Climate Change and Conflict in Somalia
Climate Change and Conflict in Somalia
Briefing 64 / Africa

索马里:邦特兰之乱

概述

索马里东北部的邦特兰半自治州曾被誉为重建国家稳定的“模块”方案的成功典范,并被广泛认为是索马里最繁荣的地区之一,然而在过去三年中,动荡与政治对立却在邦特兰不断加剧。1998年达鲁德全族同心,各宗族团结一致才获得了邦特兰自治州的建立,但现在,曾经的凝聚力已经土崩瓦解,加之政府无能,导致问题不断涌现。协商性政治曾经是稳定的基石,却在达鲁德内部斗争中被逐渐遗弃。海盗猖獗只是引人注目的表象,其背后隐藏着深层次的问题。这些问题如果得不到解决,那么邦特兰将可能分崩离析,或者被伊斯兰地下激进运动推翻。若要斩除这些威胁,邦特兰当局必须实行改革,使政府更加透明化和开放化,给地区内各宗族参政的机会。

十年前,邦特兰在成立之初曾被看作是一次自下而上创建政体的宏伟实验,如果成功,将为索马里其它地区——特别是历经战火、满目疮痍的南部——树立样本。但如今的邦特兰已不再是光辉的榜样,其政府摇摇欲坠,主要责任全在政治领袖。马杰尔廷支族上层集团中重要的一个分支一改自1998年以来一贯流传的民族团结立场,转而推行分裂。如果各种民怨没有得到及时全面的解决,那么整个索马里和非洲之角将会遭受严重后果。

邦特兰的新主席阿布迪拉赫曼·法罗里及其政府曾许诺进行多项改革,并宣称根除海盗不过是“几个月的事”。自2009年4月以来,政府打击了一些犯罪团伙,少数几名犯罪分子被送上了法庭,并被宣判长期监禁,治安部队也突袭了一些可疑的藏匿点。然而,仅仅靠这些行动并不足以动摇树大根深的犯罪集团。邦特兰的犯罪团伙不仅仅参与海上抢劫,还经营其它非法活动,比如武器走私、绑架、人口和禁运品走私。有迹象表明,这些活动可能有政府同谋,而且由于犯罪集团势力强大,对它们采取行动可能会引发次部族间的斗争,因此政府究竟是否有打击犯罪的决心还是个问题。政府官员对此心知肚明,因此按兵不动,转而优先开展所谓的公共教育活动。

有部落长老和神职人员在沿海村落就海上抢劫的不道德性和危险性对年轻人进行教育,然而多数人对海盗行为采取宽容态度,甚至有人认为索马里海洋资源遭“掠夺”,海岸成为有毒垃圾的倾倒场,海上抢劫只不过是对这些行为的反击而已。在青年人口中,失业和贫困蔓延,生存环境日益恶化,也使问题愈演愈烈。

海盗问题已经引起了国际社会的关注,邦特兰政府应抓住这一机会,调动资金,发动专家进行全面的政治、经济和机构改革,以应对管理不善、腐败、失业和沿海地区的极度贫困等根本性问题。国际社会应重新聚焦长远措施,否则海盗问题得不到根除,邦特兰也得不到真正的稳定。政府应装备和培训一支小型海上卫队,但也应采取其它步骤,例如扶助贫困渔民及提高社会整体福利。国际社会应鼓励和帮助邦特兰政府采取以下措施:

  • 暂停新宪法的实施,并通过开放兼容的程序,在同民间社会和各宗族主要利益相关者协商的基础上重新起草宪法,同时征求专家帮助以使其达到国际标准;
     
  • 在国内有关各方和国际专家的参与下,制定和执行可信的安全部门改革方案。改革的关键措施应包括民众监督和政府保安部门专业培训。另外,修改赦免所有自首海盗的政策,以避免海盗头目和其赞助者一边分赃一边逍遥法外;
     
  • 实行全面选举制度改革:建立独立的选举委员会——应由各部族成员组成,应获得部族长老和议会的支持,应保障委员会成员任期,并给予委员会自主权;建立跨部族专家委员会以重新划分议会选区;建立特别法庭以处理选举有关的申诉和对争端进行仲裁;
     
  • 建立独立的反腐败机构,并给予该机构调查和起诉官员的能力;
     
  • 同索马里兰、临时联邦政府及苏尔州和萨那格州的部落长老开展严肃对话;在必要的情况下寻求外部仲裁以决定争议领土的最终地位和归属权;
     
  • 以孕育了邦特兰实践的1998年加洛威大会为模板,召集部族长老、政治领袖和民间社会团体举行全区大会,就以上措施寻求共识。

 

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔, 2009年8月12日

I. Overview

The semi-autonomous north-eastern Somali region of Puntland, once touted as a success of the “building blocks” approach to reestablishing national stability and widely viewed as one of the most prosperous parts of Somalia, is experiencing a three-year rise in insecurity and political tension. At its roots are poor governance and a collapse of the intra-clan cohesion and pan-Darood solidarity that led to its creation in 1998. Intra-Darood friction has eroded the consensual style of politics that once underpinned a relative stability. The piracy problem is a dramatic symptom of deeper problems that, left untreated, could lead to Puntland’s disintegration or overthrow by an underground militant Islamist movement. A solution to the security threat requires the Puntland government to institute reforms that would make it more transparent and inclusive of all clans living within the region.

Puntland’s founding a decade ago was an ambitious experiment to create from the bottom up a polity that might ultimately offer a template for replication in the rest of the country, especially the war-scarred south. But Puntland is no longer a shining example, and its regime is in dire straits, with most of the blame resting squarely on the political leadership. In a major shift from the traditional unionist position officially adopted in 1998, an important segment of the Majerten elite is pushing for secession. If a wide variety of grievances are not urgently tackled in a comprehensive manner, the consequences could be severe for the whole of Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

The new president, Abdirahman Farole, and his government promise many reforms and say they will eradicate piracy in “a matter of months”. Since the beginning of April 2009, there has been a crackdown on the gangs; a few members have been put on trial and sentenced to long jail terms; and the security forces have raided suspected hideouts. These measures alone are likely not enough, however, to cope with an entrenched criminal enterprise. Criminal gangs in Puntland are involved not only in piracy, but also in other illicit activities, including arms trafficking, kidnapping and the smuggling of both people and contraband. There is evidence of state complicity, and doubts remain that the government has the political will to move against the powerful gangs, since that could spark fighting between sub-clans. Officials know this and are prioritising what they call a wa’yigelin (sensitisation campaign) rather than use of force.

Clan elders and clerics are talking to youth groups in coastal villages about the immorality and dangers of piracy, but the practice is widely tolerated and even described as a response to the “plunder” of Somalia’s marine resources and the reported dumping of toxic waste on its shores. Youth unemployment, poverty and worsening living conditions fuel the problem.

The government must take advantage of the piracy-driven international attention to mobilise funds and expertise to carry out comprehensive political, economic and institutional reforms that address the fundamental problems of poor governance, corruption, unemployment and the grinding poverty in coastal villages. The international community needs to refocus on the long-term measures without which there can be no sustainable end to that practice or true stability. Equipping and training a small coast guard is obviously a necessary investment, but so too are other steps, such as to improve the general welfare and help impoverished fishing communities. International partners should encourage and support the government of Puntland to do the following:

  • suspend implementation of the new constitution and redraft it in a more inclusive process involving consultation with civil society and key clan stakeholders, as well as expert help to meet international standards;
     
  • draw up and implement a credible security sector reform strategy with input from domestic stakeholders and foreign experts, key elements of which should include civilian oversight and professionalisation of the state security agencies, and recast the general amnesty for pirates who surrender so leaders and their financial backers do not have impunity to enjoy their profits;
     
  • implement comprehensive electoral reform, including an independent electoral commission whose members come from all clans, are endorsed by the elders and parliament and enjoy secure tenure and autonomy; an independent cross-clan committee of experts to redraw parliamentary boundaries; and a special court to handle election petitions and arbitrate disputes;
     
  • set up an independent anti-corruption authority competent to investigate and prosecute officials;
     
  • open serious talks with Somaliland, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and clan elders in the Sool and Sanaag regions, and if necessary seek external arbitration to determine the final status and ownership of the disputed territories; and
     
  • build consensus around these measures by convening a region-wide conference of clan elders, political leaders and civil society groups, modelled on the 1998 Garowe Conference that launched the Puntland experiment.

 

Nairobi/Brussels, 12 August 2009

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