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Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform?
Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform?
Briefing 103 / Africa

津巴布韦:等待未来

概述

津巴布韦的非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线(ZANU-PF)在2013年7月的选举中获胜,但这并没能给穆加贝总统带来广泛认同的合法性,没能为挽救经济提供基础,也没能使津巴布韦的对外关系正常化。一年后,这个国家面临诸多社会和经济问题,它们是根本性执政失败的产物,而让国家几近瘫痪的执政党内继任危机无疑是雪上加霜。非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线和争取民主变革运动(MDC-T)都卷入了严重的内部权力斗争,无暇应对社会和经济结构受到的侵蚀。津巴布韦是个入不敷出、日益衰颓的国家,它的政治是零和游戏,制度千疮百孔,曾经充满活力的经济也奄奄一息。政治精英阶层需要进行一场深刻的文化变革,并从服务于党派或个人利益转而致力于国家利益。

90岁的穆加贝虽然明显能力日益不济,却没有透露出一丝想要离职的迹象。他党派内的继任之争看上去是副总统穆朱鲁和司法部长姆南加古瓦之间的较量,实际上的情况则要复杂得多。公开的斗争已经激化,以令人不安的恐吓和暴力为典型手段。穆加贝管理这一矛盾的能力已经减弱,而在12月国民议会召开前,又将经受严峻考验。津巴布韦第一夫人格雷斯.穆加贝被提升为非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线妇女联盟的领导人,这使得继任斗争的形势进一步复杂化。

在过去一年里,主要经济部门收缩,政府几乎难以支付工资或者提供基本服务。如果得不到大笔预算援助,政府就无法兑现选举承诺。同中国签订的改善基础设施的协议能稍作缓解,但不能解决燃眉之急。东方和西方国家提供的国际援助将有助于最大限度地提升经济恢复的可能性。但是,由于严重的资金流动困难,政策的前后不一致,腐败和管理失误,可行方案有限。要促进可持续的、包容性的发展,就需要进行有力度的改革。

津巴布韦政府和反对派都无法拿出一个能获得全国支持的计划。非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线提出的“津巴布韦可持续的社会经济转型规划”不过是由平民主义的选举承诺加凭空妄想所构成。本已不堪重负的纳税人又遭政府进一步压榨,结果财政收益有限却引发了民怨。争取民主变革运动和其它反对党则已被排挤到一边。它们的国际声望也一落千丈。各反对派制定共同纲领的可能性很小,为国家前途而展开包容性的全国性对话也不太可能。争取民主变革运动自2007年以来首次提出大规模抗议是切实可行的方案,但根据过去的表现推测,非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线会在必要时再次派出安全部队镇压。

非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线的选举胜利为国内和解和建立国际友好关系创造了机会。在津巴布韦政府探索筹款办法之际,国际金融机构与其有所接触,尽管是试探性的。捐赠国必须在兑现同津巴布韦政府重建关系的承诺同时,支持津巴布韦改善执政和解决民主化的不足,并在两方面取得平衡。由于捐赠国并不确定政府是否决心推进未实施的改革、实施新宪法和推进法制,对其政策充满担忧,而且对政权继任感到焦虑,双方的信任受到了影响。非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线中的一些人现在承认,他们需要改弦更张。穆加贝2014年8月接过南部非洲发展共同体(SADC)主席的职务,并将从2015年初开始担任非洲联盟(AU)的主席。这为他保住自己的一些良好政绩提供了前所未有的平台,但他不太可能会把这当作缓和关系的契机。

 

为避免长期的不确定性和可能出现的危机,非洲民族联盟—爱国阵线应当:

  • 在12月的大会上最终决定穆加贝总统一旦丧失执政能力或不在2018年寻求连任,该由谁来继位;
  • 寻求同国内和国际支持者建立互信与合作,方法是(1)同反对派和公民社会进行包容性的全国对话,讨论政治、社会和经济改革;(2)在诸如本土化、土地改革、法制和反腐败等重要政策领域讲明立场并采取行动;以及 
  • 惩罚恐吓选民、选举造假和从事其它不法行为的党员。

为建立公信力,政治反对派应该:

  • 同公民社会联合建立协商机制,以在各个政治派别中就优先改革事项,尤其是经济和执政问题,谋求共识;以及
  • 本着着眼未来的目的总结2013年选举的不足之处,以期解决2018年选举预计会出现的问题(例如,选民名册,选举法修正案中的问题)。

南部非洲发展共同体和非洲联盟应当:

  • 鼓励津巴布韦解决这两个组织在各自的2013年观察小组报告中指出的同选举有关的担忧。

中国应当:

  • 鼓励津巴布韦政府促进政治包容和政策一致性,以实现经济复苏。

对津巴布韦采取制裁和其它措施的国家(例如欧盟、美国和澳大利亚)应提倡一种连贯立场,该立场:

  • 说明津巴布韦政府需采取哪些措施以加快解除剩下的制裁;
  • 依据经济改革和执政改革的成效,整合再接触和发展援助;
     
  • 采取具体行动巩固独立司法、人权和选举机构等支撑民主的制度,并支持公民社会监督和保护宪法权利的能力。

布鲁塞尔/约翰内斯堡,2014年9月29日

Commentary / Africa

Zimbabwe: An Opportunity for Reform?

A new presidential administration in Zimbabwe offers an opportunity for much-needed democratic and economic reform after years of stagnation. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018, Crisis Group proposes four key areas on which the EU and its member states should focus its support: the security sector, elections, the economy and national reconciliation.

This commentary on the oppurtunity for reform in Zimbabwe is part of our annual early-warning report Watch List 2018.

Amid a rise in authoritarian tendencies across parts of the continent, Robert Mugabe’s resignation and the November 2017 appointment of his former deputy, Emmerson Mnangagwa, as president make Zimbabwe a potential exception, carrying fresh prospects for reform and economic recovery. Mnangagwa and his administration have set a different tone, promising to clean up government, reach across political, ethnic and racial lines, strengthen Zimbabwe’s democracy and reform its moribund economy. Re-engaging with Western partners and financial institutions is an integral component of his strategy. Questions remain, however, as to whether Mnangagwa’s administration represents a genuine change or simply a reconfiguration of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), now dominated by security sector interests and factions aligned to the new president. International actors will have an important role in encouraging the reforms that will determine whether the country can recover economically and steer a more open and democratic course.

African and non-African governments alike agree that Zimbabwe’s continued isolation would be counterproductive. Following the lead of the AU and Southern African Development Community (SADC), actors including Western governments and China – most of which were happy to see the back of Mugabe – stopped short of calling the “military-assisted transition” a coup d’état, thus ensuring they could maintain diplomatic relations with and provide assistance to the government. Most also agree that the new government should be given an opportunity to demonstrate it is serious about its commitments. But while encouragement and incentives are important, Zimbabwe’s partners, including the EU, should calibrate support to maintain pressure on the government to enact both political and economic reforms, particularly given ZANU-PF’s long track record of backtracking on its promises.

So far, Mnangagwa has set an encouraging tone, focusing on the need to resuscitate the economy and open the political system. But doubts remain. Questions surround in particular the government’s willingness to address structural economic issues through fiscal discipline, transparency and accountability. They also surround its commitment to a genuinely inclusive political system; in response, the opposition and civil society – although weak and fragmented – have united in calling for a level electoral playing field, enhanced participation, and strengthened institutional checks and balances.

A calibrated framework for EU engagement in Zimbabwe

Although relations have long been strained, the EU resumed direct development cooperation with Harare in November 2014. Since then, with member states, it has engaged in limited senior-level political dialogue. The EU set out a framework for engagement in the National Indicative Program for Zimbabwe 2014-2020, focusing on three sectors: health, agriculture-based economic development, and governance as well as institution-building.

While this framework remains relevant, Mugabe’s ouster provides the EU an opportunity to adjust its approach and offer Zimbabwe the promise of a deeper relationship should certain conditions be met (a promise which is explicit in the 22 January 2018 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Zimbabwe). This would require determining levels of support based on realistic deliverables and deadlines, based partly on timelines set by the new president and government themselves (such as in Mnangagwa’s December presentation to ZANU-PF’s extraordinary Congress, his State of the Nation address and the government’s commitments to deliverables within the first 100 days in office). Specifically, the EU could link its support to reforms in four key areas:

  • Security sector, including initiatives to professionalise the police forces and provide for civilian supervision, improve parliamentary oversight of the defence sector and repeal legislation inconsistent with the 2013 constitution, such as the Public Order and Security Act (which curtails rights such as freedom of assembly) and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (which allows the state to severely control the work of the media and limit free speech).
     
  • Elections, including guaranteeing greater independence for the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and credible voter rolls for Zimbabweans at home and abroad. The EU also should follow up on the president’s recent offer to allow EU observers to monitor the 2018 elections.
     
  • Economic sector, including organisation of a broad dialogue on the government’s economic reform strategy to be led by an independent committee, including representatives from the opposition, civil society, the churches and important commercial sectors.
     
  • National reconciliation, notably by bolstering the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission and extending its mandate so as to form a truly independent body able to deal with past government abuses.

In parallel, the EU should step up support for institutions such as the Auditor General, Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission and Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission while continuing to engage civil society organisations, and support their efforts to track government reforms, particularly those related to security, governance, fiscal accountability and anti-corruption.