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巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部
巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部
National Ambitions Meet Local Opposition Along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
National Ambitions Meet Local Opposition Along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Supporters of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa Islamic organization take part in an anti-India demonstration to condemn the hanging of Mohammad Afzal Guru, Rawalpindi, 10 February 2013. REUTERS/Mian Khursheed
Report 279 / Asia

巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部

曾一度社会民风宽容的旁遮普南部而今沦为圣战组织基地。对政治和经济的不满、政治上的疏离感和贫乏的教育使其源源不断地为圣战组织提供新兵。为了扭转局面,政府必须彻底改变纵容的环境、制止仇恨言论、改善法治并巩固对所有圣战组织的反恐行动。

执行摘要

无论采取任何长期措施来打击巴基斯坦境内外圣战主义者,其都必须以南旁遮普(Punjab)为中心。因为此地区不仅存在着与本地、泛地区和跨国组织有挂钩的武装组织,而且该地大型的宗教学校和清真寺网络还为圣战组织提供了大量兵源。旁遮普南部盘踞着巴基斯坦的两大最为激进的德奥班德教派(Deobandi)组织——穆罕默德军(Jaish-e-Mohammed)和宗教分派心强的羌城军(LeJ)。前者被控于2016年1月2日袭击了印度的帕坦科特(Pathankot)空军基地;后者则被认为若非主谋,至少串谋了3月27日复活节在拉哈尔的袭击,并造成70多人丧生。为了扭转圣战局势,巴基斯坦穆斯林联盟(PML-N)的联邦和旁遮普省政府需要共同采取措施,不仅须终结纵容这些组织肆无忌惮的环境,同时还应解决因治理不当引起的政治疏离情绪,令其不再为圣战组织所利。

南旁遮普曾以其社会包容性而著称,但在过去几十年,圣战运动在该地区蔓延,其因是该省对圣战代表提供的支持,尤其来自沙特及其他海湾国家的海外财务资助。再加之充斥着火药味的政治、社会经济和地缘因素集合。南旁遮普邻近巴基斯坦饱受武装分子袭击且毫无法度的地区,并还与印度接壤,这使得该地区成为武装分子长期以来招募、训练、谋划和实施恐怖袭击的便利基地。尽管圣战组织在该地区中仍占少数,且其大多数遵从提倡宽容、融合的伊斯兰教派,但由于该省的一些决策,尤其是长期依靠圣战运动的势力来推进其国家安全利益,圣战组织因此在很大程度上可以为所欲为。缺乏法制加之政权失调和治理无能,这也使圣战组织得以发挥超出其规模和社会根基的影响力。

政府的支持和纵容的环境提高了圣战组织招募成员的潜力,且加入组织的风险远低于其可能获得的利益,其中包括就业及其他金钱奖赏、社会地位和使命感。这些现象在旁遮普以务农为主且较贫穷的南部地区中尤为明显。南旁遮普人强烈地认为,素被称为“拉哈尔宝座”(Takht Lahore)的工业化中部和北部地区剥削了他们。这些意识产生是源于政治上的歧视、治理的薄弱、经济上的忽略,和收入的明显不均衡。

2014年12月,巴基斯坦塔利班派袭击了白沙瓦陆军公立学校(Peshawar Army Public School),并造成150余人死亡,且其中大多为儿童。事后,政府和军方领导虽誓言要铲除所有极端组织;但他们制定的国家行动计划(NAP)之核心目标——不再将圣战分子区分为那些可以推进巴在印度和阿富汗的战略目标“好”组织和那些针对安全部队和巴基斯坦人的“坏”组织——似乎也已经半途而废了。

目前在南旁遮普武装组织的持续镇压中,其仍显露出了明显地厚此薄彼的做法,这也削弱了其更广泛的反恐目标。一方面反印度的圣战组织继续恣意妄为,而另一方面,准军事部队滥用武力打击本地犯罪组织,而旁遮普政府则诉诸于法外处决的手段来铲除圣战领导层和卒兵。过度依赖于武力打击的反恐政策或会有短期效果,但长期而言则会适得其反,因为该政策破坏了法制并助长了政治疏离情绪。

反恐国家行动计划的其他主要目标尚无进展,尤其是在改革和监管宗教学校部门方面,并尤其对有着大量迪奥班德(Deobandi)宗教学校的南旁遮普造成了负面影响。穷人的孩子受宗派主义和其他激进意识形态的侵蚀。且政府无意在穆斯林学校和清真寺抵制这些现象、缔止仇恨言语和文字的传播,这从而助长了该地区的激进化。

旁遮普虽是巴基斯坦最富有、人口最多的省份,但南旁遮普却是其最贫困的地区。周期性的自然灾害,如破坏房屋和生计的干旱和洪涝,令本已困难的经济条件雪上加霜。而圣战组织,因常获政府支持,享受了官方为之提供的便利,并得以借机通过其慈善的部属来博得人心。同时,有能力填补政府服务的欠缺的民间社会组织则往往会受到限制和恐吓。

尽管圣战组织当道,但南旁遮普的大多数人仍然坚持更温和、融合的伊斯兰教派:苏菲派(Sufism)和巴雷尔维派(Barelvism),而其尊崇的宗教仪式被德奥班迪学派(Deobandis)和瓦哈比教派(Wahhabi)/Salafis视为异端。然而,大环境的纵容助长了极端宗教、宗派主义和性别歧视及排斥。若听之任之,这些组织的影响力将可能在本地区内外滋长。

拉合尔和伊斯兰堡应对所有圣战组织实施一视同仁的法律控制。若不这样做,那在南旁遮普还会有不少人继续将加入圣战组织视为是利大于弊的。

伊斯兰堡/布鲁塞尔,2016年5月30日

Op-Ed / Asia

National Ambitions Meet Local Opposition Along the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Originally published in The Diplomat

Pakistan’s central government is all-in on CPEC. But at key points, local communities are resisting.

In the run-up to Pakistan’s general election on July 25, most political parties stand united in their belief that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) will transform Pakistan’s ailing economy. In May, Pakistan’s ambassador to China asserted that “regardless of any political change in Pakistan, our commitment towards the successful completion of CPEC will not change.”

But if political support at the national level appears unwavering, local opposition is growing over the lack of consultation and concerns regarding the inequitable distribution of the prospective benefits. In few places is this more noticeable than the southern Balochistan fishing town of Gwadar, the entry point of the corridor and a microcosm of the center-periphery tensions elsewhere that threaten CPEC’s implementation.

An Ambitious Vision

Aiming to develop a “growth axis and development belt” between China and Pakistan, CPEC could involve investments of some $60 billion. The corridor connects Gwadar, in the southwestern province of Balochistan, to China’s Xinjiang region via a 2,700 kilometer route through the mountainous terrain of Gilgit-Baltistan in northernmost Pakistan .

For China’s and Pakistan’s foreign policies, the potential payoffs are clear. CPEC is a flagship project of Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a geopolitical ambition to develop trade and infrastructure with over 60 economies across Eurasia, Africa, and beyond. For Islamabad, CPEC brings the hope of not only economic dividends but also potentially a geopolitical reconfiguration. Some Pakistani strategists believe deepening ties to China will offset rising U.S. diplomatic and economic pressure aimed at ending Islamabad’s support to Afghanistan- and India-oriented militant proxies.

CPEC’s prospective economic benefits are forecast to materialize slowly across Pakistan between 2017 and 2030. But policy planning has been opaque, omitting details of how development projects will actually impact local economies, infrastructure and business. An urban planner and expert on Gwadar said the government’s plan lacks even “cosmetic consultation.” As more details slowly emerge, local alarm is growing about what CPEC will bring to Balochistan.

Stirring Local Unrest

In Gwadar, the Arabian Sea town in southern Balochistan that CPEC aims to transform into a bustling commercial port, inner city locals fear displacement over government plans to expropriate land, bulldoze the old city, and resettle residents. The state-led land grab is estimated to claim at least 290,000 acres to make way for development, in large part through ultimatums issued to local residents. Those who refuse to sell land or property could simply have it seized by the federal government and would likely face forced resettlement.

Local livelihoods also appear to be under fire. Fisher folk, whose daily catch provides them just enough to feed their families, have on occasion been denied access to the sea and could face the permanent closure of Gwadar’s jetty. Unskilled workers resent exclusion from the port’s construction, as federal authorities favor importing labor from other provinces. One official in Gwadar said that “the plan seems to be to make life so miserable for the residents that they leave on their own.”

Anti-Chinese sentiment is rising in step with suspicions of Beijing’s intentions.

Nor is it clear that those who stay in Gwadar will reap the fruits of Chinese investment. At the start of the project, Pakistan transferred leasing rights for Gwadar port to the China Overseas Port Holding Company, sealing a deal that grants China 91 percent of the port-generated profits and Islamabad just 9 percent, while denying Balochistan’s provincial government any revenue. With such lopsided terms, China is under minimal pressure to ensure local prosperity.

Anti-Chinese sentiment is rising in step with suspicions of Beijing’s intentions. Some Pakistani security analysts see China’s development plans as a mask for broader geopolitical ambitions. In Gwadar, they perceive Beijing as less interested in developing a transport link to Xinjiang or a commercial waystation to the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf than eventually transforming the port into a military or naval base, another in a string of installations dotted across the Indian Ocean that affords Beijing the strategic initiative vis-à-vis regional rival India.

Regardless of China’s true intentions, the net result for locals is the same. Economic marginalization is stirring local dissent, which could lead to significant security risks. Balochistan’s insurgency has long rested on popular demands for greater political and economic autonomy. The failure to provide Gwadar the benefits of CPEC development is heightening hostility toward Islamabad and Beijing, and affording Baloch insurgents a chance to expand their outreach and recruit disgruntled locals. Since 2017, Baloch militants have already killed scores of Pakistanis employed on CPEC projects and future attacks might target Chinese construction workers or Chinese nationals living in Pakistan.

A Chance to Reverse Course

Instead of addressing the causes of this dissent, Pakistani authorities have opted to respond through crackdowns of anti-CPEC protests, an overbearing security presence, and harassment and intimidation of local residents. The best chances for the country’s stability – not to mention CPEC’s success in Gwadar and elsewhere – lie in giving provinces and communities a voice in shaping development projects.

In particular, the government should make greater efforts to consult communities and experts regarding the impact of development and reconsider the ongoing policy of rampant land expropriation. It should also put in place measures to ensure the employment of local labor on construction projects to ensure that they reap the dividends of outside investment. Chinese and Pakistani companies, too, ought to take similar measures to assess the risks associated with controversial development initiatives.

Whatever the result of Pakistan’s elections, the new parliament should seize the opportunities of a fresh mandate by informing a new government policy. That policy should have the well-being of Pakistani citizens at its heart, rather than treating it as expendable in the pursuit of mega-development.