Guinea-Bissau: Transition after the Coup
Guinea-Bissau: Transition after the Coup
Report 183 / Africa

超越妥协:几内亚比绍的改革前景

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执行摘要

几内亚比绍当局成功挫败2011年12月26日的未遂政变是令人鼓舞的。这印证了该国自2010年4月1日的政治和军事动荡以来所保持的稳定。然而,这种相对的稳定是脆弱的、不确定的和非常模糊的妥协的产物。至关重要的政治、军事和司法挑战仍然摆在眼前。2012年1月9日总统马拉姆·巴卡伊·萨尼亚的病逝引发了对国家未来的疑问。政党将不得不管控党际和党内竞争,并避免过分强调部族间的紧张和对军队派系的操纵。安全部门改革(SSR)被搁置,而2009年3月和6月的暗杀仍引发着谣言、指责和威胁。总理卡洛斯·戈梅斯的政权虽然稳固,仍然需要改善国家的整体情况。国际社会必须在几内亚比绍的事务中保持稳定、持续和关键的角色。安哥拉必须在改善沟通、透明度和与其它国际行动参与者的协调合作方面作出更大努力。

随着2010年4月1日军队总参谋长萨莫拉·因杜塔被其副手安东尼奥·因贾伊推翻,以及总理卡洛斯·戈梅斯被短暂扣押,占主导地位的政治和军事派别达成默契。连普通的几内亚人都知道的该国对于国际援助的依赖,加上欧盟(EU)和美国的强硬反应,加强了其他国际行为体和几内亚当局在与军队进行谈判中的操控力。已故总统的阵营与总理的阵营都属于几内亚和佛得角非洲独立党(PAIGC),他们之间的紧张势头逐渐减弱。

2010年4月1日事件的领导者,因贾伊将军和楚托少将——长久以来被认为是从拉丁美洲贩运可卡因的铁腕人物——都认可了文官统治的合法性,以换取对他们的军队领导权的肯定。然而,2011年12月26日的军事骚乱(对此骚乱有几种解释),导致了楚托在没有受到任何指控的情况下遭到逮捕。安哥拉被证明在这一微妙时期是一个关键的参与者。罗安达方面虽然极度缺乏透明度,但是已经部署了一支强大的军事合作特派团,并向几内亚提供物质支持。

国家改革、有利的经济条件以及大量的捐助者支持也已经使经济略有改善,并加强了警察和司法能力。这加强了政治家和军队高级将领之间的默契,也巩固了文职领导层的合法性。经济发展随之得以恢复,并且在具备潜力的自然资源行业的投资计划也取得一些进展。

但是,最重要的发展尚未到来。国家面临艰巨的政治障碍:几佛独立党(PAIGC)即将来临的代表大会及其党派主义;萨尼亚总统的去世和应于2012年3月举行的总统选举;计划于年底举行的立法选举;以及随后的在该国后殖民历史上首次举行的地方选举。这些里程碑将可能巩固几佛独立党和总理的领导权。被边缘化的反对党前途未卜,因为它可能会变得激进化并诉诸武力。一些反对党正运用近期的紧张局势对2009年悬而未决的政治暗杀加以利用并对总理进行违抗。

加强国家稳定和促进发展的结构性改革,特别是安全部门改革(SSR),代表了另一个挑战。军队的未来还不确定。2500名士兵是否能够如期复员?与之前的统治不一样的是,文官更能够履行其在部队方面的有关职责,而军队是否将遵从文官的统治?国际社会所提出的要有争议的军事领导人下台的条件是否危及改革?安哥拉的军事存在以及更强硬的国际干预的可能性是否真正改变了这些领导人的打算?所有这些问题,加上特别是尼日利亚和塞内加尔对安哥拉日渐增加的领导力的担忧,延迟和削弱了对于进行更广泛改革的国际支持,特别是对急需的养老金方案的支持。

拥有安哥拉支持的总理和军队参谋长的统治必须与贩毒和有罪不罚彻底断绝关系。这样做将为他们赢得合法性,满足人民的愿望,缓解国际担忧,并应对文官和军职人员关系的复杂历史以及巴兰特民族认同的政治化。几内亚比绍迫切需要一个有效的官僚机构及可信的制衡机制。政党的教育和能力建设长期来看特别重要。政治和军事灾难以及贩毒不应掩盖其它突出的结构性问题,比如治理、经济控制,以及资本和国家其它部分之间的不平等。区域和国际行为体应该对几内亚政治和经济权力向精英的集中化持审慎眼光。

达喀尔/布鲁塞尔,2012年1月23日

Executive Summary

The successful resistance of the Bissau-Guinean authorities to an attempted coup on 26 December 2011 is encouraging. It confirms the stabilisation the country has been experiencing since the political and military turmoil of 1 April 2010. However, this relative stability is the outcome of fragile, uncertain and very ambiguous compromises. Crucial political, military and judicial challenges still lie ahead. The death of President Malam Bacai Sanhá on 9 January 2012 raises questions over the country’s future. Political parties will have to manage inter- and intra-party competition and resist the temptation to harp on inter-communal tensions and the manipulation of army factions. Security sector reform (SSR) is pending, while the March and June 2009 assassinations still generate rumours, accusations and threats. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior’s regime, while solid, has yet to improve the country’s overall situation. International involvement must remain steady, sustained and critical. Angola must do more to improve communication, transparency and coordination with other international actors.

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The dominant political and military factions reached a tacit agreement in the wake of the overthrow of army Chief of Staff Zamora Induta by his deputy António Injai and the brief arrest of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior on 1 April 2010. The country’s dependence on international assistance, which is recognised by ordinary Guineans, and the firm response of the European Union (EU) and the U.S., have strengthened the hand of other international actors and the Guinean authorities to negotiate with the military. Tensions between the late president’s and the prime minister’s camps, both members of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), have gradually diminished.

The leaders of the 1 April 2010 events, General Injai and Admiral Bubo na Tchuto – long regarded as the strongman of cocaine trafficking from Latin America – have both recognised the legitimacy of the civilian rule, in exchange for a validation of their leadership over the army. The 26 December 2011 military unrest, which is subject to several interpretations, has, however, led to the arrest of na Tchuto without charges being brought against him. Angola has proven a key player during this delicate period. Luanda has deployed – albeit with a crucial lack of transparency – a robust military cooperation mission and provided material support to the Guinean state.

State reforms, favourable economic conditions and significant donor support have also slightly improved the economy and strengthened police and justice capacities. This has consolidated the tacit agreement between politicians and the army top brass and the legitimacy of the civilian leadership. A resumption of development has ensued, as well as some progress in investment plans in a promising natural resource sector.

But the most important developments have yet to come. The country faces daunting political hurdles: the PAIGC’s forthcoming congress and its factionalism; the death of President Sanhá and presidential elections which should be held by March 2012; the legislative elections scheduled for the end of the year; and the subsequent local elections – the first in the country’s post-colonial history. These milestones will likely consolidate the hegemony of the PAIGC and the prime minister. The future of a marginalised opposition hangs in the balance, as it may be tempted by radicalisation and resort to force. Some opposition parties are using recent tensions to capitalise on the unresolved political assassinations of 2009 and defy the prime minister.

Structural reforms to strengthen the state and foster development, especially SSR, represent another challenge. The future of the army is uncertain. Can 2,500 soldiers demobilise as scheduled? Will the military abide by rule by civilians who have fulfilled their obligations better than before with regards to the army? Does the international community’s condition that controversial military leaders step down endanger reforms? Have the Angolan military presence and the likelihood of more robust international intervention really changed those leaders’ calculations? All these questions, combined with concerns, notably from Nigeria and Senegal, about Angola’s growing leadership, delay and weaken international support for wider reforms, particularly regarding the much needed pension fund.

The Angola-backed domination of the prime minister and the army chief of staff must make a clean break from drug trafficking and impunity. Doing so will win them legitimacy, meet the aspirations of the population, relieve international concerns, and address both the complex history of civilian-military relations and the politicisation of the Balanta ethnic identity. An efficient bureaucracy and credible checks and balances are urgently needed. Education and capacity building of the political parties are particularly important over the long-term. Political and military woes and drug trafficking should not obscure other prominent, structural problems, such as governance, economic control and the inequality between the capital and the rest of the country. Regional and international actors should keep a critical eye on the concentration of political and economic power by Guinean elites.

Dakar/Brussels, 23 January 2012

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