Report / Africa 4 minutes

遏制尼日利亚的暴力(二):“博科圣地”叛乱

执行摘要

“博科圣地”的反叛活动已持续四年之久,导致友邻反目,造成4000多人死亡,近百万人背井离乡,几百座学校及政府建筑遭到破坏。尼日利亚东北部是全国最贫穷的地区之一,“博科圣地”使得当地本已凋敝的经济雪上加霜。这一组织让尼日利亚的联邦安全部门疲于应付,其反叛活动无休无止,正在向尼日利亚北部的其他地方渗透,并有可能扩散到尼日尔及喀麦隆。这一激进的伊斯兰武装组织充分利用该区域大多数居民对于国家治理、腐败、有罪不罚及发展不足问题的不满情绪,将使尼日尔、喀麦隆这样的弱国无力应对。“博科圣地”是对尼日利亚安全的严重挑战,同时它也反映出该国面临的更深层的安全威胁。尼日利亚联邦政府、各州政府以及整个区域应当制定并实施全面的计划,不仅要应对安全危机,而且要着手消除导致诸多问题的不公正现象。如若不然,“博科圣地”或者类似的组织必将继续扰乱尼日利亚广大地区的稳定。但是,政府的反应大部分以军事行动为主,似乎完全没有采取其他措施的政治意愿。

由于资源诅咒以及根深蒂固的猖獗腐败,大多数尼日利亚人如今比起1960年国家独立时更加贫穷。农业曾经是尼日利亚经济的支柱,但现在发展得也很艰难。在尼日利亚的许多地方,政府无法提供安全、良好的公路、水源、医疗、稳定的电力以及教育。边远北部地区情况尤其严重。对政府的失望及疏离感导致许多人加入民族、宗教、社区或是公民“自助”团体,其中有些团体对国家持敌对态度。

正是在这样的环境中,缺乏社会归属感的群体创立了名为“博科圣地”(大意一般翻译为“禁止西方教育”)的组织。这个伊斯兰派系认为,尼日利亚北部地区为腐败的伪穆斯林所控制。为了纠正这一现象,“博科圣地”及其支持者希望在北部建立一个严格遵守沙里亚法(伊斯兰教教法)的伊斯兰国家。

“博科圣地”的早期领导人穆罕默德·优素福是一位富有领袖魅力的教士。他试图通过非暴力手段来实现上述目的。 “博科圣地”宣称2002年左右,当时的博尔诺州州长候选人阿里·莫杜·谢里夫曾经将优素福收编,以获得优素福支持其大规模的青年运动,作为回报,谢里夫承诺如果胜选,将全面推行沙里亚法,并允诺优素福的追随者担任州政府高官。尽管事件经过尚存争议,但整个区域也基本相信这一说法。谢里夫否认与“博科圣地”有过任何此类安排或关系。随着“博科圣地”影响力的上升,有人指控博尔诺州的宗教事务官员曾向优素福提供资源,不过州政府倒从未全面推行过沙里亚法。

优素福此后对政府及官员腐败的批评越来越严厉,他的名望大增,“博科圣地”也扩大到了包奇、约贝、卡诺等州。一位高级安全官员评论道:“政客创造了这个怪物,然后又失去了对它的控制。”尼日利亚国家安全局曾几次逮捕并审问优素福,但从未对他提起诉讼,据说是由于有权势的官员从中干预。优素福据称也接收过外部萨拉菲派人士(包括奥萨马·本·拉登)提供的资金,用于为追随者的小额信贷项目提供资金,以及为难民和无业青年提供福利与食宿。

2009年,“博科圣地”成员与警察之间的一系列冲突升级成为武装叛乱。军队镇压了反叛分子,造成几百名追随者死亡,并摧毁了该组织主要的清真寺。优素福被捕,并被移交给警察。不久之后,他就被法外处决了。

“博科圣地”转入了地下,并于一年后对警员、警察局及军营发动袭击,明确要为优素福及其同志之死报仇。组织发言人要求起诉相关责任人,释放被关押成员,修复清真寺,并向被军队杀死的教派成员提供补偿。2010年以来,该组织的攻击范围不断扩大,不仅针对安全部队、政府官员及政客,还针对基督徒、持批评意见的穆斯林教士、传统领袖、联合国机构、酒吧及学校。最近,“博科圣地”开始转向纯粹的恐怖活动,将目标锁定为世俗公立学校的学生、参与脊髓灰质炎疫苗接种的医疗工作者以及支持政府的村庄。

2013年5月,古德勒克·乔纳森总统宣布博尔诺、约贝及阿达马瓦州进入紧急状态,在联防队员的协助下,总统增派的军队将“博科圣地”驱逐出了大多数的城镇。乔纳森总统还设立了谈判委员会,试图与“博科圣地”的领导人达成协议,但收效甚微。2014年3月18日,国家安全顾问穆罕默德·桑博·达苏基宣布要以“软性”方式消除恐怖主义的根源,但尼日利亚是否以及如何采取此类措施尚有待观察。

“博科圣地”内部一直没有严格的等级制度,如今这一组织比以往都更加分散,许多领导人散布于阿达马瓦山区、喀麦隆以及尼日尔。其暴力领袖阿布巴卡尔·谢考处于孤立状态,对于基层组织的日常控制或许微乎其微。整个组织正在分裂为不同的派系,其中就包括经验较为丰富、更针对外国目标的“安萨鲁”。除非政府通过根本性的政治改革,解决治理不力、腐败及发展不足的问题,从而获得当地人民全心全意的支持,这些基本畅行无阻的团体很难被完全压制。北部许多地区的安全问题也可能会加剧政治暴力,破坏2015年选举的可信度,进一步损害政府的合法性。

阿布贾 / 达喀尔 / 内罗毕 / 布鲁塞尔,2014年4月3日

Executive Summary

Boko Haram’s four-year-old insurgency has pitted neighbour against neighbour, cost more than 4,000 lives, displaced close to half a million, destroyed hundreds of schools and government buildings and devastated an already ravaged economy in the North East, one of Nigeria’s poorest regions. It overstretches federal security services, with no end in sight, spills over to other parts of the north and risks reaching Niger and Cameroon, weak countries poorly equipped to combat a radical Islamist armed group tapping into real governance, corruption, impunity and underdevelopment grievances shared by most people in the region. Boko Haram is both a serious challenge and manifestation of more profound threats to Nigeria’s security. Unless the federal and state governments, and the region, develop and implement comprehensive plans to tackle not only insecurity but also the injustices that drive much of the troubles, Boko Haram, or groups like it, will continue to destabilise large parts of the country. Yet, the government’s response is largely military, and political will to do more than that appears entirely lacking.

Most Nigerians are poorer today than they were at independence in 1960, victims of the resource curse and rampant, entrenched corruption. Agriculture, once the economy’s mainstay is struggling. In many parts of the country, the government is unable to provide security, good roads, water, health, reliable power and education. The situation is particularly dire in the far north. Frustration and alienation drive many to join “self-help” ethnic, religious, community or civic groups, some of which are hostile to the state.

It is in this environment that the group called Boko Haram (usually translated loosely as “Western education is forbidden”) by outsiders emerged. It is an Islamic sect that believes corrupt, false Muslims control northern Nigeria. The group and fellow travellers want to remedy this by establishing an Islamic state in the north with strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic law).

Boko Haram’s early leader, the charismatic preacher Mohammed Yusuf, tried to do so non-violently. While accounts are disputed, the narrative put forward by Boko Haram and now dominant in the region is that around 2002, Yusuf was co-opted by the then Borno state gubernatorial candidate, Ali Modu Sheriff, for the support of his large youth movement, in exchange for full implementation of Sharia and promises of senior state government positions for his followers in the event of an electoral victory. Sheriff denies any such arrangement or involvement with the sect. As the group rose to greater prominence, the state religious commissioner was accused of providing resources to Yusuf, while the government never implemented full Sharia.

Yusuf subsequently became increasingly critical of the government and official corruption, his popularity soared, and the group expanded into other states, including Bauchi, Yobe and Kano. “After the politicians created the monster”, a senior security officer commented, “they lost control of it”. The State Security Services (SSS) arrested and interrogated Yusuf a number of times, but he was never prosecuted, reportedly because of the intervention of influential officials. He also was said to receive funds from external Salafi contacts, including Osama bin Laden, that he used to fund a micro-credit scheme for his followers and give welfare, food and shelter to refugees and unemployed youth.

A series of clashes between Boko Haram members and police escalated into an armed insurrection in 2009. Troops crushed the rebellion, killing hundreds of followers and destroying the group’s principal mosque. Yusuf was captured, handed over to the police and shortly thereafter extrajudicially executed. 

Boko Haram went underground and a year later launched attacks on police officers, police stations and military barracks, explicitly in revenge for the killings of Yusuf and his comrades. Its spokesman demanded prosecution of those responsible, release of their detained colleagues, restoration of the mosque and compensation for sect members killed by troops. Since 2010, the group’s campaign has grown, targeting not only security forces, government officials and politicians, but also Christians, critical Muslim clerics, traditional leaders, the UN presence, bars and schools. Lately it has evolved into pure terrorism, with targeting of students attending secular state schools, health workers involved in polio vaccination campaigns and villages supporting the government.

In May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared an emergency in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states and deployed additional troops that with the help of vigilantes drove Boko Haram from most cities and towns. He also established a committee to negotiate a settlement with its leadership, with little success. On 18 March 2014, National Security Advisor Mohammed Sambo Dasuki announced a “soft” approach to addressing the root causes of terrorism, but it remains to be seen whether and how it will be implemented.

The movement, never very hierarchical, is more dispersed than ever, with many leaders in the Adamawa mountains, Cameroon, and Niger. Its isolated leader, the violent Abubakar Shekau, probably has little daily control over cells, and it is fragmenting into factions, including the relatively sophisticated Ansaru, which focuses more on foreign targets. Able to move fairly freely, these groups are unlikely ever to be completely suppressed, unless the government wins local hearts and minds by implementing fundamental political reforms to address bad governance, corruption and underdevelopment. Insecurity in much of the north may also worsen political violence and undermine the credibility of the 2015 elections, further damaging government legitimacy.

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