苏丹冲突的蔓延(三):达尔富尔和平进程的局限
苏丹冲突的蔓延(三):达尔富尔和平进程的局限
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
A Darfur Decade: Ten Years of War
A Darfur Decade: Ten Years of War
Report 211 / Africa

苏丹冲突的蔓延(三):达尔富尔和平进程的局限

执行摘要及建议

达尔富尔的战争已历时十年,而暴力在2013年急剧升级:当地的民兵组织以阿拉伯人为主,本来是政府为了遏制叛乱而武装起来的,但却越来越不受喀土穆的控制,开始自相残杀。最近的战斗又使得将近50万平民流离失所(达尔富尔需要人道主义援助的人口共计320万)。2011年于多哈签署的《多哈达尔富尔和平文件》基本没有得到落实,主要的原因在于,支持该文件的派系在政治和军事方面影响力有限,受到政府的阻挠,获得的国际支持也越来越少。主要的叛乱组织依然活跃,他们组建起了跨区域的联盟,其主张日益扩大到国家事务。如果达尔富尔要建立持久的和平,多个冲突的有关各方就需要在国际社会支持下,建立起更协调一致的办法来同时应对地方上的冲突与全国性的问题——后者需要通过全面的全国对话解决。各方还需要避免零敲碎打的处理方式,接受包容多方的会谈,重新承诺维护苏丹的统一。

这场冲突的根本原因——尤其是地方和中央之间的不平等关系——与造成苏丹其他边远地区(特别是现在独立的南苏丹,也包括南科尔多凡州与青尼罗州)爆发内战的根源问题类似。政府与叛乱分子之间一次次的和平会谈与协议试图以大同小异的方式平息地方上的不满:承诺在政府与安全部队中给予地方(包括叛乱分子)更大的代表权,也承诺更好地分配国家财富,但会谈与协议的落实却存在问题。虽然冲突的原因被认定是全国性的,但解决冲突的方案却未能着眼全国。

从叛乱组织分裂出来的数个派系组成的 “解放与正义运动”与政府签署了《多哈达尔富尔和平文件》,但后续措施并不全面,以向运动成员及其支持者提供政府职位为主。南苏丹独立后,苏丹陷入经济危机,喀土穆兑现资金承诺的能力和意愿都打了折扣。安全方面的措施也被搁置,尤其是解除武装与收编军队,原因是 “解放与正义运动”夸大自身军队人数,而且由于民兵组织越来越不受政府控制,内斗愈演愈烈,政府既无意愿也无能力解除他们的武装。

由于《多哈达尔富尔和平文件》的签署比较仓促,该文件允许各方重新谈判,以便吸纳主要的叛乱组织。但这却遭到了政府以及非盟-联合国联合调解团的拒绝,因为他们还没有做好进一步让步的准备,仍旧希望通过分裂叛乱势力来为协议获取更多的支持。达尔富尔主要的几个叛乱组织与在南科尔多凡州和青尼罗州战斗的“苏丹人民解放运动-北方局”结成了联盟。联盟性组织“苏丹革命阵线”正在科尔多凡州(离喀土穆的距离比离达尔富尔更近)开展联合军事行动,并要求推行国家改革。国际社会基本没有考虑到这些新的现实,他们中许多本应协力寻找全国性解决方案,却依然支持零敲碎打的方法。联合国和非盟虽然表面赞同全面措施的必要性,但仍然以制裁威胁达尔富尔叛乱分子,要求他们加入《多哈达尔富尔和平文件》。达尔富尔地区权力机构是《多哈达尔富尔和平文件》的主要制度成果,这一机构两年之内就会到期,因而该文件对于主要的叛乱组织来说已经不再具有吸引力。

经济危机分散了政府的精力,国际社会也将注意力聚焦在南苏丹内战上,但在达尔富尔和平进程上,各方现在需要解决零散与全面两种方法之间的分歧,确定哪些是地方问题,哪些是全国问题,且应当通过全面综合的方案加以解决。2013年中以来,联合国-非盟达尔富尔特派团新任联合首席调解员及负责人穆罕默德·伊宾·钱巴斯表示愿意采取这样的做法,但他缺乏清晰授权,难以回应叛乱分子日益强烈的全国性要求。

由南非前总统塔博·姆贝基领导的非盟高级别小组将2009年的冲突称为“苏丹在达尔富尔的危机”,但为了寻求捷径,而且因为缺乏苏丹政府的支持,这一解决思路遭到摒弃。多哈进程的范围与议程依然不清晰。《多哈达尔富尔和平文件》虽然试图将谈判限制在地方问题上,但也包括了一些只有在全国范围内讨论实施才有意义的条款,比如施政改革,更加平等地分享权力与资源,以及通过平权措施缩小中央与边远地区之间的社会经济差距。

这类议题对于加入“苏丹革命阵线”的达尔富尔叛乱分子来说十分重要。如果叛乱分子能够参与和平的全国对话,甚至加入过渡政府,那么上述议题也会为此类对话创造条件。执政的全国大会党无疑需要参与这一进程,而其全面性和最终的成功与否取决于奥马尔·阿尔-巴希尔总统。如果全国大会党和巴希尔同意实施大刀阔斧的改革,达到了具体、不可逆的指标(比如危机组织最早在2009年列出的那些指标),并继续在过渡进程上取得可核实的进步,国际社会就可以通过提供激励措施援助苏丹。这可能会推迟当下正在进行的有关巴希尔是否犯有暴行罪的法律程序,但如果要结束几十年的长期冲突,甚至要挽救苏丹的统一,这样的举措就必不可少。因此,这可能是《国际刑事法院罗马规约》第16条规定的例外情况。

本文是分析苏丹冲突蔓延的系列报告中的一篇。这一系列的前两份报告于2013年发布,2012年我们也发布过一份支持广泛全国对话与改革的报告,之前的这些报告中提出的许多建议也适用于解决达尔富尔持久的冲突,而这一冲突的动因已超出了地方范畴。

The violence in Darfur’s decade-old war spiked in 2013, as the mostly Arab militias initially armed by the government to contain the rebellion increasingly escaped Khartoum’s control and fought each other. Recent fighting has displaced nearly half a million additional civilians – in all 3.2 million Darfurians need humanitarian help. The Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) signed in Qatar in 2011 is largely unimplemented, notably because it was endorsed by factions with limited political and military influence, blocked by the government and suffered fading international support. The main insurgent groups remain active, have formed an alliance that goes beyond the region and increasingly assert a national agenda. If Darfur is to have durable peace, all parties to the country’s multiple conflicts, supported by the international community, need to develop a more coherent means of addressing, in parallel, both local conflicts and nationwide stresses, the latter through a comprehensive national dialogue; eschew piecemeal approaches; embrace inclusive talks; and recommit to Sudan’s unity.

The roots of the conflict, especially unequal relations with the centre, are similar to those of civil wars that other Sudan peripheries have experienced, in particular now independent South Sudan but also South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Successive peace talks and agreements between government and rebels try to address grievances in similar ways, promising greater representation, including for rebels, in government and security forces and better distribution of the national wealth, but implementation is flawed. While causes are recognised as national, solutions are not.

The government signed the DDPD with the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), an umbrella group of rebel splinter factions, but follow-through was only partial, mainly by giving government positions to LJM members and supporters. With the country in economic crisis since South Sudan’s separation, Khartoum’s ability and willingness to fulfil its financial pledges to Darfur have been limited. Security arrangements, particularly disarmament and integration, have stalled over LJM’s highly inflated troop numbers, as well as government reluctance and incapacity to disarm militias that are increasingly beyond its authority and fighting among themselves.

Because the DDPD was rushed to conclusion, it was to be open to renegotiation so the main rebel groups could join, but this was repudiated by the government and joint African Union (AU)-UN mediation, which were not ready for further concessions and sought more support for the agreement by splintering the rebels. The main Darfur groups allied with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. The umbrella Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) now carries out joint military operations in Kordofan (closer to Khartoum than Darfur) and demands national transformation. Internationals have largely not taken account of the new reality. Instead of working cohesively on a national approach, many still support piecemeal solutions. The UN and AU threaten Darfur rebels with sanctions for not joining the DDPD, even as they ostensibly agree a comprehensive approach is needed. As its main institutional achievement, the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA), expires in less than two years, the DDPD is no longer attractive to the main rebels.

Even though the government is distracted by its economic crisis, and the international community is focused on the civil war in South Sudan, there is present need to resolve the contradiction between the piecemeal and comprehensive approaches to peace in Darfur, to look at what is local and what is national and should be transferred to a more comprehensive process. Since mid-2013, the new joint chief mediator and head of the UN African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), Mohammed Ibn Chambas, has shown willingness to do so, but he lacks a clear mandate to reply to the rebels’ increasingly national demands.

The AU High-Level Panel led by former South African President Thabo Mbeki described the conflict in 2009 as “Sudan’s crisis in Darfur”, but that approach was abandoned due to expediency and absence of Sudanese government support. The scope and agenda of the Doha process remained unclear. While trying to limit negotiations to local issues, the DDPD included provisions that only made sense if discussed and implemented nationally, such as governance reform, more equitable sharing of power and resources and affirmative action to reduce the socio-economic gap between the centre and peripheries.

Such issues are important to the Darfur rebels who joined the SRF, and they offer opportunity for a peaceful national dialogue, if the rebels are included in it and possibly in a transitional government as well. The ruling National Congress Party (NCP), of course, needs to be part of the process as well; President Omar al-Bashir is a key to how comprehensive and ultimately successful it might be. If they agree to radical reform, the international community can help by offering incentives, provided Bashir and the NCP meet specific, irreversible benchmarks, such as those Crisis Group set out as early as 2009, and verifiably continue the transition process.  This might defer the legal process underway to determine whether Bashir is responsible for atrocity crimes, but would be necessary to end decades of chronic conflict – and perhaps save Sudan’s unity. It would, therefore, be the exceptional situation for which Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was devised.

This report continues a series analysing Sudan’s spreading conflicts. Many of the recommendations in its two 2013 predecessors, as well as an earlier 2012 report that likewise argued for broad national dialogue and reforms, are similarly relevant for solving Darfur’s chronic conflict, the dynamics of which are more than local.

Slideshow / Africa

A Darfur Decade: Ten Years of War

This slideshow accompanies the report Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur’s Peace Process, the third report in a series that analyses the roots of the conflicts in Sudan’s peripheries.

The war in Darfur started more than ten years ago and continues to affect civilian populations within western Sudan as well as in neighbouring states, including Chad and the newly formed South Sudan.

For more images from Sudan, see Chroniques du Darfour by Crisis Group's senior Sudan analyst, Jérôme Tubiana.

Slideshow: A Darfur Decade. CRISIS GROUP/Jérôme Tubiana © All RIGHTS RESERVED

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