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Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 218 / Asia

印度尼西亚:警力欠佳的致命成本

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印度尼西亚的社区正在越来越多地转向使用暴力来对警察的滥用职权进行报复,不管是真正的滥用职权或者是人们感知到的滥用职权。自2010年8月以来发生了大约40起对警察局和警察的袭击,这清楚地表明社区警务这一警察改革议程的中心问题并没有得到改善。警察动不动就开枪射击,而且通常使用实弹;警察的问责制也几乎没有什么进步。在缺乏应对地方不满的紧迫改革和机制的情况下,公众的敌意可能会增长。警察的任务应该是帮助防止冲突发生,但是往往却促进了冲突爆发。

机制内的文化、结构、个人、财政和教育方面的障碍阻碍了行为的改变。申请加入警察的人是为了谋权和牟利。一旦他们加入警察,无论是在金钱或者职业发展方面,都缺乏激励机制来促使他们与其应当服务的社区建立良好的关系。2005年和2008年关于社区警务的政策指令没有下达到子地区的分局(kepolisian sektor, polsek)。同时,那些致力于建立友好关系的地方官员因为频繁的更换,而影响有限。

社区的敌意是警察暴行累积的结果。这些暴行包括:无理索取金钱;带给人们的嚣张的印象;缺乏问责制,这尤其体现在那些致命的枪击事件中。当如果涉案的警察不受任何处罚,社区会更加抵触对那些采用暴力的民众实施逮捕时,对行为不当的警察没有进行调查或者处罚会触发通常包括纵火在内的暴民行为。

将那些从省级警察学校毕业的没有受到良好培训的毕业生分配到分局工作,使问题更为严重。这些毕业生没有受到完善的枪支方面的训练,更不用说社区警务方面的培训了。在许多情况下,因为没有别的机制来解决人民的不满,地方选举出来的官员不得不担当起了调节警察和社区之间僵局的担子,通过谈判来解决问题。

本报告着眼于讨论2010年和2011年发生的对警察局袭击的三起案例的细节。这些案例的开始都是人们对滥用武力的抱怨。

在中苏拉威西的博尔(Buol, Central Sulawesi),一名年轻人在被警察关押期间死亡,这导致了大规模的群众抗议。在抗议中,有七名群众被打死。随后,民众摧毁了警察设施并迫使警察及其家庭成员离开博尔。这次事件能成为极少数的警察局官员受到法庭审判的案例中的一起,仅仅是因为死亡人数较多和高度的媒体关注。其中一名警察被判无罪,两名警察被判的很短的刑期,还有大约24名其他警察受到轻微的纪律处分。许多的问题仍然悬而未决。

在廖内的金宝(Kampar, Riau), 在一位无辜的部族长老在集市上被拘留和殴打后,居民们破坏了一个警察分局。该长老因为在一张纸上写下一些数字,就被控非法赌博。而事实上他只是记下了产品的价格。因为警察会因处理的犯罪事件的数量受到奖赏,与此类似的小事导致的逮捕事件时常发生。无论犯罪事件的严重性,只要警察逮捕的人数越多,他们就被认为是更好地完成了工作。

在南苏拉威西的班腾(Bantaeng, South Sulawesi),警察对被控涉及赌博的一场婚礼宴会的突袭导致了一人死亡。随后,村民们袭击了一个警察分局。突袭婚礼的警察并不属于该警察分局,但是该警察分局是离死者家最近的分局。警方声称他们开枪是因为他们认为参加婚礼的宾客对赌博人员受到逮捕非常愤怒,这将他们的指挥官的生命置于危险当中。事实上,警察似乎是在黑暗中疯狂扫射,并不能看清楚他们对什么人进行射击。

这些事件象征着更加广泛的问题,印尼政府应当停止将它们作为孤立事件进行处理。这些事件代表着体系的失败。除非解决社区敌意产生的根源,这一体系失败会继续削弱警方的“服务和保卫”人民的承诺,也会继续引发更多的致命的暴力事件。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年2月16日

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

Originally published in The Interpreter

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.