists back into Kosovo.

Lacking a central command structure, the rebels appear to be a cluster of loosely co-ordinated cells of experienced ethnic Albanian fighters from Macedonia, Kosovo and abroad as well as a small number of foreigners.[fn]Macedonian officials have alleged the involvement of mujahedin. While this is possible, no evidence has been presented.Hide Footnote   The political demands issued by the rebels are designed to gain popular support in the Albanian community, and a hearing by the international community.  Whatever the rebels’ long-term intentions may be, they clearly tapped into the frustrated local demands for basic minority rights: citizenship, ownership, education, language and representative government.

Now that the dust around Tetovo has settled, the government and parliament need to face squarely, without panicking, a large political question: Are the Macedonians and Albanians in the country committed to integrated living? Or, should they accept nationalist logic and prepare to negotiate federalisation?

A policy of half-hearted, half-reluctant ethnic cohabitation has led to the present crisis. If the government does not want federalisation, it should declare its commitment to the full and equal integration of all nationalities in the country. It will not be enough to improve the legal framework. The Slavic majority must be ready to challenge the notion that Macedonian state identity is synonymous with the Slavic population.

The government should get strong international backing to ensure that political dialogue leads to real action. The troublesome preamble of the constitution must be deleted, as well as other discriminatory references. Decentralisation measures that have languished in parliament should be adopted and implemented. A census should be prepared and conducted, with international assistance, to determine demographic reality as accurately as possible. Political ethics must be reformed, in particular by introducing and enforcing effective anti-corruption measures. Otherwise, violence may spread along the lines of ethnic cleavage.

Skopje/Brussels, 5 April 2001

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