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Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 228 / Asia

印度尼西亚的极端分子是如何重新组织的

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巴厘岛爆炸事件使印度尼西亚的恐怖主义活动引起了国际关注。近10年之后的今天,印尼的暴力极端分子虽已被削弱、分裂,但仍然活跃。面对警方的高压,这些暴力极端分子在逃亡中、监狱里以及通过网络论坛、军事集训营和包办婚姻等找到了办法重新组织起来。 一些人物重复出现在许多案例里,运用旧的网络建立新的联盟。近年来,他们采取的行动极没有影响力,但这并不意味着发生袭击的威胁已经消失了。有迹象表明,一些人正从过去的失败中汲取教训,开始采取更复杂的招兵买马和筹资方式。印尼只有更好地理解极端分子如何重新组织起来,才能实施更有效的反激进化计划。

近年来对恐怖分子实力最沉重的一次打击是2010年初在苏门答腊岛最北端的亚齐省瓦解了一个集训营,一个由印尼几乎所有的主要圣战组织组成的联盟计划在该地成立一个基地。多名高级领导人被逮捕或者丧生,在此次行动中获取的大量信息又导致200多名人员被逮捕、审讯和关押。圣战分子不仅没有因此受到恐吓而投降,反而被警方的行动激发了报复的欲望,开始实施新一波的行动,同新的伙伴进行合作,建立训练中心,并启动了新计划。他们的活动在以下地区非常明显:北苏门答腊省的棉兰,中苏拉威西省的波索,中爪哇省的梭罗,西努沙登加拉省的比马,以及东加里曼丹省的部分地区。秘密活动直接或间接地得到了激进的传教士们的帮助,这些传教士的聚会鼓舞了圣战分子及其同情者,并为他们提供了会面的场所。一些支持伊斯兰教教法的倡议团体也扮演了与这些传教士类似的角色,这些团体本身虽然没有使用暴力,但是他们的教义与圣战观点是一致的。

自2010年以来已经有超过12起的阴谋事件,几乎所有事件都与亚齐的逃亡分子有着直接或间接的联系。这些通缉犯能够轻松地来往于各地,同监狱里的朋友通讯,分享信息和技巧,传播意识形态,购买武器,实施训练以及招募新兵。这些都表示出仍有大量的基础预防极端暴力活动的工作需要开展。

目前,许多仍在活动的圣战组织都与唯一真主游击队(Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid,JAT)有联系,JAT是由激进的传教士阿布·巴卡尔·巴希尔在2008年成立的,成立之后便取代伊斯兰祈祷团(Jemaah Islamiyah,JI)成为了印尼最大、最活跃的圣战组织。JI是2002年巴厘岛爆炸事件的策划者,但如今,更好战的一些组织却对其嗤之以鼻,指责它抛弃了圣战。然而,JI通过它创办的学校继续在发挥影响力,许多因不满而脱离该组织的前成员通过其他一些组织仍在积极活动。另外还出现了几个小型的组织,这些组织的成员往往是毫无经验的年轻人,与1985年至1994年之间在阿富汗-巴基斯坦边境地区受训并且实施了巴厘岛爆炸事件的那代人相比,这些年轻人缺乏技术、纪律和战略性眼光。

一些激进网站上发布的信息显示,教育程度更高的极端分子从亚齐事件中学到了重要的教训,尤其是认识到了他们的队伍已被其“敌人”——印尼政府所渗透。他们得出了以下结论,那就是必须在审查成员、保护通讯方式以及保守秘密方面加倍谨慎。如果圣战分子留心遵守学到的教训,那么警察所肩负的担子将会更沉重。

恐怖组织为何还在继续招兵买马或者为何还在制造更多的恐怖阴谋(即使多数阴谋的实施技巧非常拙劣),政府内部关于这点进行的反省更少一些。印尼反恐行动的胜利全都归功于良好的执法行为。警方在以下方面变得越发有经验:识别和逮捕暴力犯罪活动的罪犯,依据诸如非法持有枪械或爆炸物等证据来阻止阴谋的发生。但实际上,并没有一个有效的计划来应对和铲除目前圣战意识形态赖以持续滋生的这种环境。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年7月16日

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

Originally published in The Interpreter

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.