Report 174 / Africa 04 May 2011 苏丹执政党的分裂与对国家未来稳定的威胁 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Full Report (en) Also available in English 简体中文 English 执行摘要 在南苏丹将于2011年7月9日正式脱离苏丹的时候，北苏丹存在的问题不会发生什么改变。国民大会党（NCP）还没有解决苏丹长年冲突的根源，却已然加剧了民族和地区分裂。面临安全、政治、社会和经济的多重挑战，党内在选择何种前进道路上有着深刻的分歧。大会党的安全强硬派认为这些都是次要问题，不对他们的存在产生迫在眉睫的威胁，所以继续以军事手段解决长期的不稳定。其他人则呼吁以党内改革——一个“第二共和”来解决大会党的问题，但对于解决国家问题则没有什么想法。大会党已经动用其安全机构镇压叛乱，决意结束关于苏丹多样性和身份认同的争论，继续致力于为所有苏丹人民保持阿拉伯伊斯兰身份认同，坚持伊斯兰教教法，并且准备将关键的州进行划分以适应政治大亨们的需要。这些特设决策为持续不断的暴力提供了基础。这些暴力可能难以控制并且会导致国家进一步分裂。 权力现在越来越集中在以巴希尔总统为中心的小集团手中。然而，这种集权并没有反映在武装部队上。巴希尔及其亲密伙伴担心有可能发生政变，所以拆分了安全服务系统，并且变得越来越依赖个人忠诚和部落效忠来继续掌权。同时，他们的政党已在苦苦挣扎，早已失去了战略眼光和政策的一致性。领导层四分五裂，并且更加关注如何继续掌权，所以往往都是对事件做出反应，而非实施经过深思熟虑的国家方案。这可以从纳菲阿（全国大会党组织事务副主席及总统顾问）和塔哈（苏丹第二副总统）之间旷日持久且众所周知的争论中看出。并且，在苏丹自决公投的准备阶段，党内领导者各执一词的言论也是对此最好的说明。最近，重权在握的萨拉赫·戈什被撤职，反映出大会党的内部分裂可能导致党派分裂或政变。 巴希尔、纳菲阿和安全强硬派认为反对党力量薄弱，拒绝了他们呼吁召开更具包容性的宪法会议，以便在南苏丹7月独立后起草一个永久宪法的要求。他们认为自己已经控制了达尔富尔的局势，并且认为南部科尔多凡和蓝尼罗河的过渡区不太可能发生冲突。在他们看来，这些地区被分割成块，它们的军队对于喀土穆来说并不是迫在眉睫的威胁，因为南苏丹正专注于其他问题。他们继续追求分而治之的策略，以防止与处于主导地位的全国大会党相抗衡的统一力量的出现。塔哈和其他更加务实的盟友则愿意与其他政治力量进行谈判，但却受到安全强硬派的阻挠。他们也似乎仍将致力于让大会党继续在所有仍旧属于苏丹的地区推动阿拉伯伊斯兰身份认同。而对于一个仍然有着上百个民族和语言群体的国家来说，这只能导致极度分裂。 领导者通过提供诱人的政府职位来回报可以贡献自己选区的政治大亨，以此维持他们的忠诚。由于缺乏问责制，在这一过程中，领导者享有绝对的自由，并为了自身利益而使腐败制度化。各省的省长在各自的辖区内运作着自己的赞助网络。 2005年签订的全面和平协议（CPA）虽然看似成功，但却未能解决导致苏丹内部长期冲突的问题。它的目的是实现国家的“民主变革”。然而，在六年的过渡期内（到七月份正式结束），全国大会党拒绝执行许多有意义的规定，因为这些规定会严重威胁到他们对权力的控制。保持苏丹统一并建立一个稳定、民主的国家的机会已经失去。毫不意外，南苏丹人民在2011年1月投票时选择了分离。 苏丹的其余地区因此仍背负着“苏丹问题”。在这些地区，政府仍然过度关注权力、资源和发展，这都以处于权力边缘的人民为代价，也从而引起了这些人们的愤怒。。在至今还是过渡区的阿卜耶伊、南科尔多凡州和蓝尼罗河地区，以及达尔富尔、东部以及其他边缘地区，一个“新南方”正在出现，继续扰乱大会党的统治。除非有一个更具包容性的政府来解决他们的不满，不然苏丹将面临更多暴力和更加分裂的危险。 反对党呼吁召开一个更为广泛的宪法审查会议，这建议了一条前进的道路。这样一个会议应该被视为一个更广泛的国家协商进程，以适应在过渡区常见的磋商和达尔富尔国民对话。这后面两个进程如果平行举行，将不会引导整个国家走向政治稳定和持久和平。解决治理国家方面的主要问题必须在全国范围内实行。为鼓励这一做法，一个团结的国际社会，特别是非盟、阿拉伯联盟和联合国，必须向全国大会党施压，令其接受一个自由无阻的全国对话，以创建一个国家稳定计划，其中包括建立一个具有包容性的、被广泛接受的宪制安排的明确原则。 喀土穆/内罗毕/布鲁塞尔， 2011年5月4日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report (English) Executive Summary When the South officially secedes, on 9 July 2011, the North’s problems will change little. The National Congress Party (NCP) has not addressed the root causes of Sudan’s chronic conflicts and has exacerbated ethnic and regional divisions. Facing multiple security, political, social and economic challenges, it is deeply divided over the way forward. Its security hardliners see these as minor issues, not imminent threats to their survival, and remain committed to a military solution to chronic instability. Others call for internal party reform – a “second republic” – to address the NCP’s problems but are giving little thought to resolving those of the country. The party has mobilised its security apparatus to suppress any revolts, has decided to end the debate about Sudan’s diversity and identity, remains committed to an Arab-Islamic identity for all Sudanese and keeping Sharia and is ready to sub-divide key states to accommodate political barons. These are ad-hoc decisions that set the stage for continued violence that may not be containable and could lead to further fragmentation of the country. Power is now increasingly centralised in a small clique around President Bashir. However, this centralisation is not reflected in the armed forces. Concerned about a possible coup, he and close associates have fragmented the security services and have come to rely increasingly on personal loyalty and tribal allegiances to remain in power. Meanwhile, their party has been allowed to flounder, having long ago lost its strategic vision and policy coherence. Deeply divided and more concerned with staying in power, the leadership more often reacts to events rather than implements a well-thought-out national program. This is best illustrated by the protracted, very public dispute between Nafie Ali Nafie (NCP deputy chairman for organisational affairs and presidential adviser) and Ali Osman Taha (second vice president of Sudan) and the wildly diverging statements made by party leaders in the run-up to the South’s self-determination referendum. The recent dismissal from his posts of the formerly powerful Salah Gosh reflects divisions within the NCP that have the potential to lead to the party’s collapse or a coup. Bashir, Nafie and the security hardliners have concluded that the opposition parties are very weak and reject their call for a more inclusive constitutional conference to draft a permanent constitution after the South secedes in July. They think they have the situation in Darfur under control and discount the possibility of conflict in the transitional areas of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile, believing that those regions are divided, and their military forces are not an imminent threat to Khartoum now that the South is focused on other issues. They continue to pursue divide and rule tactics to prevent the emergence of a unified counterweight to NCP dominance of the centre. Taha and more pragmatic allies are willing to negotiate with other political forces but are undermined by the security hardliners. They also seemingly remain committed to the party’s goal of imposing an Arab-Islamic identify on all of what remains of Sudan – an extremely divisive issue in a country that still includes hundreds of ethnic and linguistic groups. In the absence of accountability, the leadership enjoys absolute freedom and has institutionalised corruption to its benefit, in the process rewarding political barons who can deliver their constituencies by giving them lucrative government positions to maintain their loyalty. The governors of each state run their own patronage network within their respective regions. Despite the seemingly successful conclusion of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the accord has failed to resolve the issues that drive chronic conflict in Sudan. It was intended to lead to the “democratic transformation” of the country. However, during its six year interim period (to end formally in July), the NCP resisted meaningful implementation of many provisions, because they would seriously threaten its grip on power. The opportunity to maintain Sudan’s unity and to establish a stable, democratic state was lost. Not surprisingly, Southerners chose separation when they voted in January 2011. The remainder of the country thus remains saddled with the “Sudan Problem”, where power, resources and development continue to be overly concentrated in the centre, at the expense of and to the exasperation of the peripheries. A “new south” is emerging in the hitherto transitional areas of Abyei, Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile that – along with Darfur, the East and other marginal areas – continues to chafe under the domination of the NCP. Unless their grievances are addressed by a more inclusive government, Sudan risks more violence and disintegration. The call by the opposition parties for a wider constitutional review conference suggests a way forward. Such a conference should be seen as a more extensive national consultative process, to accommodate the popular consultations in the transitional areas and the Darfur people-to-people dialogue. Those latter two processes, if run separately, will not lead to political stability and lasting peace in the whole country. The cardinal issue of governance must be addressed nationally. To encourage this, a united international community, particularly the African Union (AU), Arab League and the UN, should put pressure on the NCP to accept a free and unhindered national dialogue to create a national stabilisation program that includes defined principles for establishing an inclusive constitutional arrangement accepted by all. Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 4 May 2011 Related Tags Sudan More for you Q&A / Africa A Breakthrough in Sudan’s Impasse? Op-Ed / Africa The U.S. Must Raise the Stakes for Sudan’s Coup Leaders Up Next U.S. Congressional Testimony / Africa Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.