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巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部
巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部
Supporters of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa Islamic organization take part in an anti-India demonstration to condemn the hanging of Mohammad Afzal Guru, Rawalpindi, 10 February 2013. REUTERS/Mian Khursheed
Report 279 / Asia

巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部

曾一度社会民风宽容的旁遮普南部而今沦为圣战组织基地。对政治和经济的不满、政治上的疏离感和贫乏的教育使其源源不断地为圣战组织提供新兵。为了扭转局面,政府必须彻底改变纵容的环境、制止仇恨言论、改善法治并巩固对所有圣战组织的反恐行动。

执行摘要

无论采取任何长期措施来打击巴基斯坦境内外圣战主义者,其都必须以南旁遮普(Punjab)为中心。因为此地区不仅存在着与本地、泛地区和跨国组织有挂钩的武装组织,而且该地大型的宗教学校和清真寺网络还为圣战组织提供了大量兵源。旁遮普南部盘踞着巴基斯坦的两大最为激进的德奥班德教派(Deobandi)组织——穆罕默德军(Jaish-e-Mohammed)和宗教分派心强的羌城军(LeJ)。前者被控于2016年1月2日袭击了印度的帕坦科特(Pathankot)空军基地;后者则被认为若非主谋,至少串谋了3月27日复活节在拉哈尔的袭击,并造成70多人丧生。为了扭转圣战局势,巴基斯坦穆斯林联盟(PML-N)的联邦和旁遮普省政府需要共同采取措施,不仅须终结纵容这些组织肆无忌惮的环境,同时还应解决因治理不当引起的政治疏离情绪,令其不再为圣战组织所利。

南旁遮普曾以其社会包容性而著称,但在过去几十年,圣战运动在该地区蔓延,其因是该省对圣战代表提供的支持,尤其来自沙特及其他海湾国家的海外财务资助。再加之充斥着火药味的政治、社会经济和地缘因素集合。南旁遮普邻近巴基斯坦饱受武装分子袭击且毫无法度的地区,并还与印度接壤,这使得该地区成为武装分子长期以来招募、训练、谋划和实施恐怖袭击的便利基地。尽管圣战组织在该地区中仍占少数,且其大多数遵从提倡宽容、融合的伊斯兰教派,但由于该省的一些决策,尤其是长期依靠圣战运动的势力来推进其国家安全利益,圣战组织因此在很大程度上可以为所欲为。缺乏法制加之政权失调和治理无能,这也使圣战组织得以发挥超出其规模和社会根基的影响力。

政府的支持和纵容的环境提高了圣战组织招募成员的潜力,且加入组织的风险远低于其可能获得的利益,其中包括就业及其他金钱奖赏、社会地位和使命感。这些现象在旁遮普以务农为主且较贫穷的南部地区中尤为明显。南旁遮普人强烈地认为,素被称为“拉哈尔宝座”(Takht Lahore)的工业化中部和北部地区剥削了他们。这些意识产生是源于政治上的歧视、治理的薄弱、经济上的忽略,和收入的明显不均衡。

2014年12月,巴基斯坦塔利班派袭击了白沙瓦陆军公立学校(Peshawar Army Public School),并造成150余人死亡,且其中大多为儿童。事后,政府和军方领导虽誓言要铲除所有极端组织;但他们制定的国家行动计划(NAP)之核心目标——不再将圣战分子区分为那些可以推进巴在印度和阿富汗的战略目标“好”组织和那些针对安全部队和巴基斯坦人的“坏”组织——似乎也已经半途而废了。

目前在南旁遮普武装组织的持续镇压中,其仍显露出了明显地厚此薄彼的做法,这也削弱了其更广泛的反恐目标。一方面反印度的圣战组织继续恣意妄为,而另一方面,准军事部队滥用武力打击本地犯罪组织,而旁遮普政府则诉诸于法外处决的手段来铲除圣战领导层和卒兵。过度依赖于武力打击的反恐政策或会有短期效果,但长期而言则会适得其反,因为该政策破坏了法制并助长了政治疏离情绪。

反恐国家行动计划的其他主要目标尚无进展,尤其是在改革和监管宗教学校部门方面,并尤其对有着大量迪奥班德(Deobandi)宗教学校的南旁遮普造成了负面影响。穷人的孩子受宗派主义和其他激进意识形态的侵蚀。且政府无意在穆斯林学校和清真寺抵制这些现象、缔止仇恨言语和文字的传播,这从而助长了该地区的激进化。

旁遮普虽是巴基斯坦最富有、人口最多的省份,但南旁遮普却是其最贫困的地区。周期性的自然灾害,如破坏房屋和生计的干旱和洪涝,令本已困难的经济条件雪上加霜。而圣战组织,因常获政府支持,享受了官方为之提供的便利,并得以借机通过其慈善的部属来博得人心。同时,有能力填补政府服务的欠缺的民间社会组织则往往会受到限制和恐吓。

尽管圣战组织当道,但南旁遮普的大多数人仍然坚持更温和、融合的伊斯兰教派:苏菲派(Sufism)和巴雷尔维派(Barelvism),而其尊崇的宗教仪式被德奥班迪学派(Deobandis)和瓦哈比教派(Wahhabi)/Salafis视为异端。然而,大环境的纵容助长了极端宗教、宗派主义和性别歧视及排斥。若听之任之,这些组织的影响力将可能在本地区内外滋长。

拉合尔和伊斯兰堡应对所有圣战组织实施一视同仁的法律控制。若不这样做,那在南旁遮普还会有不少人继续将加入圣战组织视为是利大于弊的。

伊斯兰堡/布鲁塞尔,2016年5月30日

Commentary / Asia

Pakistan: Challenges of a Weak Democracy

The new government of Imran Khan is repressing opposition voices and yielding to parties propagating sectarianism. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2019 for European policymakers, Crisis Group urges the EU to help Pakistan abide by its international commitments and keep supporting democratic governance.

On 30 October 2018, after Pakistan’s Supreme Court overturned the death sentence of a Christian woman, Aasia Masih (also known as Aasia Bibi) on blasphemy charges, a hardline Islamist party, Tehreek-i-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah, launched violent demonstrations countrywide demanding the verdict’s reversal. The protests ended after Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government offered immunity to Labaik’s leadership and violent activists and permitted the movement to submit a review petition calling on the court to reinstate Bibi’s death penalty. The government’s actions appeared to relent to a group that propagates sectarian hatred and threatens the lives of religious and other minorities. Meanwhile, the military-sponsored “mainstreaming” of anti-India jihadists (notably the Laskhar-e-Tayyaba/Jamaat-ud-Dawa), which permits such groups to rebrand and enter politics without renouncing militancy, risks further fuelling intolerance and sectarianism. Mainstreaming could also entail international sanction, given that it contravenes Pakistan’s counter-terrorism commitments. Yet another challenge lies in persistent political tensions: having come to power after contested elections in July 2018, Khan’s government thus far has done little to bridge divisions between it and opposition parties. The government has targeted opposition leaders in politicised corruption trials, while security forces’ have cracked down on dissenting voices within civil society and the media.

The EU and its member states should:

  • Leverage Pakistan’s sensitivity to its international standing and aversion to isolation, urge Pakistan to prosecute Labaik leaders and activists, through fair trials and with due process, for threatening judges and public officials, attacking police and citizens, and destroying public and private properties during the November 2018 protests; at the same time, call for parliament to enact legislation to prevent the misuse of the blasphemy laws that threaten the security of marginalised communities;
     
  • Also call on the government to implement existing and enact additional laws that meet international human rights standards to ban jihadists from fundraising, recruiting, and conducting attacks within the country and in the region;
     
  • Continue to support democratic governance and the rule of law in Pakistan, including calling for due process in prosecution of cases against the opposition and press the government to protect individual freedoms. Warn Islamabad that its failure to respect freedoms of expression, association, religion and belief could adversely affect the preferential trading status it receives under the GSP+ scheme.

Rising Religious Intolerance and Violence

On 31 October 2018, the Supreme Court acquitted and ordered the release of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman sentenced to death on blasphemy charges in November 2010. In response, religious groups, spearheaded by Tehreek-i-Labaik Pakistan, the political front of the Sunni Barelvi Tehreek-i-Labaik Ya Rasool Allah, launched violent protests countrywide, attacking police officers and citizens and destroying public and private property. By invoking highly-provocative claims of blasphemy, the several thousand Labaik protesters gained the support of many conservative Muslims. Holding “Hang Aasia Bibi” rallies, Labaik leaders accused Supreme Court judges of blasphemy, called for their assassination, and urged soldiers to mutiny against army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa, whose religious faith they questioned. On 2 November, Imran Khan’s government struck a deal with Labaik. Arguing that to do otherwise would lead to more violence, the government agreed not to take any action against Labaik leaders and supporters, releasing those responsible for inciting sectarian hatred and resorting to violence during the protests. It also agreed not to oppose a review petition to reinstate Bibi’s death sentence, to bar her from leaving the country until the Supreme Court has reached a decision on that petition, and to release those responsible for violence during the protests. Though the government may have faced a short-term dilemma in looking for a way to defuse the protests and avoid provoking wider unrest, the tensions provoked by intolerant and sectarian groups like Labaik is a problem of Pakistani authorities’ own making over decades, one that is reinforced, not lessened, by a pattern of capitulation to such groups.

Mere accusations of blasphemy can lead to death [in Pakistan], and those defending the innocent [...] have often been silenced.

Emboldened by the government’s backing down, Labaik threatened another protest on 24 November. The government, fearing more violence, quickly placed the group’s leaders and hundreds of activists under preventive detention. Although cases have been filed, including in anti-terrorism courts against Labaik’s top leadership, those men are still awaiting prosecution. The outcome of these cases is uncertain, but in similar instances in the past, the filing of charges has not led to prosecution, once immediate pressures are relieved and public attention wanes. Bibi, though freed by the courts, remains in hiding. Her case has fuelled the fears of religious minorities that the state cannot protect them if those responsible for inciting and using violence against their communities operate with impunity. Mere accusations of blasphemy can lead to death, and those defending the innocent, such as Punjab Governor Salman Taseer, killed by his guard in 2011 for supporting Aasia Bibi, have often been silenced.

Labaik’s emergence and growing influence is closely tied to Pakistan’s military and intelligence services’ longstanding use of Islamists to challenge civilian rivals by supporting their forays into political life. Reportedly backed by the military to destabilise the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government in November 2017, Labaik at that time accused the law minister of blasphemy and besieged Islamabad, attacking police officers and civilians. The siege ended after the military concluded a deal whereby the law minister resigned and the state gave Labaik leaders and activists immunity from criminal prosecution. In another bid to undermine the PML-N by cutting into its support base in the July 2018 election, Labaik created a political front to contest the vote even as it continued to encourage and deploy violence. Exploiting popular sentiment about blasphemy, Labaik won 2.2 million votes and emerged as the third-largest party in parliament after the PTI and PML-N. It now uses its newfound political legitimacy to raise funds, recruit and propagate a hardline sectarian agenda.

Militants Deepen their Political Clout

In addition to using Islamists to weaken other parties, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services have also encouraged anti-India jihadists, including some designated by the UN Security Council as terrorist organisations, to enter politics. Most prominent is the now-rebranded Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD) – previously Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT), which was responsible for the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks – and its charity front, the Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation. LeT/JD is included in the UN Security Council’s 1267 sanctions list. In June 2018, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) body that works to combat money laundering and terrorism financing, placed Pakistan on its “grey list” due to lax counter-terrorism financing laws and enforcement. Partly to avert FATF pressure, a presidential ordinance nominally banned LeT/JD and its charity front in February 2018. But the banned group was allowed to take part in the 2018 vote through yet another front, the Allah-o-Akbar Tehreek, though it failed to gain even a single seat. The presidential ordinance banning LeT/JD and its charity front has since lapsed.

In principle, encouraging militants to enter politics could help moderate them. In these circumstances, however, little suggests that will happen, given that the political participation of groups allied to the military is not conditioned on their abandoning violence or related recruitment and proselytising. Indeed, their rebranding and entry into politics appears to be a deliberate strategy to keep alive groups regarded as useful foreign policy proxies in the face of international pressure. The mainstreaming strategy, particularly as it pertains to groups on the 1267 list, poses risks for Pakistan at home and abroad. The failure to ban those groups and reform financing laws could see Pakistan listed on the FATF’s “blacklist” of “non-cooperative countries” next fall, with serious implications for the country’s reputation and economy. That failure also hinders any rapprochement with India: New Delhi refuses to resume bilateral dialogue with Islamabad, frozen since a 2016 attack attributed to Pakistan-based militants, until Pakistan takes decisive action against jihadists. For the region, the security risks inherent in the failure to demobilise such groups are grave: another major attack on India by Pakistan-based groups could bring the two nuclear-armed neighbours to the brink of war.

Crackdowns Heighten Political Turmoil

The military’s backing of the PTI and its alleged support for Khan’s government as it targets opponents fuel the political acrimony that already marked the July 2018 election. The two main opposition parties, Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N and former President Asif Zardari’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), were denied an equal playing field amid reports, as noted in the EU election observation mission’s October report, “of interference in the electoral process by the military-led establishment and the active role of the judiciary in political affairs”.

Reportedly with military and judicial backing, the government is now pursuing the PML-N and PPP leadership through a legal process that is deeply partisan. Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz, now opposition leader in the federal legislature, have been indicted and imprisoned on corruption charges without due process; the government is also lodging corruption cases against the PPP leadership. Unless the government changes course, political turmoil could increase at a time when militant threats are still acute – over 200 people died in terror attacks during the election. The government would be better served by working with the parliamentary opposition to ban and prosecute groups that refuse to shun violence and that propagate sectarian hatred.

Engaging with Pakistan

The EU should push Pakistani authorities to take steps to ease political acrimony, protect minorities and stop militants entering politics without first renouncing violence. First, in line with its traditional emphasis on the rule of law, the EU should leverage Pakistan’s concerns about its international standing to urge the government to ensure due process in prosecuting cases against opposition leaders and thus help defuse political tensions. It should warn Islamabad that failure to meet its human rights obligations, particularly in respecting freedoms of expression, association, religion and belief, could adversely affect the preferential trading status it receives under the GSP+ scheme.

Second, the EU should press the Pakistan parliament to amend blasphemy laws to prevent their misuse. Aasia Bibi’s case is one of scores in which false accusations of blasphemy have placed innocent people, particularly from religious and ethnic minorities, on death row. The EU Council has repeatedly voiced concerns about the abuse of these laws, including in their most recent conclusions on Pakistan. Updating the legislation is even more important now as Labaik is exploiting the blasphemy issue to foment sectarian hatred among parts of Pakistani society.

Lastly, though the EU has called on Pakistan to work with the FATF to strengthen its counter-terrorism financial oversight regime, it should also highlight the importance of implementing existing or drafting new laws to prevent jihadists and other militants that refuse to abjure violence from operating under changed names. In its October report, the EU Election Observation Mission rightly expressed concern about the “the emergence of extremist parties with affiliations either to terrorist groups, or individuals linked to organisations that have used, incited or advocated violence”. So long as the state fails to take action against such groups, they will continue to fuel religious sectarianism and intolerance at home and threaten the security of Pakistan’s neighbours.