Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Briefing 135 / Asia

印度尼西亚:避免亚齐的选举暴力

I. 概述

亚齐省将在4月9日举行选举,离现在还有不到两个月的时间。这次选举将产生一名省长和副省长,以及17名地区区长和副区长。尽管所有的候选人都口头承诺进行和平选举,但是从现在到选举期间发生独立的暴力行为的可能性很大。尤其是这次竞选的参选方实力相近,所以在竞选结果宣布后发生滋扰事件的可能性更大。接下来的几周,至关重要的是向亚齐省派驻尽可能多的经过培训的选举监督人员。

暴力是否会发生可能取决于好几个因素:

  • 向亚齐省派遣的选举监督人员的人数以及他们能多快抵达亚齐。尽管官方的竞选开始时间是3月22日,因为各种实际的原因,竞选运动早已展开。对选举的监督需要现在就开始,而不是在选举前几天才开始;
     
  • 警方多快能确认及逮捕2011年12月和2012年1月枪击事件中的抢手。这两次事件造成了10人死亡,其中多数为爪哇籍工人。这次枪杀事件被认为是出于政治动因;
     
  • 选举监督委员会(Panitia Pengawas Pilkada)对报道的暴力事件展开调查及迅速采取行动的能力;
     
  • 领先的候选人控制由前游击队指挥官组成的亚齐过渡委员会(Komite Pera­lihan Aceh, KPA)中的支持者的能力。

亚齐党是由前叛乱组织自由亚齐运动(Gerakan Aceh Mer­deka, GAM)的领导层创建的地方政治党。其试图让选举向自己期望的方向发展,引发了新的冲突威胁。亚齐党主要目的是使2006年12月当选省长并正在寻求第二个五年任期的阿瓦地·尤素夫(Irwandi Yusuf)下台。这样一来,阿瓦地无法利用他的省长职位来保持自己在公众的视线中,也就不能确保资金流向他的支持者或者要求安全部队的部署方式,来对选举产生影响。

为此,亚齐党以保卫亚齐省的自治和2006年亚齐治理法(Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh)的完整性为借口,展开了一系列操纵法律的行为。亚齐治理法是结束针对印尼政府的自由亚齐运动30年叛乱的赫尔辛基谅解备忘录(MoU)的法律基础。亚齐党尤其对宪法法院的一项决定提出了挑战,该决定废止了治理法中的一项规定,从而使独立(非党派)候选人能角逐原定于2011年底举行的选举。基于宪法法院的这项决定,阿瓦地原本打算作为独立候选人参选,而亚齐党希望能阻止他。亚齐党控制的省议会,也拒绝通过允许独立候选人参选的选举规例(qanun),此举妨碍了地方的选举委员会制定投票的时间表。

去年12月和今年1月的一系列杀戮昭示着暴力事件发生的可能性,在加上来自雅加达的压力,选举一再被推迟。选举时间从2011年10月10日依次被推迟至:2011年11月14日,2011年12月24日,2012年2月16日,并最终定于2012年4月9日。通过最后确定的选举时间,亚齐党成功实现了其目的。阿瓦地在2012年2月8日任期到期,结束了其省长生涯。内政部任命了来自北亚齐的塔米兹·卡里姆(Tarmizi Karim)管理亚齐事务,直至选举产生新的省长。

这些对法律的操纵加深了阿瓦地和以自由亚齐运动的前“总理”马利克·马哈茂德 (Malik Mahmud)为首的亚齐党领导层之间的分歧。他们之间的公开对立始于2006年的选举。当时,阿瓦地击败马利克当选为省长。然而,他们对立的历史可以追溯到更早期存在于流亡海外和留守亚齐的两派自由亚齐运动人士之间的分歧。马利克和现在参选省长的亚齐党候选人再尼·阿卜杜拉(Zaini Abdullah)代表的是流亡海外一派的利益,而阿瓦地代表的留守亚齐一派的利益。去年12月和今年1月的枪击事件引发了人们对这两个阵营之间的更多暴力冲突将会发生的担忧。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年2月29日

I. Overview

In less than two months, on 9 April, Aceh will go to the polls to elect a governor and vice governor, as well as seventeen district heads and deputies. Despite rhetorical commitments on the part of all contenders to a peaceful election, the potential for isolated acts of violence between now and then is high; the potential for trouble after the results are announced may be even higher, especially if it is a close election. Getting as many trained monitors to Aceh as possible in the coming weeks is critical.

Whether violence materialises may depend on several factors:

  • the number of election monitors deployed and the speed with which they get to Aceh. The campaign is already well underway for all practical purposes, even though officially it does not begin until 22 March. The monitoring needs to start now, not days before the election;
     
  • the speed with which the police can identify and arrest the gunmen responsible for shootings in December 2011 and January 2012 that took the lives of ten men, most of them poor Javanese workers. The killings are widely believed to have been politically motivated;
     
  • the ability of the election oversight committee (Panitia Pengawas Pilkada) to investigate reported violations and quickly take action; and
     
  • the ability of leading candidates to control their supporters in the Aceh Transition Committee (Komite Pera­lihan Aceh, KPA), the organisation of former guerrilla commanders.

Partai Aceh, the local political party created by the leadership of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Mer­deka, GAM), the former rebel group, has played on the threat of renewed conflict to get the election on its own terms. Its main goal was to have Irwandi Yusuf, who was elected governor in December 2006 and now seeks a second five-year term, forced from office so that he could not use his position to keep himself in the public eye, ensure funds flowed to his supporters or request the deployment of security forces in a way that might have a bearing on the election.

To this end, it engaged in a number of legal manoeuvres, on the pretext of safeguarding Acehnese autonomy and the integrity of the 2006 Law on the Governing of Aceh (Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh), the legal underpinning of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that ended GAM’s 30-year insurgency against the Indonesian government. In particular, it challenged a Constitutional Court decision that annulled one provision of the law, thereby enabling independent (non-party) candidates to contest the elections originally scheduled for late 2011. Irwandi, based on the court’s ruling, intended to stand as an independent, and Partai Aceh was hoping to block him. The provincial parliament, which Partai Aceh controls, also refused to pass a regulation (qanun) on elections allowing independent candidates, a move that prevented the local election commission from scheduling the polls.

With the help of pressure from Jakarta and a series of killings in December and January that seemed to suggest a high potential for violence, the election was repeatedly postponed, from 10 October 2011 to 14 November to 24 December, then to 16 February 2012 and finally to 9 April. With the last change, Partai Aceh achieved its objective: on 8 February 2012, when his term expired, Irwandi stepped down as governor. The home affairs ministry appointed a caretaker, Tarmizi Karim, a native of North Aceh, who will serve until a newly elected governor is inaugurated.

The manoeuvring deepened a bitter divide between Irwandi and the Partai Aceh leadership under Malik Mahmud, GAM’s former “prime minister”. Their mutual antagonism first came to public attention in the run-up to the 2006 election in which Irwandi ran against Malik’s choice for governor and won. Its history goes back much further, however, to differences between the exiled diaspora, represented by Malik and the man who is now Partai Aceh’s candidate for governor, Zaini Abdullah, and GAM members like Irwandi who stayed behind in Aceh. The shootings in December and January have raised concerns that more violence between these two camps will follow.

Jakarta/Brussels, 29 February 2012

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