The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): A Dangerous Stalemate
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): A Dangerous Stalemate
Report 182 / Africa

圣灵抵抗军:穷途末路?

执行摘要

圣灵抵抗军(LRA)对于三个中非国家的平民来说仍旧是一个致命威胁。2008年,在就和平解决长达三十年之久的叛乱停火并进行谈判失败之后,乌干达军队搞砸了对圣灵抵抗军的首次袭击。自此之后的三年,再没有全心全意的针对圣灵抵抗军的军事行动,也未能阻止这支小型但极其残忍的部队杀害2400多名平民,绑架3400多人,以及致使44万人逃离家园。2010年,总统穆塞韦尼撤出了其中大概一半的军力,转而追求更具政治意义的目标。刚果的不信任阻碍了当前的军事行动,非盟(AU)的提案启动缓慢。虽然最后还有一个击败圣灵抵抗军的机会,但强有力的军事行动和外交都必不可少。乌干达需要从新的、可能是暂时的美国参与中获益,重振军事进攻;华盛顿则需要向地方领导者施压,要求进行合作;最重要的是,非盟必须迅速采取行动,履行其作为大陆安全保障者所肩负的职责。只要非盟做出表率,乌干达和美国就应该加入非盟的动议,共同行动。

圣灵抵抗军最初是乌干达北部的一支叛军,但现在已成为一支非常危险的跨国犯罪和恐怖部队。乌干达军队在2008年12月试图通过捣毁其在东北部刚果民主共和国(DRC)的营地来粉碎圣灵抵抗军,但这一尝试是错误的。圣灵抵抗军首领约瑟夫·科尼逃脱并迅速组织报复,导致上百平民在之后数月中被杀。由美国支持的“雷电行动”演变成了消耗战,因为乌干达军队开始在茂密的森林中追击小型、分散并高度灵活的圣灵抵抗军部队,跟随他们辗转南苏丹和中非共和国(CAR)。在早期这一行动取得了一些胜利,但在2010年年中失去动力,使得圣灵抵抗军在三国交界的边境地区继续掠夺村庄,强虏数百人成为俘虏和新兵。正如联合国安理会在2011年11月14日达成的,这一状况必须得到制止。

军事失败的根源在于政治方面的原因。穆塞韦尼削减了针对圣灵抵抗军的军事行动,转而把资源投入到他认为可以在国际和国内为他带来更大政治利益的领域。因为圣灵抵抗军多年来不能在乌干达境内活动,并且不再威害其安全,非常少的乌干达反对派政治家或社区领袖要求消灭抵抗军。在刚果(金)追捕抵抗军的努力由于该国拒绝合作和拒绝确保军队能够进入受圣灵抵抗军影响的地区而备受阻挠。乌干达在20世纪90年代晚期曾侵略刚果(金)并掠夺其资源,导致刚果(金)总统卡比拉长久以来对乌干达并不信任。随着预计仍将于2011年底举行的刚果选举日渐迫近,刚果军队已经要求乌干达军队撤出,并在等待官方决定期间,禁止他们离开营地。大多数圣灵抵抗军高级将领和战士现在在中非共和国,但因为乌干达的军队在刚果(金)的活动受到限制,他们可以随时返回刚果(金)并寻求安全避风港。中非共和国总统博齐泽不信任乌干达军队,嫉妒其受到美国支持,已经下令乌干达军队从其钻石产区撤出,并可能进一步妨碍军事行动,除非他自己的军队也能从中受益。

对于圣灵抵抗军问题,考虑到多年的朱巴进程失败,并且无论是穆塞韦尼或特别是科尼在三年多的战斗之后已经没有兴趣再去重复和谈之路,所以通过谈判解决问题的前景渺茫。反而非盟在来自一些成员国和美国的压力之下,在2010年底宣布它将授权一个针对圣灵抵抗军的强硬军事行动,并协调地区努力。然而,一年已经过去,由于非盟未能调和与主要成员国和捐助者以及他们各方之间的差异,计划已经失败了。乌干达和三个直接受到影响的国家希望,非盟的提案能够为西方向他们的部队资助更多资金敞开大门,但却对政治指导或与平民有关的方案毫无兴趣。美国想让非盟的主要捐助者欧盟(EU)分摊它的一些负担。但是,欧盟更倾向于让非盟在政治上有所行动,并不愿意资助军队。乌干达拒绝向非洲区域组织让步自己的任何军事和政治自由。

由于对雷电行动没有成效倍感挫折,美国在10月14日宣布将部署约100支部队协助乌干达军队——主要驻扎在坎帕拉,其余在现场提供咨询。这一行动是在更大范围上扩大其在政治和军事上参与打击圣灵抵抗军的一部分。美国还提出将训练更多刚果士兵,并向中非共和国军队提供设备,为行动赢得政治空间。现场顾问应该可以提高乌干达军队的表现。然而,离下次总统选举只有一年时间的奥巴马政府在试探美国对于进行其它海外军事行动的容忍度方面极为谨慎,并已经明确表示,这次军队部署将是短期的。

乌干达军队虽然有美国顾问的帮助,但是要想击败圣灵抵抗军,这支部队仍存在缺陷和不确定性。由于其历来滥用职权并未能保护平民,受到圣灵抵抗军影响的国家的政府和人民对乌干达军队缺乏信任。抵抗军首领科尼对其利益不再构成直接威胁,这也引起了人们怀疑坎帕拉是否有政治意愿将打击圣灵抵抗军的军事行动贯彻到底。但是乌干达军队也是必不可少的,因为没有其他组织准备派遣强劲的作战部队去完成这个使命。美国在军事和政治上的支持是重要但可能是短暂的。非盟的资金和平民方案有益但却不能阻止圣灵抵抗军的暴力。

乌干达现在有美国的建议和支持,应该因此争分夺秒地对圣灵抵抗军重新发动袭击,如有可能,要在抵抗军大部分高级将领和战士仍在中非共和国,还未返回作战环境更受限制的刚果(金)之前就发动袭击。美国在向乌干达军队施压的建议中应该包括的一个重要部分就是需要优先保护平民,提供接触人道主义机构的途径,接受对于其军事行动的严格问责。

同时,如果这一新行动要成功,非盟必须打破政治僵局并将方案落实到实际行动中。将非盟纳入打击圣灵抵抗军的阵营,通过给予正在进行的行动以明确的全大陆合法性, 对于重整乌干达、刚果(金)、中非共和国和南苏丹的政治承诺是至关重要的。提案的中心要素应该是任命一位特使以平缓金沙萨和坎帕拉之间的关系,并对非盟规划者称之为区域干预部队(RIF)的跨国的多维军事任务进行授权。这将可能只包括那些参与反对圣灵抵抗军的部队派遣国,主要是乌干达,但应为乌干达和统领军队引入一个新的共同的作战和法律框架,创立新的军事架构以加强双方协调。一旦区域干预部队设立,乌干达和统领军队反对圣灵抵抗军的力量应被纳入旗下。

非盟规划者应该与美国密切合作,从一开始就保证非洲组织的提案将华盛顿需要对乌干达军队采取的双边施压的原则优先化 。同时,捐助国,特别是欧盟,应该对补充性文职工作也给以资助,特别是可以吸引圣灵抵抗军战士离开其组织的工作。只有这样的多维度的方法有可能为三国交界的边境地区带来和平,并开始缓慢地抚平长久以来圣灵抵抗军噩梦所造成物质和社会创伤。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2011年11月17日

Executive Summary

The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remains a deadly threat to civilians in three Central African states. After a ceasefire and negotiations for peaceful settlement of the generation-long insurgency broke down in 2008, Uganda’s army botched an initial assault. In three years since, half-hearted operations have failed to stop the small, brutally effective band from killing more than 2,400 civilians, abducting more than 3,400 and causing 440,000 to flee. In 2010 President Museveni withdrew about half the troops to pursue more politically rewarding goals. Congolese mistrust hampers current operations, and an African Union (AU) initiative has been slow to start. While there is at last a chance to defeat the LRA, both robust military action and vigorous diplomacy is required. Uganda needs to take advantage of new, perhaps brief, U.S. engagement by reinvigorating the military offensive; Washington needs to press regional leaders for cooperation; above all, the AU must act promptly to live up to its responsibilities as guarantor of continental security. When it does, Uganda and the U.S. should fold their efforts into the AU initiative.

The Ugandan army’s attempt in December 2008 to crush the LRA, originally an insurgency in northern Uganda but now a deadly, multinational criminal and terror band, by destroying its camps in north-eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) went badly wrong. Joseph Kony, the group’s leader, escaped and quickly organised reprisals that left hundreds of civilians dead in the following months. The U.S.-backed Operation Lightning Thunder became a campaign of attrition, as the Ugandan army began hunting small, scattered and highly mobile groups of fighters in thick forest. It followed them into South Sudan and the Central African Republic (CAR) and scored some early successes, but the operation lost steam in mid-2010, allowing the LRA to go on plundering villages and seizing hundreds of captives and new recruits in the tri-border area. As the UN Security Council agreed on 14 November 2011, this must stop.

The reasons for military failure are at root political. Museveni scaled down the operation to pursue other ventures he felt would win him greater political capital at home and abroad. Since the LRA has not been able to operate within Uganda for years and no longer endangers its security, few opposition politicians or community leaders there demand its defeat. Efforts to pursue it in the DRC are dogged by the host’s refusal to cooperate and grant access to LRA-affected areas. Uganda invaded in the late 1990s, plundered DRC resources and earned President Kabila’s lasting mistrust. As Congolese elections, still scheduled for late 2011, draw near, the army has demanded the Ugandans pull out and, while waiting for the official decision, forbidden them to leave camp. Most LRA senior commanders and fighters are now in the CAR but could return to the DRC at any time and, with the Ugandans restrained, find safe haven. CAR President Bozizé distrusts Uganda’s army, envies its U.S. support, has ordered it to withdraw from diamond areas and could hamper operations further unless satisfied his own army is benefiting.

There is no prospect of a negotiated end to the LRA problem, given the collapse of the multi-year Juba process and the lack of any apparent interest on the part of either Museveni or, especially, Kony to go that route again after three more years of fighting. Instead, the AU, under pressure from some member states and the U.S., announced in late 2010 that it would authorise a forceful mission against the LRA and coordinate regional efforts. A year and counting, however, planning has foundered over its inability to reconcile differences with and between key member states and donors. Uganda and the three directly affected countries hoped the AU initiative would open the door to more Western funding for their armies but are little interested in political guidance or civilian programs. The U.S. wanted the European Union (EU), the AU’s main donor, to share some of its burdens. However, the EU prefers the AU to act politically and is reluctant to finance the armies. Uganda resists ceding any of its military and policy freedom to the African regional body.

Frustrated with the ineffectiveness of Operation Lightning Thunder, the U.S. announced on 14 October that it would deploy about 100 troops to assist the Ugandan army – a majority to stay in Kampala, the rest to advise in the field. The move is part of a broader ramping up of its political and military engagement against the LRA. It has also offered to train more Congolese soldiers and has given equipment to the CAR army in order to win the operation political space. The few score field advisers should be able to improve the Ugandans’ performance. However, the Obama administration, a year from its own elections, is cautious about testing U.S. tolerance of another overseas military commitment. The deployment, it has made clear, will be short term.

The Ugandan army, even with U.S. advisers, is a flawed and uncertain instrument for defeating the LRA. Due to its record of abuses and failures to protect civilians, the governments and populations of the LRA-affected countries distrust it. That Kony no longer presents a direct threat to its interests leaves room for scepticism about Kampala’s political will to see the military job through to the end. But the Ugandan army is also essential, because no one else is prepared to send competent combat troops to do the job. U.S. support, both military and political, is important but may be short-lived. AU money and civilian programs are helpful but cannot stop LRA violence.

Uganda, with U.S. advice and support, should, therefore, lose no time in launching a reinvigorated attack on the LRA, if possible while most of the group’s senior commanders and fighters are still in the CAR and before they can return to the DRC’s more restrictive operational environment. A key part of the advice the U.S. should press on the Ugandan army is the need to prioritise protecting civilians, provide access to humanitarian agencies and accept stricter accountability for its actions.

At the same time, if this new activism is to succeed, the AU must break its political deadlock and put its initiative in play. Adding the AU to the equation is vital to rally the political commitment of Uganda, the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan by giving the undertaking clear continent-wide legitimacy. The central elements of the initiative should be appointment of a special envoy to smooth relations between Kinshasa and Kampala and authorisation of a multinational and multi-dimensional mission – what AU planners call the Regional Intervention Force (RIF). This will likely involve only those troop contributors presently engaged against the LRA, primarily the Ugandans, but should introduce a new, common operational and legal framework for the Ugandan and host armies and create new military structures to improve coordination between them. Once the RIF exists, their anti-LRA efforts should be placed under its umbrella.

The AU planners should work closely with the U.S. to ensure that from the start the African organisation’s initiative prioritises the same principles as Washington needs to press bilaterally on the Ugandan army. Donors, particularly the EU, should meanwhile fund complementary civilian work, especially to entice LRA fighters to leave the bush. Only such a multi-dimensional approach is likely to bring peace to the tri-border area and begin the slow task of healing the physical and social wounds the long LRA nightmare has inflicted.

Nairobi/Brussels, 17 November 2011

 

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