印度尼西亚:出人意料的亚齐圣战组织
印度尼西亚:出人意料的亚齐圣战组织
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 189 / Asia

印度尼西亚:出人意料的亚齐圣战组织

执行摘要

2010年2月底在亚齐省发现的圣战组织训练营在三个方面令人们出乎意料,揭示了印尼圣战队伍的主要变化:一个新的联盟已经出现,该联盟既独立于该地区此类组织中最知名的伊斯兰祈祷团(JI),也不属于更暴力的努尔丁分裂团体,该团体由努尔丁·托普领导,直到他于2009年9月去世;训练营选择了亚齐省作为基地,尽管亚齐人对激进伊斯兰教十分反感;它由杜尔马丁领导,他是受到通缉的东南亚头号恐怖分子之一,印尼和菲律宾的官员都一直认为他藏匿于棉兰老岛。

截至4月中旬,警方已逮捕了48名联盟成员,处决了包括杜尔马丁在内的8人,并一直在寻找其他15名成员。该组织的存在以及政府的反应表明,尽管从2002年巴厘岛发生第一次炸弹袭击以来印尼已经在反恐主义方面做出巨大努力,但情报工作依然薄弱;对在押犯和已释放人员的监控仍然是个问题;警方在处理“主动射杀”方面仍需改进;腐败仍是印尼恐怖主义活动的主要润滑剂。

杜尔马丁大致于2007年末返回印度尼西亚,开始运行后来众所周知的“lintas tanzim,或称跨组织项目。一些有影响力的圣战领导人纷纷认为伊斯兰祈祷团变得太过被动,为传教放弃了圣战,而努尔丁的组织除了会准备下一次袭击外毫无新意。一位联盟内颇有影响力的神职人员阿曼·罗奇曼(别名阿曼·阿卜杜拉赫曼)认为,印尼应该遵循约旦激进学者阿布·穆罕默德·迈格迪西的教导,通过开展圣战建立伊斯兰法,但要以不造成穆斯林伤亡为前提进行。对于阿曼和其他包括杜尔马丁在内的领导人来说,建立一个安全基地至关重要。基地可以成为总指挥部和伊斯兰国家的核心。组织不应将敌人简单地定义为任何来自美国或其盟国的人,而应该是任何阻碍伊斯兰法应用的人——这就意味着许多印尼官员会出现在这一名单的前列。

阿曼的追随者之一通过探监与杜尔马丁一些最亲密的同僚建立了联系,其中包括伊斯兰祈祷团内部一些已经加入努尔丁组织的成员,以及曾在棉兰老岛受训的一个被称为危机处理与防止委员会(KOMPAK)的圣战组织成员。阿曼与亚齐交情非浅,他曾一度与警察驻扎在亚齐,正是他建议组织可以将亚齐作为安全基地。另一个来自亚齐的阿曼研究小组成员招募了大约二十个亚齐人,希望他们能扩大招募范围;其中大多数都曾是大亚齐地区一位著名的沙拉菲牧师的追随者。然而,圣战者最想招募的是某亚齐牧师,他被证实曾发动群众示威支持伊斯兰法,并让他的学生发动治安搜捕打击犯罪。他的学校是伊斯兰捍卫者阵线(Front Pembela Islam, FPI)亚齐分支的基地,该组织在雅加达因其在酒吧、妓院、斋月期间仍然开放的饭店、偏差教派以及“未经授权”的教堂所进行的一系列暗杀袭击而出名。这一跨组织项目成功地招募了一些伊斯兰捍卫者阵线成员,但未能招募到其领导者。

最终,杜尔马丁和其他人决定在亚齐设立安全基地,认为既然反自由亚齐运动(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM)已在那里与印尼军队交战长达30年,这本身就说明亚齐确实具备合适的地形;而且,与印尼其他省份不同,亚齐有授权实行伊斯兰法,并且许多当地领袖都亲伊斯兰教法;一些在2004年海啸后在亚齐设立分支机构的强硬派团体也是潜在的盟友。事实上,当地民众的支持微乎其微,而联盟从一开始就注定失败。这一尝试最终随着二至四月在亚齐和雅加达的一系列警察搜捕而结束。

这一创举的失败引发了对于印度尼西亚圣战何去何从的疑问。三股势力虽然发展受限但仍然挥之不去:一种势力是伊斯兰祈祷团的变体,教导圣战组织,主张军事训练,但其所谓忠实的追随者目前缺乏资源与敌人较量,因此应着眼于通过宗教宣传(dakwah)来建设队伍。第二种势力是由已故的努尔丁·托普领导的网络,重点使用自杀性爆炸恐吓美国及其盟国。第三种势力的代表就是联盟,但也有个体组织,如:危机处理与防止委员会(KOMPAK)、回教之家(Darul Islam)、心怀不满的伊斯兰祈祷团成员以及其他组织。例如,努尔丁组织目前已为成为圣战组织做好准备,但只把圣战视为实现全面应用伊斯兰法的手段。努尔丁组织青睐爆炸事件,联盟成员则偏好有目标的暗杀,从而避免穆斯林的伤亡。进一步的变异和重组几乎肯定会发生;联盟的失败有可能导致一些团体重新思考它们对努尔丁战术的厌恶。

杜尔马丁参与亚齐组织也昭示了跨国圣战合作的可能性。杜尔马丁希望亚齐训练营成为穆斯林游击队员在整个地区的活动中心,但还不清楚他到底想与他的阿布沙耶夫和摩洛伊斯兰解放阵线(MILF)同事在棉兰老岛开展何种合作。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2010年4月20日

Executive Summary

The discovery in late February 2010 of a jihadi training camp in Aceh came as a surprise in three ways. It revealed a major mutation in Indonesian jihadi ranks: a new coalition had emerged that rejected both Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the best-known such organisation in the region, and the more violent splinter group led until his death in September 2009 by Noordin Top. It had chosen Aceh as a base, despite the antipathy of Acehnese to radical Islam. And it was led by Dulmatin, one of South East Asia’s most wanted terrorists, whom officials in both Indonesia and the Philippines believed was in Mindanao.

By mid-April police had arrested 48 coalition members, killed eight, including Dulmatin, and were looking for about fifteen others. The group’s existence and the government response show that despite enormous gains made in counter-terrorism efforts since the first Bali bombs in 2002, intelligence remains weak; monitoring of prisons and ex-prisoners remains a problem; police handling of “active shooters” needs improvement; and corruption continues to be a major lubricant for terrorist activities in Indonesia.

Dulmatin’s return to Indonesia, probably in late 2007, set in motion what became known as the lintas tanzim or cross-organisational project. Several influential jihadi leaders independently had reached the conclusion that JI had become too passive, abandoning jihad for religious outreach, and Noordin’s group had no plans beyond preparing for the next attack. One influential cleric who joined the group, Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman, argued that Indonesians should follow the teachings of Jordanian radical scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and wage jihad to establish Islamic law but in a way that did not cause Muslim casualties. For both Aman and other leaders, including Dulmatin, it was critical to establish a secure base from which operations could be launched and the nucleus of an Islamic state established. The enemy should be defined not simply as anyone from the U.S. or allied countries, but as anyone who obstructed the application of Islamic law – and that meant that many Indonesian officials were high on the list.

One of Aman’s followers, through prison visits, had ties to some of Dulmatin’s closest associates – JI members who had joined Noordin, and men from another jihadi organisation called KOMPAK who had trained in Mindanao. He also had ties to Aceh, having once been stationed with the police there, and it was he who suggested that Aceh could be the secure base. Another Acehnese member of Aman’s study group recruited about twenty Acehnese, hoping they would bring in others; most were local followers of a well-known salafi cleric in Aceh Besar district. The man the jihadis wanted badly to recruit, however, was an Acehnese cleric with a proven track record of mobilising mass demonstrations in support of Islamic law and sending his students out on vigilante raids against vice. His school was a base for the Aceh branch of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), a national group that in Jakarta is known for its thuggish attacks on bars, brothels, restaurants open during Ramadan, deviant sects and “unauthorised” churches. The lintas tanzim project succeeded in recruiting some FPI members but not their leader.

In the end, Dulmatin and the others went along with the idea of setting up a secure base in Aceh, believing that since the rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) had fought the Indonesian army there for more than 30 years, it had suitable terrain; alone among Indonesian provinces, it was authorised to apply Islamic law and many community leaders were pro-sharia; and a number of hardline groups that had set up shop in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami were potential allies. In fact, community support was negligible and the coalition was doomed from the start. The experiment ended with a series of police raids in Aceh and Jakarta in February, March and April.

The failure of this initiative raises the question of where Indonesian jihadism goes next. Three streams are alive, if not particularly well. One is the JI variant, which teaches jihad, advocates military training, but says the faithful currently lack the resources to take on the enemy and therefore should focus on building up their ranks through dakwah (religious outreach). The second is the network led by the late Noordin Top focused on the use of suicide bombings to terrorise the U.S. and its allies. The third was represented by the coalition, but also by its individual components: KOMPAK, Darul Islam, disgruntled JI members and others. Like Noordin, it was ready for jihad now, but only as the means to the end of applying Islamic law in full. If Noordin favoured bombings, the coalition members preferred targeted assassinations, as less likely to result in Muslim deaths. Further mutations and realignments will almost certainly occur; it is not impossible that the coalition’s failure will lead some to reconsider their distaste for Noordin’s tactics.

Dulmatin’s involvement in the Aceh group also underscores the possibility of cross-border jihadi cooperation. Dulmatin wanted the Aceh training camp to be a centre for mujahidin from across the region, but it remains unclear exactly what kind of cooperation he envisaged with his Abu Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) colleagues in Mindanao.

Jakarta/Brussels, 20 April 2010

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