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印度尼西亚的极端分子是如何重新组织的

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巴厘岛爆炸事件使印度尼西亚的恐怖主义活动引起了国际关注。近10年之后的今天,印尼的暴力极端分子虽已被削弱、分裂,但仍然活跃。面对警方的高压,这些暴力极端分子在逃亡中、监狱里以及通过网络论坛、军事集训营和包办婚姻等找到了办法重新组织起来。 一些人物重复出现在许多案例里,运用旧的网络建立新的联盟。近年来,他们采取的行动极没有影响力,但这并不意味着发生袭击的威胁已经消失了。有迹象表明,一些人正从过去的失败中汲取教训,开始采取更复杂的招兵买马和筹资方式。印尼只有更好地理解极端分子如何重新组织起来,才能实施更有效的反激进化计划。

近年来对恐怖分子实力最沉重的一次打击是2010年初在苏门答腊岛最北端的亚齐省瓦解了一个集训营,一个由印尼几乎所有的主要圣战组织组成的联盟计划在该地成立一个基地。多名高级领导人被逮捕或者丧生,在此次行动中获取的大量信息又导致200多名人员被逮捕、审讯和关押。圣战分子不仅没有因此受到恐吓而投降,反而被警方的行动激发了报复的欲望,开始实施新一波的行动,同新的伙伴进行合作,建立训练中心,并启动了新计划。他们的活动在以下地区非常明显:北苏门答腊省的棉兰,中苏拉威西省的波索,中爪哇省的梭罗,西努沙登加拉省的比马,以及东加里曼丹省的部分地区。秘密活动直接或间接地得到了激进的传教士们的帮助,这些传教士的聚会鼓舞了圣战分子及其同情者,并为他们提供了会面的场所。一些支持伊斯兰教教法的倡议团体也扮演了与这些传教士类似的角色,这些团体本身虽然没有使用暴力,但是他们的教义与圣战观点是一致的。

自2010年以来已经有超过12起的阴谋事件,几乎所有事件都与亚齐的逃亡分子有着直接或间接的联系。这些通缉犯能够轻松地来往于各地,同监狱里的朋友通讯,分享信息和技巧,传播意识形态,购买武器,实施训练以及招募新兵。这些都表示出仍有大量的基础预防极端暴力活动的工作需要开展。

目前,许多仍在活动的圣战组织都与唯一真主游击队(Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid,JAT)有联系,JAT是由激进的传教士阿布·巴卡尔·巴希尔在2008年成立的,成立之后便取代伊斯兰祈祷团(Jemaah Islamiyah,JI)成为了印尼最大、最活跃的圣战组织。JI是2002年巴厘岛爆炸事件的策划者,但如今,更好战的一些组织却对其嗤之以鼻,指责它抛弃了圣战。然而,JI通过它创办的学校继续在发挥影响力,许多因不满而脱离该组织的前成员通过其他一些组织仍在积极活动。另外还出现了几个小型的组织,这些组织的成员往往是毫无经验的年轻人,与1985年至1994年之间在阿富汗-巴基斯坦边境地区受训并且实施了巴厘岛爆炸事件的那代人相比,这些年轻人缺乏技术、纪律和战略性眼光。

一些激进网站上发布的信息显示,教育程度更高的极端分子从亚齐事件中学到了重要的教训,尤其是认识到了他们的队伍已被其“敌人”——印尼政府所渗透。他们得出了以下结论,那就是必须在审查成员、保护通讯方式以及保守秘密方面加倍谨慎。如果圣战分子留心遵守学到的教训,那么警察所肩负的担子将会更沉重。

恐怖组织为何还在继续招兵买马或者为何还在制造更多的恐怖阴谋(即使多数阴谋的实施技巧非常拙劣),政府内部关于这点进行的反省更少一些。印尼反恐行动的胜利全都归功于良好的执法行为。警方在以下方面变得越发有经验:识别和逮捕暴力犯罪活动的罪犯,依据诸如非法持有枪械或爆炸物等证据来阻止阴谋的发生。但实际上,并没有一个有效的计划来应对和铲除目前圣战意识形态赖以持续滋生的这种环境。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年7月16日

Executive Summary

Almost ten years after the Bali bombing that brought terrorism in Indonesia to international attention, the country’s violent extremists are weak and divided but still active. In the face of strong police pressure, they are finding ways to regroup on the run, in prison and through internet forums, military training camps and arranged marriages. In many cases, the same individuals keep reappearing, using old networks to build new alliances. The fact that they have been singularly inept in their operations in recent years does not mean that the danger of attacks is over. There are signs that at least some are learning lessons from past failures and becoming more sophisticated in recruitment and fundraising. Better understanding of how extremists regroup could lead to more effective counter-radicalisa­tion programs.

The biggest blow to terrorist capacity in recent years was the break-up in early 2010 of a training camp in Aceh, on the northern tip of Sumatra, where an alliance of almost all major jihadi groups in the country had planned to establish a base. Many senior leaders were captured or killed and a wealth of information discovered that led to the arrest, trial and imprisonment of some 200 individuals. Instead of cowing the jihadis into submission, however, police operations inspired a new wave of activity motivated by the desire for revenge, with new partnerships and training centres established and new plans set in motion. Activity has been particularly noticeable in Medan, North Sumatra; Poso, Central Sulawesi; Solo, Central Java; Bima, West Nusa Tenggara; and parts of East Kalimantan. Underground activity has been directly or indirectly assisted by radical preachers whose meetings provide inspiration and meeting grounds for jihadis and sympathisers. Some pro-Sharia (Islamic law) advocacy groups that do not use violence themselves but whose teachings are in line with jihadi views play a similar role.

Almost all the plots since 2010, and there have been more than a dozen, are connected directly or indirectly to the fugitives from Aceh. The ease with which wanted men can move around, communicate with friends in prison, share information and skills, disseminate ideology, purchase arms, conduct training and recruit new followers shows how much basic preventive work still needs to be done.

Many of the jihadi groups operating today have links to Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), a group set up by radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008 that has replaced Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) as the country’s largest and most active jihadi organisation. JI, responsible for the 2002 Bali attack, is now the object of scorn from more militant groups, accused of abandoning jihad. It continues to exert an influence through its schools, however, and many disaffected former members remain active through other organisations. Several smaller groups have emerged as well, often composed of inexperienced young amateurs who lack the skills, discipline and strategic vision of the generation that trained on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border between 1985 and 1994 and produced the Bali bombers.

Materials posted on radical websites suggest that the more educated extremists have learned important lessons from the Aceh experience, especially in terms of awareness of the extent to which their ranks have been infiltrated by the “enemy” – the Indonesian state. They conclude that they must be much more careful about vetting members, protecting communications and guarding secrets. If jihadis were to heed these lessons, the task of the police could become much harder.

There has been less introspection within the government about why recruitment continues to take place or why there are so many more terrorist plots – even if most have been poorly conceived. Indonesia’s counter-terrorism successes have all been due to good law enforcement. The police have become skilled at identifying and arresting those responsible for violent crimes and interdicting plots as long as there is evidence, such as illegal possession of guns or explosives, on which to act. But virtually no effective programs are in place to address the environment in which jihadi ideology continues to flourish.

Jakarta/Brussels, 16 July 2012

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