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没有卡扎菲的非洲:以乍得为例

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穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲对利比亚的长期统治伴随着其于10月20日在家乡苏尔特被打死而结束,为利比亚民主敞开了道路。他的陨落也使这个国家及其邻国面临许多潜在的新问题,可能危及该地区的稳定。乍得就是个例子。在乍得的所有冲突中,卡扎菲总是让人觉得有他的存在,尽管人们对此看法不一,有褒有贬。而且他与乍得总统代比保持着密切关系。因为代比在利比亚叛乱初期对卡扎菲这位命中的恩人给与了政治上的支持,并到了很晚的时候才与利比亚“全国过渡委员会”(NTC)进行配合,所以乍得与利比亚关系的新时代从一开始就迈错了步子。全国过渡委员会对乍得战士在军事上支持卡扎菲的指控(恩贾梅纳对此表示否认),种族主义者对非洲黑人的袭击,难民和与之相关的流离失所问题,以及边境的局势动荡,都增加了即将到来的挑战。

在卡扎菲42年的统治中,他一次又一次地成为乍得冲突的参与者和调解人,利用他的南方邻国作为达到他的地区野心的试验场。在代比的领导下,恩贾梅纳乐于附庸的黎波里,并且的黎波里和恩贾梅纳之间的关系改善显著。两国领导人的关系有起有落,但代比允许卡扎菲通过保护人身份增强其影响,以换取政治和经济上的支持。

卡扎菲在乍得的介入是前后矛盾的。卡扎菲最初积极破坏乍得北部的稳定,但近几年却通过在武装部队之间调停进为这片历来叛乱不息的地区带来了相对和平。鉴于此,代比将卡扎菲视为自己推行地区政策的要素,因此当利比亚叛乱爆发时,他不愿接受卡扎菲下台的可能性,并且很长时间之后才意识到叛乱的全面影响。当危机开始时,代比试图通过指责叛军勾结伊斯兰主义者来为卡扎菲的合法性进行辩护。虽然他的政府否认了其向卡扎菲提供了任何军事支持,在利比亚的卡扎菲部队中有乍得战士的参与的使其言论并不可信。

然而,代比对利比亚反政府军的指责自然而然令全国过渡委员会(NTC)对恩贾梅纳产生怀疑,认为恩贾梅纳倾向于卡扎菲继续统治。这严重影响了过渡委员会如何对待那些叛军控制的利比亚地区的乍得国民。只是到了北约(NATO)对利比亚局势进行干预和权力从卡扎菲手中转移时,乍得政府才采取了更具战略性和更现实的立场,呼吁谈判并与全国过渡委员会建立初步接触。 

鉴于近代历史,代比知道与的黎波里的敌对关系可能很快危及乍得北部的稳定。最近他在卡扎菲帮助下取得的与苏丹关系的正常化远不会逆转,所以他想避免与黎波里新当局之间的紧张关系。恩贾梅纳也关心利比亚的乍得国民的困境,他们经常被认为是雇佣兵,也被当作雇佣兵来对待,尽管他们中的绝大多数人多年来一直纯粹出于经济原因而留在利比亚。同样,恩贾梅纳也意识到需要保持两国间的经济关系,特别是贸易和投资关系。

考虑到安全和经济利益受到威胁,乍得政权现已经承认了利比亚的前叛军,代比已经会见了全国过渡委员会的领袖,穆斯塔法·阿卜杜勒·贾利勒。尽管双方有所和解,但是未来关系的不确定性仍然存在。的黎波里的新统治者和代比能够彼此赢得信任并将八个月的危机中双方的不满全部撇开吗?利比亚南部的动荡局势将如何影响这些关系?利比亚在与乍得和苏丹的关系上将出台什么新政策?更广泛的说,利比亚与非洲其他国家的新关系将是怎样的? 

由于卡扎菲长期统治利比亚,加上他在国外的影响和强大的恩庇政治,他在利比亚及其邻国的影响仍将继续存在。在他下台之前和之后的动乱制造了新的和潜在问题,包括人口大规模流离失所;利比亚部族间的紧张局势,和对撒哈拉以南非洲国家国民的种族主义袭击;伊斯兰教可能复苏;以及军队扩充和武器扩散。现在要对这些改变是否将演变为地区(特别是在萨赫勒地区和达尔富尔)不稳定的中期和长期因素做出结论还为时过早。然而,乍得作为一个联接撒哈拉以南地区和北非以及东西萨赫勒的国家,所面临的问题凸现了该地区在后卡扎菲时代所面对的危险。

恩贾梅纳/内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2011年10月21日

Executive Summary

The end of the long reign of Muammar Qaddafi, killed on 20 October in his hometown of Sirte, opens the way to democracy in Libya. His fall has also left the country and its neighbours facing a multitude of potential new problems that could threaten stability in the region. Chad is a case in point. Qaddafi made his presence felt in all the country’s conflicts, for good and ill, and he maintained a close relationship with President Déby. Because the latter supported his doomed benefactor politically at the start of the insurgency and only belatedly aligned with Libya’s National Tran­sitional Council (NTC), the new era of Chad-Libya relations has started on the wrong foot. The NTC’s accusations – denied by N’Djamena – that Chadian fighters supported Qaddafi militarily, racist attacks against black Af­ricans, refugees and related displacement issues, and the volatile situation on the border increase forthcoming challenges.

During his 42-year reign, Qaddafi was time and again an actor and mediator of Chad’s conflicts, while using his southern neighbour as a testing ground to achieve his regional ambitions. Under Déby, N’Djamena was a willing subject, and relations between Tripoli and N’Djamena improved significantly. The two leaders’ relationship had its ups and downs, but Déby allowed Qaddafi to increase his influence through patronage in return for political and economic support.

Qaddafi’s involvement in Chad became paradoxical. After initially playing an active role in destabilising the North, he contributed in recent years to bringing relative peace to that historically rebellious zone by mediating between armed groups. In view of this, Déby saw Qaddafi as essential to his own regional policy and was, therefore, reluctant to accept the possibility of his fall when the Libyan insurgency broke out and slow to realise its full consequences. When the crisis began, Déby tried to defend Qaddafi’s legitimacy by accusing the rebels of colluding with Islamists. Though his government denied it was providing any military support, the presence of Chadian fighters in Libya among Qaddafi’s troops stripped his statements of weight.

However, Déby’s accusations naturally made the NTC suspicious of N’Djamena, which it considered as favouring Qaddafi’s continued rule. This had serious consequences for the treatment of Chadian nationals in Libya in areas where the insurgents gained control. It was only when NATO intervened and power shifted away from Qaddafi, that the Chadian government took a more strategic and realistic stance, calling for negotiations and establishing preliminary contacts with the NTC.

Déby knows from recent history that hostile relations with Tripoli could quickly endanger the stability of northern Chad. The recent normalisation of relations with Sudan that he achieved with Qaddafi’s help is far from irreversible, so he would like to avoid tensions with the new authorities in Tripoli. N’Djamena is also concerned for the plight of Chadian nationals in Libya, who frequently have been perceived and treated as mercenaries, though at least the overwhelming majority have been in the country for years for purely economic reasons. It is likewise aware of the need to maintain economic relations, particularly trade and investments, between the two countries.

Given the security and economic interests at stake, the Chadian regime has now recognised the former rebels, and Déby has met with the NTC leader, Mustafa Abdul Jalil. But despite this rapprochement, uncertainty about the future of relations remains. Will the new rulers of Tripoli and Déby be able to win each other’s trust and put aside grievances born during the eight-month crisis? How will the volatile situation in southern Libya impact on these relations? What will be Libya’s new policy on the Chad-Sudan equation? More generally, what will be Libya’s new relationship with the rest of Africa?

Due to the length of his reign, his influence abroad and strong patronage politics, Qaddafi’s shadow will continue to be felt in Libya and neighbouring countries. The upheavals that preceded and followed his fall have created new and potential problems, including massive displacement of populations; tribal tensions within Libya and racist attacks against nationals of sub-Saharan countries; a possible resurgence of Islamism; and the proliferation of fighters and weapons. It is too early to say whether the changes will evolve into medium- and long-term factors of instability in the region, notably in the Sahel and Darfur. However the issues faced by Chad, a country bridging sub-Saharan and North Africa and east and west Sahel, highlight some of the dangers the region faces in the post-Qaddafi era.

N’Djamena/Nairobi/Brussels, 21 October 2011

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