巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部
巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部
Keeping Turmoil at Bay in Pakistan’s Polarised Polity
Keeping Turmoil at Bay in Pakistan’s Polarised Polity
Supporters of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa Islamic organization take part in an anti-India demonstration to condemn the hanging of Mohammad Afzal Guru, Rawalpindi, 10 February 2013. REUTERS/Mian Khursheed
Supporters of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa Islamic organization take part in an anti-India demonstration to condemn the hanging of Mohammad Afzal Guru, Rawalpindi, 10 February 2013. REUTERS/Mian Khursheed
Report 279 / Asia

巴基斯坦圣战者的中心地带:旁遮普南部

曾一度社会民风宽容的旁遮普南部而今沦为圣战组织基地。对政治和经济的不满、政治上的疏离感和贫乏的教育使其源源不断地为圣战组织提供新兵。为了扭转局面,政府必须彻底改变纵容的环境、制止仇恨言论、改善法治并巩固对所有圣战组织的反恐行动。

执行摘要

无论采取任何长期措施来打击巴基斯坦境内外圣战主义者,其都必须以南旁遮普(Punjab)为中心。因为此地区不仅存在着与本地、泛地区和跨国组织有挂钩的武装组织,而且该地大型的宗教学校和清真寺网络还为圣战组织提供了大量兵源。旁遮普南部盘踞着巴基斯坦的两大最为激进的德奥班德教派(Deobandi)组织——穆罕默德军(Jaish-e-Mohammed)和宗教分派心强的羌城军(LeJ)。前者被控于2016年1月2日袭击了印度的帕坦科特(Pathankot)空军基地;后者则被认为若非主谋,至少串谋了3月27日复活节在拉哈尔的袭击,并造成70多人丧生。为了扭转圣战局势,巴基斯坦穆斯林联盟(PML-N)的联邦和旁遮普省政府需要共同采取措施,不仅须终结纵容这些组织肆无忌惮的环境,同时还应解决因治理不当引起的政治疏离情绪,令其不再为圣战组织所利。

南旁遮普曾以其社会包容性而著称,但在过去几十年,圣战运动在该地区蔓延,其因是该省对圣战代表提供的支持,尤其来自沙特及其他海湾国家的海外财务资助。再加之充斥着火药味的政治、社会经济和地缘因素集合。南旁遮普邻近巴基斯坦饱受武装分子袭击且毫无法度的地区,并还与印度接壤,这使得该地区成为武装分子长期以来招募、训练、谋划和实施恐怖袭击的便利基地。尽管圣战组织在该地区中仍占少数,且其大多数遵从提倡宽容、融合的伊斯兰教派,但由于该省的一些决策,尤其是长期依靠圣战运动的势力来推进其国家安全利益,圣战组织因此在很大程度上可以为所欲为。缺乏法制加之政权失调和治理无能,这也使圣战组织得以发挥超出其规模和社会根基的影响力。

政府的支持和纵容的环境提高了圣战组织招募成员的潜力,且加入组织的风险远低于其可能获得的利益,其中包括就业及其他金钱奖赏、社会地位和使命感。这些现象在旁遮普以务农为主且较贫穷的南部地区中尤为明显。南旁遮普人强烈地认为,素被称为“拉哈尔宝座”(Takht Lahore)的工业化中部和北部地区剥削了他们。这些意识产生是源于政治上的歧视、治理的薄弱、经济上的忽略,和收入的明显不均衡。

2014年12月,巴基斯坦塔利班派袭击了白沙瓦陆军公立学校(Peshawar Army Public School),并造成150余人死亡,且其中大多为儿童。事后,政府和军方领导虽誓言要铲除所有极端组织;但他们制定的国家行动计划(NAP)之核心目标——不再将圣战分子区分为那些可以推进巴在印度和阿富汗的战略目标“好”组织和那些针对安全部队和巴基斯坦人的“坏”组织——似乎也已经半途而废了。

目前在南旁遮普武装组织的持续镇压中,其仍显露出了明显地厚此薄彼的做法,这也削弱了其更广泛的反恐目标。一方面反印度的圣战组织继续恣意妄为,而另一方面,准军事部队滥用武力打击本地犯罪组织,而旁遮普政府则诉诸于法外处决的手段来铲除圣战领导层和卒兵。过度依赖于武力打击的反恐政策或会有短期效果,但长期而言则会适得其反,因为该政策破坏了法制并助长了政治疏离情绪。

反恐国家行动计划的其他主要目标尚无进展,尤其是在改革和监管宗教学校部门方面,并尤其对有着大量迪奥班德(Deobandi)宗教学校的南旁遮普造成了负面影响。穷人的孩子受宗派主义和其他激进意识形态的侵蚀。且政府无意在穆斯林学校和清真寺抵制这些现象、缔止仇恨言语和文字的传播,这从而助长了该地区的激进化。

旁遮普虽是巴基斯坦最富有、人口最多的省份,但南旁遮普却是其最贫困的地区。周期性的自然灾害,如破坏房屋和生计的干旱和洪涝,令本已困难的经济条件雪上加霜。而圣战组织,因常获政府支持,享受了官方为之提供的便利,并得以借机通过其慈善的部属来博得人心。同时,有能力填补政府服务的欠缺的民间社会组织则往往会受到限制和恐吓。

尽管圣战组织当道,但南旁遮普的大多数人仍然坚持更温和、融合的伊斯兰教派:苏菲派(Sufism)和巴雷尔维派(Barelvism),而其尊崇的宗教仪式被德奥班迪学派(Deobandis)和瓦哈比教派(Wahhabi)/Salafis视为异端。然而,大环境的纵容助长了极端宗教、宗派主义和性别歧视及排斥。若听之任之,这些组织的影响力将可能在本地区内外滋长。

拉合尔和伊斯兰堡应对所有圣战组织实施一视同仁的法律控制。若不这样做,那在南旁遮普还会有不少人继续将加入圣战组织视为是利大于弊的。

伊斯兰堡/布鲁塞尔,2016年5月30日

Executive Summary

Southern Punjab must be central to any sustainable effort to counter jihadist violence within and beyond Pakistan’s borders, given the presence of militant groups with local, regional and transnational links and an endless source of recruits, including through large madrasa and mosque networks. The region hosts two of Pakistan’s most radical Deobandi groups, Jaish-e-Mohammed, held responsible by India for the 2 January 2016 attack on its Pathankot airbase; and the sectarian Laskhar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), which was at least complicit in, if not solely responsible for, the 27 March Easter Sunday attack that killed more than 70 in Lahore. To reverse the jihadist tide, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)’s federal and Punjab province governments will have to both end the climate of impunity that allows these groups to operate freely and address political alienation resulting from other governance failures these groups tap into. 

Southern Punjab was once known for a tolerant society, but over the past few decades, state support for jihadist proxies, financial support from foreign, particularly Saudi and other Gulf countries, combined with an explosive mix of political, socio-economic, and geostrategic factors, has enabled jihadist expansion there. Bordering on insurgency-hit and lawless regions of the country and also sharing a border with India, it has long provided a convenient base where these outfits can recruit, train and plan and conduct terror attacks. Although jihadist groups still harbour a fringe minority in a region where the vast majority follows a more tolerant, syncretic form of Islam, their ability to operate freely is largely the result of the state’s policy choices, particularly long reliance on jihadist proxies to promote perceived national security interests. The absence of rule-of-law, combined with political dysfunction and inept governance, also allows these organisations to exercise influence disproportionate to their size and social roots.

With state sponsorship and a pervasive climate of impunity enhancing jihadist groups’ recruitment potential, the risks of joining are far lower than potential gains that include employment and other financial rewards, social status and sense of purpose. These are all the more compelling in Punjab’s largely rural and relatively poorly developed southern regions, where perceptions of exploitation by the industrialised central and north Punjab, referred to by southern Punjabis as Takht Lahore (throne of Lahore), are high, the result of political marginalisation, weak governance, economic neglect and glaring income inequity.

After the December 2014 attack on the Peshawar Army Public School by a Pakistani Taliban faction that killed over 150, mostly children, the civilian and military leadership vowed to eliminate all extremist groups. Yet, the core goal of the counter-terrorism National Action Plan (NAP) it developed – to end distinctions between “good” jihadists, those perceived to promote strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan, and “ bad” jihadists, those that target the security forces and other Pakistanis – appears to have fallen by the wayside.

A highly selective approach still characterises the ongoing crackdown on militant outfits in southern Punjab and undermines broader counter-terrorism objectives. While the anti-India Jaish continues to operate freely, paramilitary units use indiscriminate force against local criminal groups, and the Punjab government resorts to extrajudicial killings to eliminate the LeJ leadership and foot soldiers. Overreliance on a militarised counter-terrorism approach based on blunt force might yield short-term benefits but, by undermining rule-of-law and fuelling alienation, will prove counterproductive in the long term. 

The lack of progress on other major NAP goals, particularly reform and regulation of the madrasa sector, has especially adverse implications for southern Punjab, with its many Deobandi madrasas. The children of the poor are exposed to sectarian and other radical ideological discourse. The state’s unwillingness to clamp down on it in sectarian madrasas and mosques so as to counter hate speech and prevent dissemination of hate literature increases the potential for radicalisation in the region.

In the poorest region of the country’s richest and most populous province, where economic hardships are compounded by periodic natural disasters, including droughts and floods that destroy homes and livelihoods, jihadist groups, often with state support, their access being facilitated by the bureaucracy, are given opportunities to win hearts and minds through their charity wings. At the same time, civil society organisations capable of filling the gaps in the state’s delivery of services are often subjected to restrictions and intimidation.

Despite jihadist inroads, the vast majority in southern Punjab still adhere to more moderate syncretic forms of Islam: Sufism, and Barelvism, with practices and rituals that Deobandis and Wahhabi/Salafis portray as heretic. Yet, a general climate of impunity is encouraging extreme religious, sectarian and gender discrimination and exclusion. If left unchecked, these groups’ influence will likely spread within and beyond the region.

Lahore and Islamabad should enforce the law against all jihadist organisations, without exception. If they do not, many in southern Punjab may continue to see the rewards of joining such organisations as far outweighing the costs.

Recommendations

To end the climate of impunity 

To the federal and Punjab governments:

  1. Replace selective counter-terrorism with an approach that targets all jihadist groups that use violence within or from Pakistani territory, including by thoroughly investigating the alleged role of Pakistan-based jihadists in the Pathankot attack, extending beyond individual operatives to the organisations that sustain them.
     
  2. Focus counter-terrorism efforts on reforming and strengthening the criminal justice system, with a properly resourced, authorised and accountable provincial police force at its heart, so as to moderate reliance on lethal force.
     
  3. Investigate and monitor under the Anti-Terrorism Act or UN Security Council Resolution 1267 and its blacklist all madrasas, mosques and charities with known or suspected links to banned groups, as well as those that maintain armed militias, or whose administrators and/or members incite violence and other criminal acts within or from the country; and act first against those madrasas in southern Punjab already identified as actively training militants and having direct or indirect links with jihadist outfits. 
     
  4. Prevent circulation of hate literature and enforce laws against hate speech in madrasas, mosques and other forums, including by following through on all current cases against hard-line preachers and others accused of violating them.

To redress policy that favours a jihadist fringe over a moderate and diverse civil society

  1. Remove arbitrary official and unofficial restrictions on NGOs and other civil society organisations in southern Punjab and assume responsibility for protecting against jihadist threats.
     
  2. Repeal all legislation that discriminates on the basis of religion, sect and gender and refrain from backtracking on provincial pro-women legislation or yielding to Islamist party pressure to dilute its provisions. 
     
  3. Protect southern Punjab’s religious minorities, in particular Christians and Hindus, and take action against perpetrators of violence against women by acting through the legal system on reports of intimidation and abuse.

To redress the political, social and economic alienation in southern Punjab that contributes to recruitment opportunities for jihadist groups 

To the federal and Punjab governments:

  1. Reform and expand the public school network, including by removing intolerant religious discourse and distorted narratives glorifying jihadist violence from the classroom; and accompany education reform with assistance along the lines of the Benazir Income Support Program (BISP) to help poor families afford to send their children to school.
     
  2. Increase southern Punjab’s development budget, accompanied by meaningful consultations with communities on development programs; and establish and implement requirements to hire a significant proportion of local labour for such programs and provide it related training.

To the ruling and opposition parties:

  1. Respond to the political alienation in southern Punjab by including local leaders within party decision-making processes and structures, and giving them a voice at the local, provincial and national levels. 
     
  2. Redress local grievances by addressing them in the provincial and federal parliaments, including through appropriate legislation.

Islamabad/Brussels, 30 May 2016

Subscribe to Crisis Group’s Email Updates

Receive the best source of conflict analysis right in your inbox.