What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?
What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?
Report 184 / Africa

肯尼亚在索马里的军事干涉

执行摘要

2011年10月,肯尼亚作出决定在索马里的朱巴地区部署数千军队向青年党开战。对于从未向海外派兵参战的肯尼亚来说,这是一个激进的举动,也是其自独立以来在安全方面所下的最大赌注。虽然政治、外交和军事方面的准备均不充分,被称为“护国行动”(Operation Linda Nchi)的这次部署还是获得了批准。而且,肯尼亚部队在索马里陷入困境的可能性很高;青年党进行报复性恐怖活动的风险切实存在;在朱巴地区建立一个可行、不极端、且稳定的政体前景渺茫。政府不太会可能会因为外界的呼声而从索马里撤军, 因为它对这次行动已投入太多,也要顾及其自尊。一旦其军事力量成为非盟驻索马里特派团(AMISOM)的一部分,肯尼亚的财政和后勤压力将得到缓解。但肯尼亚应该避免长期“占据”索马里南部,以免引发索马里当地舆论对其干预的反对并导致可能由青年党指使的武装抵抗。这种不利的局面曾在其于2006至2009年期间向埃塞俄比亚派出干预部队时发生过。

军事干涉是由一小部分人在一系列跨境绑架事件后匆忙作出的决定,并没有对该行动将在肯尼亚国内和索马里导致的后果进行充分考虑。军事领导者显然相信这将是一个快速行动,但很快地,肯尼亚国防军(Kenyan Defence Forces, KDF)陷入对地形不熟悉的困境中。索马里方面的联盟部队未能兑现承诺并出现纷争,而青年党也没有与肯尼亚的坦克和装甲运兵车硬碰硬,而是如预期的那样恢复了游击战。游击战却是肯尼亚国防军完全不擅长并同时缺乏相应装备的打法。不论其军队是否被“整编”入非盟驻索特派团,肯尼亚肯定将面临的现实是,不仅索马里方面的盟友不可靠,而且自己将陷入旷日持久的反叛乱活动,且面对的是经验丰富的敌手。

肯尼亚介入索马里的部分动机是由于渴望让其东北省免受边界混乱的困扰,缓解沉重的难民负担,并遏制青年党的激进影响,但其未预料到的后果可能是不稳定的局势。这次行动可能重揭旧伤,挑起新的部族间分歧,使肯尼亚裔索马里人变得激进,并破坏最近所取得的社会、经济和政治进步。东北省现在是与青年党进行战争的软肋。新证据显示,激进的伊斯兰抵抗运动企图破坏东北省的稳定,其战略的一部分就是包抄肯尼亚国防军并在那里和其它肯尼亚战线后方的区域发动低强度的游击战。在加里萨和其它地区发生的一系列致命的手榴弹袭击最初被视为当地不满分子所为而被忽略,而现在看来都是出自相同的模式。大部分受到袭击的场所要么是政府和安全部门官员经常光顾的酒吧,要么就是防备不严的政府哨所。

此外,此次干预唤起了长期以来肯尼亚对于索马里侵犯的恐惧,以及相应的索马里对于肯尼亚渴望重新控制殖民地时期曾经是其一部分的领土的疑虑。青年党正试图利用肯尼亚的索马里人的不满来反对内罗毕的,并发起整个索马里境内对肯尼亚的集体反对。不过,至今其还没有获得任何显著的成功。肯尼亚的行动要想取得积极的成果,其领导者将需要更加明晰这次行动的目标以及撤退的战略,而且要与国际伙伴有效合作以促进和解并在其部队活动的地区促进建立有效的当地政府机制,作为结束索马里冲突并恢复该地区稳定的更广泛努力的一部分。

本简报是对肯尼亚在索马里的干预的单独论述,但一些要素,特别是与青年党、肯尼亚裔索马里人和东北省有关的问题,已经在早前危机组织的简报中进行过讨论,最新的一次可见于《肯尼亚裔索马里伊斯兰激进化》简报(2012年1月25日)。危机组织近期将出版有关恢复索马里和平的更广泛的问题的简报。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2012年2月15日

Executive Summary

The decision in October 2011 to deploy thousands of troops in Somalia’s Juba Valley to wage war on Al-Shabaab is the biggest security gamble Kenya has taken since independence, a radical departure for a country that has never sent its soldiers abroad to fight. Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) was given the go-ahead with what has shown itself to be inadequate political, diplomatic and military preparation; the potential for getting bogged down is high; the risks of an Al-Shabaab retaliatory terror campaign are real; and the prospects for a viable, extremist-free and stable polity emerging in the Juba Valley are slim. The government is unlikely to heed any calls for a troop pullout: it has invested too much, and pride is at stake. Financial and logistical pressures will ease once its force becomes part of the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM). But it should avoid prolonged “occupation” of southern Somalia, lest it turn local Somali opinion against the intervention and galvanise an armed resistance that could be co-opted by Al-Shabaab, much as happened to Ethiopia during its 2006-2009 intervention.

The intervention was hastily approved, after a string of cross-border kidnappings, by a small group without sufficient consideration of the consequences, at home as well as in Somalia. Military leaders were apparently convinced it would be a quick campaign, but the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) promptly ran into difficulties on the unfamiliar terrain. Somali allies failed to deliver and began squabbling, while Al-Shabaab, rather than confront Kenyan tanks and armoured personnel carriers head-on, predictably reverted to guerrilla warfare – something the KDF was poorly trained and equipped to fight. Irrespective of whether its troops are “rehatted” into AMISOM, there is a real prospect Kenya will find itself with undependable allies, enmeshed in a protracted counter-insurgency campaign against a resilient and experienced enemy.

The involvement in Somalia was partly motivated by a desire to inoculate North Eastern Province from the chaos across its border, ease a huge refugee burden and curtail the radical influence of Al-Shabaab, but the unintended consequences may prove destabilising. The venture could reopen old wounds, foment new inter-clan discord, radicalise Kenyan Somalis and undermine recent social, economic and political advances. The North Eastern Province is now the soft underbelly in the war against Al-Shabaab. New evidence suggests the radical Islamist movement is intent on destabilising the province, and part of its strategy is to outflank the KDF and wage a low-intensity guerrilla campaign there and in other areas behind Kenyan lines. A string of deadly grenade attacks in Garissa and elsewhere, initially dismissed as the work of local malcontents, now is seen to have a pattern. Most of the venues targeted have been bars frequented by government and security officials and poorly-defended government outposts.

Furthermore, the intervention taps into deep-seated Kenyan fears of Somali encroachment and corresponding Somali qualms that Kenya seeks to assert control over territory that was once part of colonial Kenya. Al-Shabaab is trying to exploit Kenyan-Somali grievances against Nairobi and making pan-Somali appeals, although without much apparent success to date. For Kenya’s venture to have a positive outcome, its leadership will need to define its goals and exit strategy more clearly, as well as work effectively with international partners to facilitate reconciliation and the development of effective local government mechanisms in the areas of Somalia where its forces are active, as part of a larger commitment to ending Somalia’s conflicts and restoring stability to the region.

While this briefing is an independent treatment of the Kenyan intervention in Somalia, some elements, in particular issues related to Al-Shabaab, Kenyan Somalis, and North Eastern Province, have also been discussed in earlier Crisis Group reporting, most recently the briefing Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation (25 January 2012). Crisis Group will publish shortly a briefing on the wider issues involved in restoring peace to Somalia.

Nairobi/Brussels, 15 February 2012

Podcast / Africa

What Next After Ruto is Declared Winner of Kenya’s Nail-biter Election?

This week on The Horn, Alan is joined by Murithi Mutiga, Crisis Group’s Africa program director, to discuss the outcome of Kenya’s closely fought, high-stakes election.  

Kenyans went to the polls last week in what turned out to be a closely fought but so far strikingly peaceful election. After six tense days of vote counting, Deputy President William Ruto was declared Kenya’s next President with a wafer-thin majority. While the election has been broadly regarded as free and fair, his challenger, Raila Odinga, a political heavyweight backed by outgoing President and former rival Uhuru Kenyatta, has launched a legal challenge to the results. 

This week on The Horn, Alan speaks to Murithi Mutiga, Crisis Group’s Program Director for Africa, to discuss how Kenya’s nail-biting election has shaped up and the possible fallout of Odinga’s challenge. They outline both candidates' backgrounds and assess their respective campaigns in the build-up to election day. They talk about the significance of Odinga’s challenge to the vote, the role of Kenya’s electoral commission and the resilience of the country's democratic institutions in the wake of the election. They also assess how far ethnic divisions have played a role in the outcome of the election and where Kenya’s democracy might be headed if Ruto’s presidency is confirmed by the Supreme Court. 

Click here to listen on Apple Podcasts or Spotify

For more analyses, check out Crisis Group’s Kenya country page.

We want to hear from you as we start preparing Season Four of The Horn! If you have any feedback or suggestions for topics you’d like us to cover next season, you can write to podcasts@crisisgroup.org or get in touch with Alan directly on Twitter, @AlanBoswell.

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