刚果东部地区:ADF-NALU残留的叛乱力量
刚果东部地区:ADF-NALU残留的叛乱力量
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Supporting Dialogue and Demobilisation in the DR Congo
Supporting Dialogue and Demobilisation in the DR Congo
Briefing 93 / Africa

刚果东部地区:ADF-NALU残留的叛乱力量

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概览

民主同盟军-解放乌干达国民军(Forces démocratiques alliées-Armée nationale de libération de l’Ouganda, ADF-NALU)是刚果民主共和国东部地区存在时间最长、但最不为人所知的武装团体。它也是该地区唯一被认为是伊斯兰恐怖组织的团体。虽然ADF-NALU并不像另一个武装团体“3.23运动”(M23运动)那样是造成不稳定的一种威胁,但是自2010年以来,它设法一直坚持与刚果军队对峙的立场。ADF-NALU于1995年在刚果(金)建立,其根据地位于刚果(金)与乌干达接壤的多山地区。这个刚果-乌干达武装团体展现出了卓越的适应能力,这源于它所拥有的地缘政治位置,它在融入跨境经济方面获得的成功以及安全部队的腐败活动。因此,在考虑针对ADF-NALU采取任何进一步的军事行动前,明智的做法是,把事实和虚构因素区分开,然后寻求另一种替代军事行动的方式,这种方式既能削弱该组织的社会经济基础,同时又能向其战斗人员提供一个遣散和重返社会的方案。

ADF-NALU是由几个受到外部行为体(蒙博托·塞塞·塞科领导的扎伊尔和哈桑·图拉比领导的苏丹)支持的武装团体所组成的联盟,最初是与约韦里·穆塞韦尼总统领导的乌干达政府进行对抗。然而,尽管发源于乌干达,这个组织却从来没能在乌干达站稳脚跟,而是扎根在了刚果东部地区,尤其是在偏远的边境山区。在那里,它融入了当地社区,参与跨境贸易,并与刚果东部地区的一些武装团体以及刚果和乌干达的文职政府和武装当局都建立了关系。在过去超过15年的时间里,ADF-NALU从未赢得过一场战斗,还被打败了好几次,但是由于其地处“灰色地带”,吃了败仗的ADF-NALU战斗人员仍然能够生存下来,从来没有被瓦解。

ADF-NALU的领袖贾米尔·穆库努(Jamil Mukulu)原是基督徒,后来皈依了伊斯兰教。在他的领导下,ADF-NALU从一个原本只是刚果-乌干达的问题变成了一个区域性的问题,成为了东非地区激进伊斯兰教运动的一部分。然而,几乎没有人了解ADF-​​NALU和该地区的激进伊斯兰组织之间所谓的关系究竟如何,而ADF-​​NALU对伊斯兰教的效忠似乎也很流于表面。

针对刚果东部地区武装团体的打击还是继续停留在军事层面上,但是,明智的做法是避免再进行另一场无效的军事行动。因此,非洲大​​湖地区国际会议组织(The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region,ICGLR)、联合国、刚果(金)和乌干达应该采取一种不同的办法,力求:

  • 制定以情报为基础的战略来瓦解ADF-NALU的跨境经济和物流网络。ICGLR在2012年部署的联合核查机制(Joint Verification Mechanism)的工作人员应该与联合国专家小组合作,开展对上述网络的详细研究,并利用这项研究来制定一个合适的策略,破坏该武装团体的经济和物流基础。
     
  • 刚果(金)境内外都有ADF-NALU的支持网络,以支持武装团体为由将这些网络的领导人列入受联合国制裁的个人的名单中。在刚果和乌干达境内还有与这些网络相勾结的军事人员,两国的当局应对这些人员予以适当处置。
     
  • 部署在该地区的刚果和乌干达的官员定期轮岗。
     
  • 调查发现,一些刚果和乌干达战士并不犯有战争和反人类罪行,针对这些人员要制定一项让他们解除武装、遣散和重返社会的计划。联和国组织刚果民主共和国特派团(MONUSCO)应该呼吁捐助者资助这一针对刚果的ADF-NALU战士的项目。
     
  • 授权塞伦盖蒂(Erengeti)和奥伊查(Oïcha)地区的村民恢复被军事当局中止的农场工作。

内罗毕⁄布鲁塞尔,2012年12月19日

I. Overview

The Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (Forces démocratiques alliées-Armée nationale de libération de l’Ouganda, ADF-Nalu) is one of the oldest but least known armed groups in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the only one in the area to be considered an east African Islamist terrorist organisation. Although it does not represent the same destabilising threat as the 23 March Movement (M23), it has managed to fend off the Congolese army since 2010. Created in the DRC in 1995 and located in the mountainous DRC-Uganda border area, this Congolese-Ugandan armed group has shown remarkable resilience because of its geostrategic position, its successful integration into the cross-border economy and corruption in the security forces. Before countenancing any further military intervention against the ADF-Nalu, it would be wise to separate legend from fact and weaken its socio-economic means of support while at the same time offering a demobilisation and reintegration program to its combatants. 

An alliance of several armed groups supported by external actors (Mobutu Sese Seko’s Zaire and Hassan al-Turabi’s Sudan), the ADF-Nalu fought the Ugandan government led by Yoweri Museveni, but never managed to gain a foothold in that country. A Ugandan movement in origin, it put down roots in eastern Congo, especially in the remote mountainous border areas. It became integrated into local communities, participated in cross-border trade and established relations with various armed groups in eastern Congo and with Congolese and Ugandan civilian and military authorities. The way the ADF-Nalu blended into this grey area allowed the group to survive without winning a battle for more than fifteen years and to resist several attempts to neutralise it. 

The efforts of its leader, Jamil Mukulu, a Christian converted to Islam, have turned the ADF-Nalu from a purely Congolese-Ugandan problem into a regional problem, because of the links it has formed with radical east African Islamist groups. However, little is known about these links and allegations of the groups’ allegiance to Islamism seem rather superficial.

The fight against armed groups in eastern Congo continues to be viewed through a military lens, but it would be wise to avoid another ineffective military operation. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the UN, the DRC and Uganda should adopt a different approach that seeks to:

  • Formulate an intelligence-based strategy to neutralise the ADF-Nalu’s cross-border economic and logistical networks. The officers of the Joint Verification Mechanism deployed by the ICGLR in 2012 should work with the UN group of experts to produce a detailed study of these networks and use it to define an appropriate strategy for undermining the armed group’s economic and logistical base. 
     
  • Include the leaders of ADF-Nalu’s support networks, inside and outside the DRC, on the list of individuals subject to UN sanctions for their support of armed groups. Congolese and Ugandan military personnel colluding with these networks should be punished by the authorities of their country.
     
  • Rotate on a regular basis Congolese and Ugandan officers deployed in this region.
     
  • Introduce a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) program for Congolese and Ugandan combatants who after investigation are found not to be responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity. MONUSCO should appeal to donors to fund the program for Congolese ADF-Nalu combatants. 
     
  • Authorise villagers in the Erengeti and Oïcha areas to resume work on their farms, which was suspended by the military authorities.

Nairobi/Brussels, 19 December 2012

Commentary / Africa

Supporting Dialogue and Demobilisation in the DR Congo

Rising violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has the Great Lakes region on edge. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2022 – Autumn Update, Crisis Group explains what the EU and its member states can do to help bring stability to the area.

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