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科特迪瓦:缓解紧张局势

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动荡的安全形势和日益加剧的政治紧张局势正在威胁科特迪瓦的复苏。在过去的几个月里,除了西部地区的暴乱,科特迪瓦还经受了一系列致命的袭击,遭到袭击的目标包括一个警察局,一个重要的军事基地,一些军队驻点和一个发电站。尽管这些事件并未对科特迪瓦的稳定构成直接威胁,但却揭示出对于一些组织来说,战争还没有结束。其它一些迹象也令人担忧:安全部门的改革一直以来都很缓慢,政治对话陷入僵局,执政联盟看起来孱弱不堪,暴力言论又重新抬头,已经策划好的一些政变阴谋被发现,以及各方明显缺乏促进民族和解的政治意愿。鉴于这种状况,总统阿拉萨内·瓦塔拉和他的新政府不该仅依赖于经济复苏和收紧安保措施来巩固和平。国际社会也不该把注意力从科特迪瓦的稳定上转移到其他方面,因为科特迪瓦的邻国马里已经陷入了深刻而持久的危机。

科特迪瓦大选后爆发的冲突造成了3000人死亡,这场冲突仅仅是长达十年之久的政治和军事危机的尾声。自冲突结束后已经过去了18个月时间,没有人期待国家能完全回复正常。科特迪瓦必须应付诸多挑战,这些挑战是战后国家普遍面临的。其中一个挑战是安全机构仍在努力恢复元气,尽管已经取得了一些进展,科特迪瓦的安全力量仍然不稳定,并分裂为两派:一派是巴博时代的国防和安全部队(Forces de défense et de sécurité,FDS)的前成员,另一派是新生力量武装部队(Forces armées des forces nouvelles, FAFN)的前叛军。对于他们各自所期待的与科特迪瓦共和国部队(Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire,FRCI)的整合,这两方所持的态度以及整合的方式都成为了和解的障碍。此外,前FAFN仍然是主力部队,而警察和宪兵则继续担任不那么重要的角色。

一个更深层次的安全问题是传统的猎人。他们被称为Dozo,人数超过18,000人,被部署在全国各地,曾起到了保护国家的作用。目前Dozo还在继续参与安保,但是他们既不具备合法性也不具备相应的能力。这支为政府服务的军队力量同时也是民兵力量并不受人们的欢迎,尤其是前总统洛朗·巴博的支持者很不待见这支力量。巴博现在被拘禁在荷兰海牙的国际刑事法院(ICC),并且很快他的妻子西蒙娜·巴博可能也会受到ICC的拘留,因为ICC在11月22日对她发出了逮捕令。安全机构的这种配置加剧了紧张形势,尤其是在社区土地问题凸显的西部地区。此外,将成千上万曾卷入冲突的青少年重新融入到平民生活当中的进程很缓慢,增加了这些青少年的挫折感,也鼓励他们把保留武器作为了维系其经济生存的一种保障,由此引发了更多的安全问题。

政府和反对派之间的对话是和解的重要组成部分。现在对话陷于僵局之中,双方仅仅发表了一些意向性的声明。前总统巴博领导的政党——科特迪瓦人民阵线(Front populaire ivoirien,FPI)选择了保持孤立,它退出了选举进程,并提出了不现实的条件来作为重返政治进程的前提。FPI的温和派一直没能与流亡的强硬派保持距离,这些强硬派希望重获军事权力。2012年6月、9月和10月,一系列的政变阴谋被发现,它们都是由逃亡加纳的前总统巴博时代的部长们以及巴博的家庭成员和亲信们一手策划。这些事件使得政治对话陷入瘫痪,和解进程前景暗淡。这些阴谋也让另一个政治阵营的强硬派——包括总统领导的政党“共和人士联盟”(Rassemblement des républicains,RDR)的成员以及前叛军“新生力量”(FN)的成员——确信有必要加强军事上的胜利以及继续压制包括温和派在内的旧体系的所有代表。

随着这场政治动荡的发生,由党派控制的媒体重新开始发表一些带有憎恨色彩的、危险的言辞。在这种两极分化的环境下,政府做出的决定逐渐偏离了当初的竞选承诺——实行善治、摒弃过往,而这些承诺是瓦塔拉获得2010年11月总统选举胜利的关键。

司法系统由于其偏颇的立场,也加剧了紧张局势:一些FRCI成员或者在大选后的冲突中犯下了罪行,或者在自冲突结束到目前为止的这段时间内犯下了罪行,但没有一个成员被起诉。支持巴博的媒体遭到任意逮捕,逮捕任务多由有权有势的领土监视局(Direction de la surveillance du territoire,DST)和宪兵来执行。

在行政部门和国有企业中,对于一些职位的任命只是基于地区标准或政治标准做出的。这些任命打着“调整政策”——一种逆向歧视的形式——的旗号,却与改善政府治理的承诺相矛盾。对话、真相与和解委员会(Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission,CDVR)仍然尽力想要开始开展工作。要建立地区级的委员会已被证明是很困难的。更令人担忧的是,根据媒体的广泛报道,该委员会似乎并没有得到去年组建它的政治势力的支持。政府也还是没有为其提供必要的财政资源,而委员会主席夏尔·科南·班尼(Charles Konan Banny)个性化的管理风格仍然饱受尖锐批评。

在此情形下,执政联盟已经显现出脆弱性,并最终决定在11月14日解散政府。该决定暴露出了RDR与其主要盟友——科特迪瓦民主党(Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire,PDCI)——之间的裂痕。11月21日,PDCI资深成员丹尼尔·卡布兰·敦坎(Daniel Kablan Duncan)被任命为总理,取代了同样来自民主党的让诺·阿胡苏-夸迪奥(Jeannot Ahoussou-Kouadio)。这项任命应该可以中止联盟内的危机,确保新政府内部更为团结,与上届政府相比新政府几乎没有什么人员上的变动。卡布兰·敦坎曾在1994至1999年担任总理,被重新任命为总理之前担任外长一职。敦坎在党内颇受尊敬,是瓦塔拉总统的私人朋友,与总统一样是一名经济学家。现任政府把促进强劲的经济增长以减少失业和贫困这一点明确地放在了优先考虑的位置,这点受到了民众的欢迎,但却并不能成为一种替代品,取代致力于民族和解的政治姿态。

看起来,政治阶层还没有从选举后的危机中学到重要的教训,因此他们目前所持的看法依然在重蹈覆辙——过去正是这类看法导致了科特迪瓦濒临险境。当务之急是总统瓦塔拉、新政府和执政的整个政治阶层要抗拒滥用权力的诱惑,权力的滥用已经使许多科特迪瓦人付出了生命的代价。同时,对于非洲的组织以及更广泛的国际社会而言,是时候公开而坚决地谴责现任科特迪瓦政权的错误了。

达喀尔⁄布鲁塞尔,2012年11月26日

Executive Summary

The volatile security situation and political tensions are threatening Côte d’Ivoire’s recovery. The last few months have seen a series of deadly attacks against a police station, one of the main military bases of the country, several army positions and a power station. Violence also broke out in the west. Although these incidents do not pose a direct threat to stability, they show that, for some segments of the population, the war is not yet over. Some signs are particularly worrying: slow security sector reform, stalled political dialogue, a weak ruling coalition, a return to violent discourses, uncovered coup plots, and an apparent lack of political will to promote national reconciliation. President Alassane Ouattara and his new government should not rely solely on economic recovery and the tightening of security measures to consolidate peace. International attention should remain focused on Côte d’Ivoire’s stabilisation, which is all the more crucial as its neighbour, Mali, has descended into a deep and lasting crisis.

Eighteen months after the end of a post-election conflict which caused over 3,000 deaths and was merely the epilogue of a decade-long political and military crisis, no one could have expected a complete return to normalcy. Côte d’Ivoire has to cope with challenges commonly faced by post-war countries. The security apparatus is struggling to get back in order. Despite some progress, the Ivorian forces remain unstable and divided between former members of the Gbagbo-era Forces de défense et de sécurité (FDS) and former rebels of the Forces armées des forces nouvelles (FAFN). Their attitude, as well as the modalities of their integration within the Forces républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), are an impediment to reconciliation. The former FAFN are still the dominant forces, while the police and gendarmerie remain sidelined.

Over 18,000 traditional hunters deployed across the territory, the so-called Dozos, helped secure the country, thus playing a role for which they have neither legitimacy nor skills. This military and militia apparatus working for the government is not well accepted, especially by supporters of former President Laurent Gbagbo, who is being detained at the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, in the Netherlands. He could soon be joined by his spouse, Simone Gbagbo, against whom the ICC unsealed an arrest warrant on 22 November. The configuration of the security sector aggravates tensions, particularly in the west, where intercommunal land issues are adding up. Slow reintegration into civilian life of tens of thousands of youths who participated in the conflict increases their frustration and encourages them to keep their weapons as a guarantee of their economic survival.

Dialogue between the government and the opposition – which is a vital component of reconciliation – is stalled and does not go beyond statements of intent. The Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), former President Gbagbo’s party, has chosen isolation by withdrawing from the electoral process and imposing unrealistic conditions to its effective return in the political game. The FPI’s moderate wing has not been able to distance itself from the exiled hardliners who nourish hope of regaining military power. Political dialogue and reconciliation prospects are paralysed since the revelation in June, September and October 2012 of coup plots orchestrated from Ghana by former ministers of Gbagbo, his family members and close associates. These plots have convinced hardliners on the other side – including members of the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), the presidential party, and the Forces nouvelles, the former rebellion – of the need to consolidate their military victory and maintain a repressive stance toward all representatives of the old regime, may they be moderate or not.

Political turmoil is accompanied by a return of hateful and dangerous discourses relayed by a partisan press, loyal to one side or the other. In this climate of polarisation, the government is making decisions that gradually move it away from its campaign promises of better governance and a break with the past, which allowed Ouattara to win the presidential election in November 2010. The judicial system remains biased: not a single FRCI member has been charged, either for crimes committed during the post-election crisis or for those committed since. Arbitrary arrests have been taking place in the pro-Gbagbo media and have been widely carried out by the powerful Direction de la surveillance du territoire (DST) and military police.

In the administration and public companies, some appointments were made on regional or political criteria, in the name of an “adjustment policy” – a form of reverse discrimination – that contradicts promises of improving governance. The Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) is still struggling to start its work. The establishment of its local committees is difficult. More worrying still, the commission does not seem to be supported by the political power that established it last year with wide media coverage. The government still has not provided it with the necessary financial resources, and the personalised management style of its president, Charles Konan Banny, remains under sharp criticism.

In this context, the ruling coalition has been showing signs of fragility, culminating in the dissolution of the government on 14 November, a decision which exposed the cleavages between the RDR and its main ally, the Parti démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI). The appointment on 21 November of a senior PDCI member, Daniel Kablan Duncan, as prime minister replacing Jeannot Ahoussou-Kouadio, who is also from that party, should abort the crisis within the coalition and ensure stronger unity. Kablan Duncan, who held the same position from 1994 to 1999 and was the incumbent foreign minister, is a respected member of his party, a personal friend of President Ouattara and, like him, an economist. The clear priority given to the promotion of strong economic growth to reduce unemployment and poverty is welcome, but it cannot be a substitute for political gestures toward national reconciliation.

The political class does not seem to have learned all the lessons from the post-electoral crisis, and is repeating the very attitudes that have led the country to the brink. It is urgent for President Ouattara, the new government and the entire ruling political class to resist the temptation of abusing power, which has already cost many lives in Côte d’Ivoire. It is time for the African organisations and the international community to publicly and firmly denounce the current Ivorian regime’s dysfunctions.

Brussels/Dakar, 26 November 2012

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