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Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Briefing 135 / Asia

印度尼西亚:避免亚齐的选举暴力

I. 概述

亚齐省将在4月9日举行选举,离现在还有不到两个月的时间。这次选举将产生一名省长和副省长,以及17名地区区长和副区长。尽管所有的候选人都口头承诺进行和平选举,但是从现在到选举期间发生独立的暴力行为的可能性很大。尤其是这次竞选的参选方实力相近,所以在竞选结果宣布后发生滋扰事件的可能性更大。接下来的几周,至关重要的是向亚齐省派驻尽可能多的经过培训的选举监督人员。

暴力是否会发生可能取决于好几个因素:

  • 向亚齐省派遣的选举监督人员的人数以及他们能多快抵达亚齐。尽管官方的竞选开始时间是3月22日,因为各种实际的原因,竞选运动早已展开。对选举的监督需要现在就开始,而不是在选举前几天才开始;
     
  • 警方多快能确认及逮捕2011年12月和2012年1月枪击事件中的抢手。这两次事件造成了10人死亡,其中多数为爪哇籍工人。这次枪杀事件被认为是出于政治动因;
     
  • 选举监督委员会(Panitia Pengawas Pilkada)对报道的暴力事件展开调查及迅速采取行动的能力;
     
  • 领先的候选人控制由前游击队指挥官组成的亚齐过渡委员会(Komite Pera­lihan Aceh, KPA)中的支持者的能力。

亚齐党是由前叛乱组织自由亚齐运动(Gerakan Aceh Mer­deka, GAM)的领导层创建的地方政治党。其试图让选举向自己期望的方向发展,引发了新的冲突威胁。亚齐党主要目的是使2006年12月当选省长并正在寻求第二个五年任期的阿瓦地·尤素夫(Irwandi Yusuf)下台。这样一来,阿瓦地无法利用他的省长职位来保持自己在公众的视线中,也就不能确保资金流向他的支持者或者要求安全部队的部署方式,来对选举产生影响。

为此,亚齐党以保卫亚齐省的自治和2006年亚齐治理法(Undang-Undang Pemerintahan Aceh)的完整性为借口,展开了一系列操纵法律的行为。亚齐治理法是结束针对印尼政府的自由亚齐运动30年叛乱的赫尔辛基谅解备忘录(MoU)的法律基础。亚齐党尤其对宪法法院的一项决定提出了挑战,该决定废止了治理法中的一项规定,从而使独立(非党派)候选人能角逐原定于2011年底举行的选举。基于宪法法院的这项决定,阿瓦地原本打算作为独立候选人参选,而亚齐党希望能阻止他。亚齐党控制的省议会,也拒绝通过允许独立候选人参选的选举规例(qanun),此举妨碍了地方的选举委员会制定投票的时间表。

去年12月和今年1月的一系列杀戮昭示着暴力事件发生的可能性,在加上来自雅加达的压力,选举一再被推迟。选举时间从2011年10月10日依次被推迟至:2011年11月14日,2011年12月24日,2012年2月16日,并最终定于2012年4月9日。通过最后确定的选举时间,亚齐党成功实现了其目的。阿瓦地在2012年2月8日任期到期,结束了其省长生涯。内政部任命了来自北亚齐的塔米兹·卡里姆(Tarmizi Karim)管理亚齐事务,直至选举产生新的省长。

这些对法律的操纵加深了阿瓦地和以自由亚齐运动的前“总理”马利克·马哈茂德 (Malik Mahmud)为首的亚齐党领导层之间的分歧。他们之间的公开对立始于2006年的选举。当时,阿瓦地击败马利克当选为省长。然而,他们对立的历史可以追溯到更早期存在于流亡海外和留守亚齐的两派自由亚齐运动人士之间的分歧。马利克和现在参选省长的亚齐党候选人再尼·阿卜杜拉(Zaini Abdullah)代表的是流亡海外一派的利益,而阿瓦地代表的留守亚齐一派的利益。去年12月和今年1月的枪击事件引发了人们对这两个阵营之间的更多暴力冲突将会发生的担忧。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年2月29日

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

Originally published in The Interpreter

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.