搀假的达尔富尔选举 和全国大会党取得苏丹大选胜利的后果
搀假的达尔富尔选举 和全国大会党取得苏丹大选胜利的后果
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Briefing 72 / Africa

搀假的达尔富尔选举 和全国大会党取得苏丹大选胜利的后果

概述

苏丹执政党全国大会党目前的当务之急是赢得2010年4月11~13日的大选,因此,该党已经对人口普查和选民登记过程动了手脚,制定了于己有利的选举法,改划了选区,收买了部落。虽然这些行径遍及苏丹,但在达尔富尔尤其猖獗。达尔富尔是全国唯一仍处在紧急状态法治下的地区,因此政府可以为所欲为。由于整个选举程序漏洞百出,国际社会应联合非洲联盟高级别执行小组,声明选举的获胜者将可能缺乏合法性;敦促各方在选举后立即重启达尔富尔和平谈判;坚持在达尔富尔和平协议中加入重新举行人口普查、选民登记和全国大选的条款;最后,为南苏丹自治公决的和平进行及公决后的南北关系重建作好铺垫。

早在2008年,全国大会党在主持人口普查时,就暴露了操控选举的企图。掺水的人口普查结果进而被用作划分选区、分配国民议会和省级议会席位及组织选民登记活动的依据。在大会党组织者的帮助下,人口普查人员不遗余力地登记达尔富尔南部(居民大多为阿拉伯人)的支持者、北部的游牧民和其他拥护大会党的部落成员。另外,达尔富尔危机迫使许多人背乡离井,此后许多乍得和尼日尔移民迁入到逃难者曾经的居住地。有报告说,普查人员将这些新移民也登记入册,并发给他们身份证明让他们可以像苏丹公民一样投票。而另一方面,住在难民营的约260万国内流离失所者、城市“不安全”社区内仇视政府的人群及叛军控制区的人口大多没有被登记。

南达尔富尔是苏丹人口第二大省,而北达尔富尔人口排全国第五,因此达尔富尔地区对全国大会党至关重要。即使根据2008年不准确的人口普查结果,达尔富尔三省人口总数也占到全苏丹人口数的19%,仅稍次于南苏丹。苏丹国民议会总共有450个席位(如果议会批准全国大会党同南部第一大党——苏丹人民解放运动达成的协议,那么总席位将增至496个),达尔富尔地区分到了86个。因此,大会党必须在达尔富尔取得压倒性胜利才能在北部获得足够的选票以保持其统治地位。

全国大会党通过种种伎俩获得了选举优势地位。首先,尽管苏丹人民解放运动和其它政党提出了抗议,大会党一手遮天制定了选举法。其次,选区的划分是按照2008年人口普查的结果来进行的。再次,由于大会党党员遍布选举委员会的各个部门,所以负责选区划分的委员会也在大会党的控制之下。因此,在大会党支持者占多数的地域,选区有所增加,而在其支持者占少数的地域,选区有所减少。

达尔富尔的选民登记程序同样偏向全国大会党。国际和国内观察员均报道说,在冲突中成为袭击目标的人群,尤其是国内的流离失所者,没有登记机会或者拒绝登记。登记组时常故意不给这些群体足够的时间和信息进行登记,而另一方面却在边远地区竭尽所能地注册拥护政府的游牧民。大会党组织人员也不遗余力地帮助潜在支持者和新移民注册。而且虽然有违全国选举委员会规定,派驻边缘地区的治安保卫人员也被登记在册。最后,大会党还收买当地领袖,并且利用民族关系进一步挑起矛盾。该党以金钱和职位为诱饵换取部落和社区领袖的支持,作为回报,这些首领动员辖区的选民支持执政全国大会党几乎胜利在握,但后果对达尔富尔却不堪设想。由于大量人群被剥夺了选举权,他们将进一步脱离社会。而对这些边缘化的人群来说,不公的选举将产生不具合法性的政府官员,和平改变现状的希望将更加渺茫,因此他们中的许多人将寄希望于叛乱组织来夺回失去的权利和土地。

在理想的情况下,应在和平协议谈判结束,人口普查、选民登记和选区划分中的问题得到纠正以后,再进行选举,但这一理想很难实现。总统奥马尔·巴希尔遭到国际刑事法庭起诉,因此大会党急于使他的地位合法化,而且苏丹人民解放运动也担心推迟选举会危及2011年1月的南苏丹自治公决。为了限制选举作弊给结束南北冲突的《全面和平协议》和达尔富尔和平进程带来的危害,必须采取以下步骤:

  1. 在苏丹的选举观察团将严重不公的选举程序记录在案。其它国家和国际组织,尤其是联合国安理会和非洲联盟和平与安全理事会,声明获胜者缺乏真正的民主授权。
  2. 国际社会同非洲联盟高级别执行小组紧密合作,要求《全面和平协议》得到实施,及选举后立即重启达尔富尔和平谈判;坚持在达尔富尔和平协议中加入重新举行人口普查、选民登记和全国大选的条款。
  3. 非盟、联合国、东非政府间发展组织及其它《全面和平协议》的赞助者应在选举后立即采取行动,敦促苏丹政府和南苏丹政府商定关键步骤以保障2011年1月的南苏丹自治公决和平举行,并维护公决后南、北苏丹的稳定。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔, 2010年3月30日 

Overview

The principal preoccupation of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is to win the elections now scheduled for 11-13 April 2010. It has manipulated the census results and voter registration, drafted the election laws in its favour, gerrymandered electoral districts, co-opted traditional leaders and bought tribal loyalties. It has done this all over Sudan, but especially in Darfur, where it has had freedom and means to carry out its strategy, since that is the only region still under emergency rule. Because of the fundamentally flawed process, the international community, working closely with the African Union High Level Implementation Panel for Sudan (AUHIP), should acknowledge that whoever wins will likely lack legitimacy; press for Darfur peace talks to resume immediately after the elections; insist that any Darfur peace deal provides for a new census, voter registration and national elections; and lay the groundwork for a peaceful referendum on southern self-determination and post referendum North-South relations.

One indication of the NCP’s long-term plans to rig the elections was the management of the 2008 census. The flawed results were then used to draw electoral districts, apportion seats in the national and state legislatures and organise the voter registration drive. Census takers – aided by NCP party organisers – expended great efforts to count supporters in Southern Darfur (mostly inhabited by Arabs), nomads of Northern Darfur and some tribes loyal to the party. They also reportedly counted newcomers from Chad and Niger, who had settled in areas originally inhabited by persons displaced in the Darfur conflict, and issued them identity papers so they can vote as Sudanese citizens. However, most of the estimated 2.6 million internally displaced (IDPs) living in camps, as well as people from groups hostile to the NCP living in “insecure” neighbourhoods of cities and the population of rebel-controlled areas were not counted.

Darfur is important for the NCP because Southern Darfur is the second most populous state and Northern Darfur is the fifth. The three Darfur states combined have 19 per cent of Sudan’s population (according to the flawed 2008 census), slightly less than the South. Darfur has been allocated 86 seats out of 450 in the national assembly (the latter number may increase to 496, if the assembly approves an agreement the NCP reached with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, SPLM, the dominant party in the South). Winning big in Darfur is thus central to the NCP’s hopes of capturing enough votes in northern Sudan to ensure its continued national dominance.

The NCP was able to gain advantages by dominating the drafting of election laws, despite opposition from the SPLM and other parties, and through the demarcation of favourable new electoral districts based on the flawed census results and organised by a National Elections Commission (NEC) heavily influenced by NCP members appointed to its various branches. As a result, constituencies have been added in areas where NCP supporters are the majority and removed in areas where they are not.

The voter registration process in Darfur also favoured the NCP. According to national and international observers alike, many groups targeted in the conflict, especially IDPs, were unable to register or refused to do so. In many instances, people were deliberately denied sufficient time and information, while teams worked hard in remote areas to register nomads who support the government. NCP party organisers aggressively helped register likely supporters and new immigrants; security personnel deployed in remote areas were registered in contravention of the NEC regulations. Lastly, the NCP has co-opted local leaders and played the ethnic card, further polarising the population. It has used money and offers of positions of power to buy the loyalty of tribal and community leaders, who in turn have been mobilising their constituencies to support the ruling party.

The result is an almost certain victory for the NCP. And the consequences for Darfur are catastrophic. Disenfranchising large numbers of people will only further marginalise them. Since the vote will impose illegitimate officials through rigged polls, they will be left with little or no hope of a peaceful change in the status quo, and many can be expected to look to rebel groups to fight and win back their lost rights and lands.

Ideally, elections would be held after a peace deal has been negotiated and the problems with the census, voter registration and demarcation of electoral districts resolved. However, this is not likely. The NCP is desperate to legitimise President Omar al-Bashir, who has been indicted by the International Criminal Court, and the SPLM fears any delay may risk jeopardising the South’s January 2011 self-determination referendum. To contain the damage from rigged elections to both the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that ended the North-South conflict and the Darfur peace process, therefore, it is necessary that:

- electoral observation missions in Sudan take note of the severely flawed process, and governments and international organisations, especially the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council, state that whoever wins will lack a genuinely democratic mandate to govern;

- the international community, working closely with the AUHIP, demand that CPA implementation and Darfur peace negotiations resume immediately after the elections, and any new peace deal in Darfur include provisions for a new census and voter registration drive in the region and new national elections at that time; and

- the AU, UN and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as well as other key international supporters of the CPA act immediately after the election to encourage the Khartoum government and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) to agree on the critical steps needed to ensure a peaceful self-determination referendum in the South in January 2011 and stability in both North and South in the aftermath of that referendum.

Nairobi/Brussels, 30 March 2010

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