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Report 197 / Africa

肯尼亚2013年选举

执行摘要

肯尼亚今年的选举应该翻开新的一页,不再发生像五年前那样的流血事件,但发生政治暴力的风险仍然高得令人无法接受。出台新宪法,成立新的选举委员会并对司法体系进行改革应该会对此有所帮助。目前投票时间定在2013年3月4日,但是,无论是在全国层面还是在47个新成立的县里,这次投票仍然将会是一场高风险的权力竞争。国际刑事法院(International Criminal Court,ICC)即将对4名肯尼亚人进行审判,他们被控参与了2007-2008年大选后的暴力事件。这次审判看起来会影响选举的格局。地方上发生暴力事件的可能性特别高。政治家们必须停止以下行为:无视规则,利用人民的不满情绪,以及通过民族竞选煽动分裂。肯尼亚的机构面临着强大的压力,但是必须采取大胆的行动来遏制这些政治家。商业领袖、宗教领袖和公民社会应该要求开展自由和公平的投票。地区合作伙伴和国际性的合作伙伴也应当要求开展自由和公平的投票,并明确指出那些通过使用或煽动暴力来危害国家和地区稳定的人将被追究责任。

为了解决2007年有缺陷的投票和随后产生的暴力问题,肯尼亚开展了许多改革。2010年8月的和平公投后肯尼亚通过了一部新宪法,旨在通过制约行政权力来巩固民主和缓和总统竞选的零和竞争。新的投票规则要求候选人赢得超过半数的选票并享有更广泛的地域支持才能当选总统。权力被下放给47个县,每个县将选举出1名县长,1名参议员和地方议会。尽管最近出了一些事故,但是新的独立选举和边界委员会(Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission,IEBC)仍然享有公众的信任。司法改革——包括任命1名受人尊敬的新的首席法官——也是个好兆头,预示着肯尼亚会对选举舞弊和选举纠纷作出更强有力的回应。

然而,这些新的机构面临着艰巨的任务。ICC的诉讼正在影响政治联盟和选举。面临审判的这4个人否认指控,坚持自己是无辜的。虽然这些审判旨在削弱政治精英们长期享有的有罪不罚现象,并可能会阻止流血事件,但是它们也极大地增加了风险。最有权力的两名被告——乌胡鲁·肯雅塔(Uhuru Kenyatta)和威廉·鲁托(William Ruto)看来会联合参加竞选(肯雅塔竞选总统,而鲁托竞选副总统)。这两人都已经将ICC的案子政治化,加深了种族的两极分化。他们还指责其最强劲的竞争对手总理拉伊拉·奥廷加(Raila Odinga)与外国人合谋来对付他们。

肯雅塔-鲁托联盟将会是一个强势的竞选联盟。两人都意识到了肯尼亚人民想结束有罪不罚的现象,都承诺说即使赢得竞选,也要遵守ICC的判决。然而,无论他们案件的结果如何,一位面临ICC漫长的审判的总统可能会给改革和对外关系带来极大的破坏性影响,对此肯雅塔的支持者们应该进行慎重考虑。目前,肯雅塔和鲁托的竞选资格仍然存在疑问;一个质疑他们是否遵守了新宪法对政府官员诚信的要求的案件正由某个高级法院受理,并有可能上诉至最高法院。提交候选文件的截止日期是1月30日,如果法院在这个日期之后判决肯雅塔和鲁托没有资格参加竞选的话,他们的支持者将无法再另行选择其他候选人,这可能会导致强烈抗议,甚至引发冲突。这的确是一个异常紧张的政治案件,无论案件朝哪个方向发展,处理这种案件的最终结果都很可能存在争议性。如有可能,应该提前宣布做出判决的日期,这样的话安全机构和其他组织可以做好相应的准备。

其它迹象也令人不安。政党和政客肆意蔑视新规。IEBC在选民登记用品的采购上有贻误,导致之前人们对它怀有的信心有所降低,这也表明,随着选举的临近,它要竭力抵御巨大的压力。迟迟才开始的选举登记使得选举时间表变得异常紧迫,任何错误都将加剧紧张局势。IEBC必须与政党和其他利益相关者展开透明的合作,明确时间表并对其进行定期检查,以避免任何进一步的——同时也是高风险的——延迟。

对选民的教育将是至关重要的。这是根据2010年宪法举行的第一次大选,新的投票规则比起以前要复杂得多(每个选民要投6次票)。将混淆和误解控制在有限的程度有助于减少纠纷和与选举有关的冲突。同样重要的是,IEBC应向公民观察员和其他公民社会团体提供充分的参与渠道和信息。他们必须能够正确规划自己的部署,畅通无阻地参与选举过程的每个部分,尤其是对选举结果的统计。在加强IEBC委员们抵御政治干预的能力方面,这些团体也能成为有用的盟友。

不安全性也带来了巨大的挑战。2007-2008年暴力冲突背后有很多结构性的驱动因素--对种族分化的继续依赖,对土地和资源的竞争,国内流离失所者的重新安置,贫穷,以及青年失业。尽管经历了改革,这些问题仍然没有得到解决,并且还可能被政客为了一己之私而加以利用,来获取民众的支持。许多因动荡而逃离家园的人仍然流离失所。土地纠纷是地方紧张局势不断的源头。青年的失业率仍然很高,再加之贫困和不平等,意味着犯罪集团和民兵组织可以获得源源不断的兵源。同过去一样,这些犯罪集团和民兵组织可以被动员起来,威慑反对派及其支持者或者对选举结果发起抗议。归咎于极端主义组织“青年党”(Al-Shabaab movement)的袭击和关于土地的冲突可以遮盖政治暴力。同时,警察方面的改革滞后,安全部队看起来还没有做足准备来为选举提供安保。经验丰富的大卫·基迈若(David Kimaiyo)已被任命为警察总检察长,但是对大卫的任命是一个迟来的决定,这意味着对安全机构进行大刀阔斧改革的时间所剩无几。跨机构的安全规划也已滞后,必须要完成该规划并付诸实施。

肯雅塔和鲁托以及其他政要组成了联盟,随着这个联盟的形成,民族竞选运动和政治选票交易方面的分歧日益加深。两个主要竞选团体是副总理肯雅塔和前内阁部长鲁托的组合,以及总理奥廷加和副总统卡隆佐·穆西约卡(Kalonzo Musyoka)的组合。任何一方输掉这场势均力敌但被认为存在缺陷的竞选,甚至是竞选早期出现落后迹象,他们的支持者会如何应对落选结果或这种落后迹象还不清楚。国际合作伙伴,包括在经济上仰仗和平过渡的地区邻国,应该对任何干扰或暴力的迹象进行监测,并且迅速介入阻止其发生。分权尽管有很多好处,但是随着各团体之间对县级控制的权力和资源的竞争愈演愈烈,新的冲突动态也出现了。

所有这些挑战都是可以克服的,尤其是考虑到多数人都怀揣着要避免重蹈2007-2008年覆辙的坚定决心。但是解决这些问题需要肯尼亚各机构及其伙伴采取协调一致的行动,并且——也是最重要的一点,需要肯尼亚领导人发出明确的信号——人们看到的是这些领导人把对权力的追求放在了优先考虑的位置。肯尼亚人民应该得到更好的结果。为了把五年前的恐怖抛在身后,他们理应得到这次机会,在没有恐惧的情况下进行投票,选举出致力于改革并做好准备为整个社会而不是社会精英分子的狭隘利益所服务的领导人。

内罗毕⁄布鲁塞尔,2013年1月17日

Security officers and residents assess the damage at Arabia Boys Secondary School after suspected al Shabaab militants threw an explosive device at a teacher's house in Mandera county, Kenya, October 10, 2018. REUTERS/Stringer
Briefing 159 / Africa

How to Shield Education from Al-Shabaab in Kenya’s North East

Al-Shabaab is targeting teachers in order to expel those it views as outsiders from majority-Muslim north-eastern Kenya. The government’s response – to evacuate non-native tutors – has shuttered the area’s schools. Nairobi should supply funds to hire local educators, while it works to restore security.

What’s new? Jihadists have repeatedly attacked schools in north-eastern Kenya in the last eighteen months. In response, the government has shuttered many schools and pulled most teachers out of a long-neglected region that is one of Al-Shabaab’s main recruiting centres outside Somalia.

Why does it matter? The education crisis adds to an already existing sense of marginalisation in north-eastern Kenya. Thousands of out-of-school youngsters could constitute an attractive pool of recruits for Al-Shabaab, which is engaged in a long-term campaign to deepen its foothold in the region.

What should be done? The Kenyan government should afford the north east’s residents, including police reservists, a greater role in tackling militancy and revive community-centred efforts that to some degree succeeded in rolling back Al-Shabaab in the past. It should also restore learning by providing stopgap funding so local administrations can hire replacement teachers.

I. Overview

Kenya’s 2011 deployment of troops to fight Al-Shabaab’s insurgency in Somalia has, over the years, eroded security at home. In 2013 and 2019, Al-Shabaab attacked Nairobi, respectively hitting a shopping mall and a luxury hotel, and exposing the vulnerability of the capital’s soft targets. But the group’s activities in the long-neglected north east are of greatest concern to Kenyan officials today. In January 2020, Al-Shabaab staged a major assault on a joint U.S.-Kenyan military base near the Somali border, exhibiting its operational prowess in the area. It has also pursued a campaign of killing teachers, in effect stripping the north east’s children of the chance to get a modern education. In response, the authorities have evacuated all non-native teachers from the north east. While understandable, given the peril these teachers faced, the policy has brought the school system to a halt and may play into Al-Shabaab’s hands by further alienating an already disaffected population. The government should work with local residents to restore security and take steps to preserve education for young people in the north east.

II. Al-Shabaab Attacks and an Education Crisis

North-eastern Kenya has proven fertile ground for Al-Shabaab, which has vowed revenge against the government ever since Nairobi sent troops to Somalia in 2011.[fn]Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°102, Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home, 25 September 2014. See also Crisis Group Africa Report N°265, Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa, 21 September 2018.Hide Footnote The group’s leaders have long eyed the area, one of the country’s poorest and where the ethnic Somali population has for years complained of mistreatment by the state, as a target for infiltration.[fn]Abdullahi Abdille, “The Hidden Cost of Al-Shabaab’s Campaign in North-eastern Kenya”, Crisis Group Commentary, 4 April 2019.Hide Footnote Security sources in Kenya say the militants have built a loyal intelligence network in the region, which shares a 700km largely unmanned border with southern Somalia, itself under partial Al-Shabaab control.[fn]Crisis Group interview, security official, Garissa, 28 February 2020.Hide Footnote

As Al-Shabaab has stepped up its activities in Kenya, it has often been with the idea of fomenting sectarian strife. In 2014, gunmen belonging to the group killed more than 50 civilians in the mainly Christian town of Mpeketoni. After the incident, an Al-Shabaab spokesman, Sheikh Mohammed Dulyadeyn, himself a Kenyan national, said “Kenya might also be divided along Christian and Muslim lines”.[fn]Crisis Group Briefing, Kenya: Al-Shabaab – Closer to Home, op. cit. According to the most recent data, some 84.5 per cent of Kenya’s population is Christian, whereas Muslims, concentrated along the coast and in the north east, represent approximately 10.8 per cent. See “2019 Kenya Population and Housing Census, Volume IV: Distribution of Population by Socio-Economic Characteristics”, Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, December 2019.Hide Footnote In 2015, the jihadists took credit for killing 148 more people on a college campus in Garissa, the biggest town in the north east. Attackers spared Muslim students, training their sights on Christians.

The insecurity has hit the education sector hard since 2018, when Al-Shabaab began attacking schools and killing teachers.

After a lull, the last eighteen months have seen an uptick in Al-Shabaab violence. Militants have combined complex, headline-grabbing attacks with a grinding war of attrition on lower-profile targets, including police stations and communications masts. In 2019, according to a local research firm’s tally, Al-Shabaab conducted 34 attacks in Kenya with over half of them concentrated in the three north-eastern counties: Mandera, Wajir and Garissa.[fn]“Trends of Violent Extremist Attacks and Arrests in Kenya, January 2019-December 2019”, Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, January 2020.Hide Footnote At least 83 people were killed in these assaults. In January 2020, militants stormed the Manda Bay base in Lamu, killing a U.S. soldier and two U.S. military contractors, in what was the first Al-Shabaab attack on a military facility outside Somalia. The assault’s spectacular nature, including the destruction of a U.S. surveillance plane as it was taking off, drew considerable attention. Attacks have not let up since then, not even after the COVID-19 pandemic arrived in March.[fn]See “Civilians in Kenya’s northeast targeted by both jihadists and the state”, The New Humanitarian, 16 June 2020.Hide Footnote

The insecurity has hit the education sector hard since 2018, when Al-Shabaab began attacking schools and killing teachers, many of whom started fleeing the region that year.[fn]Abdille, “The Hidden Cost of Al-Shabaab’s Campaign in North-eastern Kenya”, op. cit.Hide Footnote Most teachers hail from elsewhere in Kenya. They also are often Christians. Al-Shabaab, which seeks to force all non-Muslims out of the north east, thus considers them outsiders. Teachers are also easy targets as they live in the places where schools are located, unlike other non-local officials and businesspeople who reside in better secured towns. Al-Shabaab has killed many public servants besides teachers, including engineers and security personnel, and in 2015 it launched a string of attacks on non-local casual labourers at construction sites, forcing many of them to flee.[fn]Ibid. See also “Kenyan quarry workers targeted in deadly attack”, France 24, 7 July 2015.Hide Footnote

A pair of legal suits lodged in response to the crisis in the education sector illustrate the problem authorities face in fashioning a response. Soon after these attacks started, the Kenya National Union of Teachers and the Kenya Human Rights Commission initiated court proceedings to stop the state from posting non-local teachers to the north east until it could restore security.[fn]“Petition 104 of 2018” filed with the Kenyan Employment and Labour Relations Court of Nairobi, 15 October 2018.Hide Footnote With the court case under way, Nairobi nonetheless decided in January to officially order all non-native tutors out of the region in response to increasing attacks. In turn, civil society organisations brought legal action against the authorities for removing the teachers, citing the harm it could do to the region’s children. George Kegoro, head of the human rights commission, emphasised the dilemma: “We are left to choose between the lives of teachers and the education of children. As long as security issues in the north east are not resolved, we cannot force teachers to go there and die”.[fn]Crisis Group telephone interview, George Kegoro, executive director of the Kenya Human Rights Commission, 12 June 2020.Hide Footnote Both cases are still in the courts.

The immediate crisis triggered by the decision to transfer thousands of teachers was compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the decision’s aftermath, hundreds of schools across the north closed. In the few that stayed open, children of all ages crowded into the same classrooms. Final-year students were left to prepare for national exams without instruction. As COVID-19 arrived in Kenya, the authorities went further by closing all remaining schools, although by then the damage to the education system was done. On 7 July, the authorities announced that the rest of the school year would be cancelled, and national exams pushed to 2021.[fn]“CS Magoha cancels KCPE, KCSE exams as COVID-19 crisis bites”, Daily Nation, 7 July 2020.Hide Footnote  Tens of thousands of students in north-eastern Kenya now face a bleak future, exposed to the region’s security, economic and social problems with few ways out. Even if the authorities bring the coronavirus under control by 2021, they will face a real challenge in improving security and persuading teachers to return.

III. Violence and Underdevelopment

The north-eastern counties of Kenya are among the most marginalised parts of the country.[fn]“Unmasking Ethnic Minorities and Marginalised Communities in Kenya”, National Gender and Equality Commission, 2018.Hide Footnote The area’s high levels of poverty, unemployment and insecurity today are partly rooted in policies developed under colonial rule and perpetuated by successive post-independence governments. After establishing Kenya as a protectorate in 1920, the British colonial authorities concentrated development in the well-watered highlands, populated largely by Christian farmers, while neglecting the semi-arid north, inhabited by Muslim, ethnic Somali pastoralists. Just before independence, the British granted residents of north-eastern Kenya the right to decide via referendum whether to remain part of Kenya or to join Somalia. Residents overwhelmingly chose the latter, but Kenyan nationalist leaders at the time flatly rejected the vote’s outcome and subsequently waged a long, brutal war against an irredentist movement that emerged in the north, creating enduring mutual mistrust.[fn]“How Northern Frontier District was carved out”, Business Daily, 27 September 2018. The Kenyan authorities succeeded in crushing the irredentist movement and it petered out in the late 1980s, although human rights groups say security forces engaged in widespread abuses while fighting the insurgents. “Summary: Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Report”, Kenya Transitional Justice Network, May 2013.Hide Footnote

The area’s high levels of poverty, unemployment and insecurity today are partly rooted in policies developed under colonial rule.

Subsequent neglect by Nairobi has deepened inequalities between the north east and other regions. Infrastructure development in the north east lags far behind the central highlands, for example.[fn]“Boosting Prosperity, Improving Equity in North and North Eastern Kenya”, The World Bank, 8 May 2018.Hide Footnote The north east falls below the rest of the country on indices of public health, education and employment. Only 1 per cent of north-eastern households have direct access to potable water, compared to 33 per cent in Nairobi.[fn]“Pulling Apart Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya”, Society for International Development, 2014.Hide Footnote Almost all eligible children in central Kenya are registered in primary school, but that proportion drops to 18 per cent in the north east. The region’s secondary school enrolment figures are even lower. North-eastern Kenya also registers the worst joblessness in the country, with 35 per cent of the population out of work.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote

The situation is compounded by police and army misconduct toward the population. Many police officers and soldiers detest being deployed in the north east, where they face a greater danger of attack than in other parts of the country. “Kenyan police officers in the north east are generally poorly equipped, poorly paid and poorly commanded”, according to Andrew Franklin, a security consultant and former U.S. marine.[fn] Crisis Group interview, Nairobi, 21 February 2020. “State must equip officers to stop IED killings”, The Standard, 14 October 2019. “Give military special wage consideration”, Daily Nation, 18 March 2020.Hide Footnote

An overhaul of Kenya’s constitution in 2010, devolving power and resources from Nairobi to counties across the country, has opened the way for authorities to redress at least some entrenched inequalities.[fn]“Kenya’s Devolution”, The World Bank, 26 November 2019.Hide Footnote Under the law, Kenya’s 47 counties each elect their own governors and regional assemblies. These bodies then receive a defined proportion of the national budget annually. The new order has breathed fresh economic life into the north east, since county authorities now have greater autonomy in developing their areas and providing local services, including construction of health care facilities.[fn]As an example of progress, Mandera county reportedly carried out its first caesarean section in 2014, following the election of the first crop of governors the preceding year. Previously, physicians could not perform operations of such complexity in the region’s dilapidated hospitals. The influx of devolved funds allowed local authorities to improve the facilities. “Where is the most dangerous place in the world to give birth?”, The Guardian, 17 December 2015.Hide Footnote

Devolution has not, however, translated into greater safety in the north east. If anything, Al-Shabaab, often facing little resistance from demoralised security services, has stepped up its campaign in the region, where it already controls important recruitment and cross-border smuggling networks.[fn]Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°88, Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation, 25 January 2012. Also “How smuggling at Kenya-Somalia border fuels terror”, The Standard, 7 January 2020.Hide Footnote Between 2014 and 2017, Kenyan security officials say, the group conducted at least five assassination attempts against Mandera’s governor, Ali Roba.[fn]“Al Shabaab claims responsibility for attack on Governor Roba's convoy”, The Star, 24 May 2017.Hide Footnote The group’s frequent night-time strikes on communications masts regularly cut off telephone service and disrupt commerce in an area where, as in the rest of Kenya, mobile money is a key driver of trade.[fn]“M-Pesa has completely changed Kenyans’ access to financial services: this is how …”, CNBC Africa, 3 April 2019.Hide Footnote By attacking civil servants and businessmen from outside the region, who are overwhelmingly Christian, Al-Shabaab also appears to seek to drive a wedge between Christians and Muslims across Kenya. The more militants can rend the north east’s socio-economic fabric, the more likely it is that they can tap grievances and poverty in the north to recruit young Kenyans.

In this light, the government’s January decision to withdraw all non-local teachers, while an understandable step to protect them, has played into Al-Shabaab’s hands. First, it has created widespread anger in northern Kenya, since residents took it as a further signal that Nairobi does not consider them fully Kenyan. “On one hand, Al-Shabaab accuses locals of being too Kenyan; on the other hand, the government sees them as Somali”, said Abdimalik Hajir, a local commentator.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, civil society actor, local county administrator and local commentator, Garissa, 27 February 2020.Hide Footnote Secondly, evacuating teaching staff from the north east risks consigning the region’s youth to penury or worse. Several residents, teachers and pupils who spoke to Crisis Group in Garissa expressed concern that an entire generation of students is missing out on an education, with dire consequences likely to follow. A headmaster at one high school warned that students whose time in school was cut short prematurely would constitute an attractive pool of recruits for Al-Shabaab.[fn]Crisis Group interview, local headmaster, Garissa, 27 February 2020.Hide Footnote

IV. Stemming the Crisis

As Crisis Group has noted in the past, affording locals a greater role in tackling insecurity is a critical first step to rolling back Al-Shabaab’s efforts to cleave the north east from the rest of the country.[fn]Crisis Group Report, Al-Shabaab Five Years after Westgate: Still a Menace in East Africa, op. cit.Hide Footnote It has worked before. Al-Shabaab activity dropped substantially when Nairobi appointed veteran local administrator Mohamud Saleh to lead the region’s security forces between 2015 and 2018.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote  His approach – centred on community intelligence gathering – gave locals the confidence they needed to go to the police with information about what Al-Shabaab was saying and doing. Authorities should reprise this strategy, which they seem to have abandoned after transferring Saleh to another post in the capital. Due to scant trust between citizens and security forces, officials deployed from Nairobi to the region since then have struggled to gather intelligence on Al-Shabaab.

Immediate action would help relieve the education crisis.

The authorities should also consider ramping up the involvement of police reservists drawn from the north east. In rural Kenya, members of the Kenya Police Reserve, a local force armed by the central government, play an important role in maintaining security in areas where the state has limited sway. Reservists in the north east, many of whom are locally born, are often more willing to combat Al-Shabaab, including by responding to militants’ night-time assaults, something that non-local security forces with lower stakes in the community rarely do. But reservists’ families are frequently targeted for retaliation by militants and are poorly paid and lightly equipped.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Andrew Franklin, security consultant, Nairobi, 21 February 2020. See also “Sad tale of poorly armed and unpaid police reservists”, The Standard, 7 August 2018.Hide Footnote The authorities should fold them into the regular security forces and give them better training, pay and equipment. They should also redouble efforts to rein in security sector abuses and halt extrajudicial killings by the national police and the army.[fn]“Extra-judicial killings in north eastern region should stop”, The Standard, 24 July 2016.Hide Footnote

Some immediate action would help relieve the education crisis. Local leaders and education specialists have offered different options since the first wave of teacher killings occurred in 2014, including some discussed by Crisis Group in 2019, but their ideas have largely gone unheeded.[fn]Abdille, “The Hidden Cost of Al-Shabaab’s Campaign in North-eastern Kenya”, op. cit.Hide Footnote The authorities, possibly in partnership with the United States and European Union, which have programs aimed at tackling insecurity in the north, could provide stopgap funding to county governments so they can recruit tutors to replace the departed non-local teachers. This emergency measure would tide the counties over and – once COVID-19 restrictions are lifted – help prepare students for national exams due at year’s end.

Over the longer term, other steps could help. Ideally, better security would allow teachers from outside the region to return. At the same time, the government could also offer a scholarship program for students from the north east to join teacher training colleges, and in so doing start building a cadre of native-born Muslim teachers whom Al-Shabaab is less likely to target than their Christian colleagues. It could lower university entry grades for students from the north east wishing to pursue a career in education. Some local leaders object to this proposal, saying it might dilute standards.[fn]Crisis Group interview, local educator, Garissa, 27 February 2020.Hide Footnote But, while imperfect, the option is preferable to the less pleasant alternatives, including the possibility of schools closing indefinitely due to an absence of teachers.

V. Conclusion

Kenya’s government urgently needs to stem the tide of insecurity in the north east, drawing on the assistance of residents and local police reservists. The authorities should also explore emergency measures to fill the gap left by the exodus of teachers from schools in the area. When some level of safety is assured, they can adopt longer-term solutions, including training a cadre of local teachers from north-eastern Kenya whom militants might be less likely to attack. Failing to restore education will hand Al-Shabaab greater chances of success at attracting youngsters from this long-marginalised region than the group enjoys at present.

Nairobi/Brussels, 22 July 2020

Appendix A: Map of Kenya

Appendix B: Al-Shabaab Attacks on Teachers in North-eastern Kenya, 2014-Present