乌干达: 日益升级的紧张局势解决乏术
乌干达: 日益升级的紧张局势解决乏术
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
The Kampala Attacks and Their Regional Implications
The Kampala Attacks and Their Regional Implications
Report 187 / Africa

乌干达: 日益升级的紧张局势解决乏术

执行摘要

大多数乌干达人的生活比25年前约韦里·穆塞韦尼上任总统时要好过得多。然而 ,频繁的示威游行和暴力镇压表明许多人对于穆塞韦尼政府深感不满,这很大程度上是由于原先基础广泛的宪政慢慢转变为一个以裙带关系为基础的独裁政体所造成的。在这方面,穆塞韦尼虽然没有进行残酷镇压,但还是沿袭了与前任们相似的治理轨迹,。如其前任,穆塞韦尼没能克服使乌干达难于治理的区域和宗教分歧,并且越来越依赖集权化、赡徇制和高压政治来维持统治。除非纠正这一趋势,否则乌干达将愈发难以治理,政治冲突也可能愈发致命。

乌干达沦为英国保护领地,使这个王国间相互竞争的多样化地区以及组织结构较为松散的田园社会合并成为一个单一实体。殖民政策则造成了进一步的分歧。英国殖民者通过委任首领而非惯常的氏族首长进行统治,并以天主教徒和穆斯林为代价与基督新教徒结盟。当局也开始在不同时间不同地区发展经济,其成果现今仍可由诊所、学校的数量和平均财富加以衡量。

乌干达独立后的第一任总统米尔顿·奥博特和伊迪·阿明使由来已久的分歧雪上加霜。均来自乌干达北部的两人经常被指控偏袒自己的地区和部族。他们当政时所拥有广泛的联盟不久就在殖民分裂中覆没,之后他们依靠赡徇制和高压政治继续掌权。在“全国抵抗运动”(NRM)于1986年夺取政权后,穆塞韦尼也似乎首先把国家置于更具包容性的道路上,恢复文官控制、法律和经济增长,创建了受到热情拥护的非党派“民主”体系。详尽的协商进程最终使得具备制衡机制的新宪法在1995年建立。

穆塞韦尼也将奥博特废弃的王国视为文化而非政治实体。1993年布干达的卡巴卡作为文化国王复位,但不拥有任何执行权力,此举被证明是权宜妥协之计而不是稳妥的解决方案。君主制主义者想要的是他们的王国,而不仅仅是他们的国王。他们的目标是联邦制,对土地和税收具有控制权,而穆塞韦尼所希望的分权是建立在地区依赖于中央政府资金的基础之上的,并坚持保留最终权力,他限制卡巴卡影响力的策略导致结果事与愿违。

民主措施在穆塞韦尼执掌政权的头十年之后势头颓减。这位总统没有支持无党派体系成为自由参政的框架,而是开始利用这一体系推动自己的目标。随着时间的推移,他用自己核心集团中所信任的成员替换掉对其政策颇有微词的老政治家和全国抵抗运动(NRM)资深成员,这些新成员通常都来自他的故乡。他还建立了一个忠于他的裙带关系网。 

在2011年的选举中,总统面对着一个强劲对手基扎·贝西杰,他是“全国抵抗军”(NRA)的高级指挥官、穆塞韦尼的私人医生,并身负政府和全国抵抗运动(NRM)的重要职位。他在1999年踏入国家政界。当时,他公开批判政府对民主置之不理并容忍高层官员中的腐败行为。竞选包括相当多的暴力和恐吓活动。当选举委员会宣布穆塞韦尼获胜时,贝西杰要求最高法院否决这一结果。最高法院审理此案的全部五名法官都认为出现过严重违反选举法的现象,但三比二的投票结果使得法官仍维持穆塞韦尼竞选获胜的结果,认为违规现象没有影响选举结果。

穆塞韦尼随即展开新战略以巩固自己的统治地位,虽然这一战略有些自相矛盾,即通过恢复多党民主和消除宪法约束来巩固统治地位。在2003年全国抵抗运动(NRM)的一次会议中,他要求“开放政治空间”以允许竞争各党的参与,减少议会、司法机构和监督机构的权力,并取消对总统只能连任两届的任期限制。2006年选举是首次多党参与竞选的选举。然而,穆塞韦尼利用延长全国抵抗运动(NRM)官方地位直到表决这一漏洞,使全国抵抗运动(NRM)能够既使用自己的组织也使用官方资源,而所有其他政党则限于在宪法全民公决后七个月内重组。而且,贝西杰以强奸和叛国罪被逮捕并监禁,并在竞选的大部分时间被迫出庭。高等法院在选举前一周才驳回了强奸指控,表明起诉严重滥用了法院程序(叛国罪的指控于2010年才被撤消)。

穆塞韦尼在2011年2月第四次成功连任,模式与以前的选举相似,只是暴力现象有所减少。这位总统为其竞选投入了巨额官方资金,而政府和全国抵抗运动(NRM)骚扰了反对派。穆塞韦尼赢得了全国大多数选票,包括在北部首次获得大部分选票,但尚不确定这反映的是他的受欢迎程度还是其资金和其他资源的力量。

重大石油藏量(大约25亿桶)的发现不太可能减少社会和政治紧张局势。石油帮助穆塞韦尼巩固其裙带体系从,确保其统治地位,但也将助长腐败并破坏经济多样化所带来的稳步发展。政府在知道国家将成为一个主要的石油生产国的五年之后,才刚开始将监管体系落实到位。

同时,群众抗议日益增多。尽管遭到暴力镇压,“步行上班”示威抗议——表面上针对高燃油价,但同时也明确地指向穆塞韦尼的统治——仍在坎帕拉和其他城市中心持续进行。2011年10月,议会对石油合同缺乏透明度表示不满,并声称致使部长层待遇丰厚也表明总统并没有绝对控制权。穆塞韦尼越来越无法预见反对之声,其中一些反对甚至来自全国抵抗运动(NRM)的政治家和他自己的核心团体。穆塞韦尼的重新当选、对物质资源的获取、战术技能、转移国际批评和控制国家向石油出口国过渡的能力都表明,他将试图继续巩固个人权力并在一段时期内继续指引乌干达的未来,尽管后果可能影响乌干达的长期稳定。除非穆塞韦尼改变方式,不然事情可能最终仍会失去控制。考虑到乌干达暴力充斥的历史,冲突可能因此愈演愈烈。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2012年4月5日

Executive Summary

Most Ugandans are better off than they were a quarter-century ago, when Yoweri Museveni became president. But frequent demonstrations and violent crackdowns indicate many are deeply dissatisfied with his administration. This is largely the consequence of a slow shift from a broad-based constitutional government to patronage-based, personal rule. In this respect, Museveni has followed a governance trajectory similar to that of his predecessors, although without their brutal repression. Like them, he has failed to overcome regional and religious cleavages that make Uganda difficult to govern and has relied increasingly on centralisation, patronage and coercion to maintain control. Unless this trend is corrected, Uganda will become increasingly difficult to govern and political conflict may become more deadly.

The British Protectorate of Uganda amalgamated a highly diverse region of competing kingdoms and more loosely organised pastoral societies into a single entity. Colonial policies created further divisions. The British ruled through appointed chiefs rather than customary clan heads and allied with Protestants at the expense of Catholics and Muslims. The authorities also began economic development in the various regions at different times, and the consequences can still be measured today in numbers of clinics, schools and average wealth.

Milton Obote, independent Uganda’s first president, and Idi Amin made old divisions worse. Both northerners, they were frequently accused of favouring their region and ethnic groups. They entered office with broad coalitions that soon foundered over colonial cleavages, and turned instead to patronage and coercion to remain in power. After the National Resistance Movement (NRM) seized power in 1986, Museveni also seemed at first to put the country on a more inclusive path, to restore civilian control, rule of law and economic growth. He created a non-partisan “democratic” system that many enthusiastically embraced. An elaborate consultative process led to a new constitution in 1995 with checks and balances.

Museveni also recognised the kingdoms Obote abolished, but as cultural, not political bodies. Restoration of Buganda’s Kabaka as a cultural king without executive powers in 1993 proved an expedient compromise rather than a stable solution. Monarchists wanted their kingdom, not just their king. Their goal was federalism, with control over land and the power to tax, while Museveni wanted decentralisation based on districts dependent on funds from the central government and insisted on keeping final authority. His manoeuvres to limit the Kabaka’s influence backfired.

Democratic initiatives lost momentum after the first decade of Museveni’s rule. Instead of supporting the no-party system as the framework for unfettered participation, the president began using it to further his own objectives. Over time, he replaced old politicians and longstanding NRM members who criticised his policies with trusted members of his inner circle, often from his home area. He also created a patronage network loyal to him.

In the 2001 elections, the president faced a credible opponent in Kizza Besigye, who had been a senior National Resistance Army (NRA) commander, Museveni’s personal physician and occupant of important government and NRM positions. He burst into national politics in 1999, when he publicly criticised the government for losing interest in democracy while tolerating corruption among top officials. The election campaign involved considerable violence and intimidation. When the electoral commission reported that Museveni won, Besigye asked the Supreme Court to nullify the result. All five justices who heard the case agreed there had been serious violations of the electoral law, but by a three-to-two vote they sustained Museveni’s victory, arguing the irregularities had not affected the result.

Museveni then developed a new, although paradoxical, strategy to consolidate his position by restoring multi-party democracy and removing constitutional restraints. At a 2003 NRM meeting, he called for “opening political space” to permit competing parties, reducing the powers of parliament, the judiciary and watchdog agencies – and dropping the two-term presidential limit. The latter proposal conveniently opened the way for him to retain power. The 2006 elections were the first contested by multiple parties. Museveni, however, exploited a loophole that extended the NRM’s official status until the vote, thus enabling it to use its organisation as well as official resources, while all other parties were limited to seven months to organise from scratch after the constitutional referendum. Moreover, Besigye was arrested and imprisoned on charges of rape and treason and forced to appear in court during most of the campaign. A High Court judge dismissed the rape charge only a week before the elections, suggesting the prosecution had badly abused the court process (the treason charge was dismissed in 2010).

Museveni’s fourth-term victory, in February 2011, followed the pattern of earlier elections but was less violent. The president injected huge amounts of official funds into his campaign, and the government and NRM harassed the opposition. While Museveni received majorities throughout the country, including in the north for the first time, it is uncertain whether this reflected more his popularity or the power of his purse and other resources.

The discovery of significant oil reserves (estimated at 2.5 billion barrels) is unlikely to reduce social and political tensions. The oil may ensure Museveni’s control by enabling him to consolidate his system of patronage but also will increase corruption and disrupt the steady growth produced by economic diversification. Five years after learning that the country will become a major oil producer, the government is just beginning to put a regulatory framework in place.

Meanwhile, popular protests are increasing. “Walk to Work” demonstrations – ostensibly over high fuel prices but clearly also directed at Museveni’s rule – continue in Kampala and other urban centres despite a violent crackdown. The October 2011 parliamentary revolt over the lack of transparency in oil contracts and alleged resulting large payments to ministers also suggests the president’s control is far from absolute. Increasingly, Museveni fails to anticipate opposition, some of it from NRM politicians and his inner circle. His re-election, access to material resources, tactical skill, ability to deflect international criticism and ambition to control its transition to an oil exporter suggest that he will try to continue to consolidate his personal power and direct Uganda’s future for some time to come, despite the consequences this may have for long-term stability. Unless Museveni changes course, however, events may eventually spiral out of his control. Considering Uganda’s violent past, conflict might then become more deadly.

Nairobi/Brussels, 5 April 2012

People extinguish fire on cars caused by a bomb explosion near Parliament building in Kampala, Uganda, on November 16, 2021. - Two explosions hit Uganda's capital Kampala on November 16, 2021, injuring a number of people in what police termed an attack on Ivan Kabuye / AFP
Q&A / Africa

The Kampala Attacks and Their Regional Implications

The Islamic State has claimed two suicide bombings in the Ugandan capital Kampala. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Dino Mahtani unpacks what happened and assesses the threat of further such attacks in East Africa.

What happened and who is allegedly involved?

On 16 November, a trio of suicide bombers targeted Kampala, Uganda’s capital city, one detonating his vest outside police headquarters and two more blowing themselves up near parliament. The attacks killed at least four other people, according to official reports, and wounded 37 more, 27 of whom were police officers. As the city reeled from the blasts, security forces hunted down a fourth bomber in north-western Kampala, shooting him before recovering his suicide vest. The police said they had recovered more explosive materials from a safe house the fourth attacker was using in a nearby suburb and were continuing to track other possible members of the “terror groups”. In a statement later that day, President Yoweri Museveni said the attackers were tied to the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), a rebel group that emerged in Uganda in the early 1990s and later fled into the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Its resurgence in the DRC since 2013 has been marked by the killing of thousands of civilians.

Hours after the president’s statement, the Islamic State (ISIS), which now counts the ADF’s largest faction as one of its affiliates, issued its own communiqué via its media agency Amaq, claiming the attacks as its handiwork. ISIS said the attackers were all Ugandan foot soldiers of its so-called caliphate. In recent weeks, the jihadist group and the ADF have been linked to a spate of bombings in public spaces in Uganda. On 8 October, ISIS said it was behind a reported bomb attack against a police station in Kampala. It then claimed responsibility for an explosion in a speciality pork restaurant and bar on the city outskirts on 23 October, which killed one person. Days later, a suicide bomber blew himself up on a bus on the way to the DRC border, injuring a few passengers. Ugandan officials said he was part of the ADF. Earlier in 2021, authorities say, the ADF was also involved in a failed bomb plot targeting a Ugandan general’s funeral and a failed assassination attempt directed at a government minister.

A main suspect in some of the bomb plots, according to Ugandan security officials who have spoken to Crisis Group, is a Ugandan individual, Meddie Nkalubo (known in ADF circles as “Punisher”), who is based in an ADF camp in the eastern DRC from where he coordinates cells in Kampala and elsewhere. In June, UN investigators working under a Security Council mandate covering the DRC reported that several ADF ex-combatants had identified him as the operator of a drone the ADF used in combat against the Congolese military, as well as an important bombmaker for the group. An ADF ex-combatant who worked for him and who has been interviewed by Crisis Group explained that Nkalubo is also an important disseminator of ISIS propaganda and instructional videos to cells not just in Uganda but elsewhere in the region.

In the aftermath of the attacks, Ugandan security forces have deployed large numbers of troops and police and put up several new checkpoints across Kampala. As of Friday morning, police say they have arrested at least 34 people, including six children, who are allegedly connected to the ADF, and have recovered more explosive materials as part of ongoing raids. They say they have killed at least four suspected ADF operatives who were crossing into a Ugandan frontier town facing the DRC. They have also shot dead a Ugandan Muslim cleric, Muhammed Abas Kirevu, at his home outside Kampala. The police say he was an ADF recruiter and was killed after allegedly trying to escape while police tried to escort him into a patrol car. His family have described his killing as “cold blooded murder”. Meanwhile, authorities say they are hunting down another cleric, Suleiman Nsubuga, suspected of recruiting and training fighters, and providing them materials to make bombs. Rights activists have voiced concerns that a broader crackdown could translate into heavy-handed repression which could enable militant recruitment.

How has the ADF evolved while affiliating itself to Islamic State?

Originally composed of both Christian and Muslim fighters, the ADF began as an alliance of rebels seeking to oust President Museveni’s government. Its insurgency was routed by Ugandan troops in the mid-2000s, forcing it to flee to the eastern DRC, where it classed itself as an armed Islamist group. Although its activities are centred in the DRC, the ADF recruits heavily in Uganda, where it draws upon a wellspring of discontent among Ugandan Muslims, who make up roughly 14 per cent of the population according to official estimates. Some Muslims accuse authorities of religious discrimination, as seen in particular in mass roundups of young Muslims after high-profile security incidents.  

For a time, the ADF appeared to have faded away in the DRC, but it has rebounded significantly since 2013, when it embarked on what would turn into a years-long spree of killing civilians and attacking security forces. The group became increasingly active in the run-up to national elections then slated to take place in 2016. During that period, it developed alliances with other local militias and armed groups opposing the state, plus, reportedly, with officers in the DRC’s army, while also taking sides in various local intercommunal disputes, all of which together created fiendishly difficult and bloody conflict dynamics for Kinshasa and the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC to have to bring under control. By the beginning of 2017, however, the ADF had petered out in the group’s stronghold of North Kivu province, as it faced supply and finance shortfalls following a period of intensive pressure from the DRC military. The ex-combatant interviewed by Crisis Group said food supplies were scarce until at least March 2017, after which the group began to recuperate again.

The [Allied Democratic Forces'] resurgence from 2017 coincided with a closer association with ISIS.

The ADF’s resurgence from 2017 coincided with a closer association with ISIS. The group appeared to have established links with Waleed Zein, a Kenyan national now in custody in his home country and sanctioned by the U.S. for his alleged role as a financial conduit between ISIS and the ADF. It also welcomed into its ranks another fighter known as Jundi, whom ADF ex-combatants identify as a Tanzanian national and the man who first brought the ISIS flag to ADF camps. In April 2019, ISIS claimed its first attack in the DRC, carried out by the ADF. Musa Baluku, leader of the group’s largest faction, now appears to be a self-proclaimed ISIS devotee. In a 2020 video seen by Crisis Group and referred to in a report from George Washington University, he stated that the ADF “ceased to exist a long time ago”, adding that he and his fighters, numbering several hundred, were now part of ISIS. A rival faction, made up of no more than dozens of people loyal to Baluku’s predecessor, Jamil Mukulu,  now in custody and on trial in Uganda, is considered by DRC’s security officials to be only a minor threat.

Since 2020, Baluku’s group has also started moving north from its heartland in North Kivu into Ituri province, where violence involving predominantly ethnic Lendu militias has been escalating since 2017. DRC and UN officials say the ADF’s movement in this direction was spurred partly by renewed military operations launched against the group in North Kivu in October 2019. Since entering Ituri, the ADF has attempted to expand its collaborator network in the province. It has tried to recruit from among ethnic Hutu migrants who have settled in large numbers in Ituri’s south and are at odds with other local communities. Some of the latter community leaders have at times helped the DRC’s army track down the ADF. A “state of siege” declared by the DRC’s President Félix Tshisekedi in May, placing provincial authority in North Kivu and Ituri in military hands, has so far failed to stem the ADF’s continued expansion and deadly attacks.

Baluku’s faction appears meanwhile to have benefited from an influx of foreign fighters and advances in its deployment of improvised explosive devices (IED) and use of drones. DRC security officials and the former ADF combatant interviewed by Crisis Group noted that the group has since 2018 absorbed more foreign fighters, including from Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Kenya, and also gave combat training to Mozambican al-Shabab insurgents from Cabo Delgado as late as that year. UN investigators also stated in a June 2021 report that “the involvement of ADF combatants from outside the Democratic Republic of Congo contributed to modest advancements in improvised explosive device construction techniques”, listing Burundians, Kenyans and Tanzanians as especially important to that development. The investigators cited an uptick in the ADF’s deployment of such devices on the battlefield, although many of the bombs are still rudimentary and fail to detonate. They also documented the group’s use of at least two surveillance drones in support of combat operations.

DRC authorities are meanwhile investigating whether a Middle Eastern individual they arrested in September at a location close to ADF camps in North Kivu is affiliated with ISIS in any way. The man was reportedly travelling on a Jordanian passport. After they arrested him, officials in Kinshasa say, they found drone management and bomb-making instructional materials as well as jihadist propaganda among his possessions. They have provided no evidence supporting this claim, however.

How does this all relate to other jihadist threats in the region?

The attack in Kampala comes as officials in other East African countries have begun to raise the alarm, warning of a possible surge in plots involving not just ISIS and its affiliates, but also Somalia’s Al-Shabaab movement, which swears allegiance to al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab has conducted major attacks in Kenya and Uganda over the last decade or so.

In early October, authorities in Rwanda, next door to Uganda, announced that they had arrested thirteen individuals involved in a failed plot to detonate explosives in public spaces in the capital Kigali. Some of the suspects were allegedly found in possession of bomb-making equipment, including wires, nails, dynamite sticks and phones. Rwandan officials had told Crisis Group prior to the Kampala attack that they had obtained evidence that some of those arrested were in communication with Nkalubo. They said it was proof that the plot was connected to the ADF. One of the arrested suspects has reportedly stated that the plotters were looking to punish Rwanda for its military intervention in Cabo Delgado, where its troops deployed in March in support of government efforts to stem the al-Shabab insurrection that ISIS has also claimed as its affiliate in 2019.

Kenyan and Tanzanian authorities ... report observing the return of significant numbers of their nationals who have served in militant groups abroad.

Kenyan and Tanzanian authorities meanwhile report observing the return of significant numbers of their nationals who have served in militant groups abroad. Over the last few years, both countries had clamped down on domestic jihadist networks connected to Al-Shabaab in Somalia. These networks recruited from pools of disillusioned youth in Kenya’s north and along the Indian Ocean coast. Some of those youth fled the crackdowns, especially after 2017, and moved to the ADF or Mozambique’s al-Shabab, where they have been influenced by ISIS propaganda. Following foreign military intervention in Cabo Delgado, security sources say, many of these Kenyan and Tanzanian fighters, the latter of whom have occupied senior positions in al-Shabab, are retreating home.

These fighters’ return via Tanzania has coincided with other significant developments. In August, a lone shooter embarked on a killing spree near the French embassy in the main city of Dar es Salaam. Tanzanian officials are close-mouthed about his origins. Somali intelligence sources, however, say the man was a former member of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab who travelled to Mozambique in 2020 to join militants there. Sources close to the ADF, meanwhile, say the arrested Middle Eastern man mentioned above, prior to crossing into the DRC, had also stopped for nearly two weeks in August in the Tanzanian town of Kigoma, where he may have provided training to East African nationals. Immigration data, seen by Crisis Group, proves his presence there, although Crisis Group has not been able to independently confirm he provided training.

In the last few weeks, Kenya’s security services have issued a number of warnings, including in an official memorandum that was leaked in late October, that both ISIS and Al-Shabaab are looking to unleash fresh attacks along the Kenyan coast. One official told Crisis Group that Al-Shabaab would likely want to compete with ISIS for headlines if it learned that the latter was plotting new operations.

What are the prospects for the Islamic State’s growth in the region?

In March, the U.S. designated the ADF and Mozambique’s al-Shabab as branches of ISIS. It stopped short, however, of recognising these groups as constituent parts of the Islamic State in Central Africa Province, the core group’s preferred name for what it would still like to present as a caliphate with wholly integrated outposts. While fighters from both theatres of war have undoubtedly mingled, they are still pursuing local battlefield objectives under separate chains of command. DRC and Mozambican authorities, however, are worried that ISIS may try and channel more assistance to both of them. Meanwhile, it is claiming ever more attacks committed by the ADF and Mozambique’s al-Shabab on its media channels.

Independent financial investigators and regional authorities confirm that they have identified the transfer of hundreds of thousands of dollars from at least one cell in Kenya to ADF-affiliated individuals in the DRC and Uganda, as well as to unknown persons in Tanzania and Mozambique. Kenyan officials say they are investigating whether the money is connected to ISIS. If the global jihadist group is behind the transfers, it could indicate an attempt to reinforce not just the ADF and al-Shabab, but also the associated networks proliferating IEDs throughout the region.

In the meantime, another ISIS faction seems to be playing a role in the development of both the ADF and Mozambique’s al-Shabab. Al-Shabaab North East (ASNE), a small ISIS faction based in the mountains and coastal areas of north-eastern Puntland facing the Gulf of Aden, has for years built up a reputation as an important trafficker of arms and explosive materials into Somalia via associated clans. One of its commanders, Mohamed Ahmed “Qahiye”, is known by UN investigators and Somali intelligence sources to have travelled to Mozambique in 2020 via Ethiopia to provide training to fighters there. A document seen by Crisis Group dated April 2020 and recovered by security forces from militants in Mozambique also shows their leader reporting battle progress to ASNE. The ADF ex-combatant interviewed by Crisis Group stated that Nkalubo was also in touch with the Puntland faction.

Security officials in Mogadishu and Puntland’s capital Garowe express particular concern about ASNE. It has come under sustained military pressure from both Puntland security forces and Al-Shabaab units in the area, hemming in its movement. Still, it continues to resist and, those officials fear, may use its strategic location facing Yemen to bring in more weapons and fighters, and try to expand and project more influence in Somalia and further afield.

What should regional authorities and their partners do?

The latest attacks in Kampala reinforce the need for governments across the region to tackle what appears to be a multidimensional threat straddling national boundaries. While Ugandan authorities are preoccupied with the latest security operations in the wake of the horrific attacks, they must in the longer term ensure that their responses do not translate into indiscriminate roundups. Security forces must also try and prioritise arrests over shoot-to-kill operations. A heavy-handed approach may simply play into the hands of the ADF, helping it recruit at a time when national political tensions are also simmering after contested elections earlier this year.

Authorities in the DRC and Mozambique need to reduce opportunities for ISIS to finance the groups operating there. In the DRC, Crisis Group has already advocated that the government and UN peacekeeping mission work more closely with communities in ADF-afflicted areas, resolving disputes among them and drawing upon their local knowledge to develop military operations that target the ADF core more precisely. The group’s fighters would be more likely to demobilise if they come under more effective military pressure while also losing any local support they may have garnered. In Mozambique, Crisis Group has pushed the government to complement military operations by deploying the millions of dollars of aid money it has received. The spending is urgent and should be paired with confidence-building dialogue with locals who could help persuade Mozambican militants to defect.

Regional authorities from the Horn of Africa, East Africa and southern Africa also need to come together to cooperate more intensively to interdict and dismantle transnational support networks connected to the ADF, Mozambique’s al-Shabab and international jihadists operating across boundaries. Rwandan and Ugandan security services do not cooperate at present, due to tensions between them, as previously documented by Crisis Group. A number of Kenyan and Tanzanian officials have also told Crisis Group that intelligence cooperation between their countries is not as free and open as it should be. Meanwhile, Maputo’s security and judicial authorities have yet to receive details of suspected ISIS-related financial transfers that have been flagged in another country in the region and which also partly relate to Mozambique. Insufficient cooperation among countries in the region is likely a boon for militants that increasingly operate across those countries’ borders.

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