印度尼西亚:“基督教化”和宗教偏执
印度尼西亚:“基督教化”和宗教偏执
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Briefing 114 / Asia

印度尼西亚:“基督教化”和宗教偏执

概述

近年来,印度尼西亚的宗教和谐一直承受着与日俱增的压力,特别是在那些强硬派伊斯兰教徒和基督教信福音主义者相互竞争的地区。伊斯兰教徒用“基督教化”一词来为其大众动员和报复性攻击进行辩护,“基督教化”通常既指基督教徒致力于使穆斯林改变信仰皈依基督教,也指所谓的基督教在穆斯林占多数的印度尼西亚影响日益增长。这些原教旨主义冲突导致的紧张局势在雅加达郊区的勿加泗显而易见,在这里,基督教自2008年以来进行了一系列有关教堂建设和所谓的传教工作、以及侮辱伊斯兰教的行为,引起争端导致了暴力事件。印尼政府需要制定政策以应对日益严重的宗教偏执,否则暴民统治将会盛行。目前,当地官员只在事件失控时才着手解决问题,并且通常偏向更为嚣张的一方。这无疑助长了胜利方在日后冲突中的气焰。

印度尼西亚的基督教和穆斯林的紧张关系持续升级的原因有几点:

  • 政府未能阻止或有效追究针对宗教少数民族的挑衅和威胁。
     
  • 伊斯兰治安团体以及各种类似联盟不断增多威胁公共秩序。
     
  • 激进的福音派基督教徒在穆斯林中心地区劝诱穆斯林改变信仰。
     
  • 中央政府通过分权到地方进行了有效的权力下放,甚至那些本应由中央政府处理的宗教事件也由地方政府负责处理。
     
  • 由于政府本身不确定合法自由言论的可接受范围而不愿就“敌视性言语”进行起诉。
     
  • 未能切实努力将将宗教包容性发展为民族价值观。
     

勿加泗事件反映出以上列举的一些宗教动态。长期以来,伊斯兰组织在勿加泗相当活跃,比如印度尼西亚伊斯兰传播委员会(Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII)和伊斯兰学生运动(Gerakan Pemuda Islam, GPI),两者都带有强烈的反基督教倾向。伊斯兰捍卫者阵线(Front Pembela Islam, FPI)在过去十年中的势力增长也不容忽视。近年来,各种反叛教组织的形成也屡见不鲜。勿加泗还有一个根深蒂固的沙拉菲圣战团体,以及由激进教士阿布·巴卡尔·巴希尔建立的统一游击队(JAT),该组织于2008年在麦加朝拜者在勿加泗的宿舍区举行了其成立仪式。

在基督教一边,一些致力于让穆斯林改变信仰的信福音主义组织也已经在勿加泗建立了分支机构,一些受到国际资助,另一些则完全土生土长。玛哈基金会(Yayasan Mahanaim)是资金最雄厚、活动能力最强的组织之一。由于其项目专门针对穆斯林贫民,所以特别遭到伊斯兰团体的反感。另外一个基金会,Yayasan Bethmidrash Talmiddin,则是由一个新近皈依基督教的穆斯林运作,其宣传册的封面设计使用阿拉伯语书法,暗示宣传册的内容是伊斯兰教的,并要求其学校中的每个学生必须使五名穆斯林皈依基督教才能毕业。

当政府官员和立法者谈论印尼需要“宗教和谐”,他们总是给人以错觉宗教和谐可以通过法律确立,甚至是可以强迫执行,好像政府并不需要持续努力以了解紧张状态的根源或是制定相应措施以缓解紧张局面。不同宗教团体的对话并不是答案;虽然有一些例外,但大部分都是感觉良好的脱口秀巨星汇,并不真正解决实际问题。

制定战略以抑制双方紧张局势的紧迫性有诸多原因,但有一条值得特别注意:“基督教化”的争端也许正迫使非暴力人员与暴力极端分子联系在一起。直到最近,暴力极端分子沙拉菲圣战者一直追求更为国际主义的议程,因此故意忽略了在当地开展的“反叛教”运动。但由于在印尼当地的活动逐渐失去其他助力,特别是宗派暴力在中部苏拉威西岛的波索(Poso)地区的终结,将“基督教化”作为征讨对象更加具有号召力。2008年,在南苏门答腊的巴邻旁,一个逃亡的伊斯兰祈祷团(JI)的新加坡籍成员招募了反叛教组织FAKTA的一些成员,招募的方式正是宣传杀戮才是唯一可以阻止基督教诱劝伊斯兰信徒叛教的方式,而不是非暴力主张——。2010年9月,几十个亚齐人因参加恐怖主义训练营而受审,他们都把对于亚齐的“基督教化”的担忧列举为其动机之一。

恐怖主义在印度尼西亚的网络实际上在近五年来日渐衰微并有所分化,但系统化地扩展对于基督教徒正在侵入伊斯兰的恐惧有可能会为他们增添新的追随者,其中包括迄今为止他们力图回避的对基督教采取报复行为的伊斯兰成员。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2010年11月24日

I. Overview

Religious tolerance in Indonesia has come under increasing strain in recent years, particularly where hardline Islamists and Christian evangelicals compete for the same ground. Islamists use “Christianisation” – a term that generally refers both to Christian efforts to convert Muslims and the alleged growing influence of Christianity in Muslim-majority Indonesia – as a justification for mass mobilisation and vigilante attacks. The tensions brought about by these clashing fundamentalisms are nowhere clearer than in Bekasi, a suburb of Jakarta, where a series of disputes since 2008 over church construction, alleged mass conversion efforts and affronts to Islam have led in some cases to violence. The Indonesian government needs a strategy to address growing religious intolerance, because without one, mob rule prevails. Local officials address each incident only when it gets out of hand and usually by capitulating to whoever makes the most noise. Every time this happens, the victors are emboldened to raise the stakes for the next confrontation.

Christian-Muslim tensions have increased in Indonesia for several reasons:

  • Failure of the government to prevent or effectively prosecute incitement and intimidation against religious minorities.
     
  • Growth of Islamic vigilante organisations and various like-minded coalitions that have become a public order menace.
     
  • Aggressive evangelical Christian proselytising in Muslim strongholds.
     
  • Effective devolution of power through decentralisation to local authorities, even on issues such as religious affairs which are supposed to be the preserve of the central government.
     
  • Reluctance to prosecute “hate speech” partly out of confusion over acceptable limits on legitimate free expression.
     
  • Lack of any serious effort to promote tolerance as a national value.

The incidents in Bekasi exemplify some of the dynamics involved. Islamist organisations like the Indonesian Islamic Propagation Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, DDII) and Islamic Student Movement (Gerakan Pemuda Islam, GPI) have long been active there, both with a strongly anti-Christian streak. Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI) has had a strong presence for the last decade, and recent years have seen the formation of a variety of anti-apostasy coalitions. Bekasi also has a well-entrenched salafi jihadi community, and Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), the organisation established by the radical cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008, held its inaugural ceremony at the dormitory for Mecca-bound pilgrims there.

On the Christian side, several evangelical organisations committed to converting Muslims have also set up shop in Bekasi, some funded internationally, others purely home-grown. Yayasan Mahanaim, one of the wealthiest and most active, is particularly loathed by the Islamist community because of its programs targeting the Muslim poor. Another, Yayasan Bethmidrash Talmiddin, run by a Muslim convert to Christianity, uses Arabic calligraphy on the cover of its booklets, suggesting they are Islamic in content, and requires every student at its school as a graduation requirement to convert five people.

While officials and legislators talk of the need for “religious harmony”, there is a sense that this can be legislated or even imposed, rather than requiring sustained time and effort to understand how tensions have grown and developing programs designed to reduce them. Interfaith dialogues are not the answer; with a few exceptions, they are often little more than feel-good talk-fests that do not grapple with real problems.

Among the many reasons for developing a strategy to curb communal tensions, one deserves particular attention: the issue of “Christianisation” may be driving non-violent and violent extremists together. Until recently, the attachment of salafi jihadis – the violent extremists – to a more internationalist agenda led them to generally steer clear of local “anti-apostasy” activists. But the loss of other local drivers for recruitment, particularly the end of sectarian violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi, has made “Christianisation” more attractive as a rallying cry. In Palembang, South Sumatra in 2008, a fugitive Singaporean member of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) recruited members of an anti-apostasy group called FAKTA by first persuading them that murder, rather than non-violent advocacy, was the only way to stop Christian proselytisation. And in September 2010, dozens of Acehnese on trial for taking part in a terrorist training camp cited as one of their motivations concern over “Christianisation” in Aceh.

Terrorist networks in Indonesia have grown substantially weaker and more divided over the last five years, but systematic exploitation of the fear that Christians are making inroads on Islam might bring them new followers, including from among the vigilantes that they have hitherto largely shunned.

Jakarta/Brussels, 24 November 2010

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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