icon caret Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Line Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Whatsapp Youtube
Report 232 / Asia

印度尼西亚:巴布亚省暴力活动的动态

  • Share
  • Save
  • Print
  • Download PDF Full Report

执行摘要

2012年5月和6月在巴布亚省爆发的一连串暴力活动暴露出政府缺乏一个连贯的策略来处理这场多维度的动乱。6月在省府查亚普拉发生了枪击非巴布亚本地人的事件,可能有煽动独立的激进分子参与其中。这次事件之后,其中一名激进分子便死于警察之手,突出了这个事件的政治维度。在瓦梅纳,由于一名士兵死亡而导致的一场士兵的暴乱显示了当地群众和军队之间彼此不信任的程度之深,也暴露出危机应对机制的匮乏。新进驻巴布亚省的准军事化警察部队(机动旅警察,Brimob)的成员在帕尼艾一个偏远的金矿开采区枪击了5名巴布亚人,凸显出这场暴力活动是同巴布亚巨大的资源财富以及几乎不受雅加达监管的安全组织的寻租行为联系在一起的。虽然这些事件仍在调查之中,但是这些事件显示出,除非尤多约诺政府能够处理与冲突相关的极难处理的那些方面,否则事态可能会进一步恶化。对安全政策的全面修订会有助于事态的发展。

有两个因素在对大部分暴力活动起着推动作用:一个是巴布亚省民众普遍对印尼中央政府心存不满,另一个则是中央政府虽然声称想要构建信任、加快发展和保证2001年出台的针对巴布亚省的特别自治法会给该省带来实实在在的好处,但是现有的安全政策却似乎与这些愿望背道而驰。迄今为止,自治法既未能提高大部分巴布亚人民的生活水平,也未能改善该省与中央政府的关系。虽然省议会议员对未能颁布关于如何执行自治法的关键条例负有责任,但是雅加达方面的一些行为时常削弱了自治法。雅加达采取的一些措施引发了巴布亚民众对雅加达不守信用的指控,最近的此类措施之一就是2011年把巴布亚人民议会(Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP)拆分成两个部分。MRP是在自治法的基础上成立的,其任务是保护巴布亚的价值观和文化,这个机构应该是一个统一的机构,覆盖整个巴布亚省。MRP在很多方面都是特别自治权的基石。但是,它的成立被严重延期,并且自成立以来一直问题缠身。这次在雅加达的积极支持下实行的拆分之举,更是进一步削弱了其影响力。

哪怕巴布亚有正常运作的政治机构,这些问题也会非常难于处理。而现在巴布亚没有这种机构,问题则更难处理。2011年7月被任命的一位临时省长毫无影响力可言,使得巴布亚省政府如同虚设。与此同时,新的选举的组织工作得到省议会的阻碍,因为省议会的将工作重心集中在阻挠前任省长参选,以及同地方选举委员会一起在国家法庭争夺对部分竞选进程的控制权。在县级地区情况同样糟糕。这使得中央政府在巴布亚没有积极参与的合作伙伴,巴布亚人民也没有能够把关切传递给雅加达方面的正式渠道。

2011年9月成立了一个新的政策部门——巴布亚和西巴布亚发展工作组(Unit for Accelerated Development in Papua and West Papua,印尼语简称UP4B)。有越来越多的迹象表明,该部门的作用仅局限于经济事务。UP4B将力求短期内在经济方面取得明显进展。人们原本希望该部门能在幕后起到一定的政治作用,就巴布亚的不满情绪促成双方开展对话,随着事态发展,愈发明确显示出对话对不同人而言具有不同意义,这种希望也在逐渐消退。政府不愿对暴力活动采取任何措施,这些措施有可能会被看做是屈从于压力而作出的让步,因此,想要就某些条件和目标达成一定共识的努力也因为暴力活动而受挫。

政府面临的挑战是要找到一个能够减少暴力活动的短期策略,与此同时,要继续着手制定能够带来社会、经济和政治利益的长期政策,并继续解决长久积压的不满情绪。这个短期策略必须提及对警察和军队的管理、控制和负有责任地进行清晰的、可见的改革。安全部门并不是唯一的问题来源,警察和士兵也并非总是暴力活动的行凶者;他们中的许多人也是受害者。但是他们已经开始成为一种象征,象征着雅加达对巴布亚冲突采取的一切不得当措施。由此,转变安全政策是取得“快速成效”的最佳希望,能够改变政治动态,阻止暴力活动的进一步蔓延。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔,2012年8月9日

Briefing 139 / Asia

印度尼西亚:亚齐旗帜引发紧张局势

A dispute over a flag in Aceh is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Indonesia’s central government, heightening ethnic tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of the province and raising fears of violence as the 2014 national elections approach.
 

I. Overview

The decision of the Aceh provincial government to adopt the banner of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) as its official provincial flag is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Jakarta, heightening ethnic and political tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of Aceh and raising fears of violence as a national election approaches in 2014.

On 25 March 2013, the provincial legislature adopted a regulation (qanun) making the GAM’s old banner the provincial flag. It was immediately signed by Governor Zaini Abdullah. The governor and deputy governor are members of Partai Aceh, the political party set up by former rebel leaders in 2008 that also controls the legislature.

The central government, seeing the flag as a separatist symbol and thus in violation of national law, immediately raised objections and asked for changes. Partai Aceh leaders, seeing the flag as a potent tool for mass mobilisation in 2014, have refused, arguing that it cannot be a separatist symbol if GAM explicitly recognised Indonesian sovereignty as part of the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 that ended a nearly 30-year insurgency. Partai Aceh believes that if it remains firm, Jakarta will eventually concede, as it did in 2012 over an election dispute.

Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s government is torn. On the one hand, it does not want a fight with the GAM leaders; the 2005 peace agreement is the most important achievement of a president who, in his final term, is very much concerned about his legacy. It also is unwilling to provoke GAM too far, fearful that it will return to conflict, a fear many in Aceh discount as unwarranted but one that Partai Aceh has exploited with relish. On the other hand, it does not want to be branded as anti-nationalist as the 2014 election looms, especially as some in the security forces remain convinced that GAM has not given up the goal of independence and is using democratic means to pursue it. The president and his advisers also know that if they allow the GAM flag to fly, it will have repercussions in Papua, where dozens of pro-independence activists remain jailed for flying the “Morning Star” flag of the independence movement.

GAM leaders see little to lose by standing their ground. The flag is a hugely emotive symbol, and defying Jakarta is generally a winning stance locally. Some individual members of parliament see it as a way of regaining waning popularity for failing to deliver anything substantive to their constituencies. Also, Partai Aceh took a controversial decision to partner with Gerindra, the party of former army General Prabowo Subianto, for the 2014 election. Leaders like Muzakir Manaf, deputy governor and former commander of GAM’s armed wing, may want to use the flag issue to show they have not compromised their principles by allying with a man whose human rights record is often questioned.

Within Aceh, adoption of the GAM flag has sparked protests from non-Acehnese ethnic groups in the central highlands and south west. The GAM heartland has always been along the east coast; to highlanders like the Gayo, the flag thus represents the domination of the coastal Acehnese at their expense. The issue has revived a dormant campaign for the division of Aceh into three by the creation of two new provinces, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) for the central highlands and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS) for the south west. If GAM does not back down on the flag, support for that campaign by the intelligence services is likely to rise, and with it, the probability of increased ethnic tensions.

The options for breaking the stalemate seem to be as follows: the government concedes; GAM concedes, making slight changes to the flag by adding or removing an element; GAM agrees to limits on how or where the flag can be displayed; or the dispute is taken to the Supreme Court, thereby delaying any resolution.

In the meantime, the power of the GAM machinery in Aceh continues to grow.

Jakarta /Brussels, 7 May 2013