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中非危机:从掠夺到稳定

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执行摘要

自2012年12月起困扰中非共和国的危机——尤其是当局及武装团体的掠夺——导致了这个国家的崩溃。,前政权遗留下来的执政不力问题在“塞雷卡”的统治下继续恶化。“塞雷卡”的领导人掠夺国家资源,控制中非的非法经济网络。如果要结束这种掠夺性统治的循环,并以和平方式建立起一个可以正常运转、保护公民的国家,就需要中非的国际伙伴将恢复经济、反腐败以及打击非法贩运放在和安全问题同等重要的优先位置。只有在政府、联合国及其他国际参与者之间建立紧密的伙伴关系,让外国顾问与政府关键部门的公务员并肩合作,才能应对这些挑战。

短暂的“塞雷卡”统治(2013年3月至12月)期间,当政者言行不一:他们宣称积极的意愿,但实际上却和前政权一样,掠夺公共资金,滥用手中权力,中饱私囊。尽管“塞雷卡”的战斗人员之前就参与过非法活动,但该组织掌权之后便立刻控制了利润丰厚的贩运网络(黄金、钻石及象牙)。他们的制度性掠夺摧毁了本已名存实亡的国家。中非大多数商人为穆斯林,因此反巴拉卡武装力量针对穆斯林的报复行动加剧了经济崩溃。

国家政体崩溃之前,中非的经济就已经解体了。不过,现在由非盟、联合国、欧盟、美国及法国五方领导的国际干预行动基本只侧重于安全问题的解决。虽然部队动员正在进行,但如果冲突的主要原因——根深蒂固的掠夺行为——没有得到解决,国际社会的干预只会再次失败。保护公民十分重要,但重新恢复经济活力以及改善公共财政管理也很重要,后两者有助于建立有效的公共治理体系,以向包括穆斯林和基督徒在内的所有中非公民提供服务。

联合国将于2014年9月部署新的特派团(联合国驻中非多层面稳定特派团)。除了执行其现有任务,即保护平民,协助政治过渡,支持人道主义救援工作,监控人权状况,新的特派团还需改变激励机制,以提高中非政府执政能力。他们应当优先重建经济及公共机构,打击走私。区域各国以及相关的多边组织也应参与其中。更加全面的经济复兴战略应当包括对中非国内外的掠夺者实施针对性的制裁。

某些与武装团体有联系或者有意参加总统竞选(暂时来说竞选还只是一种假设)的政客可能会阻挠中非与国际社会建立紧密的伙伴关系。但过渡政府对于强有力国际支持的需求,有助于建立这样的伙伴关系,有助于采取对于稳定国家、推动治理变革至关重要的政策。

Executive Summary

The crisis that has plagued the Central African Republic (CAR) since December 2012, particularly predation by both authorities and armed groups, has led to the collapse of the state. Under the Seleka, bad governance inherited from former regimes worsened. Its leaders looted state resources and controlled the country’s illicit economic networks. Ending this cycle of predatory rule and moving peacefully to a state that functions and can protect its citizens requires CAR’s international partners to prioritise, alongside security, economic revival and the fight against corruption and illegal trafficking. Only a close partnership between the government, UN and other inter­national actors, with foreign advisers working alongside civil servants in key ministries, can address these challenges.

Governance under the short Seleka rule (March-December 2013) was deceptive: the regime proclaimed its positive intentions while, like its predecessors, plundering public funds and abusing power for self-enrichment. Though Seleka fighters were involved in illicit activities even before, once in power the movement asserted control of lucrative trafficking networks (gold, diamond and ivory). Their systematic looting destroyed what was already a phantom state. Retaliation by anti-balaka fighters against Muslims – the majority of traders are Muslim – aggravated the economic collapse.

The economy fell apart even before the state; yet the current international intervention spearheaded by the G5 (African Union, UN, European Union, the U.S. and France) focuses for the most part on security. Troops are being mobilised, but if a principal cause of the conflict – entrenched predation – is left unaddressed, the international community will repeat the failures of its past interventions. Protecting citizens is important; but so too is rekindling economic activity and improving financial public management to help build an effective public governance system delivering services for all CAR citizens, both Muslim and Christian.

A new UN mission (MINUSCA) will be deployed in September 2014. In addition to its current mandate – protecting civilians, assisting a political transition, supporting humanitarian work and monitoring human rights – it must change the incentive structure for better governance. It should prioritise rebuilding the economy and public institutions and fighting trafficking. The region and relevant multilateral organisations should be involved too. Targeted sanctions against spoilers in and outside CAR should be embedded in a more comprehensive strategy to revive the economy.

Some politicians with ties to armed groups or who are eying what are for the moment hypothetical presidential elections could resist a tight partnership between the state and international community. But the transitional government’s demand for strong international support offers an opportunity to forge such a partnership and adopt the policies essential to both stabilise the country and promote a change of governance.

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