津巴布韦:过渡期的政治与安全挑战
津巴布韦:过渡期的政治与安全挑战
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Revolt and Repression in Zimbabwe
Revolt and Repression in Zimbabwe
Briefing 70 / Africa

津巴布韦:过渡期的政治与安全挑战

概述

津巴布韦的统一政府执政已经进入第二年,民主变革的困难已经突现。自2009年2月以来,政府在恢复政治与社会稳定,结束镇压和稳定经济方面取得了一定进步,但在重重威胁下,改革进程仍可能偏离轨道。危险因素具体包括:安全部门领导掌握重权,却顽固不化拒绝改革;津巴布韦非洲民族联盟(简称民盟)和争取民主变革运动(简称民革运)之间争端不断而且各自党内帮派斗争频繁。南非和非洲南部其它监督过渡程序协议实施的国家必须敦促有关各方,尤其是津巴布韦总统罗伯特·加布里埃尔·穆加贝,坚持始终成功地完成过渡。援助国应对非洲国家的这一努力提供支持。

津巴布韦的统一政府是在《全面政治和解协议》的框架下建立的。总统穆加贝和民主改革运动两个派系首领摩根·茨万吉拉伊和亚瑟·穆坦巴拉都在协议上签了字。政府建立之初,许多人将信将疑。大多数评论员对新政府毫无信心。他们预言说,茨万吉拉伊即使身居总理职位,在穆加贝的“挑拨、统治、收买和摧毁”的伎俩下仍然会不堪一击。然而尽管困难重重,新政府开端良好:学校和医院重新开张;公务员领取工资重回岗位;津巴布韦元被暂停使用;商品重回商场货架;原本迅速蔓延的霍乱也得到控制。人权活动者报告说侵权行为大幅度减少。捐助国收到了一份雄心勃勃却也不失务实精神的重建方案,寻求价值85亿美元的国外援助与投资。

但可能扰乱过渡进程的一些令人忧虑的因素已经开始突现:强硬派的军队统帅和民盟其他穆加贝的忠实追随者拒绝执行政府命令,抵制新的安全部门并且公开对茨万吉拉伊表示轻蔑;强占农田的行为仍然猖獗;虽然《全面政治和解协议》的签订引起了广泛关注,但民盟仍在拖延或无视对协议的重要承诺,同时以保护多项行政特权为由阻挠变法维新。目前被搁置的重要措施有:土地审计,任命民革运成员为省长,结束任意拘留逮捕行为,由全国安全理事会取代臭名昭著的联合行动指挥部来行使常规安全职责,以及就新宪法的制定和选举的准备工作进行公开协商。

这些迟迟得不到落实的改革步骤反映了两个深层次的问题,它们是本简报重点讨论的内容。首先,必须建立一套成熟的政治系统和开放的政府,从而使民盟和民革运既能相互竞争也能共同合作。要达到这一目标很难,在擅长制造分裂的穆加贝统治下更是难上加难,但民盟其他领袖,包括副总统乔伊斯·穆朱鲁和国防部长埃默森·姆南加古瓦所领导的派系,已经意识到他们的政党已经失去了民心,急需进行领导换代。民革运的职责包括:对工会、人权组织和妇女组织等支持者继续给予信任和保持合作;并且向全国人民证明自己有治国能力,是一个称职和公开的政党,而且有能力保护独立以来社会变革的成果。

安全问题也同样具有挑战性。一小撮“安全官僚”利用职权及同穆加贝相互依赖的关系对过渡期事务行使否决权。他们的动机各异:有的担心失去权势和权势带来的经济利益;有的担心因滥用政治和经济职权遭到起诉;还有一些人认为民革运和茨万吉拉伊是白人和西方利益集团的傀儡,因此必须防止他们窃取解放成果。津巴布韦各个党派的政治人士都在考虑一方面如何诱劝这些军官退休,哪怕让他们保留财产并给予一定本国豁免权,另一方面如何培训一支尊重人权和民选政府的专业安全部队。

虽然津巴布韦应对今后的任务负主要责任,但南部非洲发展共同体作为《全面政治和解协议》监护机构,应重视自己的职责。南非总统雅各布·祖马在进行调停活动的过程中,必须向津巴布韦各方说明地区各国不会容忍任何违反协议的行为。祖马最近任命了三名德高望重的顾问来监督津巴布韦事务,此举表明他将在《全面政治和解协议》的落实和尊重法治上对穆加贝采取更为强硬的态度。

广大国际社会,尤其是英国、美国、欧盟和中国,应谨慎调整贸易、援助和投资政策来鼓励进步;针对阻挠变革的人员和组织实施制裁;同时取消对经济复苏起关键作用的实体的制裁,从而支持和补充南部非洲发展共同体的工作。援助国应通过公开透明的机构,如多捐款方信托基金,提供新的经济复苏与发展援助,包括农村发展、卫生与教育发展、及强化司法和立法机构及民间社会。

本简报将重点分析津巴布韦政党和安全事务及南非的调停工作。以后的报道将分析其它与变革有关的重要议题,如变法维新、法制与和解、制裁措施和安全机构改革。

Overview

As Zimbabwe enters its second year under a unity government, the challenges to democratic transformation have come into sharp focus. Despite reasonable progress in restoring political and social stability, ending widespread repression and stabilising the economy since February 2009, major threats could still derail the reform process. In particular, resistance of intransigent and still powerful security sector leaders and fractious in-fighting between and within the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) must be addressed now. South Africa and other countries in southern Africa – who monitor the accord that guides the transition – must press the parties, and particularly President Robert Mugabe, to see the transition through to a successful conclusion. Donors should back their efforts.

The unity government, created under the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by Mugabe and MDC factional leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Arthur Mutambara, was born under a cloud of scepticism. Most observers gave it little chance, predicting that, even as prime minister, Tsvangirai would fall prey to Mugabe’s “divide, rule, co-opt and destroy” strategy. Against the odds, the government started well: schools and hospitals re-opened; civil servants were paid and returned to work; the Zimbabwe dollar was shelved; goods returned to store shelves; and a cholera epidemic was controlled. Human rights activists reported a significant drop in abuses. Donors generally received well an ambitious yet pragmatic reconstruction program calling for $8.5 billion in foreign aid and investment.

But major concerns undermining the transition process have come to the fore. Hardline generals and other Mugabe loyalists in ZANU-PF are refusing to implement the government’s decisions, boycotting the new national security organ and showing public disdain for Tsvangirai. Farm seizures have continued virtually unabated. Most attention has focused on completing the GPA, but ZANU-PF has delayed or ignored important commitments in that document, while stalling constitutional reforms by insisting on preserving broad executive privileges. Key blocked steps include a land audit, appointment of MDC governors, an end of arbitrary detentions and arrests, regular functioning of the National Security Council in place of the infamous Joint Operations Command, public consultations on a new constitution and preparation for elections.

These delays reflect the two deeper challenges on which this briefing concentrates. First, a mature political system must develop, so that ZANU-PF and MDC engage as both competitors in the political arena and partners in the inclusive government. This will be difficult, especially under the divisive Mugabe, but other ZANU-PF leaders, including the factions led by Vice President Joice Mujuru, and Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, know that their party has lost much popular support and needs a generational shift. For its part, the MDC must keep faith and engaged with its broad following in the transition process, including trade unions, human rights groups and women’s organisations. It must also show the country as a whole that it is a viable custodian of the state – competent, transparent, and capable of preserving social change since independence.

Equally challenging are security issues. A relatively small number of “securocrats” use their positions and symbiotic relationship with Mugabe to exercise veto power over the transition. They are motivated by differing factors: fear of losing power and its financial benefits, fear of prosecution for political or financial abuses, and a belief that they guard the liberation heritage against Tsvangirai and the MDC, which they view as fronts for white and Western interests. Zimbabweans across the political spectrum are quietly considering how to ease these officers into retirement, even at the cost of allowing them to keep their assets and providing them a degree of impunity from domestic prosecution, while simultaneously professionalising security forces respectful of human rights and a democratically elected government.

While the primary tasks ahead rest with Zimbabweans, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) must take seriously its GPA guarantor role. South African President Jacob Zuma’s activism as mediator must convey the message that the region will abide no alternative to the GPA. His recent actions, including appointment of three respected advisers to oversee the Zimbabwe account, are welcome indications he will be tougher vis-à-vis Mugabe on GPA obligations and respect for rule of law.

The broader international community, especially the UK, U.S., EU and China, should support and complement SADC’s efforts through careful calibration of trade, aid, and investment to encourage progress; maintenance of targeted sanctions on those thwarting the transition; and lifting of sanctions on entities key to economic recovery. Donors should provide new recovery and development assistance – including for rural development, health and education and strengthening of the judiciary, legislature and civil society – through transparent mechanisms, such as the Multi-Donor Trust Fund.

This briefing focuses on political party and security issues, as well as South Africa’s mediation. Subsequent reporting will analyse other topics vital to the transition, including constitutional and legal reform, justice and reconciliation, sanctions policies and security sector reform.

Harare/Pretoria/Nairobi/Brussels, 3 March 2010

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