中非共和国:过渡时期的首要任务
中非共和国:过渡时期的首要任务
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  1. Executive Summary
Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic
Russia’s Influence in the Central African Republic
Report 203 / Africa

中非共和国:过渡时期的首要任务

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执行摘要

2013年3月,塞雷卡反政府联盟发动的政变结束了弗朗索瓦·博齐泽长达十年之久的统治,也使中非共和国陷入了新的险恶危机之中。对此,中部非洲国家经济共同体(中非经共体,ECCAS)以及中非共和国(CAR)的其他合作伙伴作出了一个较为常见的妥协:在事实上承认新的政权,并在国际监督下完成过渡框架的建设。然而,由于国家处于无政府状态,塞雷卡联盟非常脆弱,基督徒与穆斯林之间关系紧张,这些都导致不确定因素的继续存在。为了避免在非洲的中心出现一块无法治理的领土,新的民族团结政府必须迅速采取紧急安全、人道主义和政治经济措施,以恢复安全并振兴经济。对他们来说,国际合作伙伴必须调整自身的“等待观望”政策,加大政治和财政参与力度,以监督和支持中非共和国的过渡进程。

  塞雷卡反政府联盟在2012年12月发动快速进攻,叛乱军队直接打到了首都班吉城外。乍得和中非经共体派遣的中非巩固和平特派团(MICOPAX)联手实施干预,迫使叛军停火并与博齐泽政府展开谈判。在中非经共体施压后于2013年1月11日签署的《利伯维尔政治协议》暂时阻止了政变,并提出了一项为期三年的权力共享计划。然而,由于博齐泽拒绝协同完成和平过渡,中非经共体也未能监督协议的执行,塞雷卡联盟又享有实地战术优势,这些都导致该过渡计划的最终流产。在一场导致多名南非士兵丧生的战斗之后,塞雷卡联盟终于在3月24日接管了班吉。

新的民族团结政府是脆弱的,而且面临着巨大挑战。在《利伯维尔协议》中,达成但尚未执行的协议包括:保卫国家、组织选举、恢复公共服务和落实司法、经济和社会改革。然而,塞雷卡联盟内部的分歧,班吉的武器扩散以及社会环境的恶化都为已然非常脆弱的过渡进程增添了风险。中非共和国的人道主义局势正日益恶化:人民的流离失所状况随着雨季的来临将更加严峻,估计共有约150,000-180,000名居民流离失所。新政府面临着众多亟待解决的问题,因此必须就国家安全、人道主义、财政预算和政治问题分清轻重缓急。要确保历届政府未能实现的和平与稳定,就必须达成新的解除武装、军人复员和重返社会协议(DDR),并重新考虑安全部门改革(SSR)。恢复安全秩序,并根据国家需要来促进创新改革,这两点是确保成功过渡的关键。

为了应对这些挑战,政府将需要两种类型的援助:资金捐助和专家支援,从而完成三项重要举措——解除武装、军人复员和重返社会、安全部门改革和重建资金的管理;以及中非经共体的政治和军事支持。在联合国和法国的帮助下,中非经共体应严格监督《利伯维尔协议》及其在2013年4月恩贾梅纳国家元首和政府首脑会议上达成的决议的实施。此外,还应该扮演调解员的角色,以缓解可能出现的政治和军事紧张局势。如果过渡进程失败,中非共和国的国家管理将完全失控,这将在非洲大陆的心脏位置造成一个“灰色地带”。中非共和国目前已经成为各种武装团体的避风港;圣主抵抗军武装力量自2008年起就在东南地区活动,来自包括苏丹在内的周边国家的偷猎者和非法贩卖者把瓦卡加地区当做必经之地。国家分崩离析将为形成新的犯罪网络创造条件,进一步破坏地区的安全稳定。

为了防止中非共和国的局势进一步恶化,国际合作伙伴必须摒弃“等待观望”的态度和含糊的参与感,这些特点往往存在于许多负责监督政治过渡的国际组织行动中。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2013年6月11日

Executive Summary

The coup by the Seleka rebel coalition in March 2013 that ended François Bozizé’s decade-old rule plunged the Central African Republic into a new and dangerous crisis. In response, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and other partners of the Central African Republic (CAR) offered an all-too-common compromise: a de facto recognition of the new power and a transition framework under international supervision. However, uncertainty remains due to the absence of the state, Seleka’s fragility and tensions between Christians and Muslims. To avoid having an ungovernable territory in the heart of Africa, the new government of national unity must quickly adopt emergency security, humanitarian, political and economic measures to restore security and revive the economy. For their part, international partners must replace their “wait-and-see” policy with more robust political and financial engagement to supervise and support the transition.

Seleka’s swift offensive in December 2012 brought the rebellion to the door-step of the capital, Bangui. The intervention by Chad and ECCAS’s Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in CAR (MICOPAX) forced them to stop and negotiate with the Bozizé government. The 11 January 2013 Libreville Agreement, imposed by ECCAS, temporarily prevented a coup and initiated a three-year power-sharing arrangement. However, this transition plan failed due to Bozizé’s refusal to engage in a concerted and peaceful transition; failure by ECCAS to monitor the agreement; and Seleka’s tactical advantage on the ground. Eventually, the Seleka took over Bangui on 24 March during an attack that claimed the lives of several South African soldiers.

The new government of national unity is fragile and faces considerable challenges. Securing the country, organising elections, restoring public services and implementing judicial, economic and social reforms, were agreed to in Libreville and remain on the agenda. But dissension within Seleka, the proliferation of weapons in Bangui and the deterioration of the social environment could jeopardise the very fragile transition. The humanitarian situation is deteriorating: the population is suffering from deprivation, which will be compounded by the rainy season, and there are some 150,000-180,000 internally displaced people. Faced with multiple problems, the new government will have to define security, humanitarian, budgetary and political priorities. To secure the peace and stability that previous governments failed to achieve, it must develop a new disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program and rethink security sector reform (SSR). Restoring security and promoting innovative approaches tailored to the country’s needs are key to ensuring the success of the transition.

To overcome these challenges, the government will need two types of assistance: funding and experts from donors for three important initiatives – DDR, SSR and the management of reconstruction funds; and political and military support from ECCAS. With the help of the UN and France, the regional organisation should ensure rigorous monitoring of the Libreville Agreement and the decisions taken at its April 2013 heads of state summit in N’Djamena. It should also act as a mediator to mitigate political and military tensions that may arise. Should the transition fail, it will be impossible to govern the country and this will create a “grey zone” at the heart of the continent. CAR is already a haven for various armed groups; combatants from the Lord’s Resistance Army have been present in the south east of the country since 2008 and the Vakaga region is a transit route for poachers and traffickers from neighbouring countries, including Sudan. State collapse could pave the way for new criminal networks to establish themselves in the country and further undermine regional stability.

To prevent the country’s further decline, international partners must go beyond their “wait-and-see” attitude and mixed commitments that have too often characterised international supervision of political transitions.

Nairobi/Brussels, 11 June 2013

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