Tensions dans la région des Grands-Lacs | Turmoil in the Great Lakes
Tensions dans la région des Grands-Lacs | Turmoil in the Great Lakes
Report 175 / Africa

刚果:选举困境

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执行摘要与建议

在经历了四年的选举惰性和民主停滞之后,刚果民主共和国(金)正在匆忙准备即将迫近的第二轮民主选举。反对党试图联合起来,但迄今为止还没有成功;国际社会也不掌控选举,因为实际上2006年大选是刚果(金)的首次公开选举。刚果当局面临着两难困境:要么尊重宪法所规定的选举最后期限而组织一场糟糕的选举,要么忽略这个最后期限而陷入违宪政权的结局。无论哪种情况,政府的合法性都将受到严重质疑。要摆脱这种进退两难的困境,唯一出路是既要加快筹备工作,又要协商一个应急选举日程和政治协议以管理几乎必需的过渡期。另外,还要多注重使衡量透明度与包容性的必要措施到位,并且建立一个最终需要联合国提供重要帮助的安全体系。如果刚果(金)不采取这些措施,外国合作伙伴必须退出相关事务,以免太过于信任一个从根本上就有缺陷的进程。

即将举行的选举没有体现出民主的巩固,相反,它反映出来选举的后勤有问题,而这还是最好的情况。最坏的情况则是选举再次造成国家的不稳定,而刚果(金)尚未从长期战乱中恢复,战争只是标志着蒙博托时代的终结。总统约瑟夫·卡比拉带领的执政党甚至在选举季正式开始前就已经开始了竞选运动,而反对党则在试图寻找“获胜者”来参加总统大选 。不仅后勤方面的困难让人担忧。今年初,宪法审查取消了总统选举的决胜轮,使其成为了对现任者有利的单一的赢者全赢制;其他有利于执政党的选举法规变化也许很快就会出台,目前宪法草案仍在讨论中。在基本不安全的大气候下,卡比拉反对者的恐吓已经很明显了。尽管一些武装团体在最后时刻被整编进刚果军队,不安全因素在基伍(Kivus)仍然猖獗,而在西部则发生了一些原因不明的安全事件,其中包括一起未遂政变。

选举的技术准备工作仍然滞后。无论是新的选举法和选民名单,还是预算都没有到位。全国独立选举委员会(NIEC)比预定时间晚了一年成立,现在正在与时间赛跑。选民登记已经充满争议,支持整个选举周期的资金还不充足,而选举日程已于3月30日公布,虽然日程设置部分尊重了宪法中的最后期限,但还是存在问题。

国际社会的角色远比2006年有限。上次选举中,国际社会组织、资助和保卫了各个方面。然而,在此次大选中,国际社会仍提供40%的大选费用,给予技术支持,并在该国驻扎了大约17,000人的联合国部队。鉴于有存在不法选举、偏见和暴力的危险,国际社会不应待在幕后,而应该向刚果政治家们表明,推迟大选比举行一个糟糕的大选要好得多。

国际社会,包括通过联合国安理会和一个包容性的资助者论坛,应该对刚果当局表明需要采取选举制度的必要措施,并应用和2006年一样的标准。在这方面,加强政治接触是必需的,并且应该任命新的美国、法国和欧盟特使;联合国秘书长特别代表也将发挥同等重要的作用。为了避免陷入一个有偏见的选举进程(这种情况正如科特迪瓦近期所经历的一样,太容易变得暴力),所以技术和资金援助应该视情况而定,要对竞选自由、对政治多元化的尊重、政治暴力、国家媒体的获得、与刚果当局的对话、国家分配给全国独立选举委员会的资金情况以及民间社会团体对竞选进程自行监控的机会进行持续和认真的监控。

刚果政治家和国际社会应该预先考虑到非常有可能赶不上12月5日的宪法最后期限。与反对派协商一个过渡协议,为组织选举设立一个新的期限,并且限定政府在过渡期只管理日常事务,这些虽然都还不能保证一个自由公平的选举,但可以避免让可能违宪的选举推迟成为一场合法性危机。

金沙萨/内罗毕/布鲁塞尔, 2011年5月5日

After four years of electoral inertia and in a stalled democratic process, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is preparing its second set of democratic elections in a hurry and on a rolling calendar. Opposition parties are trying to unite, thus far without success, and the international community is not in charge, as in effect it was the first time, in 2006. The Congolese authorities face a dilemma: respect the constitutional deadline and organise botched elections, or ignore that deadline and slide into a situation of unconstitutional power. In both cases, the government’s legitimacy would be seriously questioned. The only way out of this Catch-22 situation is to both speed up preparations and negotiate a contingency electoral calendar and political agreement to manage an almost certainly necessary transition period. More attention must also be paid to putting in place essential measures for transparency and inclusiveness, as well as a security system that will ultimately require important UN help. If these steps are not taken, foreign partners should disengage lest they lend undeserved credibility to a fundamentally flawed process.

Instead of signalling consolidation of democracy, the coming elections present at best a logistical problem and at worst a new cause of destabilisation for a country that has still not recovered from the long wars that marked the end of the Mobutu era and its denouement. President Joseph Kabila’s ruling party has already launched its campaign, even before the official start of the electoral season, while the opposition is trying to find its “champion” for the presidential contest. More than logistical difficulties give reason for concern. At the start of the year, a constitutional review removed the presidential election’s run-off round, making it a single winner-takes-all round to the incumbent’s benefit, other electoral law changes favouring the ruling party may happen soon, as the draft bill is still being discussed. Within what is a general climate of insecurity, intimidation of Kabila’s opponents has already become apparent. Despite last-minute integration of some armed groups into the Congolese army, insecurity is still rife in the Kivus, while unexplained security incidents, including an attempted coup, have occurred in the west.

Technical preparations are lagging. Neither the new electoral law, the voters list, nor the budget are ready. Set up a year late, the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) is in a race against time. Registration is already controversial, funding of the electoral cycle is incomplete, and the electoral calendar published on 30 March, though it partially respects constitutional deadlines, is problematic.

The international community’s role is far more limited than in 2006, when it organised, financed and secured all aspects of the elections. However, it still provides 40 per cent of the funding, gives technical assistance and maintains about 17,000 UN troops in country. Given the risks of electoral illegitimacy, bias and violence, it should not stay in the background but instead make clear to the Congolese politicians that a postponed election would be better than a botched one.

The international community, including through the UN Security Council and an inclusive donors forum, should make clear the need for the Congolese authorities to include essential measures in the electoral system and apply the same standards as in 2006. In this respect, stepped-up political engagement is required, and new Special Envoys for the U.S., France and EU should be appointed; the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (SRSG) has an equally significant role to play. In order not to become trapped in a biased process that could all too easily become as violent as that which Côte d’Ivoire recently experienced, technical and financial assistance should be contingent on constant and precise monitoring of the freedom to campaign, respect for political pluralism, political violence, access to state media, dialogue with the Congolese authorities and state funding for the NIEC, as well as the opportunity for civil society groups to do their own monitoring of the process.

Congolese politicians and the international community should anticipate now the very real possibility that the 5 December constitutional deadline cannot be met. Negotiating a transition agreement with the opposition, setting a new deadline for organising the elections and limiting the business of government to routine matters during the transition would not yet guarantee a free and fair election, but it would avoid having a likely unconstitutional postponement of the elections become a crisis of legitimacy.

Kinshasa/Nairobi/Brussels, 5 May 2011

Video / Africa

Tensions dans la région des Grands-Lacs | Turmoil in the Great Lakes

English version below / English subtitles available

FRANÇAIS: Depuis 25 ans, l'est de la République démocratique du Congo est devenu une zone de non-droit où opère une multitude de groupes armés locaux ou originaires des pays voisins. Les civils sont les premières victimes des violences dans cette région riche en ressources naturelles. 

Depuis fin 2021, avec l'accord de Kinshasa, l’Ouganda maintient une présence militaire dans l’est de la RDC pour combattre les Forces démocratiques alliées, un groupe armé aux origines ougandaises. Cette présence n’a toutefois pas permis d’endiguer les attaques. Dans le même temps, un groupe armé congolais que l’on croyait moribond, le Mouvement du 23 Mars, a refait surface sur fond de tensions entre les pays des Grands Lacs.

Pour amorcer une sortie des cycles de violence dans la région, notre analyste pour la RDC, Onesphore Sematumba, nous explique que le gouvernement congolais devrait à la fois tenter de mettre en place une diplomatie régionale pour apaiser les tensions entre pays des Grands Lacs et se concentrer sur l'adoption de mesures visant à résoudre les causes profondes de la violence dans l’est de la RDC.

ENGLISH: For the past 25 years, the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo has been a lawless zone where a multitude of local and foreign armed groups operate. Those who bear the biggest brunt of the violence in this resource-rich region are the civilians.

Since the end of 2021, Uganda has had a military presence in the eastern DRC, as requested by Kinshasa, to fight the Allied Democratic Forces, an armed group originating from Uganda. However, this intervention has not been able to put an end to the attacks. Meanwhile, a Congolese armed group thought to be no longer active, the March 23 Movement, has resurfaced against a backdrop of tensions between the Great Lakes countries.

Our DRC analyst, Onesphore Sematumba, explains that in order to break out of this cycle of violence, the Congolese government should attempt to implement regional diplomacy to ease tensions between Great Lakes countries, while simultaneously placing greater emphasis on measures to address the root causes of the violence in eastern DRC.

CRISIS GROUP

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