Climate Change and Conflict in Somalia
Climate Change and Conflict in Somalia
Briefing 87 / Africa

索马里: 机不可失

I. 概况

未来六个月对于索马里来说至关重要。国际社会对该国重拾兴趣;孱弱且功能不健全的索马里过渡联邦政府(TFG)的将在半年后结束自己的统治使命;来自非洲联盟驻索马里特派团(AMISOM)、肯尼亚和埃塞俄比亚的威武之师渴望进一步挫败已被削弱(虽然仍旧强大)的激进伊斯兰运动青年党。这些因素的结合带来了多年来能促进该国南部和中部和平与稳定的最好机会。然而,为此需要达成地区性与更广泛的国际性统一的目标以及对于基本原则的共识;否则,搅局者可能会破坏所有和平建设的努力。

索马里的危机又在国际议程上不断攀升。2月23日召开的为期一天的伦敦索马里会议上,来自40多个国家、联合国、非盟(AU)、欧盟(EU)、世界银行、东非政府间发展组织(IGAD)、伊斯兰会议组织(OIC)和阿拉伯国家联盟的高级代表们将齐聚一堂。与会的还有索马里的过渡联邦机构(TFIs),以及地方政府索马里兰、邦特兰、贾穆杜格的总统和来自最大武装团体“先知的信徒”(ASWJ)的代表。会议将为亟需的进一步协调铺平道路,尤其是与亚丁湾和地区各国之间,以及非盟驻索特派团与联合国之间的协调。

协调合作十分必要,因为索马里过渡联邦政府将在2012年8月结束掌权。虽然该政府未能实现任何其核心目标,许多官员仍希望政府能像一年前一样得到延期。但这样的话不利于改革,因为太多的政府成员从不尽人意的现状中受益了。过渡政府绝不能被再次延期。与之相反,伦敦会议应该就治理索马里达成新的政治框架和原则。

这非常重要,因为非盟驻索特派团和地区军队在对抗青年党方面已取得引人瞩目的成就,并正准备对青年党重新发起进攻。不过,他们最大的挑战将可能不是把武装分子赶出主要城镇,而是确保之后的和平。青年党虽然已被削弱,但还远非昨日黄花;其武装圣战分子思想正使国内外的索马里年轻人变得激进;外国经验丰富的圣战分子正施加着越来越大的影响力;最近,青年党的埃米尔表示效忠基地组织和全球圣战。但是,它已不再是威胁稳定的唯一因素;氏族间竞争和军阀主义的复兴也同样造成严重威胁。虽然对于(以过渡联邦机构的形式)加强摩加迪沙中央州及其安全机构的倾向可以理解,但过去和目前的过渡当局都未能带来稳定,主要因为许多氏族不支持重建强大的中央政府。索马里需要一个更加分权的政治框架以及进行氏族间的和解。

索马里的许多问题——恐怖主义、海盗猖獗、周期性饥荒和持续的难民流——的根本原因是有效治理的土崩瓦解,结果导致了长期的冲突、法律的缺失和贫穷。针对这些痼疾,最有效和持久的解决办法就是逐渐建立一个具有包容性的、更加联邦制的、能被大多数氏族支持的政府结构。否则,青年党(或一些相似的后继组织)和其他不同性质的武装团体将利用对摩加迪沙的持续不满和索马里固有的对“外国侵占”的敌意来谋利。

接下来的六个月对于索马里来说是一段至关重要的时期。要想尽可能地抓住机会结束二十多年来的长期冲突,国际社会必须:

  • 增加非盟驻索特派团军力,提供更多资源。要保持势头和巩固成果,非盟驻索特派团应该实现对非盟、埃塞俄比亚和肯尼亚特派团的战术和作战执行的全面指挥,并与索马里同盟部队紧密协作。任何主要进攻都有相应的政治策略进行支持,以赢得当地氏族和社会团体的支持并稳定这些地区的局势;
     
  • 重建国际联络小组核心成员间的内部凝聚力;
     
  • 在稳定化的努力中,加强土耳其和其他穆斯林国家的作用,以在这一过程中建立索马里的自信;
     
  • 支持更密切的联合国和非盟的合作,确保两个组织的特别代表紧密合作;
     
  • 支持建立一个真正具有包容性的索马里审议机构,这一机构代表着该国所有氏族和大部分地区,并能够建立一个临时政府以在必要时替代过渡联邦政府;
     
  • 建立地区稳定资金以帮助经济上切实可行的地方政府能够实施及出台法律和命令,致力于和平并摒弃恐怖主义,愿意参与到具有包容性的对话中,并优先考虑那些希望建立可行的政府的跨氏族联盟;
     
  • 建立联合财政管理委员会,考虑在其中为国家收入的主要来源建立一个治理和经济管理计划,这些来源包括摩加迪沙港和机场,以及基斯马尤港等。该计划可以建立在当地政府和国际社会间的结成的伙伴关系的基础之上,就像帮助利比亚在内战后减少了腐败的那种伙伴关系一样。一旦资金进入财政,索马里就应该使资金使用决策透明化;

鼓励索马里当局表明希望继续与愿意放弃恐怖主义并共同向和平努力的青年军首领和战士进行谈判,以达成政治和解或将其并入国家/地区安全部队,因为这将进一步削弱该组织,并有助于新收复地区的稳定。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2012年2月22日

I. Overview

The next six months will be crucial for Somalia. The international community is taking a renewed interest in the country; the mandate of the feeble and dysfunctional Transitional Federal Government (TFG) expires in a half-year; and emboldened troops from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Kenya and Ethiopia are keen to deal the weakened (though still potent) extremist Islamist movement Al-Shabaab further defeats. This confluence of factors presents the best chance in years for peace and stability in the south and centre of the country. To achieve that, however, requires regional and wider international unity of purpose and an agreement on basic principles; otherwise spoilers could undermine all peacebuilding efforts.

The crisis has been climbing steadily back up the international agenda. The one-day London Somalia Conference on 23 February will bring together senior representatives from over 40 countries, the UN, African Union (AU), European Union (EU), World Bank, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and League of Arab States. Somalia’s Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) will participate, as well as the presidents of Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug (regional governments) and representatives of the largest armed group, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a (ASWJ). It should prepare the way for desperately needed greater coordination, especially with Gulf and regional states, as well as between AMISOM and the UN.

Coordination is required because the mandate of the TFG is set to run out in August 2012. Although it has failed to achieve any of its core objectives, many officials desire another extension, such as it received a year ago. But it is unreformable – too many of its members benefit from the fully unsatisfactory status quo. It must not be extended. Instead, the London Conference should agree on a new political framework and principles for governing Somalia.

This is important, because AMISOM and regional forces have made impressive gains against Al-Shabaab and are poised to renew their offensive. Nevertheless, their greatest challenge will probably be not to drive the militants out of major cities and towns, but rather to secure peace thereafter. Al-Shabaab, though weakened, is far from a spent force; its militant jihadi ideology is radicalising young Somalis at home and abroad; veteran foreign jihadis are exerting ever-greater influence; and recently its emir pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and global jihad. But it is no longer the only threat to stability; the resurgence of inter-clan competition and warlordism is as serious. While there is an understandable inclination to strengthen the central state in Mogadishu (in the form of the TFIs) and its security apparatus, past and present transitional administrations have failed to bring stability, in large part because many clans do not support the reestablishment of a strong central government. A more decentralised political framework and local inter-clan reconciliation are required.

The root cause of Somalia’s many troubles – terrorism, piracy, periodic famine and constant streams of refugees – is collapse of effective governance, with resulting chronic conflict, lawlessness and poverty. The most effective and durable solution to these ills is to build gradually an inclusive, more federal government structure that most clans can support. Otherwise, Al-Shabaab (or some similar successor) and other disparate groups of would-be strongmen with guns will exploit continued dissatisfaction with Mogadishu and innate Somali hostility to “foreign occupation”.

This coming six-month period is a critical time for Somalia. To make the most of the opportunity to end more than two decades of chronic conflict, the international community should:

  • increase AMISOM’s force strength and provide more resources. To maintain momentum and consolidate gains, AMISOM should quickly assume full tactical and operational command of the AU, Ethiopian, and Kenyan missions and coordinate closely with Somali allies. Any major offensive should be accompanied by a political strategy to win the support of local clans and social groups and stabilise those areas in which they are present;
     
  • rebuild internal cohesion among core members of the International Contact Group;
     
  • enhance the role of Turkey and other Muslim nations in the stabilisation effort, so as to build Somali confidence in the process;
     
  • endorse closer UN/AU cooperation and insure that the two organisations’ Special Representatives work closely together;
     
  • endorse the formation of a truly inclusive Somali deliberative body, one that represents all clans and most regions of the country, and can establish an interim government to replace the TFG if necessary;
     
  • create a Local Stability Fund to help local administrations that are economically viable, can administer and impose law and order, are committed to peace and renounce terrorism and are willing to engage in an inclusive dialogue and give priority to cross-clan alliances that seek to establish viable administrations;
     
  • create a joint financial management board and consider establishing within it a governance and economic management program for the major national sources of revenue, such as Mogadishu port and airport, as well as Kismayo port, based on the kind of partnership between local government and internationals to promote transparency and accountability that lowered corruption in post-civil war Liberia. Once funds enter the treasury, Somalis should transparently decide their use; and
     
  • encourage the Somali authorities to indicate continued willingness to negotiate a political accommodation with or incorporate into a national/regional security force Al-Shabaab commanders and fighters willing to renounce terrorism and work towards peace, since this would weaken the group further and could help stabilise newly recovered areas.

Nairobi/Brussels, 22 February 2012

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