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Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 232 / Asia

印度尼西亚:巴布亚省暴力活动的动态

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2012年5月和6月在巴布亚省爆发的一连串暴力活动暴露出政府缺乏一个连贯的策略来处理这场多维度的动乱。6月在省府查亚普拉发生了枪击非巴布亚本地人的事件,可能有煽动独立的激进分子参与其中。这次事件之后,其中一名激进分子便死于警察之手,突出了这个事件的政治维度。在瓦梅纳,由于一名士兵死亡而导致的一场士兵的暴乱显示了当地群众和军队之间彼此不信任的程度之深,也暴露出危机应对机制的匮乏。新进驻巴布亚省的准军事化警察部队(机动旅警察,Brimob)的成员在帕尼艾一个偏远的金矿开采区枪击了5名巴布亚人,凸显出这场暴力活动是同巴布亚巨大的资源财富以及几乎不受雅加达监管的安全组织的寻租行为联系在一起的。虽然这些事件仍在调查之中,但是这些事件显示出,除非尤多约诺政府能够处理与冲突相关的极难处理的那些方面,否则事态可能会进一步恶化。对安全政策的全面修订会有助于事态的发展。

有两个因素在对大部分暴力活动起着推动作用:一个是巴布亚省民众普遍对印尼中央政府心存不满,另一个则是中央政府虽然声称想要构建信任、加快发展和保证2001年出台的针对巴布亚省的特别自治法会给该省带来实实在在的好处,但是现有的安全政策却似乎与这些愿望背道而驰。迄今为止,自治法既未能提高大部分巴布亚人民的生活水平,也未能改善该省与中央政府的关系。虽然省议会议员对未能颁布关于如何执行自治法的关键条例负有责任,但是雅加达方面的一些行为时常削弱了自治法。雅加达采取的一些措施引发了巴布亚民众对雅加达不守信用的指控,最近的此类措施之一就是2011年把巴布亚人民议会(Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP)拆分成两个部分。MRP是在自治法的基础上成立的,其任务是保护巴布亚的价值观和文化,这个机构应该是一个统一的机构,覆盖整个巴布亚省。MRP在很多方面都是特别自治权的基石。但是,它的成立被严重延期,并且自成立以来一直问题缠身。这次在雅加达的积极支持下实行的拆分之举,更是进一步削弱了其影响力。

哪怕巴布亚有正常运作的政治机构,这些问题也会非常难于处理。而现在巴布亚没有这种机构,问题则更难处理。2011年7月被任命的一位临时省长毫无影响力可言,使得巴布亚省政府如同虚设。与此同时,新的选举的组织工作得到省议会的阻碍,因为省议会的将工作重心集中在阻挠前任省长参选,以及同地方选举委员会一起在国家法庭争夺对部分竞选进程的控制权。在县级地区情况同样糟糕。这使得中央政府在巴布亚没有积极参与的合作伙伴,巴布亚人民也没有能够把关切传递给雅加达方面的正式渠道。

2011年9月成立了一个新的政策部门——巴布亚和西巴布亚发展工作组(Unit for Accelerated Development in Papua and West Papua,印尼语简称UP4B)。有越来越多的迹象表明,该部门的作用仅局限于经济事务。UP4B将力求短期内在经济方面取得明显进展。人们原本希望该部门能在幕后起到一定的政治作用,就巴布亚的不满情绪促成双方开展对话,随着事态发展,愈发明确显示出对话对不同人而言具有不同意义,这种希望也在逐渐消退。政府不愿对暴力活动采取任何措施,这些措施有可能会被看做是屈从于压力而作出的让步,因此,想要就某些条件和目标达成一定共识的努力也因为暴力活动而受挫。

政府面临的挑战是要找到一个能够减少暴力活动的短期策略,与此同时,要继续着手制定能够带来社会、经济和政治利益的长期政策,并继续解决长久积压的不满情绪。这个短期策略必须提及对警察和军队的管理、控制和负有责任地进行清晰的、可见的改革。安全部门并不是唯一的问题来源,警察和士兵也并非总是暴力活动的行凶者;他们中的许多人也是受害者。但是他们已经开始成为一种象征,象征着雅加达对巴布亚冲突采取的一切不得当措施。由此,转变安全政策是取得“快速成效”的最佳希望,能够改变政治动态,阻止暴力活动的进一步蔓延。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年8月9日

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

Originally published in The Interpreter

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.