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实现和平与安全架构(I):中非

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执行摘要与建议

中非的政治与安全合作亟需重振。十多年前, 非盟(AU)责成中非国家经济共同体(ECCAS)向和平与安全架构注入活力。中非经共体(ECCAS)成员国签署了有关条约和协议,但这一多国组织一直在艰难地塑造和实施区域政策。为确保这一冲突易发地区更加的政治一体化,中非国家需要重振中非经共体,对其进行改革并就清晰的安全工作重点进行决策。外国合作伙伴应把对中非经共体的支持与该组织自己的需要、吸收能力和目标协调一致。

20世纪90年代冲突的升级令中非深陷战火之中,也使得对区域政治与安全响应的需要极其迫切。有着非盟和欧盟的双重支持,中非经共体致力于预防、管控和解决地区冲突。可惜,与之前促进经济一体化的努力一样,政治与安全方面的合作也没有产生预期结果。

从纸面上看,中非经共体做得不错。中非国家签署了互助条约和协议,建立了中非和平与安全理事会(Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Afrique centrale, COPAX)。各国还共同设立了区域总参谋部(Etat-major régional, EMR),开展多国军事演习并在中非共和国建立了巩固和平代表团(Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique, MICOPAX)。但事实上,中非地区的领导层一直不愿创建一个对于他们在安全问题上的合作方式有所限制的机构并对其投资。他们口头上对区域和平与安全架构表示支持,但事实上对中非经共体并不上心,更倾向于诉诸之前可信的双边关系以缓解安全关切,因此形成了令人困惑的伙伴关系网。

中非经共体存在着严重的内部管理问题。组织内部问题的决策高度集中,并且必须经由所有成员国达成共识后才能做出。这并没有在区域行为体中间产生凝聚力,而是意味着成员国有着不同意见的敏感问题被规避了。并且,中非经共体还是一个尚在建设中的组织,人力资源管理,如同这一组织的财政依赖于外部支持者一样,是一个持久性问题。

只有成员国做出决定性的政治承诺才能为中非经共体注入新的生机。但国家首脑峰会的一拖再拖,以及成员国未能向在经共体内部的一些机构中委任代表,都揭示了中非地区国家对于该组织的宗旨缺乏兴趣。成员之间由于过去的暴力冲突而互不信任,区域领导层的缺失也使得中非经共体的效用大打折扣。结果,最严重的安全问题都在中非经共体框架外部解决,中非的和平与安全架构要从规划成为现实仍有困难。

中非地区各国政府应该紧急深化他们对中非经共体架构和项目的政治承诺,理清共同的工作重点。他们必须决定自己是否真正愿意成为中非经共体的成员。如果是,他们就应该通过采取一些关键步骤证明自己的意愿:尊重对组织的财政义务;任命自己在组织中的代表;尽快组织一次峰会。改革议程应该侧重决策体系,保证利伯维尔秘书处的平稳运行和民间社会的更多参与。安全工作的重点应该是力求切实的实施和具体成果。

外国合作伙伴应该建立有效协作,根据中非经共体的和平与安全工作重点提供支持,并根据经共体的吸收能力做出调整。首要目标是巩固秘书处,使其能够实施各项方案,避免超支和重复的努力。

在中非经共体成员国之间,不信任、竞争以及毫无掩饰的敌意交织存在。在未来几年中,最根本的挑战就是为这一组织赋予政治意义。如果这种零和地缘政治继续下去,中非国家将继续把自己狭隘的利益置于和平与安全架构项目之上。政治和安全一体化将陷入重蹈经济合作失败的悲剧道路的危险。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2011年11月7日

Executive Summary

Political and security cooperation in Central Africa is in urgent need of revival. More than a decade ago, the African Union (AU) tasked the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to breath life into its peace and security architecture. ECCAS member states signed relevant treaties and protocols, but the multinational body has struggled to shape and implement a regional policy. To ensure this conflict-prone region moves toward greater political integration, Central African states need to reinvigorate ECCAS, reform it and decide on clear security priorities. Foreign partners should coordinate their support to the organisation in line with its needs, absorption capacity and objectives.

The spiral of conflict that set Central Africa on fire in the 1990s made painfully clear the need for a regional political and security response. With the double blessing of the AU and the European Union (EU), ECCAS committed to prevent, manage and resolve conflict in the region. Unfortunately, like previous efforts to promote economic integration, political and security cooperation has not produced the hoped-for results.

On paper, ECCAS looks good. Central African states signed a mutual assistance pact and a protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council for Central Africa (Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Afrique centrale, COPAX). They also set up a Regional Staff Headquarters (Etat-major régional, EMR) that runs multinational military training exercises and the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African Republic (Mission de consolidation de la paix en Centrafrique, MICOPAX). But in reality, regional leaders have been reluctant to create and invest in an institution that constrains the way they cooperate in security matters. They voice support to a regional peace and security architecture, but half-heartedly commit to ECCAS while turning more readily to old and trusted bilateral relations to mitigate their security concerns, thus generating a confused web of partnerships.

ECCAS suffers from serious internal governance problems. Decisions on in-house issues are highly centralised and have to be made by consensus among member states. Instead of generating cohesion among regional actors, this means sensitive issues on which member states differ are avoided. It is also an institution still under construction. Human resource management is a constant problem, as is the body’s financial dependence on outside backers.

Only decisive political commitment by its members can breathe new life into ECCAS. But the successive postponement of the heads of state summit and the failure of members to appoint representatives in some of its organs reveal a lack of interest in the organisation’s purpose. Members’ distrust of each other, ingrained by a violent past, and the absence of regional leadership also drain ECCAS of its usefulness. As a result, the most serious security problems are dealt with outside the ECCAS framework, and Central Africa’s peace and security architecture has difficulty leaving the drawing board.

The region’s governments should urgently deepen their political commitment to ECCAS’s structures and projects and sort out their common priorities. They must decide if they really want to be members of ECCAS. If so, they should prove their will by undertaking several crucial steps: respect their financial obligations to the organisation; name their representatives to it; and organise a summit as soon as possible. A reform agenda should focus on the decision-making system, ensuring smooth running of the secretariat in Libreville and greater involvement of civil society. Security priorities should seek practical implementation and concrete results.

Foreign partners should establish effective coordination, tailor their support to ECCAS’s peace and security priorities and adjust it to the organisation’s absorption capacity. The first major goal is to strengthen the secretariat so it can implement its programs and avoid overspending and duplicating efforts.

In the next few years, the fundamental challenge is to give political meaning to an organisation whose members exist in a tangle of mistrust, rivalries and thinly veiled hostility. If this zero-sum geopolitics endures, Central African countries will continue to put their own narrow interests above the project of peace and security architecture. Political and security integration would then risk following in the tragic footsteps of economic cooperation.

 Nairobi/Brussels, 7 November 2011

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