What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?
What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?
Report 197 / Africa

肯尼亚2013年选举

执行摘要

肯尼亚今年的选举应该翻开新的一页,不再发生像五年前那样的流血事件,但发生政治暴力的风险仍然高得令人无法接受。出台新宪法,成立新的选举委员会并对司法体系进行改革应该会对此有所帮助。目前投票时间定在2013年3月4日,但是,无论是在全国层面还是在47个新成立的县里,这次投票仍然将会是一场高风险的权力竞争。国际刑事法院(International Criminal Court,ICC)即将对4名肯尼亚人进行审判,他们被控参与了2007-2008年大选后的暴力事件。这次审判看起来会影响选举的格局。地方上发生暴力事件的可能性特别高。政治家们必须停止以下行为:无视规则,利用人民的不满情绪,以及通过民族竞选煽动分裂。肯尼亚的机构面临着强大的压力,但是必须采取大胆的行动来遏制这些政治家。商业领袖、宗教领袖和公民社会应该要求开展自由和公平的投票。地区合作伙伴和国际性的合作伙伴也应当要求开展自由和公平的投票,并明确指出那些通过使用或煽动暴力来危害国家和地区稳定的人将被追究责任。

为了解决2007年有缺陷的投票和随后产生的暴力问题,肯尼亚开展了许多改革。2010年8月的和平公投后肯尼亚通过了一部新宪法,旨在通过制约行政权力来巩固民主和缓和总统竞选的零和竞争。新的投票规则要求候选人赢得超过半数的选票并享有更广泛的地域支持才能当选总统。权力被下放给47个县,每个县将选举出1名县长,1名参议员和地方议会。尽管最近出了一些事故,但是新的独立选举和边界委员会(Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission,IEBC)仍然享有公众的信任。司法改革——包括任命1名受人尊敬的新的首席法官——也是个好兆头,预示着肯尼亚会对选举舞弊和选举纠纷作出更强有力的回应。

然而,这些新的机构面临着艰巨的任务。ICC的诉讼正在影响政治联盟和选举。面临审判的这4个人否认指控,坚持自己是无辜的。虽然这些审判旨在削弱政治精英们长期享有的有罪不罚现象,并可能会阻止流血事件,但是它们也极大地增加了风险。最有权力的两名被告——乌胡鲁·肯雅塔(Uhuru Kenyatta)和威廉·鲁托(William Ruto)看来会联合参加竞选(肯雅塔竞选总统,而鲁托竞选副总统)。这两人都已经将ICC的案子政治化,加深了种族的两极分化。他们还指责其最强劲的竞争对手总理拉伊拉·奥廷加(Raila Odinga)与外国人合谋来对付他们。

肯雅塔-鲁托联盟将会是一个强势的竞选联盟。两人都意识到了肯尼亚人民想结束有罪不罚的现象,都承诺说即使赢得竞选,也要遵守ICC的判决。然而,无论他们案件的结果如何,一位面临ICC漫长的审判的总统可能会给改革和对外关系带来极大的破坏性影响,对此肯雅塔的支持者们应该进行慎重考虑。目前,肯雅塔和鲁托的竞选资格仍然存在疑问;一个质疑他们是否遵守了新宪法对政府官员诚信的要求的案件正由某个高级法院受理,并有可能上诉至最高法院。提交候选文件的截止日期是1月30日,如果法院在这个日期之后判决肯雅塔和鲁托没有资格参加竞选的话,他们的支持者将无法再另行选择其他候选人,这可能会导致强烈抗议,甚至引发冲突。这的确是一个异常紧张的政治案件,无论案件朝哪个方向发展,处理这种案件的最终结果都很可能存在争议性。如有可能,应该提前宣布做出判决的日期,这样的话安全机构和其他组织可以做好相应的准备。

其它迹象也令人不安。政党和政客肆意蔑视新规。IEBC在选民登记用品的采购上有贻误,导致之前人们对它怀有的信心有所降低,这也表明,随着选举的临近,它要竭力抵御巨大的压力。迟迟才开始的选举登记使得选举时间表变得异常紧迫,任何错误都将加剧紧张局势。IEBC必须与政党和其他利益相关者展开透明的合作,明确时间表并对其进行定期检查,以避免任何进一步的——同时也是高风险的——延迟。

对选民的教育将是至关重要的。这是根据2010年宪法举行的第一次大选,新的投票规则比起以前要复杂得多(每个选民要投6次票)。将混淆和误解控制在有限的程度有助于减少纠纷和与选举有关的冲突。同样重要的是,IEBC应向公民观察员和其他公民社会团体提供充分的参与渠道和信息。他们必须能够正确规划自己的部署,畅通无阻地参与选举过程的每个部分,尤其是对选举结果的统计。在加强IEBC委员们抵御政治干预的能力方面,这些团体也能成为有用的盟友。

不安全性也带来了巨大的挑战。2007-2008年暴力冲突背后有很多结构性的驱动因素--对种族分化的继续依赖,对土地和资源的竞争,国内流离失所者的重新安置,贫穷,以及青年失业。尽管经历了改革,这些问题仍然没有得到解决,并且还可能被政客为了一己之私而加以利用,来获取民众的支持。许多因动荡而逃离家园的人仍然流离失所。土地纠纷是地方紧张局势不断的源头。青年的失业率仍然很高,再加之贫困和不平等,意味着犯罪集团和民兵组织可以获得源源不断的兵源。同过去一样,这些犯罪集团和民兵组织可以被动员起来,威慑反对派及其支持者或者对选举结果发起抗议。归咎于极端主义组织“青年党”(Al-Shabaab movement)的袭击和关于土地的冲突可以遮盖政治暴力。同时,警察方面的改革滞后,安全部队看起来还没有做足准备来为选举提供安保。经验丰富的大卫·基迈若(David Kimaiyo)已被任命为警察总检察长,但是对大卫的任命是一个迟来的决定,这意味着对安全机构进行大刀阔斧改革的时间所剩无几。跨机构的安全规划也已滞后,必须要完成该规划并付诸实施。

肯雅塔和鲁托以及其他政要组成了联盟,随着这个联盟的形成,民族竞选运动和政治选票交易方面的分歧日益加深。两个主要竞选团体是副总理肯雅塔和前内阁部长鲁托的组合,以及总理奥廷加和副总统卡隆佐·穆西约卡(Kalonzo Musyoka)的组合。任何一方输掉这场势均力敌但被认为存在缺陷的竞选,甚至是竞选早期出现落后迹象,他们的支持者会如何应对落选结果或这种落后迹象还不清楚。国际合作伙伴,包括在经济上仰仗和平过渡的地区邻国,应该对任何干扰或暴力的迹象进行监测,并且迅速介入阻止其发生。分权尽管有很多好处,但是随着各团体之间对县级控制的权力和资源的竞争愈演愈烈,新的冲突动态也出现了。

所有这些挑战都是可以克服的,尤其是考虑到多数人都怀揣着要避免重蹈2007-2008年覆辙的坚定决心。但是解决这些问题需要肯尼亚各机构及其伙伴采取协调一致的行动,并且——也是最重要的一点,需要肯尼亚领导人发出明确的信号——人们看到的是这些领导人把对权力的追求放在了优先考虑的位置。肯尼亚人民应该得到更好的结果。为了把五年前的恐怖抛在身后,他们理应得到这次机会,在没有恐惧的情况下进行投票,选举出致力于改革并做好准备为整个社会而不是社会精英分子的狭隘利益所服务的领导人。

内罗毕⁄布鲁塞尔,2013年1月17日

Executive Summary

Kenya’s elections this year should turn the page on the bloodshed of five years ago, but the risk of political violence is still unacceptably high. A new constitution, fresh election commission and reformed judiciary should help. But the vote, now set for 4 March 2013, will still be a high-stakes competition for power, both nationally and in 47 new counties. Forthcoming trials before the International Criminal Court (ICC) of four Kenyans for their alleged role in the 2007-2008 post-election violence look set to shape the campaign. The potential for local violence is especially high. Politicians must stop ignoring rules, exploiting grievances and stoking divisions through ethnic campaigning. The country’s institutions face fierce pressure but must take bold action to curb them. Business and religious leaders and civil society should demand a free and fair vote. So too should regional and wider international partners, who must also make clear that those who jeopardise the stability of the country and region by using or inciting violence will be held to account. 

Many reforms were initiated to address the flawed 2007 polls and subsequent violence. A new constitution, passed in a peaceful referendum in August 2010, aims to fortify democracy and temper zero-sum competition for the presidency by checking executive power. New voting rules require the president to win more than half the votes and enjoy wider geographic support. Power is being devolved to 47 counties, each of which will elect a governor, senator and local assembly. Despite recent mishaps, the new Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) still enjoys public trust. Judicial reform, including the appointment of a respected new chief justice, also augurs well for a more robust response to electoral fraud and disputes. 

The new institutions, however, have their work cut out. The ICC proceedings are influencing political alliances and the campaign. The four individuals facing trial deny the charges and maintain their innocence. While the cases aim to erode impunity long enjoyed by political elites and may deter bloodshed, they raise the stakes enormously. The two most powerful of the accused, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, look set to contest the elections on a single ticket (Kenyatta for president, Ruto for deputy president). Both have politicised the ICC cases, deepening ethnic polarisation, and have accused Prime Minister Raila Odinga, their strongest opponent, of conspiring with foreigners against them. 

The Kenyatta-Ruto alliance would be a strong ticket. Aware that Kenyans want an end to impunity, both have pledged to comply with the ICC, even if they win. Yet, regardless of the outcome of their cases, a president facing lengthy trial before the ICC could potentially have extremely damaging implications for reform and foreign relations, which Kenyatta’s backers should ponder carefully. For the moment, their eligibility to run for office remains in doubt; a case challenging their compliance with new constitutional requirements for public officials’ integrity is with a high court and may find its way by appeal to the Supreme Court. Were the courts to find Kenyatta and Ruto ineligible after the closing date for submitting nomination papers on 30 January, their supporters would be unable to choose alternative candidates, which might lead to strong protests and even spark conflict. Dealing as it does with a highly charged political issue, whichever way it goes, the final decision is likely to be contentious. If possible, the date of any decision should be announced in advance so the security agencies and others can prepare accordingly. 

Other signs are also troubling. Political parties and politicians flout new rules unchecked. The IEBC’s bungled procurement of voter registration kits reduced the confidence it previously enjoyed and suggests it may struggle to resist enormous pressure as the vote approaches. The late start to registration has cut all fat from the electoral timeline, and any flaws will heighten tension. The IEBC must work transparently with parties and other stakeholders to clarify and regularly review the timeline, so as to avoid any further – and highly-charged – delays.

Voter education will be crucial. It is the first general election under the 2010 constitution, with new rules that are considerably more complex than previous polls (each voter will cast six ballots). Limiting confusion and misunderstandings could help reduce disputes and election-related conflict. It is also vital that the IEBC provide sufficient access and information to citizen observers and other civil society groups. They must be able to plan their deployment properly and enjoy full access to every part of the election process, especially the tallying of results. Such groups can also be useful allies in bolstering commissioners’ ability to resist political interference.

Insecurity too poses a huge challenge. Despite the reforms, many structural conflict drivers – continuing reliance on ethnicity, competition for land and resources, resettlement of internally displaced people (IDPs), and poverty and youth unemployment – underlying the 2007-2008 violence remain unresolved and may be cynically used by politicians to whip up support. Many of those who fled the turmoil remain displaced. Land disputes feed local tension. Youth unemployment is still very high and, together with poverty and inequality, means a steady flow of recruits for criminal groups and militias that can be mobilised to intimidate opponents and their supporters or protest results, as they have in the past. Attacks blamed on the extremist Al-Shabaab movement and clashes over land can cloak political violence. Meanwhile, police reform has lagged and the security forces look ill-prepared to secure the polls. An experienced inspector general of police, David Kimaiyo, has been appointed, but the delay in his selection means little time remains for significant security reform. Multi-agency security planning, which has also lagged, must be completed and implemented. 

Ethnic campaigning and horse-trading as alliances formed – by Kenyatta and Ruto but also other leading politicians – have deepened divides. How the supporters of either of the two main tickets, those of Deputy Prime Minister Kenyatta and former cabinet minister Ruto running and of Prime Minister Odinga and Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka respectively, would respond to losing a close vote it perceives as flawed, or even to early signs it is falling behind, is unclear. International partners, including regional neighbours whose economies rely on a peaceful transition, should monitor any signs of interference or violence and weigh in quickly to deter it. Devolution, for all its benefits, introduces new conflict dynamics, as competition between groups for power and resources controlled at county level becomes fiercer. 

All these challenges are surmountable, especially given the remarkable determination of most to avoid a repeat of 2007-2008. But they require concerted action by Kenya’s institutions and their allies, and – most important – clear signals to leaders who are seen to be prioritising the pursuit of power. The people deserve better. To put the horror of five years ago behind them, they deserve the chance to vote without fear and elect leaders committed to reform and ready to serve society as a whole rather than the narrow interests of its elites.

Nairobi/Brussels, 17 January 2013

Podcast / Africa

What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?

This week on The Horn, Alan is joined by Murithi Mutiga, Crisis Group’s Africa program director, to discuss the outcome of Kenya’s closely fought, high-stakes election.  

Kenyans went to the polls last week in what turned out to be a closely fought but so far strikingly peaceful election. After six tense days of vote counting, Deputy President William Ruto was declared Kenya’s next President with a wafer-thin majority. While the election has been broadly regarded as free and fair, his challenger, Raila Odinga, a political heavyweight backed by outgoing President and former rival Uhuru Kenyatta, has launched a legal challenge to the results. 

This week on The Horn, Alan speaks to Murithi Mutiga, Crisis Group’s Program Director for Africa, to discuss how Kenya’s nail-biting election has shaped up and the possible fallout of Odinga’s challenge. They outline both candidates' backgrounds and assess their respective campaigns in the build-up to election day. They talk about the significance of Odinga’s challenge to the vote, the role of Kenya’s electoral commission and the resilience of the country's democratic institutions in the wake of the election. They also assess how far ethnic divisions have played a role in the outcome of the election and where Kenya’s democracy might be headed if Ruto’s presidency is confirmed by the Supreme Court. 

Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify

For more analyses, check out Crisis Group’s Kenya country page.

We want to hear from you as we start preparing Season Four of The Horn! If you have any feedback or suggestions for topics you’d like us to cover next season, you can write to podcasts@crisisgroup.org or get in touch with Alan directly on Twitter, @AlanBoswell.

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