In the past few weeks the Belgrade authorities have sacked a number of key public officials. The two most prominent  were security chief Stanisic and head of the army general staff Perisic. The firings triggered much speculation in the international media about the stability of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic’s regime. According to one interpretation, the sackings signal a fundamental weakness in government ranks, with Milosevic moving pre-emptively to oust potential rivals to his authority. Alternatively, the sackings may represent an attempt by the Yugoslav President to further consolidate his power base and to effectively rule with the backing of Yugoslavia’s military and security establishments.  Both Stanisic and Perisic were seen as Milosevic’s opponents on several key policies, notably Belgrade’s handling of relations with the Kosovo Albanians. Both Perisic and Stanisic, reportedly moderates not favouring the use of severe force against the Kosovars, have been replaced by Milosevic “yes-men” regarded as proponents  of a violent resolution of the Kosovo question. If this is even in part the case, Stanisic’s and Perisic’s sackings do not necessary reflect a weakness in Milosevic’s rule. Instead, the sackings may only signal Milosevic’s resolve to return to force as a means of regional problem solving.

At the same time, relations between Milosevic and Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic have been deteriorating rapidly. For his part, Djukanovic has emerged as one of the most articulate critics of Milosevic’s iron-fisted rule, coming to advocate autonomy and some Western-style economic reforms for his republic. For this, he has received Milosevic’s condemnation, and in recent months Djukanovic and his supporters have publicly raised the spectre of a violent crackdown against their government. Prompting such open discussion has been the wave of recent sackings, and the replacement of officials not unsympathetic with Montenegrin aims with blind Milosevic loyalists. For his part, Perisic has had close personal relations with Djukanovic while the new military command reportedly shares no sympathy for Djukanovic’s reforms.

Whether or not the sackings signal a weakness in the regime, an imminent violent showdown with separatist Kosovars, an attempt to bring down Djukanovic’s government, or some combination of all these, what appears clear is that Milosevic has attempted to prop up his regime with the support of the military and security establishments. In time, he may no longer even need to rely on the backing of his party loyalists in the federal and republican legislatures. For now, in the Serbian legislature, he appears to thrive on the support of the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS), headed by accused war criminal Vojislav Seselj. It is Seselj who is psychologically preparing the Serbian public for violence and confrontation, and when Milosevic is ready to refashion himself an advocate of regional peace, it is likely Seselj and his party which fall out of favour and out of government. Seselj’s ouster will probably be Milosevic’s “signal” to the West that he, as was the case with the Bosnian peace process, is prepared to play a key role in a regional peace process to end a conflict he himself crafted.

If it is Milosevic’s aim to govern with the backing of the military and security forces, then eventually any real or potential opposition political victories may be nullified upon Milosevic’s orders. The real question that emerges is just how stable or long-lived can any future opposition government be if, at any moment, it can be harassed out of existence or overthrown by Yugoslav troops?