icon caret Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Line Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Youtube
Central African Republic: Getting from Talks to Peace
Central African Republic: Getting from Talks to Peace
Report 203 / Africa

中非共和国:过渡时期的首要任务

  • Share
  • Save
  • Print
  • Download PDF Full Report

执行摘要

2013年3月,塞雷卡反政府联盟发动的政变结束了弗朗索瓦·博齐泽长达十年之久的统治,也使中非共和国陷入了新的险恶危机之中。对此,中部非洲国家经济共同体(中非经共体,ECCAS)以及中非共和国(CAR)的其他合作伙伴作出了一个较为常见的妥协:在事实上承认新的政权,并在国际监督下完成过渡框架的建设。然而,由于国家处于无政府状态,塞雷卡联盟非常脆弱,基督徒与穆斯林之间关系紧张,这些都导致不确定因素的继续存在。为了避免在非洲的中心出现一块无法治理的领土,新的民族团结政府必须迅速采取紧急安全、人道主义和政治经济措施,以恢复安全并振兴经济。对他们来说,国际合作伙伴必须调整自身的“等待观望”政策,加大政治和财政参与力度,以监督和支持中非共和国的过渡进程。

  塞雷卡反政府联盟在2012年12月发动快速进攻,叛乱军队直接打到了首都班吉城外。乍得和中非经共体派遣的中非巩固和平特派团(MICOPAX)联手实施干预,迫使叛军停火并与博齐泽政府展开谈判。在中非经共体施压后于2013年1月11日签署的《利伯维尔政治协议》暂时阻止了政变,并提出了一项为期三年的权力共享计划。然而,由于博齐泽拒绝协同完成和平过渡,中非经共体也未能监督协议的执行,塞雷卡联盟又享有实地战术优势,这些都导致该过渡计划的最终流产。在一场导致多名南非士兵丧生的战斗之后,塞雷卡联盟终于在3月24日接管了班吉。

新的民族团结政府是脆弱的,而且面临着巨大挑战。在《利伯维尔协议》中,达成但尚未执行的协议包括:保卫国家、组织选举、恢复公共服务和落实司法、经济和社会改革。然而,塞雷卡联盟内部的分歧,班吉的武器扩散以及社会环境的恶化都为已然非常脆弱的过渡进程增添了风险。中非共和国的人道主义局势正日益恶化:人民的流离失所状况随着雨季的来临将更加严峻,估计共有约150,000-180,000名居民流离失所。新政府面临着众多亟待解决的问题,因此必须就国家安全、人道主义、财政预算和政治问题分清轻重缓急。要确保历届政府未能实现的和平与稳定,就必须达成新的解除武装、军人复员和重返社会协议(DDR),并重新考虑安全部门改革(SSR)。恢复安全秩序,并根据国家需要来促进创新改革,这两点是确保成功过渡的关键。

为了应对这些挑战,政府将需要两种类型的援助:资金捐助和专家支援,从而完成三项重要举措——解除武装、军人复员和重返社会、安全部门改革和重建资金的管理;以及中非经共体的政治和军事支持。在联合国和法国的帮助下,中非经共体应严格监督《利伯维尔协议》及其在2013年4月恩贾梅纳国家元首和政府首脑会议上达成的决议的实施。此外,还应该扮演调解员的角色,以缓解可能出现的政治和军事紧张局势。如果过渡进程失败,中非共和国的国家管理将完全失控,这将在非洲大陆的心脏位置造成一个“灰色地带”。中非共和国目前已经成为各种武装团体的避风港;圣主抵抗军武装力量自2008年起就在东南地区活动,来自包括苏丹在内的周边国家的偷猎者和非法贩卖者把瓦卡加地区当做必经之地。国家分崩离析将为形成新的犯罪网络创造条件,进一步破坏地区的安全稳定。

为了防止中非共和国的局势进一步恶化,国际合作伙伴必须摒弃“等待观望”的态度和含糊的参与感,这些特点往往存在于许多负责监督政治过渡的国际组织行动中。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2013年6月11日

Commentary / Africa

Central African Republic: Getting from Talks to Peace

The deadly threat posed by armed groups in the Central African Republic has led to severe displacement and food insecurity. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2019 for European policymakers, Crisis Group urges the EU to support multi-level mediation by the African Union and to back local peace initiatives.

More than six years after the beginning of the Central African Republic’s (CAR) most important crisis since the country’s independence and three years after President Faustin Archange Touadéra’s election, the country remains in turmoil. 2018 ended with lethal clashes both between armed groups and between them and UN peacekeepers in major towns and rising tensions in the capital Bangui. Former factions of the Seleka, a coalition of rebel groups from the country’s north and east which in 2013 overthrew then President François Bozizé and held power for two years before being ousted, the anti-balaka, militias formed to fight the Seleka which then turned into bandits, and a series of other community self-defence militias hold sway across much of the country, controlling many mining sites, transport routes and pastoralists’ transmigration corridors. Neither the large UN peacekeeping force, the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) nor the fledgling national army, which is slowly deploying across the country following years of EU training, can constrain these groups’ infighting and predation.

The violence is driving severe displacement, food insecurity and malnutrition. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ October 2018 figures, there are currently 642,842 internally displaced and over 573,200, many of them Muslims fleeing persecution by various militias, seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Some 2.5 million people need humanitarian aid. Most of the Muslims remaining in the capital, concentrated in the PK5 district, still live in fear of cycles of revenge violence among armed gangs that use religious belonging as an identifier and pretext for abuses.

It will be important for international actors to present a united front and pressure neighbouring countries [...] to use their influence over armed groups.

As of late January (as this Watch List went to print), representatives of the different armed groups and the government were holding talks in the Sudanese capital Khartoum. These talks present a welcome opportunity to refocus regional efforts on the African Union (AU)-led mediation, which have recently been in unhelpful competition with a parallel Russian-Sudanese initiative. Some form of agreement appears likely to emerge from the Khartoum meeting, though will require compromise from both sides. The challenge for 2019 will be to ensure that such an agreement makes a concrete difference on the ground. It will be important for international actors to present a united front and pressure neighbouring countries, particularly Sudan and Chad, to use their influence over armed groups – notably the largest ex-Seleka factions – to ensure they fulfil any pledges made in Khartoum. They should also support local peace initiatives, during which armed groups’ demands can be taken into account alongside the concerns of local communities in which they operate, as a complement to the national-level agreement.

The EU and its member states should:

  • Follow up its support to the AU’s mediation effort with pressure on the government to adhere to its side of the prospective deal and on Sudan and Chad to use their influence to persuade armed groups to demobilise; those governments should also open talks with the CAR government on the repatriation of Chadian and Sudanese fighters in those groups;
     
  • Support the proposed nomination of a high-level AU-UN envoy and encourage that person to focus not only on negotiations between armed groups and the government but on regional diplomacy aimed at encouraging Bangui and neighbouring capitals to find common ground on issues such as the repatriation of foreign fighters and access to pastoral land;
     
  • Alongside the UN, step up support for local peace initiatives that factor in armed groups’ local demands and the concerns of local communities, and thus both diminish levels of violence and allow for a finer-grained understanding of armed groups’ interests and strengths, and improving prospects for their disarmament.

Since June 2017, the AU, backed by African countries and the UN as well as the EU and its member states, has tried to mediate between the government and fourteen armed groups including ex-Seleka factions, anti-balaka groups and community self-defence militias, which in many cases have competing sets of interests and goals. The AU Mediation Panel of Facilitation, led by Burkina Faso’s Moussa Nébié, has met those groups’ leaders in preparation for dialogue with the government, resulting in a list of 115 different demands grouped into four thematic areas (politics, socio-economy, security and defence, justice and reconciliation). Key demands likely to be obstacles in negotiations centre around devolution (which the government fears armed groups would use to consolidate their grip on provinces they control, particularly in the case of the large ex-Seleka factions in the north and east of the country ); national-level power sharing; control over natural resources; the armed groups’ demands for immunity for crimes committed during the conflict; and the integration of some of their members into the army, including at what rank.

Over the past few months, Nébié’s AU-led efforts had been undercut by a parallel Russian-Sudanese initiative. At the end of 2017, President Faustin-Archange Touadéra, frustrated by the perceived inefficiency or slowness of his partners to help deploy the national army and bring armed groups to the negotiating table, had sought Russian help. Moscow provided the national army with training and equipment following that already delivered by the EU Training Mission active in CAR since 2016. Russia also started to provide the president with security advice and personal protection. In mid-2018, it encouraged Sudan, with which Moscow has increasingly close relations, to initiate its own talks in Khartoum with armed groups and government representatives. Until recently, this parallel track had sucked oxygen from the AU’s efforts and allowed both armed groups and government representatives to forum-shop. It also provoked tensions between on the one hand the AU, the UN and the EU, which supported the AU track, and on the other Sudan, Russia and President Touadéra.

The main risk is less that the Khartoum talks fail to reach an accord along these lines than that its provisions are not enforced.

Recent AU and UN diplomacy has helped unite these parallel tracks. On 9 January, following a visit to Bangui by AU Peace and Security Commissioner Smail Chergui and UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Pierre Lacroix, President Touadéra announced that the government would meet with armed groups in Khartoum on 24 January under the aegis of the AU. Giving Sudan the opportunity to host is a neat solution to bridge the gap between the two initiatives and mend international divisions.

Talks may still be tricky, however. The government has agreed to integrate some armed group members into the armed forces, while adhering to the age and education requirements already in place. But government negotiators are likely to resist ceding more ground on power sharing and immunity, given popular anger at the armed groups’ predation and violence and the fact that the concessions those groups have won in the past have not led them to change their behaviour. Unless they face pressure from their allies, armed groups’ leaders may camp on their maximalist demands. Probably the best that can reasonably be expected from Khartoum is a broad agreement on the ranks at which a limited number of armed group members could enter the army and for some rebels who disarm to be granted mid-level public offices, in exchange for a ceasefire and an agreement from armed groups that they will demobilise.

The main risk is less that the Khartoum talks fail to reach an accord along these lines than that its provisions are not enforced. Many previous deals between government and armed groups have not brought concrete changes on the ground. Throughout 2018, some smaller armed groups expressed a willingness to disarm, but stalled doing so in anticipation of better terms emerging from an agreement in Khartoum. Following this round of talks, President Touadéra’s government and international partners, especially the UN, need to seize the opportunity of whatever is agreed to advance efforts to demobilise armed groups as much as possible.

Also important is that local mediation efforts [in CAR] complement those at national level.

CAR’s neighbours ought to lend their support to ensure that armed groups fulfil any commitments made in Khartoum. Some ex-Seleka factions in particular have close links to neighbouring governments, notably those of Chad and Sudan; indeed many combatants and armed herders that seek pastoral land hail from those countries. N’Djamena and Khartoum have an interest in their southern neighbour’s stability. But they balance that against the interests of their pastoralist and trading communities or allied armed groups in border areas. Talks are needed between Bangui and both Khartoum and N’Djamena aimed at reaching agreement on security guarantees for all sides and on modalities for repatriating Chadians and Sudanese currently fighting with armed groups in CAR. African and EU governments, as well as Russia, should offer support to such talks.

Also important is that local mediation efforts complement those at national level. The armed groups in CAR vary significantly in strength, geographical reach, motivations and relations with their communities. Of the fourteen represented in Khartoum only three, all ex-Seleka groups, have significant national and cross-border reach. The anti-balaka groups in particular are fragmented and some have ties to the government with which they are in principle negotiating. Most groups’ main concerns are local, often revolving around control of resources in areas they control. Moreover, a patchwork of other groups were not represented in Khartoum, but still need to be demobilised.

Local mediation efforts initiated by religious organisations, civil society leaders and CAR politicians already have had some success, allowing temporary truces between armed groups fighting each other and calming intercommunal tensions. Unlike the broader negotiations of which Khartoum is the latest iteration, these initiatives address local disputes among armed groups rather than their grievances toward the government or national-level demands. Resulting local agreements are precarious, however, and can scale up from small local gains to become part of a more durable and country-wide solution with sustained support, including from international actors and alongside a national-level agreement that enjoys regional backing. UN backing for such initiatives could be supplemented by the AU panel in-country, building on contacts it already has with armed groups.