Briefing 76 / Africa 23 November 2010 协商苏丹南北未来局势 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Full Report (en) Also available in English 简体中文 English 概述 苏丹脆弱的《全面和平协议》(CPA)已进入执行最后阶段，关于南方自治的决定性投票也日渐迫近，但目前关于如何在公投后建立建设性的南北关系奠定还没有任何基础。除了《全面和平协议》内少数绩优项目外，无论公投的结果如何，苏丹南北都必须对未来一系列问题进行协商，包括公民身份、国籍、自然资源管理(石油和水资源)、货币、资产和负债、安全和国籍条约。目前，苏丹国内和国外的大部分焦点都集中在确保公民投票在2011年1月9日按计划举行，但公投后的大量问题如何达成一致尚未得出解决方案。这不仅对苏丹的和平过渡和长期稳定至关重要，也会为达成双方认可的全民公投这一直接目标扫清道路。 在停滞了数月之后，非洲联盟关于苏丹问题高级别执行小组与美国联合发起的协商谈判在最近几周再次陷入僵局。然而，要消除全面和平协议中的政党隔阂仍需诸多努力，但时间已所剩无几。在公投之前不可能就所有公投后的细节完全达成一致，但若对公投后的南北关系缺乏基本蓝图，则将导致南北各自未来政治和经济局势的不确定性，公投也很有可能被沦为一场毫无结果的游戏，引发人们关于公投顺利实施并被民众接受问题的忧虑。 此次全民公投无疑会撼动苏丹政治体系。因此，为具体解决公投后各类与苏丹人民息息相关的问题，各方正在紧锣密鼓地筹划一项具体协议。这一协议应保证建立相应机制，保证各方2011年1月到7月（甚至7月以后）继续保持协商。《全面和平协议》将在7月过期，而若南方如预期般通过公投脱离北方，则届时也可能希望实现独立。目前，这一正在审议中的框架包括一系列普遍原则，对未来将进行的磋商具有指导意义。 距离公投只剩不到7个月的时间，但协商的进展状况令人担忧。各政党之间的不信任感仍然很强烈，而且在阿卜耶伊地位问题上争端亟待解决，导致政治环境进一步复杂化。考虑到边缘政治这一苏丹南北政治长期以来的特点，可以推想各政党在最后时刻大肆讨价还价之前也许只会继续无为地兜圈子。这种高风险的博弈会导致苏丹及该地区局势动荡，应尽量避免。 由于目前公投前的选民登记工作已经展开，破坏者阻碍大选的机会正迅速减少。一些全国大会党(NCP)的官员已经表现出他们可能会因为分治的出现而辞职，但是执政党仍可以以技术理由驳回公投结果或不承认南方独立。当朱巴的苏丹人民解放运动(SPLM)为南方自治权博取国际支持大声疾呼时，全国大会党只是静待时机。它可以继续阻挠关于公投后各项问题的协商，其最爱使用的伎俩就是在最后时刻运用政治杠杆，敲诈苏丹人民解放运动和国际社会，为全国大会党对公投的支持赢得而做出大幅妥协和让步。 南部苏丹的自治权受到《全面和平协议》的保证，应继续全力确保2011年1月9日的投票顺利进行。目前取得的进展可能会带来一系列双赢的安排，为公投扫除障碍，缓和公投结果的潜在影响。 Download pdf to continue reading the full report (English) I. Overview Sudan’s fragile Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is entering its final phase, and a critical vote on Southern self-determination looms, but foundations for a constructive post-referendum relationship are yet to be laid. In addition to a handful of outstanding CPA items, future arrangements on citizenship and nationality, natural resource management (oil and water), currency, assets and liabilities, security and international treaties must be negotiated, regardless of the referendum’s outcome. Many in Sudan and abroad are focused on ensuring the referendum exercise takes place on 9 January as planned. But simultaneously pursuing agreement on the broader post-referendum agenda is not only critical for a peaceful transition and long-term regional stability, but may also serve the more immediate objective of clearing the path for a mutually accepted referendum. After months with little progress, the African Union (AU) High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and the U.S. jump-started stalled negotiations in recent weeks. But considerable work remains to bridge the gaps between the CPA parties, and time is short. Details of all the post-referendum arrangements cannot, and need not, be negotiated before the vote. But the absence of a basic blueprint for the post-2011 relationship between North and South contributes to uncertainties about the political and economic future of each, risks the referendum being viewed as a zero-sum game and thus sustains fears about the smooth conduct of the exercise and acceptance of its result. The referendum is sure to shock Sudan’s political system. Thus, efforts have intensified to achieve a framework agreement that addresses, in concrete terms, those post-referendum issues that will have an immediate impact on the population. Such an agreement should also ensure that a mechanism is firmly in place so that negotiations can continue beyond January – up to (and possibly beyond) July 2011, the date on which both the CPA expires, and the South might expect to attain independence, if it votes for secession, as expected. The framework currently under consideration also espouses a series of general principles within which to frame future discussions. But with less than seven weeks until the vote, the pace of negotiations is cause for concern. Mistrust between the parties remains high, and the still unresolved issue of Abyei complicates the political environment. Given the political brinkmanship that has long characterised Sudan’s North-South politics, it is conceivable that the parties might continue to circle fruitlessly before attempting to strike a grand bargain at the last moment. Such high-stakes gambling risks instability in Sudan and the region, and should be discouraged. As voter registration for the referendum is now underway, the chances for spoilers to derail the exercise are diminishing fast. Some National Congress Party (NCP) officials have shown signs that they may be increasingly resigned to the reality of partition, but the ruling party could still contest the results on technical grounds or withhold its recognition of an independent South. As the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) in Juba clamours for international safeguarding of the South’s right to self-determination, the NCP waits. It could continue to stymie negotiations on post-referendum arrangements, preferring to employ its leverage at the eleventh hour in an attempt to extort significant concessions from the SPLM and the international community in exchange for their endorsement of the referendum. Southern Sudan’s right to self-determination is guaranteed by the CPA, and efforts must continue to ensure smooth conduct of the 9 January poll. But progress now toward a series of win-win arrangements could also remove obstacles to the referendum and temper the potential impact of its result. Juba/Khartoum/Nairobi/Brussels, 23 November 2010 Related Tags Sudan More for you Q&A / Africa A Breakthrough in Sudan’s Impasse? Op-Ed / Africa The U.S. Must Raise the Stakes for Sudan’s Coup Leaders Up Next U.S. Congressional Testimony / Africa Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.