苏丹冲突蔓延(一):南科尔多凡州的战争
苏丹冲突蔓延(一):南科尔多凡州的战争
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Slideshow: War in South Kordofan
Slideshow: War in South Kordofan
Report 198 / Africa

苏丹冲突蔓延(一):南科尔多凡州的战争

执行摘要

南科尔多凡州(South Kordofan)的战争没有很快结束的迹象。这场战争与1984-2002年的内战有很多相似之处,但是又有很大的区别。与当年相比,如今的叛乱力量--总部在努巴山区的苏丹人民解放运动(北方局)(Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North,SPLM-N)有着更好的武装,苏丹国内的民族分歧也不像当年那么明显。SPLM-N也是达尔富尔反政府武装联盟苏丹革命阵线(Sudan Revolutionary Front,SRF)的一部分,SRF正致力于将其它地区的一些武装团体纳入旗下,这些武装团体对政府抱有的幻想已经破灭了。阿拉伯部落以前曾输送过大批青壮年男子,这些人成为了当时战斗的主力军,而现在这些部落不再全心全意地支持政府,许多人加入了与喀土穆对抗的团体。这场冲突处处显示着一种战略僵持,陷入僵持的各方都希望来自外界的压力会改变对手的打算。然而,战争的确造成了可怕的伤亡,殃及的主要是平民。除非苏丹政府和SRF能在国际社会的帮助下进行接触,通过谈判达成一个全面解决苏丹国内多个冲突的方案,否则这个国家遭受的战祸将永无休止。

这场冲突的根源仍然和过去一样——政治边缘化、强占土地以及未兑现承诺。但是,民族动态已经有了重要的改变。米塞里亚(Misseriya)阿拉伯人在第一次战争期间是政府在当地的主要支持者,但是他们对喀土穆已经日渐失望,2005年政府废除代表单一种族家园的西科尔多凡州的决定更是让他们失望。政府号召他们再次动员起来,对此他们无动于衷,许多米塞里亚年轻人正在加入SPLM-N或SRF中的其他组织。南科尔多凡州另一个主要的阿拉伯部落哈瓦马(Hawazma)也正开始改变立场。

SPLM-N与努巴战士非常不同。努巴战士很勇敢,但几乎没有反抗喀土穆在20世纪90年代发起的圣战。SPLM-N要强大得多,拥有多达30,000名士兵,武器装备更精良、数量更多。该组织所控制的领土也比以往努巴部队所控制的要多得多,同时它还是SRF联盟的核心组成部分,SRF联盟正从多个方面对中央政府施压。与上一次内战相比,政府也在南科尔多凡州拥有更多的军队--人数在40,000和70,000之间--和更精密的装备。所有迹象表明,冲突进入了一个恶性僵持阶段,政府无法赶走盘踞在努巴山区的叛军,SPLM-N和其盟军也无法在低地地区控制很多领土。

政府军又退回到了以前那种熟悉的模式——打击一些涉嫌支持叛乱分子的社区,以防止SPLM-N成员混迹在周围的平民中间。因为无法耕种土地,政府又禁止对叛乱分子控制的地区实施人道主义援助,许多平民被迫逃离了家园。根据可靠的消息来源,超过70万平民受到冲突的影响,其中43.6万人在叛乱地区内流离失所,约6.6万人则成为了南苏丹(统一国家)的难民。

任何一方都没有强大到足以取得军事胜利。通过谈判达成解决方案是唯一可行的办法。战火重燃的原因是因为2005年签署的《全面和平协议 》(Comprehensive Peace Agreement,CPA)的关键条款没有得到执行,特别是政府曾承诺为解决长久以来的民族不满情绪要进行全民协商,这一点政府并没有做到。2011年6月28日的《框架协议》包含了政治和安全方面的安排,这个协议是阻止不断上升的冲突的最后一博,却未被强硬派所接受。

从那以后,喀土穆和SPLM-N之间的谈判大范围瘫痪,双方在关于冲突范围上的分歧是造成目前僵局的一个主要问题。反政府武装越来越坚持要有一个国家议事日程,而中央政府和南科尔多凡州的政治领袖则更愿意把注意力放在战争的区域性层面。SPLM-N试图通过要求在国家层面进行谈判和要求更具包容性的参与来提高筹码,它提出这个要求也遵守了它与SRF中的其他成员组织所达成的协议。同样,SPLM-N也正在与法定反对党进行更紧密的合作。2013年1月5日在乌干达首都坎帕拉,SRF与全国共识力量(National Consensus Forces,NCF)--由苏丹所有主要反对党和一些公民社会团体组成的联盟--签署了《新黎明宪章》(New Dawn Charter)。同SRF的计划一样,NCF也主张通过协调的暴力方式和非暴力方式实现具有包容性的过渡。从SRF的角度来看,这个宪章还解决了反对派武装最大的缺陷——即缺乏中央政权的支持。

SRF的这个创新可能会迫使国际社会把苏丹的各种危机视作一个整体来处理,而不是寻求一种局部的(并且经常会胎死腹中的)迅速解决办法。政府与不同的反对派组织在不同时期通过谈判达成了权力分享安排,这种零零碎碎的安排经常导致了更进一步的反叛——这些反叛的唯一目的是从喀土穆获得更有利的让步。如果谈判只是部分解决了外围地区的政治边缘化问题,那么达尔富尔地区和青尼罗河州要求民族自治的呼声会日渐高涨,虽然目前这种呼声只局限在上述两个地区,但在南科尔多凡州也开始出现类似声音。政府的强硬派倾向于相信在联邦制问题上做出让步和给予更大的自主权会导致分裂,但是他们应该认识到,他们如此害怕的要求分裂的呼声,其出现和延续的源头正是由于政府缺乏灵活性。

本文是研究苏丹外围地区冲突蔓延的系列报告中的第一篇。要结束多个冲突,建立持久和平,需要一个全面的解决方案,包括在治理方面进行更广泛的改革和在国家层面开展具有实际意义的对话。鉴此,危机组织最近一篇关于苏丹的报告《选择大刀阔斧的改革还是更多的战争》(Major Reform or More War)(2012年11月29日)中提出的许多建议都是关于如何解决南科尔多凡州长年的冲突的。将SRF纳入这个冲突的解决进程中来会迫使它从一个纯粹的军事联盟演变成为一个更具代表性和更善于用言语进行表达的政治运动组织,也就是说从一个战争工具演变成为和平工具。国际社会行为体,尤其是联合国安理会、非洲联盟和平与安全理事会和阿拉伯国家联盟理事会应当把SRF的各成员组织(包括SPLM-N)作为一个整体来进行接触而不是分别接触,并鼓励他们试着为苏丹的未来提出一个共同的政治立场。

内罗毕⁄布鲁塞尔,2013年2月14日

Executive Summary

The war in South Kordofan shows no sign of ending anytime soon. There are echoes of the 1984-2002 civil war, but the dynamics are quite different. The insurgents, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) based in the Nuba Mountains, are much better armed, and the state’s ethnic cleavages are much less pronounced. The SPLM-N is also part of an alliance with Darfur rebels, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), that is working to include disenchanted armed groups from other regions as well. Arab tribes that previously supplied militias that did much of the fighting no longer support the government wholeheartedly; significant numbers have joined groups fighting Khartoum. The conflict shows every sign of strategic stalemate, with each side hoping pressure from elsewhere will change its foe’s calculations. Yet, it is exacting an horrendous toll, principally among civilians. Unless the government and the SRF engage each other and, with international help, negotiate a comprehensive solution to Sudan’s multiple conflicts, there will be no stop to endless wars that plague the country.

The root causes of the conflict – political marginalisation, land dispossession and unimplemented promises, remain the same. But ethnic dynamics have changed in important ways. The Misseriya Arabs, the government’s main local supporters during the first war, have grown increasingly frustrated with Khartoum, in particular its 2005 decision to abolish the West Kordofan state that represented the tribe’s ethnically homogenous homeland. They no longer heed the government’s calls to remobilise, and many young Misseriya are joining the SPLM-N or other groups in the SRF. The other major Arab tribe in the state, the Hawazma, is also starting to switch sides.

The SPLM-N is far different from the Nuba fighters who bravely but barely resisted Khartoum’s jihad in the 1990s. It is much stronger, with as many as 30,000 soldiers, better weapons and a large stockpile of arms. It also controls much more territory than the Nuba force ever did and is part of – and central to – the SRF alliance that is pressuring the central government on multiple fronts. The government also has more troops in South Kordofan, ranging between 40,000 and 70,000, and more sophisticated equipment. All indications suggest the conflict has settled into a vicious deadlock in which Khartoum is unable to dislodge the rebels ensconced in the Nuba Mountains, and the SPLM-N and its allies are incapable of holding much territory in the lowlands.

Government forces have fallen back on their familiar pattern of striking at communities suspected of supporting the rebels, so as to prevent the SPLM-N from living off the surrounding civilian population. Unable to farm, and with the government preventing humanitarian access to insurgency-controlled areas, many civilians have been forced to flee. According to credible sources, more than 700,000 of them are affected by the conflict, including 436,000 displaced within the rebel areas and some 66,000 as refugees in South Sudan (Unity state).

Neither side is strong enough to win militarily. A negotiated solution is the only viable solution. The war restarted because key provisions of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in particular the promised popular consultations to address long-held grievances, were not implemented. A last ditch attempt to stop the spiralling conflict, the 28 June 2011 Framework Agreement that included political and security arrangements, was unacceptable to hardliners.

Since then, negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLM-N have largely stalled, with division over the scope of the conflict being a major part of the impasse. While the rebels have increasingly asserted a national agenda, the government, as well as local political leaders, prefer focusing on the local dimensions of the war. In asking for negotiations with a national scope and a more inclusive participation, the SPLM-N is not only trying to raise the stakes; it is also respecting agreement with its SRF partners. Likewise, it is coordinating more closely with the official opposition. On 5 January 2013 in Kampala, Uganda, the SRF signed a “New Dawn Charter” with the National Consensus Forces (NCF), the coalition of all Sudan’s main opposition parties and some civil society groups. Like the SRF program, it advocates an inclusive transition, obtained through coordinated violent and non-violent actions. From the SRF’s point of view, the charter also addresses the armed opposition’s biggest deficit, its lack of support at the centre.

The SRF’s creation is perhaps forcing the international community to address Sudan’s crises as a whole, instead of pursuing localised quick (and often still-born) fixes. Piecemeal power-sharing arrangements, negotiated at different times with divided rebel factions, often encourage further rebellion with the sole aim of obtaining more advantageous concessions from Khartoum. If negotiations only partially address the political marginalisation of peripheries, calls for self-determination, still limited in Darfur and Blue Nile but vocal in South Kordofan, will increase. Government hardliners tend to believe that concessions on federalism and greater autonomy could lead to separatism, but they should realise that it has been the centre’s inflexibility that created and has sustained those very demands for secession they so fear.

This report is the first in a series looking at the spreading conflict in Sudan’s peripheries. Since a comprehensive solution, including broader governance reform and meaningful national dialogue, is necessary to end the multiple conflicts and build a durable peace, many of the recommendations in Crisis Group’s most recent Sudan report, Major Reform or More War (29 November 2012), are relevant for solving chronic conflict in South Kordofan. The SRF’s inclusion in the processes outlined therein would force it to evolve from a purely military alliance to a more representative and articulate political movement – from an instrument for war to a vehicle for peace. Instead of engaging with SRF components, including the SPLM-N, individually, international actors, especially the UN Security Council, AU Peace and Security Council and Council of the League of Arab States, should engage with them as a whole and encourage their attempts to present a common political position on the future of Sudan.

Nairobi/Brussels, 14 February 2013

Slideshow / Africa

Slideshow: War in South Kordofan

Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (I): War in South Kordofan is the first report in a series that analyses the roots of the conflicts that continue in Sudan’s peripheries despite the secession in 2011 of South Sudan. The South Kordofan fighting resumed that same year and shows no sign of ending anytime soon.

This slideshow contains a selection of photos from Jérôme Tubiana, Crisis Group's Sudan Analyst, as he travelled throughout the region in early 2012.

Slideshow: War in South Kordofan CRISIS GROUP/Jérôme Tubiana © All RIGHTS RESERVED

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