苏丹蔓延的冲突(II):青尼罗州的战争
苏丹蔓延的冲突(II):青尼罗州的战争
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Slideshow: War in Blue Nile
Slideshow: War in Blue Nile
Report 204 / Africa

苏丹蔓延的冲突(II):青尼罗州的战争

执行摘要

青尼罗州战争造成的后果是令人震惊的,大约有三分之一的国家人口需要人道主义援助,其中包括在南苏丹和埃塞俄比亚的约15万难民,以及国内约20万流离失所或受到战乱严重影响的人民。2011年9月战火重新点燃,这是由于矛盾的根本原因——苏丹中心地区权力和资源的高度集中是以牺牲周边地区为代价的——尚未根据2005年《全面和平协议》(CPA)得到解决。这场战争使得在喀土穆长期执政的全国大会党(NCP)和领导人民赢得了南苏丹独立的苏丹人民解放运动/军(SPLM/A)这两个宿敌相互斗争,但却并没有为青尼罗州赢得人们所期望的独立自主权。在地方和国家层面上的冲突比以往任何时候都更为错综复杂,只有当局与武装和非武装反对派势力之间展开真正全面的民族和谈,才能彻底解决问题,结束冲突。

青尼罗州是“苏丹的缩影”,聚居着种类众多的族群社区,“土著居民”与阿拉伯和非阿拉伯“新移民”之间分歧深刻。该地区长期以来被边缘化,其自然财富大多集中在喀土穆的少数精英手中,权力相对集中,资源也未经再分配。这是苏丹众多冲突的主要原因。许多人希望《全面和平协议》能带来国家统治方式的转型,但全国大会党和苏丹人民解放运动都没有全力以赴进行改革以使“团结变得更具吸引力”,也没有通过改革阻止南苏丹的自治。青尼罗州和南科尔多凡州“这两个地区”都没有得到改革的授权,取而代之的是《全面和平协议》中提到的含义模糊的“全民协商”。2011年,“全民协商”机制允许76,000名青尼罗州公民倾诉苦水,苏丹人民解放运动借此来推动“自治”。“全民协商”工作原定于2011年7月南苏丹独立之前完成,但在该期限之后,全国大会党的权力分享比以往任何时候都更加勉强,更不用说允许地方自治。

苏丹人民解放运动北部分支(SPLM-N)在2011年7月后应该成为反对党,但它仍然保留有军队,喀土穆想将这些军队迅速驱逐或解除武装。恰恰因为这点导致南科尔多凡州和青尼罗州重燃战火。在非洲联盟(非盟,AU)和已故埃塞俄比亚总理梅莱斯·泽纳维的斡旋下,2011年6月26日,全国大会党和苏丹人民解放运动北部分支在最后一刻匆忙达成了框架协议,但苏丹总统奥马尔·巴希尔却拒绝接受该协议。执政党中的强硬派尤其反对协议中有关达成全国和解的承诺。从那时起,人道主义和政治谈判在很大程度上停滞不前,而国际合作伙伴也搞不清楚应该将两者区分开来或是相互关联。

同南科尔多凡州相比,青尼罗州的苏丹人民解放运动北部分支没有做好战争的准备,同上次战争(1985-2005年)相比,南科尔多凡州的反政府武装这次设法占据了更广阔的领土也获取了更多的武器。而在青尼罗州,反政府武装被迅速驱赶到南苏丹边界,失去了位于埃塞俄比亚边境上的库尔穆克这一占领已久的据点。埃塞俄比亚政府——苏丹人民解放运动/军曾经的支持者——一直拒绝施以援手,而是谨慎地充当中立调停者。迫于国际压力,即使是与苏丹人民解放运动/军历来关系紧密的南苏丹,也不愿意或不能够向人们期望的那样为以前的战友提供支持。

苏丹人民解放运动北部分支现在已经联合苏丹革命阵线(SRF)的达尔富尔反叛势力,制定了比以往任何时候都全面的国家议程。但南科尔多凡州和青尼罗州之间,甚至是青尼罗州内部仍存在分歧,主要集中在冲突是否应该提升到国家层面上。这些分歧正好有利于喀土穆的策略,即限制和谈以及随后的地方事务谈判协议,以阻止核心组织的改革,他们认为这些改革削弱了全国大会党的权力。虽然他们部分支持苏丹人民解放运动北部分支在全民协商过程中呼吁提倡自治权,但包括全国大会党党员在内的青尼罗州的政治精英,对苏丹革命阵线提出的国家议程颇有微词,他们支持的是地方层面的解决方案。然而,地方层面的解决方案却无助于解决青尼罗州冲突的根源,其它地区的冲突也是类似性质。

这份报告是分析苏丹周边冲突蔓延的一系列报告中的第二部分。形成一个全面的解决方案是非常必要的,它应该包括更广泛的执政方式改革和全部反对派武装都参与的有意义的全国对话,只有这样,才能结束众多冲突并建立持久和平。因此,在第一份报告《苏丹冲突蔓延(一):南科尔多凡州的战争》(2013年2月14日)和早先的报告《苏丹:重大改革或战争升级》(2012年11月29日)中提出的许多建议,都与解决青尼罗州的这些超越了地方层面的长期冲突有关。

20世纪80年代以来,苏丹已经成为两种相互对立的模式展开意识形态竞争的主要战场:喀土穆主张国家统一和权力集中,阿拉伯-伊斯兰身份在国家占主导地位,南苏丹的独立使该模式矛盾式复苏;与之对照的是反政府武装——苏丹人民解放运动/军以及现在苏丹革命阵线主张的建立更为包容、权力更为分散的国家。有鉴于此,如何解决青尼罗州过去和现在的冲突,在很大程度上反映了苏丹现在的存在主义困境,即如何最好地定义自己的国家身份。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2013年6月18日

Executive Summary

The war in Blue Nile state has had a horrible impact, with about a third of the state’s population in need of humanitarian assistance, including some 150,000 refugees in South Sudan and Ethiopia and approximately 200,000 displaced or severely affected within the state. It resumed in September 2011 because the root causes – mainly the concentration of power and resources in Sudan’s centre at the expense of its peripheries – had not been resolved by the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The war pits against each other old enemies, the long-ruling National Congress Party (NCP) regime in Khartoum and the northern branch of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) that won South Sudan’s independence, but was not able to achieve as much autonomy as it had hoped in Blue Nile. The conflict’s local and national dimensions are more intermingled than ever, and it will not end conclusively without a truly comprehensive national dialogue between the regime and both armed and unarmed oppositions.

Blue Nile state is a “microcosm of Sudan”, inhabited by an array of communities and deeply divided between “indigenous” and Arab and non-Arab “newcomers”. The area has long been marginalised, its natural wealth mostly enriching elites in Khartoum without them sharing power and redistributing resources. This feature is the main cause of Sudan’s multiple conflicts. Many had hoped the CPA would transform governance, but neither the NCP nor the SPLM focused on the reforms that would make “unity attractive” and prevent South Sudan from pursuing self-determination. Such a right was not granted to the “two areas” of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, and the CPA instead offered vague “popular consultations”. In 2011, the process allowed 76,000 Blue Nile citizens to air their grievances, and the SPLM used this to push for “self-rule”. The consultations were supposed to be finalised before South Sudan’s July 2011 independence, but once that deadline passed the NCP was less inclined than ever to share power, let alone to allow local autonomy.

The SPLM-North (SPLM-N) was supposed to become an opposition political party after July 2011, but it still had troops, which Khartoum wanted to expel or disarm expeditiously. This in particular led to the resumption of war in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. A last-minute deal between the NCP and the SPLM-N, the 26 June 2011 framework agreement, brokered by the African Union (AU) and late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, was rejected by Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Hardliners in his party in particular disagreed with the agreement’s commitment to a national solution. Since then, both humanitarian and political negotiations, with international players confused on whether they should be sepa-rated or linked, have largely stalled.

The SPLM-N in Blue Nile was less prepared for war than in South Kordofan, where the rebels managed to seize more territory and weapons than they ever had during the earlier war (1985-2005). In Blue Nile, they were rapidly pushed toward the South Sudan border and lost Kurmuk, their historical stronghold on the border with Ethiopia. Addis Ababa, a former SPLM/A supporter, has refused to help and cautiously remained a neutral mediator. Even South Sudan, under international pressure, has not proved willing or able to support former comrades as much as might have been expected given their historical ties.

The SPLM-N now has united with the main Darfur rebel movements under the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) with a more than ever national agenda. But divisions remain between South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and within Blue Nile itself, notably over whether the conflict should take a national dimension. Those differences are benefiting Khartoum’s strategy to limit peace talks and subsequent agreements to local issues in order to prevent reform – seen as dilution of NCP power – in the centre. While they partly supported SPLM-N calls for autonomy during the popular consultation, Blue Nile’s political elites, including NCP members, are now critical of the SRF’s national agenda and support a local solution. Yet a local deal is unlikely to address the root causes of the conflict in Blue Nile, which are not different from those of the other regions’ conflicts.

This report is the second in a series analysing the spreading conflict in Sudan’s peripheries. A comprehensive solution, including broader governance reform and meaningful national dialogue involving the whole armed opposition, is necessary to end the multiple conflicts and build a durable peace. Thus, many of the recommendations in the first report, Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (I): War in South Kordofan (14 February 2013) and the preceding, Major Reform or More War (29 November 2012), are relevant for solving chronic conflict in Blue Nile, which goes beyond local dynamics.

Since the 1980s, the state has become a major battleground for the ideological competition between two opposed models: Khartoum’s attempts at unifying and centralising the country with a dominant Arab-Islamic identity, which South Sudan’s separation is paradoxically reviving, versus the rebel SPLM/A’s and now SRF’s agenda for a more inclusive and devolved Sudan. Attempts to resolve Blue Nile’s past and current conflicts thus very much reflect Sudan’s existential dilemma as to how best it should define itself.

Nairobi/Brussels, 18 June 2013

Slideshow / Africa

Slideshow: War in Blue Nile

Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile is the second report in a series that analyses the roots of the conflicts that continue in Sudan’s peripheries despite the secession in 2011 of South Sudan. The Blue Nile fighting resumed two months after South Sudan’s independence and shows no sign of ending anytime soon.

This slideshow contains a selection of photos from Jérôme Tubiana, Crisis Group's Sudan Analyst, as he travelled throughout the Blue Nile’s rebel controlled territory earlier last year.

Slideshow: War in Blue Nile CRISIS GROUP/Jérôme Tubiana

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