苏丹:从地区视角看南方独立的前景
苏丹:从地区视角看南方独立的前景
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Report 159 / Africa

苏丹:从地区视角看南方独立的前景

执行摘要

距南苏丹举行民族自治公决还有八个月,其结果很可能是脱离北方。要实施《全面和平协议》中还未落实的条款任务繁多而时间紧迫。协议的总体目标——“使团结更具吸引力”——已然惨遭失败,因此目前看来,绝大多数南苏丹人民独立的决心已定。苏丹局势一触即发,而一个新的独立国家将可能诞生,因此地区邻国对苏丹事态倍加关注。要保障地区和苏丹的和平稳定,苏丹邻国必须支持公决并尊重其结果。

地区内最关键的国家包括肯尼亚、乌干达、埃塞俄比亚和埃及。另外,厄立特里亚和利比亚也很重要。如果公决程序可信且符合《全面和平协议》的条款和苏丹过渡宪法,并得到喀土穆北方政府的认可,那么地区各国和《全面和平协议》其它各签约国都会顺理成章地承认南苏丹为新的独立国家。但如果公决未能按计划发生——尤其是在北方当局企图操纵、推迟公决举行或否认其结果的情况下——地区各国和机构则须考虑如何采取适当的对策来保护《全面和平协议》和民族自决权,从而避免新的冲突爆发。目前这方面的准备工作还很欠缺。

各毗邻国家的利益都与苏丹局势息息相关。南北苏丹无论是和平分离或重燃战火,各邻邦都会受到直接影响。虽然它们对苏丹的分和意见不一,但如果南苏丹自治公决正常举行,各邻国可能支持公决并尊重其结果。但如果公决被扰乱,各国制定对策时,虽然会首先考虑南苏丹人民的决定,但也会权衡各自的战略利益。尽管最终的决定将因局势和事态的发展而定,但从对历史关系、近期交往和战略利益的分析能略知地区重要国家的立场。

肯尼亚曾主办并领导由政府间发展管理局组织的苏丹和平进程,《全面和平协议》由此产生,因此肯尼亚尤其希望看到协议得到落实。而且如果南苏丹发展成为可观的市场,并建设包括石油输送系统在内的基础设施,那么作为地区经济强国的肯尼亚必将受益。长期以来,肯尼亚成功地做到了支持南苏丹却不反对北苏丹,但由于其亲南立场日益彰显,肯尼亚同喀土穆政府的外交关系开始变得紧张。

乌干达毫不含糊地支持南方独立,因为该国希望独立的南苏丹能为自己的北部边界提供一个缓冲地带,尤其是希望将上帝反抗军拒之门外。双边贸易在近几年长了三倍,使南苏丹成为乌干达产品的最大进口方。虽然乌干达的官方立场是尊重《全面和平协议》和南苏丹人民的意志,但坎帕拉的部分政府官员却在私下鼓动南方独立。

埃及支持苏丹统一,甚至可以说为苏丹民族团结所做的努力比苏丹政府还要多。埃及曾反对在《全面和平协议》谈判中讨论民族自决,并提出了一套以团结为前提的方案。埃及担心一个新的国家——尤其是一个不稳定的国家——会导致地区动荡,并危及珍贵的尼罗河水源的供应,因此埃及最近加紧了防止苏丹分裂的外交努力。

虽然埃塞俄比亚支持南苏丹的立场很明显,但它需要同时平衡多重利益,因此在南苏丹独立问题上很谨慎地走中立路线。由于北苏丹的伊斯兰教主义分子扰乱稳定,危及埃塞俄比亚和地区安全,因此该国曾在九十年代向南苏丹人民解放运动提供军事支持以抵抗北部。一方面索马里局势变化莫测,与厄立特里亚僵持不下,另一方面内政不稳,内外夹击下,埃塞俄比亚的首要顾虑是保护地区稳定。因此该国既不能让苏丹重燃战火,也不能激怒北方当局使之成为新的敌对邻邦。埃塞俄比亚支持民族自决也会尊重南部独立的决定,但如果公决发生变故,它更可能会寻求地区共同立场,而不会独自出头作出任何困难的决定。

利比亚的外交事务向来由穆阿迈尔·卡扎菲一人执掌,其苏丹政策也不例外,而且这位常口无遮拦的上校的立场一如既往地让人难以捉摸。虽然他曾几次承诺支持南苏丹独立,却又警告南方政府建立一个新国家将会有重重风险。厄立特里亚在南苏丹独立问题上的立场也同样不可靠。阿斯马拉的厄立特里亚政府及军队在上次苏丹内战中曾为苏丹人民解放军/运动及其它反政府组织提供重要援助,同时还主张更换喀土穆的苏丹政权,但伊萨亚斯·阿费沃尔基最近的行动表明其政策动机自保多于原则。由于厄立特里亚在地区和广大国际社会越来越受到孤立,盟友不断减少,而且急需经济资助,因此已经与苏丹当局冰释前嫌。

自治公决将在《全面和平协议》所规定的六年过渡期结束前六个月举行。如果南苏丹决定自立门户,那么此后半年内必须化解所有与独立有关的争端,并完成南苏丹成为独立国家的转变。虽然苏丹政府开始使用务实口吻,但并不能排除其试图推迟或者扰乱公决的可能。苏丹人民解放运动和地区邻邦都不希望南苏丹单方面宣布独立。解放运动很清楚这样做的风险,因此努力避免这种局面发生。但在走投无路的情况下,南苏丹也会铤而走险。

如果任意一方背弃《全面和平协议》,那么双方将可能重新开火,而整个地区将无疑受到影响,并且某些国家将被迫出兵。此类局势必须避免。如果公决被取消,或者其结果引发争议,那么地区各国必须谨慎权衡对策,包括考虑是否承认南苏丹为独立国家。国际社会将根据非洲联盟的意见来调整对策。政府间发展管理局和非盟必须协调政策。发展管理局成员国将可能是首批就公决后南苏丹地位提出政策建议的国家,但只有取得非盟的合作及支持,才能给予独立后的南苏丹最大化的合法性。非盟本质上是一个支持团结的机构,但由于其地位举足轻重,争取非盟对南苏丹的承认将是不可忽视的任务。可以由非盟高级别执行小组牵头来说服53个成员国支持既成事实。

地区各国应敦促南北苏丹共同参与公决的实际操作及其结果的和平实施,从而为可能发生的南苏丹独立做准备。步骤之一是坚持2010年3月政府间发展管理局峰会公报的倡议,呼吁苏丹于2010年5月前建立公决委员会并重申对公决时间表的支持。准备工作应包括:明确制定程序,以在南苏丹选择独立的情况下给予官方承认;同时制定应对其它情况——包括单方面宣布独立——的相应措施。如果公决程序或结果引发争端,地区各国应协同非盟高级别执行小组和政府间发展管理局保障南苏丹民族自决的权利得到充分尊重,并就实施公决结果的程序达成共识。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2010年5月6日

Executive Summary

South Sudan is just eight months away from a self-determination referendum that will likely result in its secession from the North. Much remains to be done to implement the outstanding elements of Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), and time is running out. The agreement’s underlying aim of “making unity attractive” has failed, and most Southerners thus appear determined to choose independence. Neighbouring states are increasingly focused on the fragile circumstances in Sudan and the likelihood of a newly independent state in the region. Support from Sudan’s neighbours for the referendum process and respect for its result will be crucial to ensuring peace and stability in the country and the region.

Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Egypt are among the immediate regional states that matter most, as well as Eritrea and Libya. If a credible referendum is held in accordance with the CPA and the Interim National Constitution, and Khartoum endorses the process, recognition of a new Southern state should prove relatively uncomplicated for the region and CPA signatories more broadly. If, however, the process does not go according to plan – particularly if Khartoum attempts to manipulate, deny or delay the exercise or its result – regional states and institutions will need to consider how best to respond to ensure respect for the CPA and the right of self-determination and to avoid a new conflict. Not enough planning is being done in this regard.

Each border state has interests at stake and will be directly affected by either peaceful separation or a return to conflict. Despite differing views on unity, all are likely to accept the referendum on self-determination and honour its outcome, provided it goes ahead as planned. While the decision of the South Sudanese is paramount, strategic considerations will undoubtedly play a role in how each state responds if the process is disrupted. Responses will depend largely on circumstances and events, but an assessment of historical relationships, recent engagement and strategic interests sheds light on the positions of the key regional actors.

Having hosted and led the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) peace process that yielded the CPA, Kenya has a particularly strong interest in seeing it implemented successfully. As the economic powerhouse in the region, it stands to benefit from the development of a considerable market and major infrastructure in the South, including as a conduit for oil. Kenya long managed to be pro-South without being anti-North, but diplomatic relations with Khartoum have shown signs of strain as its Southern leanings have become increasingly clear.

Uganda, the most unambiguous supporter of independence, seeks a stable buffer on its northern border, not least to ensure that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency does not return to its doorstep. Trade has tripled in recent years with the South, which is now the largest importer of Ugandan goods. While the official policy is respect for the CPA and the will of the Southern people, some officials in Kampala are privately encouraging independence.

Egypt prefers unity and has arguably done more than Khartoum to make it attractive. It opposed including self-determination in the CPA talks, preferring instead to promote its own initiative premised on unity. It has recently redoubled diplomatic efforts to prevent partition, in part because it fears a new state – and an unstable one at that – could pose a threat both to regional stability and its precious supply of Nile water.

While its support to South Sudan is evident, Ethiopia has multiple interests to balance, so it is careful to toe a neutral line on independence. It provided military support to the SPLM in the 1990s, in part to counter Islamist elements in Khartoum whose destabilizing activities posed a threat to Ethiopian and regional security. Regional security remains its primary concern, given the volatile situation in Somalia, continued confrontation with Eritrea and its own domestic fragility. Addis can afford neither renewed war in Sudan nor to antagonise Khartoum, lest it find itself with another hostile neighbour. It supports the right of self-determination and will respect independence but is more likely to seek a common regional position than be out front on any difficult decisions if the process is derailed.

As with other foreign policy issues, Libya’s Sudan policy is driven personally by Muammar Qaddafi, and unsurprisingly, the outspoken Colonel has proven unpredictable on this issue. While he has several times pledged support for Southern independence, he has also cautioned Juba on the dangers of forging a new state. Eritrea’s position on Southern independence is likewise unreliable. During the last civil war, Asmara and its army provided critical backing to the SPLA/M (Sudan People’s Liberation Army/
Movement) and other opposition groups in Sudan, supporting regime change in Khartoum. However, Isaias Afwerki’s recent actions indicate that his policy may be driven more by self-preservation than principle. Increasingly isolated in the region and beyond and in need of economic assistance, Asmara’s dwindling list of allies has led it to a rapprochement with Khartoum.

The referendum is to be held six months before the end of the CPA’s six-year Interim Period. If Southerners choose to go their own way, it is during the ensuing half-year window that any disputes over, as well the transition to, independence must be resolved. While pragmatic tones are emerging in Khartoum, attempts to delay or derail the exercise are not out of the question. Neither the SPLM nor its regional supporters want a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). The SPLM is aware of the risks that would accompany it and is working hard to avoid such a scenario. But if pushed into a corner, the possibility of UDI is very real.

If either side abrogates the CPA, a return to conflict is likely and would undoubtedly affect the region and draw in some of its militaries. This must be avoided. Regional actors will face a delicate task in calibrating their response if the referendum is denied or its result contested, including the possibility of extending recognition to the South. The broader international community will seek to adjust its response in light of African opinion. Policy coherence between IGAD and the African Union (AU) is crucial. IGAD’s members will likely be the first to make any recommendations regarding Southern Sudan’s post-referendum status, but ensuring AU participation in, and ultimate backing of, that policy is crucial if an independent South is to secure maximum legitimacy. The weight of the AU – an instinctively pro-unity institution – and the importance of its recognition cannot be ignored. The AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) can play a leading role in lining up the body’s 53 member states in support of realities on the ground.

Regional states must prepare for South Sudan’s possible independence by engaging Khartoum and Juba on practicalities of the referendum and peaceful implementation of its outcome. This includes insistence per the March 2010 IGAD summit communiqué calling for the referendum commissions to be established by May 2010 and reiterating firm support for the referendum timeline. Preparations should include clear modalities for extending official recognition to the South if it votes for independence and developing policy responses to alternative scenarios, including UDI. In the event of disputes over the referendum or its result, regional states should engage the AUHIP and IGAD to ensure the right of self-determination is fully respected and modalities for implementation of its outcome are agreed.

 Nairobi/Brussels, 6 May 2010

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