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In the Central African Republic, Peace Requires More Than a Bigger U.N. Force
In the Central African Republic, Peace Requires More Than a Bigger U.N. Force
Report 219 / Africa

中非危机:从掠夺到稳定

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自2012年12月起困扰中非共和国的危机——尤其是当局及武装团体的掠夺——导致了这个国家的崩溃。,前政权遗留下来的执政不力问题在“塞雷卡”的统治下继续恶化。“塞雷卡”的领导人掠夺国家资源,控制中非的非法经济网络。如果要结束这种掠夺性统治的循环,并以和平方式建立起一个可以正常运转、保护公民的国家,就需要中非的国际伙伴将恢复经济、反腐败以及打击非法贩运放在和安全问题同等重要的优先位置。只有在政府、联合国及其他国际参与者之间建立紧密的伙伴关系,让外国顾问与政府关键部门的公务员并肩合作,才能应对这些挑战。

短暂的“塞雷卡”统治(2013年3月至12月)期间,当政者言行不一:他们宣称积极的意愿,但实际上却和前政权一样,掠夺公共资金,滥用手中权力,中饱私囊。尽管“塞雷卡”的战斗人员之前就参与过非法活动,但该组织掌权之后便立刻控制了利润丰厚的贩运网络(黄金、钻石及象牙)。他们的制度性掠夺摧毁了本已名存实亡的国家。中非大多数商人为穆斯林,因此反巴拉卡武装力量针对穆斯林的报复行动加剧了经济崩溃。

国家政体崩溃之前,中非的经济就已经解体了。不过,现在由非盟、联合国、欧盟、美国及法国五方领导的国际干预行动基本只侧重于安全问题的解决。虽然部队动员正在进行,但如果冲突的主要原因——根深蒂固的掠夺行为——没有得到解决,国际社会的干预只会再次失败。保护公民十分重要,但重新恢复经济活力以及改善公共财政管理也很重要,后两者有助于建立有效的公共治理体系,以向包括穆斯林和基督徒在内的所有中非公民提供服务。

联合国将于2014年9月部署新的特派团(联合国驻中非多层面稳定特派团)。除了执行其现有任务,即保护平民,协助政治过渡,支持人道主义救援工作,监控人权状况,新的特派团还需改变激励机制,以提高中非政府执政能力。他们应当优先重建经济及公共机构,打击走私。区域各国以及相关的多边组织也应参与其中。更加全面的经济复兴战略应当包括对中非国内外的掠夺者实施针对性的制裁。

某些与武装团体有联系或者有意参加总统竞选(暂时来说竞选还只是一种假设)的政客可能会阻挠中非与国际社会建立紧密的伙伴关系。但过渡政府对于强有力国际支持的需求,有助于建立这样的伙伴关系,有助于采取对于稳定国家、推动治理变革至关重要的政策。

Op-Ed / Africa

In the Central African Republic, Peace Requires More Than a Bigger U.N. Force

Originally published in World Politics Review

The U.N. Security Coucil approved a resolution to extend the mandate of the U.N. Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) until 15 November 2018, also increasing the mission’s troop ceiling by 900. Richard Moncrieff, Project Director for Central Africa, states that the Central African Republic needs more than just troops to meet the country's security challenges.

On Nov. 15, the United Nations Security Council will meet to decide on the fate of the U.N. mission in Central African Republic, known by its acronym MINUSCA. In stark contrast to the debate over the U.N. mission in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, which the U.S. pushed to reduce last April after citing its ineffectiveness and cost, few in New York expect cuts to the Central African Republic (CAR) mission. 

To the contrary, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres visited CAR at the end of October and called for increasing the mission’s authorized troop ceiling, currently just over 12,000, by an additional 900 troops. Adama Dieng, his adviser on genocide prevention, and Stephen O’Brien, the undersecretary for humanitarian affairs, both also visited the country in recent months and warned of the escalating violence and a distressing humanitarian catastrophe there. The troubling situation and the pockets of success the U.N. force has achieved so far have left the U.S. relatively favorably disposed to increasing troop numbers, despite serious concerns over allegations of sexual abuse by some contingents. 

The U.N. mission is in an increasingly complicated position on the ground. Having made some gains in late 2016 and early 2017 by pushing armed groups out of some towns and deterring some attacks, the U.N. force has since appeared overwhelmed by the scale of the crisis as well as by its own rigidity. Poor mobility—the mission has two operational helicopters in a country larger than France—a lack of intelligence, and an unwillingness to react quickly when such intelligence is available have rendered it ineffective in the face of rising violence among competing militias. 

This has put the U.N. under intense pressure in the capital, Bangui. When Guterres spoke to CAR’s parliament on Oct. 27, government and opposition politicians managed a rare moment of unity, criticizing the U.N. for its passivity and, according to some, even complicity in the face of the violence. Aside from wanting a far more proactive posture from the U.N., the parliamentarians want to see CAR’s national army up and running, despite slow progress on training and its history of incompetence and abuse. Guterres, sensing the mood, acknowledged that the army would start deploying soon. Unless his U.N. force can up its game, calls for ever greater—and ever riskier—deployment of the national army will increase.

The U.N. force certainly needs more troops, and the Security Council should increase the ceiling. It also needs greater mobility and a stronger willingness to react quickly and decisively. But these measures alone would still limit the U.N. mission to merely putting out fires. The U.N., and other international actors, also need to address the incentive structure that is driving the violence.

Read the full article at: World Politics Review