Briefing 71 / Africa 23 March 2010 利比亚／乍得：超越政治影响 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Full Report (fr) Also available in Français 简体中文 Français English العربية 概述 自穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲于1969年掌权以来，利比亚就成为了乍得最重要的邻国。在哈布雷执掌乍得期间，两国相互敌视，军事干预时有发生。但自代比就职以来，利比亚不再向乍得索取领土，转而摇身一变成为地区内的权势掮客，并积极参加乍得政府与各叛乱组织的和平谈判。凭着雄厚的财力和地区威望，利比亚将各方拉到谈判桌前，并亲自监护了和平协议的签订，但此后却对协议的实施几乎不闻不问。利比亚成功地协助乍得政府将叛军招安，但此外交成就却是昙花一现，因为在促进乍得长期持久稳定上卡扎菲政府无所建树。利比亚一方面积极施压，促使各方在和平协议上签字，另一方面对协议的执行毫无兴趣，其态度前后的转变表明卡扎菲为乍得所做的调停工作目标重点不在于乍得的稳定，而在于巩固自身的地区势力。 利比亚对乍得的干涉是一段令人困惑，充满矛盾的历史。上世纪八十年代，利比亚奉行以占领甚至兼并乍得大片领土为目的的政策，两国间因此爆发了数次军事冲突。乍得在前殖民国法国的援助下才得以退敌。九十年代，哈布雷倒台，代比得势，但利比亚因联合国安理会制裁遭到孤立，实力下跌，因此未能利用乍得政权交接的过渡时期乘虚而入。但利比亚政府意识到地缘政治环境已经发生了改变，因此相应地修改了对这一南边邻国的外交政策。虽然利比亚未能大幅改变乍得事务发展的轨迹，但在代比同武装反对组织的斗争中起到了关键作用。卡扎菲以各种方式参与了几乎所有的乍得内部谈判，其中最值得一提的是2007年的锡尔特谈判。 由于乍得政治危机不断，与苏丹关系日益恶化，加之达尔富尔危机爆发，自2003年以来，利比亚得以不断巩固自己地区掮客的地位。利比亚政府同乍得和苏丹两边境内的武装叛军都有联系，因而各反政府势力都视其为首要调停人，而且利比亚重新建立了乍得和苏丹政府之间的联系。如果没有利比亚搭桥，两国有可能发生战争，并给地区各国带来灾难性的后果。 然而，由于利比亚一意想支配邻邦各国，因而难以容忍地区内或国际上其它国家或组织的参与，同时利比亚没有对乍得的长期改革做打算，因此其外交成就稍纵即逝。利比亚政府极少利用其权威来迫使签约各方履行承诺，而且由于卡扎菲毫不隐讳自己利用调停来获取地缘战略优势的野心，因此各签约方对潜藏在利比亚外交努力背后的动机始终存有戒心。同时，乍得政府利用利比亚提供的丰厚职位来对武装叛乱分子进行招安，因而这些叛军通过和平协议大肆捞取个人回报。最后，由于利比亚的行动同其它和平方案之间缺乏协调，因此各方争权夺势，而主要的参与者得以利用矛盾坐收渔利。 卡扎菲在乍得付出的努力只局部改善了他的国际形象，另一方面却证实了利比亚外交政策自相矛盾的说法。代比在乍得奉行利用职位和金钱收买对手的策略，利比亚为其提供了财力和政治支持。这样的政策妨碍了乍得采取真正意义上的内部改革，从而错失了改革可能带来的脱离长期政治危机的机会。乍得要取得稳定必须实行结构改革，如果利比亚能为这一事业作出努力，那么不仅其调停工作能真正开花结果，而且其地区影响力能得到巩固。 2010年3月23日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report (French) Overview Since Muammar Gaddafi came to power in 1969, Libya has been Chad’s most important neighbour. During the Habré presidency, a hostile relationship was marked by military interventions, but since President Déby took office, Libya has dropped all territorial claims in the country and evolved into a regional powerbroker playing an active role in the peace negotiations between the N’Djamena regime and various insurgencies. Libya has the financial means and regional authority to bring the protagonists to the table but has done little to assist with the implementation of the agreements it chaperones. Its diplomacy has achieved brief successes by facilitating N’Djamena’s cooptation of rebels but has failed at longer-term progress toward durable stabilisation of Chad. The discrepancy between its strong pressure to get signatures on agreements and its lack of interest in implementation suggests Gaddafi’s mediations are based less on a desire to stabilise Chad than to assert his regional influence. Libya’s involvement in Chad is marked by an ambivalent and painful history. A strategy to occupy and even annex large parts of the country coupled with continuous support for regime opponents led to several military confrontations in the 1980s that Chad was able to fend off with the help of its former colonial power, France. Libya was unable to exploit the fall of Habré and rise of Déby, because these events coincided with UN Security Council sanctions that isolated and weakened it in the 1990s. Yet, Tripoli recognised the changing geopolitical environment and adapted its policy towards its southern neighbour. It was unable to radically change the course of events there, but it became a crucial player in Déby’s struggle against his armed opposition. In one way or other, Gaddafi has been involved in almost all the internal Chadian negotiations, most notably that of Syrte in 2007. Because of Chad’s internal political crisis, the deterioration of the Chad-Sudan relationship and the emergence of the Darfur crisis, Libya has been able since 2003 to solidify its position as a powerbroker. It used its links to the armed opposition on both sides of the Chad-Sudan border to become the principal mediator between the rebel factions, and it helped re-establish contact between N’Djamena and Khartoum, in the process perhaps preventing what could have been a direct war between the two regimes with disastrous regional consequences. However, Libya’s diplomatic successes in Chad have been short-lived, due to a lack of focus on longer-term reforms and its difficulty in tolerating the contributions of other regional or wider international players in its quest to dominate its neighbourhood. Tripoli rarely uses its authority to force the parties to stick to the deals it brokers, and those parties always suspect a hidden agenda behind the diplomacy, since Gaddafi makes little secret of the desire for his mediations to advance geostrategic ambitions. At the same time, the Chadian government uses Libya’s good offices to co-opt armed opponents, who in turn try to make the most personal profit out of the peace deals. Lastly, the lack of coordination between Libyan and other peace initiatives has led to a struggle for influence that has allowed the protagonists to play the several interlocutors against each other. Gaddafi’s efforts in Chad have only partially helped him to improve his image internationally and have, in fact, reinforced the view that Libyan foreign policy remains contradictory. In Chad, it provides the financial and political underpinnings for Déby’s strategy of buying off his opponents with positions and money and thus hampers any serious internal reform that might eventually lead the country out of its lengthy political crisis. If Libya were to engage politically in structural reforms necessary for the stabilisation of Chad, it would be able to capitalise on its mediation efforts while maintaining its regional influence. Nairobi/Brussels, 23 March 2010 Related Tags Chad Libya More for you Briefing / Africa Chad’s Transition: Easing Tensions Online Also available in Also available in Français Podcast / Africa After the Crackdowns, is Chad’s Transition Unravelling?