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中国与朝韩黄海冲突

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2010年,朝鲜在黄海发起了两次重大挑衅,天安号沉没事件和延坪岛炮击事件导致多人丧生,韩国、美国、日本对此进行了谴责和有限的军事反击,但是北京却徘徊在呼吁各方冷静克制的边缘,迟迟不愿采取更多行动。中国不仅拒绝要求朝鲜承担责任,而且强烈谴责美国与盟国在东北亚进行的军事演习。由于北京拒绝谴责朝鲜,导致国际社会不能形成统一的政策反应。朝鲜有恃无恐,进一步寻求军事行动和核武发展,增加了东北亚军事化的危险,迫使美国不得不进一步扩大在该地区的军事存在和政治影响,这本身就侵蚀着中国自身的安全利益。区域内各国和西方国家认为中国未能承担更多的责任维护地区稳定,中国与它们的外交关系也受到了相当的损害。1月19日胡锦涛和奥巴马发表的共同声明化解了一些消极影响,但是如果中国想在朝核问题六方会谈中重新树立公正的调解国形象,前路仍然漫长。

虽然朝韩在黄海北方界线争议地区爆发的冲突威胁着地区稳定,中国长期以来的政策始终是将它们视为领海争议的自然结果,淡化它们的严重性。与此类似,中国不认为朝鲜的常规武力挑衅应与核试验造成的威胁相提并论,也不认为国际社会(尤其是联合国安理会)需要对这些挑衅做出同等烈度的反应。中国对朝鲜的政策很大程度上受到两种战略判断的影响:其一是中国认为美国已经在战略上重返亚洲;其二是中国判断需要反对美国进一步加强在地区的军事和政治存在。

危机初始,北京的政策是淡化延坪岛炮击事件,批评美国与盟国在东北亚地区的军事部署和演习。但是朝韩冲突的不断升级改变了中国对威胁的认知,乃至最终降低了对华盛顿的谴责声调并派遣特使前往平壤进行调停。在2011年1月17日至21日胡锦涛访美期间,中美发表的联合声明强调了朝韩对话的重要性。在此声明中,中国首次对朝鲜浓缩铀项目表示关切。

 

但是,中国仍然继续加强和朝鲜的政治经济关系。2009年以来,双边高层互访频率大幅度上升,金正日历史性地在2010年一年内两次访问中国。中国的对朝政策仍然在根本上取决于历史因素和安全考量:两国在朝鲜战争中缔结了同志友谊,中国希望朝鲜继续扮演对美缓冲区的角色,也希望避免朝鲜政权垮台而导致大量难民涌入中国。2009年11月灾难性的货币改革和2010年朝鲜权力交接的进程增加了中国对朝鲜内部稳定的担忧。权力交接尤其是中国对朝政策中的首要考量因素之一。北京希望通过在朝鲜权力交接过程中给予朝鲜大力支持, 从而换取两国政治关系的进一步深入,同时让朝鲜下一代领导人更加接受中国经济改革的理念。虽然中国内部仍然存在关于对朝政策的辩论,但是在民族主义公共舆论的支持下,传统派和保守派势力主导着决策过程和结果。

中国不断增长的实力和外交信心是其对天安号及延坪岛事件采取模糊政策的基石。天安号事件后,中国认为韩国进行的国际调查有失偏颇且不准确,并且借助自己强大的外交筹码弱化了安理会声明的力度。尽管朝鲜对延坪岛炮击事件承担着不可推卸的责任,中国仍然否决了安理会有可能采取的行动。过去,中国至少愿意在朝鲜进行挑衅时调整自己的政策,西方也一直认为这是遏制朝鲜危险行为必不可少的因素。但是在过去一年中,中国不仅加强了对南中国海和钓鱼岛争议领土领海的主权宣示,而且还在伊朗、朝鲜问题上加强与外部压力的抗衡。中国认为自己有能力抵制外部压力,而且要求西方为中国在敏感第三国问题上的合作给予回报。但是中国与朝鲜保持团结一致,拒绝要求朝鲜为导致多人丧生的黄海冲突承担责任,这很大程度上恶化了中国与韩国、日本和美国的关系。中国在天安号事件后未能及时向韩国表示慰问,在李明博访华后热情欢迎金正日来访,这都让韩国感到愤怒。美日韩增加了在朝鲜问题上的三方协调。延坪岛炮击后中方呼吁进行六方会谈式的紧急磋商,美日韩三方一致表示反对。这显示出中国和美日韩三方在对朝鲜威胁的认知和反应方面差距逐步加大。

中国对朝鲜的影响力使得中国成为国际社会应对朝鲜挑衅的核心因素,而中国对黄海冲突采取的政策也是测试中国解决地区冲突意愿、能力和信誉的试金石。但是,中国淡化朝鲜黄海挑衅行为损害了其自身和地区的安全利益。在国际外交(尤其在联合国安理会)中为朝鲜提供庇护已经损害了中国的国际形象,也损害了它作为六方会谈公正调解方的信誉,同时促使朝鲜在危险的常规军事挑衅和核挑衅道路上越走越远。中国的行为导致韩日加强双边协调和与美国的军事同盟,这两个国家目前都已在考虑加强各自独立的导弹防御体系,这进一步增加了地区军备竞赛的危险。中国拒绝要求朝鲜承担责任,反而进一步在维护稳定的名义下支持朝鲜,这本身就增加了朝鲜半岛冲突的风险。

北京/首尔/布鲁塞尔,2011年1月27

 

Executive Summary

The deadly provocations by North Korea in the Yellow Sea in 2010 – the Ch’ŏnan sinking and the Yŏnp’yŏng Island shelling – drew condemnation and limited military responses by South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, but Beijing has been reluctant to go beyond counselling restraint to all parties. While declining to call Pyongyang to account, it criticised Washington for stepped-up military exercises with allies in North East Asia. Beijing’s unwillingness to condemn North Korea prevented a unified international response and undermines China’s own security interests, as it invites further North Korean military and nuclear initiatives, risks increased militarisation of North East Asia and encourages an expanded U.S. military and political role in the region. Because it is seen as having failed to take greater responsibility to safeguard stability, China has also damaged its relationships in the region and in the West. The joint statement Presidents Hu and Obama issued on 19 January has helped, but China has ground to make up if it is to recover credibility as an impartial broker in the Six-Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program.

Despite the threat to stability posed by inter-Korean clashes in the Yellow Sea along the Northern Limit Line, China has historically downplayed them as a natural consequence of the unsettled maritime boundary. Likewise, it does not consider Pyongyang’s conventional provocations and the demands for action they raise – particularly in the UN Security Council – as serious as those regarding its nuclear tests. But the approach to the North is also powerfully shaped by rising concern about a perceived U.S. strategic return to Asia and opposition to further entrenchment of American regional military and political presence.

Beijing initially downplayed the Yŏnp’yŏng shelling and criticised U.S. military deployment and exercises with allies in North East Asia. However, the subsequent spike in inter-Korean tensions altered its threat perception and led it ultimately to tone down criticism of Washington and send an envoy to Pyongyang. During President Hu Jintao’s visit to the U.S. from 17 to 21 January 2011, he agreed to a joint statement that emphasised the importance of North-South dialogue and expressed concern for the first time regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) uranium enrichment program.

But China continues to strengthen its political and economic ties with the DPRK. Since 2009, the frequency of high-level visits has increased dramatically, including an unprecedented two trips by Kim Jong-il in 2010. Policy toward the DPRK continues to be fundamentally shaped by historical and security considerations: Korean War comradeship, together with the desire to preserve the North as a buffer against the U.S. and avoid a regime collapse that would trigger a flood of refugees into China. The disastrous currency reform in November 2009 and developments in the DPRK succession process in 2010 deepened Chinese concerns about stability. The leadership transition in particular is a top factor in calculations; Beijing hopes that support for stability during the ongoing process will result in closer political ties and make the next generation of leaders more amenable to economic reform. While support to North Korea is subject to internal debate, traditionalist and conservative forces dominate policymaking and are supported by nationalist public opinion.

China’s growing power and foreign policy confidence are important factors underlying its ambivalence about the Ch’ŏnan and Yŏnp’yŏng Island incidents. After the sinking and what it viewed as a biased and flawed international investigation, it drew on its increased leverage to dilute the Security Council statement. And despite North Korea’s undeniable responsibility for the Yŏnp’yŏng Island shelling, it blocked Security Council action. In the past, Beijing’s willingness to at least calibrate its responses to North Korean provocations was seen by the West as essential for moderating Pyongyang’s behaviour. Over the past year, however, Beijing has not only escalated its claims to disputed territories in the South China Sea and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, but also increasingly resisted external pressure over Iran as well as North Korea. It feels under less pressure to yield to external demands and increasingly expects quid pro quos from the West in return for cooperation on sensitive third-country issues.

However, Beijing’s increased solidarity with Pyongyang and reluctance to censure it for the deadly Yellow Sea clashes has significantly strained relations with South Korea, Japan and the U.S. Seoul was offended by tardy condolences for the Ch’ŏnan sinking and the warm welcome Kim Jong-il received immediately following South Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to China. The South, the U.S. and Japan have intensified trilateral coordination on North Korea. Their rejection of China’s call for emergency consultations in the Six-Party format following the Yŏnp’yŏng Island shelling showed widening differences on threat perception and management.

China’s influence in Pyongyang makes it crucial for international efforts to address North Korean provocations, and how it deals with clashes in the Yellow Sea is an important test of its willingness, capacity and credibility in handling regional conflict risks more generally. However, Beijing is undermining both its own and regional security by downplaying Pyongyang’s deadly behaviour in the Yellow Sea. Diplomatic shielding of the North, particularly at the UN, has damaged its international image and weakened its standing as an honest broker in the Six-Party Talks, while encouraging risky conventional and nuclear initiatives by North Korea. China’s behaviour has caused South Korea and Japan to strengthen bilateral coordination and their military alliances with the U.S. and consider expansion of their own missile defence systems, intensifying the risk of a regional arms race. China’s policy of supporting Pyongyang instead of holding it to account – ostensibly for the sake of stability – is heightening the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

Beijing/Seoul/Brussels, 27 January 2011

 

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