索马里兰:走出选举危机的途径
索马里兰:走出选举危机的途径
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Somalia-Somaliland: A Halting Embrace of Dialogue
Somalia-Somaliland: A Halting Embrace of Dialogue
Briefing 67 / Africa

索马里兰:走出选举危机的途径

概述

索马里兰因选举进程受阻而陷入政治危机,地区因此新添了不稳定因素。如果各政党继续走边缘政策且拒不妥协,索马里兰来之不易的政治稳定将因不堪重负而崩溃。氏族领袖可能重新调动民兵组织,独立的梦想也将化为泡影。索马里兰的政治阶层必须维护宪法、遵守选举法和多党协议——如《选举行为守则》和2009年9月25日签订的《谅解备忘录》——才能控制危机并赢得选举机制的广泛改革机会。国际伙伴和捐助国必须紧密关注事态发展,并不断施压以保障2010年大选自由公正地举行。

总统里亚尔的第三届任期本应于2008年5月15日结束。而本应在他离任前一个月举行的选举却被连续推迟了五次。最后一次被推迟的是原定于2009年9月27日举行的选举。目前,新改组的全国选举委员会还没有指定下一次的选举日。

最近一次延迟的表面原因是选民登记过程中大规模系统性的作假行为。当时的选举委员会单方面拒绝采用选民登记册。两个反对党因此宣布抵制选举,暂停与委员会合作。此后的僵局再次引发了危机。上层政治集团公开地相互指责,或者归咎于全国选举委员会及其技术伙伴“国际和平”。实际上,危机在很大程度上正是这些上层集团成员一手造成的。

选举的一再推迟和选民登记过程中的欺诈行为体现了深层次的政治问题。虽然里亚尔总统及其领导的执政党因此额外获得了一年半的任期,成为最大的受益者,但参政各方都对此负有一定责任:他们指派了一个不称职的选举委员会,而且即使在其失职的情况下仍放任自流;选民登记过程中作假成风;各党派避不遵守宪法,而且没有真正接纳民主实践并将其制度化。

2009年9月,在国内外高压下,各党签订了《谅解备忘录》,同意撤换选举委员会领导及成员;“清理”选民册;选举委员将采纳无党派国际专家的意见以确定新的选举日。备忘录使各党派悬崖勒马,但这只是一份措词抽象的文件。若要防止新的危机爆发,必需有额外的补充措施。

索马里兰已经在民主改造上取得了显著的进步,但由于政治斗争不断,加之政治活动中弄虚作假成风,导致了政府机构腐败,法治程序受损。民主参与、公正自由的选举及有效的政府管理必须制度化,必须成为常规程序,否则武装民兵将取代非暴力方式来解决政治危机,暴力冲突的可能性将急剧上升。

改善政治文化是一个长期的内政过程,但首先,管理选举的机构——全国选举委员会和选民登记办公室——必须作到专业化和非政治化,而且应保障政党和选民都严格遵守选举法和有关协议。国际伙伴应敦促和帮助索马里兰政府和政党做到以下几点:

  • 新的全国选举委员尚经验不足,因此民间社会及国际赞助者应在总统大选的组织过程中为其屏蔽政治压力。同时,委员会也应积极努力地抵制政治操控。委员会新成员必须着力防止选举中的作弊行为,同国际专家合作拟定投票日程,找出现有选民册存在的问题,并寻求方案以清理大量重复记录。应为委员会提供充分的资金以聘请足够的职员;
     
  • 各党派都同意修改选民册的必要性。由于选民册中有大量重复记录,使得各党都对其持怀疑态度。全国选举委员会的首要任务之一是聘任公正称职的选民登记员,同时制定补充措施和机构核查选民身份和防止作弊行为。例如,用不褪色墨水给已投票选民做标记;限制投票时间;并限制车辆驾驶以防止党派或宗族将选民拉到多个投票点进行投票。应重点改善数据库更新程序,并就此对索马里兰工作人员进行培训。
     
  • 由于选民册的准确性引发了诸多忧虑,因此它不应成为确定某一地区选票及投票箱数量的依据,否则在选民登记作弊行为较盛的地区将出现一人投多票的现象。各投票点的选票及投票箱数量应由协议决定。
     
  • 必须终止违宪延长任期的行径。众议院和地方议会应于2010年内分别举行选举。另一个更具争议的问题是议会上院的重组。其成员由宗族提名而非选举产生。宪法规定上议院成员每六年换届,但没有说明换届的方式。上议院自1997年以来还没有进行过重组,因此急需制订换届程序。
     
  • 由于宪法规定只能有三个政党参加议会和总统选举,因此制宪时就存在的政党及领袖得以垄断权力。为了鼓励政治活动中的竞争并提高责任感,应制定新法以明确规定如何选择和更改三个参选政党。同时,应为独立政治社团建立常设注册机制。
     
  • 新的全国选举委员会应在援助国的帮助下,选定成熟可信的本地非政府组织来为选举前的选民教育和公民意识宣传作准备;应为学校提供宣传材料;教育部应要求学校设置民主实践课;应动员神职人员参与选举法宣传活动。
     
  • 本地非政府组织应在国外技术支持下,尽可能同国际监察员合作,为政党和民间社会观察员提供发现作弊行为、抵制政治和宗族压力及开展全国选举监督的培训。

 

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔, 2009年12月7日

I. Overview

The stalled electoral process has plunged Somaliland into a serious political crisis that presents yet another risk of destabilisation for the region. If its hard-won political stability collapses under the strain of brinkmanship and intransigence, clan leaders might remobilise militias, in effect ending its dream of independence. The political class must finally accept to uphold the region’s constitution, abide by the electoral laws and adhere to inter-party agreements such as the electoral code of conduct and memorandum of understanding signed on 25 September 2009, so as to contain the crisis and permit implementation of extensive electoral reforms. International partners and donors should keep a close watch on developments and sustain pressure for genuinely free and fair general elections in 2010.

President Rayale’s third term of office should have expired on 15 May 2008. The election that was to have been held at least one month earlier has been rescheduled five times, most recently for 27 September 2009. The new National Electoral Commission (NEC) has yet to set a sixth date.

The latest delay was ostensibly caused by the unilateral decision of the previous NEC not to use a voter registration list tainted by massive, systematic fraud. This prompted both opposition parties to declare an election boycott and suspend cooperation with the commission. The resulting impasse triggered yet another crisis. Publicly the political elite sought to blame the NEC, its technical partner, Interpeace, and each other, but the crisis was one largely of its own making.

The recurrent rescheduling of elections and the fraud-tainted voter registration process are symptoms of deeper political problems. While President Rayale and his ruling party have benefited most from more than a year and a half of additional time in power, all the political stakeholders are in some way responsible for the selection and continuation of an incompetent and dysfunctional electoral commission, rampant fraud during voter registration, frequent skirting of the constitution and failure to internalise and institutionalise democratic practices.

The crisis was defused in late September, when the parties – under strong external and internal pressure – accepted a memorandum of understanding (MOU) agreeing to a change in the NEC’s leadership and composition, use of a “refined” voter registration list and delay of the elections to a date to be determined by the NEC, with input from independent international experts. The MOU brought the parties back from the precipice, but it is a vague document that must be complemented by additional measures to prevent new crises.

Somaliland has made remarkable progress in its democratic transformation, but political wrangling and wide-scale attempts to manipulate the political process have corrupted governing institutions and undermined the rule of law. Democratic participation, fair and free elections and effective governance need to be institutionalised and made routine, or non-violent means to resolve political crises could be replaced by remobilisation of militias, with significant risk of violent conflict.

Improving the political culture will necessarily be a long-term, internal process, but as a start the institutions that manage elections – the NEC and the office of the voter registrar – need to be professionalised and depoliticised and the electoral laws and agreements adhered to strictly by both political parties and voters. International partners should encourage and support the government and parties to do the following:

  • Civil society and international supporters must shield the new, inexperienced NEC from political pressure as it organises the presidential elections, and the NEC itself must actively resist succumbing to manipulation. The new commissioners must focus on preventing electoral fraud, working with international experts to develop a calendar for the vote, identifying problems with the current voter registration list and developing solutions for extensive duplicate registrations. The NEC also should be given the resources to hire adequate staff.
     
  • All parties have agreed to the need for a revised registration list. The problem is that the list clearly still contains too many duplicate records and is not trusted by the political parties. Priorities for the new NEC should include hiring a competent, impartial permanent registrar and complementing the list with alternative methods and mechanisms for voter verification and fraud prevention, such as using indelible ink to identify those who have voted, limiting polling hours and imposing driving prohibitions to prevent parties and clans from transporting people to multiple locations. The emphasis should be on improving the process of updating the database and transferring the capability to do so to the Somaliland staff.
     
  • Because of concerns for its accuracy, the registration list should not be used to determine the number of ballots and ballot boxes for particular areas, since that could lead to ballot stuffing where there was greater registration fraud. Agreement is needed on the number of boxes and ballots to be sent to the polling stations.
     
  • Unconstitutional extensions of mandates must stop. Separate elections should be held for both the House of Representatives and district councils in 2010. More contentious will be renewal of the Guurti, presently the non-elected, clan-nominated upper house of the parliament. The constitution provides its members should be selected every six years, but does not stipulate how. Renewal has not happened since 1997, and the procedure needs to be defined urgently.
     
  • The constitutional provision limiting the number of political parties able to compete in legislative and presidential elections to three has resulted in the monopolisation of power by the parties and leaders who were in place when the constitution was adopted. A new law clarifying how these three parties are to be chosen and permitting changes, coupled with a permanent system for the registration of new and independent political associations, should be adopted to encourage competition and accountability in political life.
     
  • The new NEC, with donor support, should identify established, reputable local NGOs to prepare pre-election voter education and civic awareness campaigns. Materials should be developed for schools, and the education ministry should require classes on democratic practices. Clerics should be enlisted to raise awareness of election laws.
     
  • Local NGOs, with foreign technical aid, should help train party and civil society observers to detect fraud, resist political and clan pressures and carry out nationwide election monitoring, partnering where possible with international monitors.

 

Nairobi/Brussels, 7 December 2009

A soldier of Somalia's breakaway territory of Somaliland stands guard during an Independence day celebration parade in the capital, Hargeisa on 18 May 2016. MOHAMED ABDIWAHAB / AFP
Commentary / Africa

Somalia-Somaliland: A Halting Embrace of Dialogue

Ethiopia, the U.S. and the EU have brokered surprise talks between the Somalia and Somaliland administrations, which are historically opposed, though progress has stalled while both sides prepare for elections. The parties should cooperate on technical issues, pending a shot at deeper dialogue.

Somalia and Somaliland, which have been locked in a decades-long standoff over Somaliland’s 1991 claim of independence and Mogadishu’s rejection of it, are talking again. Previous efforts at dialogue have repeatedly failed, with both sides fundamentally at odds over Somaliland’s claim to sovereignty. This impasse, in turn, has bled into disputes over territory, the management of resources and security cooperation. Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, has worked to cajole Somalia’s President Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” and Somaliland President Muse Bihi to come back to the table, as have U.S. and EU officials. In a surprise move, the two leaders convened in the Djiboutian capital on 14 June. While the talks produced no meaningful progress on sovereignty questions, the resumption of dialogue provides a basis to improve cooperation on a number of important technical matters relating to international aid, airspace management and security cooperation. The parties should pursue further work in these areas, recognising that the time to tackle the big issues that divide them will likely not come until after both have held forthcoming elections.

From Deadlock to Dialogue

Relations between Somalia and Somaliland are both influenced by and of significant concern to a wide range of outside parties. Competing Gulf actors have tightened their ties to both sides, increasing tensions, while governments from Addis Ababa to Washington see the bad blood between Mogadishu and Hargeisa as a threat to their interests and to regional stability. Among other things, fraught relations contribute to active militarisation of border areas, imperil regional cooperation in combating Al-Shabaab and complicate collaborative arrangements to address security around the Red Sea.

Against this backdrop, outsiders have played a central role in getting the parties back to talks after a five-year hiatus. It has taken some coaxing. Abiy hosted Farmajo and Bihi for a face-to-face meeting in Addis in February 2020, but Somaliland resisted a proposed follow-up meeting among the three in Hargeisa. Officials from the Somaliland side noted to Crisis Group that they viewed the proposal as precipitous – especially given concerns that Farmajo might use the visit to make claims about Mogadishu’s sovereignty over Somaliland, which would have been negatively received by the public. Hargeisa also read Abiy’s proposal as a sign that he was not attuned to their sensitivities. In mid-June, however, Somaliland’s president agreed to sit down with his counterpart in Djibouti. One Somaliland diplomat who spoke to Crisis Group suggested that it was not just Abiy’s pressure that did the trick. Hargeisa agreed to take part after a sustained push from the U.S., which together with the EU was also trying to facilitate a return to the table.

The talks are a welcome development. Tensions have been building between Mogadishu and Hargeisa, and delaying a return to the table had the potential to make matters worse. Mogadishu’s relationship with Somaliland, frosty ever since the latter broke away from Somalia in 1991, has suffered in recent years as the federal government sought to curtail Somaliland’s relations with international actors on a number of fronts. In 2018, Mogadishu rejected the continuation of a special arrangement that permitted international assistance to flow directly to Somaliland instead of via the federal government, and in 2019 Somalia assumed airspace control from the International Civil Aviation Organization, which as a specialised UN agency had previously managed the airspace of both Somalia and Somaliland. This move reversed a previously negotiated plan that would have established a joint regulatory body in Somaliland’s capital, with Hargeisa and Mogadishu sharing the revenues accruing from overflights.

At the same time, there have also been positive developments that may have helped set the stage for the Djibouti meeting. In early 2020, Somalia made significant progress on international debt relief, to the point where in March it cleared its arrears to the World Bank, allowing it access to concessional financing. Insofar as Mogadishu will now have the capacity to seek direct assistance from international financial institutions that can benefit Hargeisa, the latter has a major incentive to improve bilateral working relations to secure its portion. For Mogadishu’s part, comments to Crisis Group from government officials and diplomats involved in the talks suggest a growing sense that in order for Somalia to make advances on key state-building priorities, such as finalising its still-unratified provisional constitution, it will need to participate in addressing Somaliland’s political status.

There are limits to what Farmajo and Bihi will be willing to put on the table, as both likely will be preoccupied by political developments at home.

There is an important wrinkle, in that the June talks came just as both sides face forthcoming polls. With Farmajo’s term ending in February 2021, Somalia is heading into what is expected to be an intense electoral cycle, with elections anticipated for the end of 2020. Pre-election power games have already contributed to parliament’s 25 July ouster of Prime Minister Ali Khayre, a potential rival to Farmajo. Somaliland is also overdue for parliamentary elections, now planned for 2020 as well. While they are likely to be less dramatic than the leadership contest in Mogadishu, these polls may present a tough challenge for Bihi’s ruling Kulmiye party, particularly given unresolved divisions stemming from its victory in the 2017 presidential race (the results of which were initially contested). The bottom line is that there are limits to what Farmajo and Bihi will be willing to put on the table, as both likely will be preoccupied by political developments at home and hesitant to expend political capital on compromises that could antagonise nationalist constituents.

The Djibouti Talks

The June talks in Djibouti were the first direct discussions the two sides have held since 2014. The last dialogue round before that, hosted by Turkey, broke down in 2015 after Somaliland became upset at the inclusion in Somalia’s negotiating team of individuals who trace their roots to Somaliland. (Hargeisa views such individuals as undermining its independence narrative by choosing to work for Somalia instead of their native Somaliland.) After the dialogue fell apart, the implementation of various technical agreements also stalled, with the Farmajo administration going back on deals reached by its predecessors as noted above. Neither Turkey’s continued outreach nor meetings arranged by private organisations were able to rekindle the dialogue; instead, Ethiopian, U.S. and EU involvement paved the way for resumed contact.

Significant hype preceded the June meeting, with diplomats telling Crisis Group of the possibility of a major breakthrough, including potentially a “grand bargain” that would address questions around Somaliland’s sovereignty. That aim, however, was unrealistic, and it was not surprising that the summit bypassed the core dispute of Somaliland’s political status and focused instead on improving working relations on technical issues as a prelude to building more political trust. The final ministerial communiqué on 22 June called for the creation of three sub-committees on humanitarian assistance and development aid, security, and co-management of Somaliland’s airspace, all aspects of the relationship that had previously been discussed between 2012 and 2014, but on which no lasting agreement had been hashed out.

In this manner, the Djibouti talks ultimately represent more revival than replacement of the previous Turkish-supported approach, albeit with a shift in external patrons. While Western diplomats expressed disappointment to Crisis Group at the lack of discussion aimed at deeper political reconciliation between the sidesthe outcomes leave ample room for continued, constructive engagement – although sustained outside pressure is likely going to be necessary to ensure that the talks maintain momentum.

The Facilitators

In recent years, outside governments and groups with an interest in reconciliation between Somalia and Somaliland have wrestled with the question of who might take the lead in trying to bring the sides back to the table. Tensions between Turkey, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on the other, have meant that certain Gulf actors would likely contest Ankara’s leadership of the process. The African Union might have been a plausible choice to lead discussions, especially if backed by a “group of friends” that would include both sides’ key external partners, but Addis Ababa tends to pursue peacemaking initiatives in the Horn without a great deal of multilateral involvement. In the end, it was a combination of Ethiopian diplomacy and donor pressure from Washington and Brussels that moved the needle. In each case, there was a clear motivation.

For Ethiopia’s prime minister, Abiy Ahmed, there is both a political and policy logic to efforts to close the divide between Somalia and Somaliland. At the political level, Abiy is besieged at home by surging factionalism and violence. A visible diplomatic success would burnish his image. The role he played helping broker the recent talks is a reminder of the work he has done to forge peace agreements in the region – notably between Ethiopia and Eritrea – which helped earn him the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.

Ethiopia maintains strong interests in a smooth relationship with Somaliland.

At the policy level, Ethiopia also has specific geopolitical interests in an improved Somalia-Somaliland relationship. At different times it has gravitated to each of Hargeisa and Mogadishu. Although most recently, Addis Ababa has tended to embrace Mogadishu and give it explicit support, Ethiopia maintains strong interests in a smooth relationship with Somaliland. Its Berbera port, in which Ethiopia maintains a 19 per cent stake, could be a key outlet for landlocked Ethiopia in its quest for sea access. But it will be harder for Ethiopia to achieve this objective if Somaliland’s political status remains unresolved and hostility between Hargeisa and Mogadishu continues. Fostering reconciliation would help ensure that Ethiopia’s economic involvement in Berbera is in step with its overall deepening political relationship with Somalia. More broadly, ending the rift between Hargeisa and Mogadishu would serve Abiy’s goal of expanding economic integration in the Horn of Africa region.

As for the U.S., its ambassador to Somalia, Donald Yamamoto, a veteran diplomat in the Horn, has been a keen supporter of the talks and spearheaded his country’s involvement. U.S. interests revolve around the rising importance of Somaliland’s location near Bab al-Mandab, where the Red Sea empties into the Gulf of Aden, the likelihood that large oil deposits lie off Somalia’s coast, and mushrooming competition with China and Russia in the Horn and elsewhere.

Complementing Washington’s efforts, the European Union also pressed for talks, reflecting the EU’s longstanding interest in the security and stability of the key Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean shipping lanes.

For both Washington and Brussels, Somaliland’s unresolved status represents a loose end. To the extent that it is not tied up, it could allow other external actors to exploit uncertainty about the Somalia-Somaliland relationship to the detriment of a wide range of U.S. and EU interests, while complicating cooperative attempts at regional security.

Hurdles and Challenges

While the talks are a step in the right direction for Somalia-Somaliland relations, they face sizeable obstacles.

One relates to the distractions created by impending elections. Already, follow-up on the items to which the parties agreed in Djibouti has been delayed. The joint sub-committees on humanitarian assistance and development aid, security, and co-management of Somaliland’s airspace were due to meet two weeks from the talks’ conclusion – meaning at the beginning of July. This deadline has passed, and Mogadishu is asking for more time to prepare. The date for a ministerial meeting that the parties had agreed to hold in Djibouti 45 days after the June talks (so at the beginning of August) for purposes of reviewing progress has consequently also slipped. The delays demonstrate how election-related hurdles in Somalia – most immediately, the selection of a new prime minister and the next round of discussions over election modalities among major Somali election stakeholders in Dhusamareb, scheduled for mid-August – will impede progress.

Another challenge that Mogadishu will have to face is how to accommodate various domestic demands and expectations.

Another challenge that Mogadishu will have to face is how to accommodate various domestic demands and expectations. In particular, the Djibouti talks triggered tensions between Mogadishu and Puntland, a semi-autonomous federal region of Somalia that shares a border with Somaliland. Puntland’s leaders (whose relations with the Farmajo administration are already strained) feel that Mogadishu is giving short shrift to a long-running dispute over the Sool, Sanaag and Cayn areas at the border between the two regions, parts of which may be rich in untapped oil. A Puntland official also complained to Crisis Group that the delegation to Djibouti did not include a representative from either Puntland or the contested areas, unlike previous dialogues with Somaliland under Somali Presidents Sheikh Sharif and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. Puntland’s president, Said Deni, vowed that his administration would not respect the outcome of any discussions in which it is not involved, and a group of traditional leaders from Sool, Sanaag and Cayn also issued a statement condemning the talks. If their concerns are not addressed in future rounds of talks, they could fester and emerge as major point of contention.

Still, the overarching challenge remains the divergence between Mogadishu’s views of the future and Hargeisa’s, especially when it comes to Somaliland’s sovereignty. Both leaders gave opening speeches in Djibouti that highlighted their starkly opposed positions. Bihi laid out the case for Somaliland’s independence and talked about the legacy of “state-sponsored genocide” perpetrated against the Somaliland people by the Siad Barre government in Somalia – referring to the former Somali dictator’s brutal campaign to repress Somaliland’s dominant Isaaq clan after they rebelled against Somalia in the late 1980s. Farmajo in turn referenced the historic Arta peace process in Djibouti in 2000, which paved the way for the re-establishment of central governance in Somalia, but in which Somaliland conspicuously did not participate – an intimation of Mogadishu’s desire to resurrect its union with Somaliland. More than just public posturing, the speeches reflected how the parties approached the talks, with Somaliland focusing on technical matters and opportunities for greater cooperation, and Somalia wanting to discuss knottier issues relating to unification.

What Happens Now?

Especially given the distractions of forthcoming electoral cycles, leaders in both Somaliland and Somalia will find it difficult to resolve their longstanding differences relating to Somaliland’s status in the short term. Some of these differences will continue to be prominently displayed. Indeed, Somaliland has appeared eager to take advantage of the attention created by the talks and present itself internationally as a sovereign state. Since Djibouti, it has hosted high-level delegations from Kenya, Egypt and Ethiopia, all of which discussed upgrading the status of their relations with Somaliland, and announced that it would exchange representatives with Taiwan.

Still, the momentum generated by the Djibouti talks need not be squandered. Continuing to seek progress on technical areas of cooperation – for example, encouraging the joint technical subcommittees to keep meeting to hammer out details – while holding off on wider political discussions until the spectre of domestic politics no longer overshadows the dialogue, could be a good way forward, at least pending elections. Also key to success is continued international support, which will be needed to keep this newly emerging phase of dialogue on track. The U.S., EU and Ethiopia should keep up the pressure – potentially in coordination with an expanded range of partners, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development regional bloc and the African Union. Following the conclusion of elections, those same actors should be prepared to lean on the parties to re-engage with a deeper exploration of political issues in mind.

Achieving progress in Somalia-Somaliland talks will require a commitment from Mogadishu, Hargeisa and the international community.

Ultimately, achieving progress in Somalia-Somaliland talks will require a commitment from Mogadishu, Hargeisa and the international community to address the difficult status issues that have eluded resolution to date. Until the time is riper for those discussions, however, the parties and their external partners should manage expectations, work through the technical issues that are in front of them and keep talking.

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