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印度尼西亚:警力欠佳的致命成本

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执行摘要

印度尼西亚的社区正在越来越多地转向使用暴力来对警察的滥用职权进行报复,不管是真正的滥用职权或者是人们感知到的滥用职权。自2010年8月以来发生了大约40起对警察局和警察的袭击,这清楚地表明社区警务这一警察改革议程的中心问题并没有得到改善。警察动不动就开枪射击,而且通常使用实弹;警察的问责制也几乎没有什么进步。在缺乏应对地方不满的紧迫改革和机制的情况下,公众的敌意可能会增长。警察的任务应该是帮助防止冲突发生,但是往往却促进了冲突爆发。

机制内的文化、结构、个人、财政和教育方面的障碍阻碍了行为的改变。申请加入警察的人是为了谋权和牟利。一旦他们加入警察,无论是在金钱或者职业发展方面,都缺乏激励机制来促使他们与其应当服务的社区建立良好的关系。2005年和2008年关于社区警务的政策指令没有下达到子地区的分局(kepolisian sektor, polsek)。同时,那些致力于建立友好关系的地方官员因为频繁的更换,而影响有限。

社区的敌意是警察暴行累积的结果。这些暴行包括:无理索取金钱;带给人们的嚣张的印象;缺乏问责制,这尤其体现在那些致命的枪击事件中。当如果涉案的警察不受任何处罚,社区会更加抵触对那些采用暴力的民众实施逮捕时,对行为不当的警察没有进行调查或者处罚会触发通常包括纵火在内的暴民行为。

将那些从省级警察学校毕业的没有受到良好培训的毕业生分配到分局工作,使问题更为严重。这些毕业生没有受到完善的枪支方面的训练,更不用说社区警务方面的培训了。在许多情况下,因为没有别的机制来解决人民的不满,地方选举出来的官员不得不担当起了调节警察和社区之间僵局的担子,通过谈判来解决问题。

本报告着眼于讨论2010年和2011年发生的对警察局袭击的三起案例的细节。这些案例的开始都是人们对滥用武力的抱怨。

在中苏拉威西的博尔(Buol, Central Sulawesi),一名年轻人在被警察关押期间死亡,这导致了大规模的群众抗议。在抗议中,有七名群众被打死。随后,民众摧毁了警察设施并迫使警察及其家庭成员离开博尔。这次事件能成为极少数的警察局官员受到法庭审判的案例中的一起,仅仅是因为死亡人数较多和高度的媒体关注。其中一名警察被判无罪,两名警察被判的很短的刑期,还有大约24名其他警察受到轻微的纪律处分。许多的问题仍然悬而未决。

在廖内的金宝(Kampar, Riau), 在一位无辜的部族长老在集市上被拘留和殴打后,居民们破坏了一个警察分局。该长老因为在一张纸上写下一些数字,就被控非法赌博。而事实上他只是记下了产品的价格。因为警察会因处理的犯罪事件的数量受到奖赏,与此类似的小事导致的逮捕事件时常发生。无论犯罪事件的严重性,只要警察逮捕的人数越多,他们就被认为是更好地完成了工作。

在南苏拉威西的班腾(Bantaeng, South Sulawesi),警察对被控涉及赌博的一场婚礼宴会的突袭导致了一人死亡。随后,村民们袭击了一个警察分局。突袭婚礼的警察并不属于该警察分局,但是该警察分局是离死者家最近的分局。警方声称他们开枪是因为他们认为参加婚礼的宾客对赌博人员受到逮捕非常愤怒,这将他们的指挥官的生命置于危险当中。事实上,警察似乎是在黑暗中疯狂扫射,并不能看清楚他们对什么人进行射击。

这些事件象征着更加广泛的问题,印尼政府应当停止将它们作为孤立事件进行处理。这些事件代表着体系的失败。除非解决社区敌意产生的根源,这一体系失败会继续削弱警方的“服务和保卫”人民的承诺,也会继续引发更多的致命的暴力事件。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年2月16日

Executive Summary

Indonesian communities are increasingly turning to violence to retaliate against the police for abuses, real or perceived. Some 40 attacks on police stations and personnel since August 2010 are clear evidence that community policing, the centrepoint of the police reform agenda, is not working; police are too quick to shoot, usually with live ammunition; and little progress has been made toward police accountability. In the absence of urgent reforms and mechanisms to address local grievances, public hostility is likely to grow. Police are supposed to be helping prevent conflict but too often they are contributing to its outbreak.

Cultural, structural, individual, financial and educational barriers within the institution hinder behavioural change. Applicants join the police to wield power and earn money, and once on the force, there are few incentives, financial or professional, to build rapport with the communities they are supposed to serve. Policy directives on community policing from 2005 and 2008 have not trickled down to the sub-district precincts (kepolisian sektor, polsek), and those field officers who are committed to building good relations have limited impact because of frequent rotations.

Community hostility is the cumulative result of police brutality; unwarranted demands for money; perceived arrogance; and lack of accountability, especially in cases of fatal shootings. Failure to investigate or punish errant officers triggers mob action, often involving arson, while community resistance to the arrest of those responsible for such violence intensifies if the police in question go free.

The problem is compounded by the staffing of precincts with poorly-trained graduates of provincial police schools who receive inadequate firearms training, let alone instruction in community policing. In many cases, local elected officials have to take on the burden of negotiating a way out of the police-community standoff because there are no available institutional mechanisms to resolve grievances.

This report looks in detail at three cases of community attacks on police stations that occurred in 2010 and 2011. All started from complaints about excessive use of force.

In Buol, Central Sulawesi, citizens destroyed police facilities and forced police families to leave town after seven men were shot dead during a mass protest against the death of a teenager in police custody. This is one of the few cases in which officers were brought to court, but only because of the high death toll and media attention. One was acquitted, two were given slap-on-the-wrist sentences, and some two dozen others faced minor disciplinary sanctions. Many questions remain unanswered.

In Kampar, Riau, residents vandalised a precinct after the arrest and beating of an innocent clan elder at a market. He was accused of illegal gambling because he was jotting numbers on a piece of paper, when in fact he was noting product prices. Trivial arrests like this frequently occur because police are rewarded for favourable crime statistics: the more arrests they make, regardless of the severity of the crime, the better they are seen to be doing their job.

In Bantaeng, South Sulawesi, villagers attacked a precinct after a deadly police raid on alleged gamblers at a wedding party that killed one. The raiders did not come from that precinct, but it was the nearest one to the dead man’s home. Police claim they opened fire because they believed anger among the wedding guests over the gambling arrests put their commander’s life in danger. In fact they seem to have shot wildly in the dark without being able to see what they were shooting at.

These incidents are emblematic of a much broader problem; the Indonesian government should stop treating them as isolated incidents. They represent a systemic failure which will continue to undermine the credibility of the police pledge to “serve and protect” the people and encourage further deadly violence unless the underlying causes of community hostility are addressed.

Jakarta/Brussels, 16 February 2012

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