icon caret Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Line Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Whatsapp Youtube
乌干达: 日益升级的紧张局势解决乏术
乌干达: 日益升级的紧张局势解决乏术
De-escalating Tensions in the Great Lakes
De-escalating Tensions in the Great Lakes
Report 187 / Africa

乌干达: 日益升级的紧张局势解决乏术

执行摘要

大多数乌干达人的生活比25年前约韦里·穆塞韦尼上任总统时要好过得多。然而 ,频繁的示威游行和暴力镇压表明许多人对于穆塞韦尼政府深感不满,这很大程度上是由于原先基础广泛的宪政慢慢转变为一个以裙带关系为基础的独裁政体所造成的。在这方面,穆塞韦尼虽然没有进行残酷镇压,但还是沿袭了与前任们相似的治理轨迹,。如其前任,穆塞韦尼没能克服使乌干达难于治理的区域和宗教分歧,并且越来越依赖集权化、赡徇制和高压政治来维持统治。除非纠正这一趋势,否则乌干达将愈发难以治理,政治冲突也可能愈发致命。

乌干达沦为英国保护领地,使这个王国间相互竞争的多样化地区以及组织结构较为松散的田园社会合并成为一个单一实体。殖民政策则造成了进一步的分歧。英国殖民者通过委任首领而非惯常的氏族首长进行统治,并以天主教徒和穆斯林为代价与基督新教徒结盟。当局也开始在不同时间不同地区发展经济,其成果现今仍可由诊所、学校的数量和平均财富加以衡量。

乌干达独立后的第一任总统米尔顿·奥博特和伊迪·阿明使由来已久的分歧雪上加霜。均来自乌干达北部的两人经常被指控偏袒自己的地区和部族。他们当政时所拥有广泛的联盟不久就在殖民分裂中覆没,之后他们依靠赡徇制和高压政治继续掌权。在“全国抵抗运动”(NRM)于1986年夺取政权后,穆塞韦尼也似乎首先把国家置于更具包容性的道路上,恢复文官控制、法律和经济增长,创建了受到热情拥护的非党派“民主”体系。详尽的协商进程最终使得具备制衡机制的新宪法在1995年建立。

穆塞韦尼也将奥博特废弃的王国视为文化而非政治实体。1993年布干达的卡巴卡作为文化国王复位,但不拥有任何执行权力,此举被证明是权宜妥协之计而不是稳妥的解决方案。君主制主义者想要的是他们的王国,而不仅仅是他们的国王。他们的目标是联邦制,对土地和税收具有控制权,而穆塞韦尼所希望的分权是建立在地区依赖于中央政府资金的基础之上的,并坚持保留最终权力,他限制卡巴卡影响力的策略导致结果事与愿违。

民主措施在穆塞韦尼执掌政权的头十年之后势头颓减。这位总统没有支持无党派体系成为自由参政的框架,而是开始利用这一体系推动自己的目标。随着时间的推移,他用自己核心集团中所信任的成员替换掉对其政策颇有微词的老政治家和全国抵抗运动(NRM)资深成员,这些新成员通常都来自他的故乡。他还建立了一个忠于他的裙带关系网。 

在2011年的选举中,总统面对着一个强劲对手基扎·贝西杰,他是“全国抵抗军”(NRA)的高级指挥官、穆塞韦尼的私人医生,并身负政府和全国抵抗运动(NRM)的重要职位。他在1999年踏入国家政界。当时,他公开批判政府对民主置之不理并容忍高层官员中的腐败行为。竞选包括相当多的暴力和恐吓活动。当选举委员会宣布穆塞韦尼获胜时,贝西杰要求最高法院否决这一结果。最高法院审理此案的全部五名法官都认为出现过严重违反选举法的现象,但三比二的投票结果使得法官仍维持穆塞韦尼竞选获胜的结果,认为违规现象没有影响选举结果。

穆塞韦尼随即展开新战略以巩固自己的统治地位,虽然这一战略有些自相矛盾,即通过恢复多党民主和消除宪法约束来巩固统治地位。在2003年全国抵抗运动(NRM)的一次会议中,他要求“开放政治空间”以允许竞争各党的参与,减少议会、司法机构和监督机构的权力,并取消对总统只能连任两届的任期限制。2006年选举是首次多党参与竞选的选举。然而,穆塞韦尼利用延长全国抵抗运动(NRM)官方地位直到表决这一漏洞,使全国抵抗运动(NRM)能够既使用自己的组织也使用官方资源,而所有其他政党则限于在宪法全民公决后七个月内重组。而且,贝西杰以强奸和叛国罪被逮捕并监禁,并在竞选的大部分时间被迫出庭。高等法院在选举前一周才驳回了强奸指控,表明起诉严重滥用了法院程序(叛国罪的指控于2010年才被撤消)。

穆塞韦尼在2011年2月第四次成功连任,模式与以前的选举相似,只是暴力现象有所减少。这位总统为其竞选投入了巨额官方资金,而政府和全国抵抗运动(NRM)骚扰了反对派。穆塞韦尼赢得了全国大多数选票,包括在北部首次获得大部分选票,但尚不确定这反映的是他的受欢迎程度还是其资金和其他资源的力量。

重大石油藏量(大约25亿桶)的发现不太可能减少社会和政治紧张局势。石油帮助穆塞韦尼巩固其裙带体系从,确保其统治地位,但也将助长腐败并破坏经济多样化所带来的稳步发展。政府在知道国家将成为一个主要的石油生产国的五年之后,才刚开始将监管体系落实到位。

同时,群众抗议日益增多。尽管遭到暴力镇压,“步行上班”示威抗议——表面上针对高燃油价,但同时也明确地指向穆塞韦尼的统治——仍在坎帕拉和其他城市中心持续进行。2011年10月,议会对石油合同缺乏透明度表示不满,并声称致使部长层待遇丰厚也表明总统并没有绝对控制权。穆塞韦尼越来越无法预见反对之声,其中一些反对甚至来自全国抵抗运动(NRM)的政治家和他自己的核心团体。穆塞韦尼的重新当选、对物质资源的获取、战术技能、转移国际批评和控制国家向石油出口国过渡的能力都表明,他将试图继续巩固个人权力并在一段时期内继续指引乌干达的未来,尽管后果可能影响乌干达的长期稳定。除非穆塞韦尼改变方式,不然事情可能最终仍会失去控制。考虑到乌干达暴力充斥的历史,冲突可能因此愈演愈烈。

内罗毕/布鲁塞尔,2012年4月5日

Commentary / Africa

De-escalating Tensions in the Great Lakes

President Tshisekedi’s plans for joint operations with DR Congo’s belligerent eastern neighbours against its rebels risks regional proxy warfare. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2020 for European policymakers, Crisis Group urges the EU to encourage diplomatic efforts in the region and Tshisekedi to shelve his plan for the joint operations.

This commentary is part of our Watch List 2020.

Since assuming office in early 2019, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) president, Félix Tshisekedi, has stressed his determination to dismantle the dozens of Congolese and foreign armed groups blighting the troubled east of the country. He has also prioritised repairing ties with neighbouring states, which have historically both backed and fought against rebels in the eastern DRC over various cycles of war in the last two decades. Today, tensions are again mounting among the DRC’s neighbours – between Burundi and Uganda, on one hand, and Rwanda, on the other – potentially compounding the country’s security challenges. Alongside Tshisekedi’s diplomatic efforts to calm tensions, he has floated plans to invite these three neighbours to deploy their armed forces into the DRC to conduct joint operations with Congolese forces against rebels. Yet insofar as tensions among those countries remain high, such operations could pave the way for them to step up support to allied groups even while fighting rivals, and thus fuel proxy warfare. Civilians in the eastern DRC are likely to suffer most.

In line with its December Foreign Affairs Council conclusions that lay out the EU’s plans for re-engagement with the DRC, and to help President Tshisekedi de-escalate regional tensions, the EU and its member states should:

  • Reinforce the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes region, an informal gathering comprising the UN (including both the UN’s special envoy to the Great Lakes and the head of its mission in the DRC, MONUSCO), the U.S., the African Union and South Africa, as well as the EU and several European states that are important donors in the region, such as Belgium, the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The EU and European governments could designate senior EU and other European ministerial appointees to fill the group, over and above the working-level desk officers who normally tend to participate.
  • Use the increased clout this would bring to push for a mechanism whereby each of the three neighbours airs allegations against states they believe are backing armed groups in the DRC and supports the charges with evidence. Allegations can then be investigated by the UN Group of Experts and the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (the ICGLR comprises regional states and is a guarantor of a 2013 regional peace agreement; its joint verification mechanism and the UN expert group already have mandates to investigate claims of support to armed groups). Their findings could inform diplomatic efforts to de-escalate tensions among neighbours and end their backing of insurgents in the DRC.
  • At the same time, encourage President Tshisekedi to shelve, at least for now, his plan for joint operations with neighbours’ security forces.
  • Offer financial and technical support for the national disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, to ensure that Congolese militias linked to foreign rebels operating in the eastern DRC have a safe pathway to giving up their fight.

Security Challenges

In recent months, eastern DRC-based foreign insurgencies have escalated attacks on both the Congolese army as well as soldiers and civilians in neighbouring countries. The Burundian, Rwandan and Ugandan presidents are all rattling their sabres in response, accusing one another of proxy warfare.

On 4 October, DRC-based fighters killed fourteen people in Kinigi village in Rwanda’s Musanze district. Rwandan authorities blame the Forces démocratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) rebels. They say the FDLR is working with another DRC-based rebel group, the Rwanda National Congress (RNC), which they allege is run by one of President Paul Kagame’s former generals. They also say both the FDLR and the RNC enjoy Burundian and Ugandan support. In a speech, Kagame vowed to retaliate against anyone seeking to attack Rwanda.

After the Kinigi killings, fighters crossed into Burundi from the DRC to launch two separate deadly attacks. Burundian RED-Tabara rebels, whom Burundian officials say are backed by Rwanda, claimed the first attack. No one claimed the second, but Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza, recalling Kigali’s support for mutineers in a 2015 coup attempt, blamed Rwanda for both attacks, alleging that Kigali supports RED-Tabara. Ugandan officials, for their part, assert that Rwanda is collaborating with the Allied Democratic Forces, a rebel movement with roots in Uganda that is implicated in dozens of massacres in the Beni area of North Kivu since 2014.

Rwandan and Ugandan officials continue to trade accusations that each is plotting to destabilise the other.

Rwandan and Ugandan officials continue to trade accusations that each is plotting to destabilise the other. Both governments have purged their security services of suspected traitors. Rwanda has now also closed a main border crossing into Uganda, suffocating trade between the two countries. Meanwhile, Burundi and Rwanda have dispatched troops to their mutual border while Uganda has deployed troops to its western frontier facing North Kivu. Should these tensions heighten, they could fuel more proxy fighting in the eastern DRC, further threatening regional stability.

Recognising the dangers, Tshisekedi invited Rwanda and Uganda for talks in July and August hosted by Angolan President João Lourenço in the Angolan capital Luanda. They culminated in a memorandum of understanding, signed on 21 August, in which both countries promised to halt “actions conducive to destabilisation or subversion in the territory of the other party and neighbouring countries”. In addition to these diplomatic efforts, the DRC president floated plans that would involve the armed forces of Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda conducting joint military operations with Congolese forces against insurgents in the eastern DRC. Absent political de-escalation among the neighbour governments, such operations could pave the way for all three to ratchet up support to proxies opposing their respective rivals. The eastern DRC could again become the arena for a multi-sided melee.

Calming Regional Tensions

In its latest Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on the DRC in December 2019, the EU asserted its readiness to redefine its relationship with the country. This comes after relations between Brussels and Kinshasa cooled at the tail end of Kabila’s presidency, when the EU sanctioned some of his top henchmen in late 2018. President Tshisekedi has expressed an increasing willingness to work with Brussels even as the EU renewed sanctions in December 2019 against twelve of the fourteen Kabila-era officials. In particular, the EU could help de-escalate regional tensions and lessen neighbours’ support to foreign armed groups while contributing to pathways to surrender for Congolese fighters allied to such groups.

The immediate priority is to encourage President Tshisekedi to reinvigorate diplomatic efforts to calm tensions among DRC’s neighbours.

The immediate priority is to encourage President Tshisekedi to reinvigorate diplomatic efforts to calm tensions among DRC’s neighbours while putting aside, at least for now, plans for those neighbours to conduct military operations in the eastern DRC. The EU’s best bet for pressing for an approach along these lines would be to increase its influence in the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes, the informal group to which it and a number of European states belong. Brussels and other European capitals should commit more senior officials both to the contact group itself and to liaising with the group and with regional governments. Together with the UN special envoy to the Great Lakes, Xia Huang, who has recently been instrumental in bringing together the Burundian, Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan intelligence chiefs to discuss their deteriorating relations, the EU should use its weight in the group to prioritise the need for a political solution to tackling foreign armed groups in the eastern DRC.

Such a solution could entail Xia encouraging the three states to lay out their allegations and evidence of support by their rivals to armed groups in the DRC. He could share all information received with the UN Group of Experts and the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region. The evidence provided by regional states, and investigations conducted by the expert group and joint verification mechanism, could collectively inform diplomatic efforts to halt or diminish support to DRC-based insurgents.

By financially and technically supporting the national DDR process, the EU can also back Tshisekedi’s priority of tackling the plague of Congolese armed groups. Congolese insurgents, many of whom are sucked into alliances with more powerful foreign armed groups, often lack an alternative in the absence of a fully funded DDR program. Under Kabila, the Congolese authorities gave only limited resources to DDR. Several donors pulled out, frustrated by Kinshasa’s lack of commitment to funding a national program. Despite the uptick in attacks in the east, there are signs that some fighters are placing greater hope in Tshisekedi’s presidency and expressing greater desire to surrender. MONUSCO’s new mandate, adopted at the end of December 2019, encourages the DRC’s government to appoint a senior coordinator to lead the DDR effort. The EU could consider supplying this person with the necessary funding and expertise to carry out the mandate.