印度尼西亚:在地方选举中预防暴力
印度尼西亚:在地方选举中预防暴力
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force
Report 197 / Asia

印度尼西亚:在地方选举中预防暴力

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执行摘要

印尼需要及时从2010年地方选举中发生的零星暴力事件中吸取经验教训,因为有证据显示,这些可以轻易避免的事件自那时以来发生的频率有所增加。大多数的地区投票都和平地完成,几起暴力事件确实不能揭示那些应当被修正的全国性的制度缺陷。地方选举通常是个人围绕社区权力进行的激烈角逐,这可能是非常情绪化的,而且如果不加以密切留意,就会很快演变为暴力。在这些激烈的竞选中,虽然宗教信仰和种族归属会被突出,但至今为止它们还没有引发任何宗派分裂。通过对实践、政策和法律进行相对简单的改变,就可以在今后的投票中避免许多冲突。这些政治斗争对于印尼这个大国来说很重要,而非小得不足以引起全国注意,因为自权力下放以来,正是地区层面的公共管理对公民生活影响最大。这些选举如何进行决定着选民对民主在整个印尼群岛成败的判断。

244场预期举行的竞选中,有不到10%发生了暴力事件。虽然有研究发现,在2005年到2008年的地方选举中只发生了13起事件,但在2010年,有记录的暴力事件上升到了至少20起。这轮竞选中,导致暴力事件上升的因素包括对在任者启用家庭成员作为代理人参加竞选从而绕过任期限制的愤怒,以及对管理不善与日俱增的沮丧。当投票变得暴力时,有人被杀,财产被毁,投票推迟,国家合法性受到挑战。在东爪哇的Mojokerto、南苏拉威西的Tana Toraja、中苏拉威西的Tolitoli,竞选运动与暴力联系在一起,对于自己的候选人可以取代在任者或是在任者钦点的继任者的期望被夸大。在这些情况中,懈怠的选举委员会和警方没能注意或者忽略了这些警示性的征兆。

此轮选举也有一些积极的方面。在吸取了过去的经验教训的地区,比如冲突后的中苏拉威西的波索区,安全部队、选举组织者和社区领导者随时保持警惕,共同努力在选举早期就预防任何不好后果。在这些社区,由于各方都认真负责、依法办事,并表现出共识,所以选举中没有发生任何暴力事件。国家和地方当局需要研究更多的成功案例,并将其作为对所有的选举进行系统性审查的一部分。

选择地区选举委员会的方式需要被重新考量,以提高委员会的合法性和有效性。他们的犹豫不决在于选择了软弱的成员,这些成员缺乏地方威信、领导技能以及与选民有效沟通的能力。委员会没有找到那些受到尊重和有资格胜任的人,其工作人员多是年轻聪明的求职者或能够操纵官僚选拔过程的人。在本报告所举出的三起暴力案件中,地方委员会似乎太过偏颇,没有足够的影响力去开展自己的工作。他们行动缓慢,缺乏透明度,对意外情况毫无准备也毫无预见,这些只会增加参选人的疑虑,加剧紧张态势,并引起对于偏见的控诉。安全部队在选举期间应始终严守中立。

选举管理的资金来自地区政府预算,这削弱了其独立性。应考虑从国库中抽出资金用于地方的选举管理。由于几乎没有法律约束地方行政官员,他们可以相当合法地利用国家设施和机构帮助他们重新参选。选举中贿选泛滥,并夹杂着恐吓以及靠动员民族团体的方式来支持特定候选人,这造成了人们对选举过程的低信任度。更完善的培训和资金监管,改良选举程序,以及改善全国监督机构可以解决这些问题。给选举管理和选举安全的拨款也不应被替代、挪用和滥用。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2010年12月8日

Executive Summary

Indonesia needs to learn promptly the lessons from the sporadic violence witnessed in its local elections during 2010 as there is some evidence these easily preventable incidents could be increasing in frequency since the last cycle. While most district polls pass peacefully, the small number that do not reveals nationwide institutional weaknesses that should be fixed. These contests are often intense personal rivalries for community power that can be highly emotive and, if not closely watched, can quickly turn violent. While religious and ethnic ties are accentuated by these tense races, to date they have not triggered any sectarian schisms. Many confrontations could be avoided in future polls by relatively simple changes in practices, policies and laws. Rather than being too small for national attention, these political battles matter to this large country because, since decentralisation, it is this level of public administration that has the greatest impact on the lives of citizens. How these elections take place can determine the judgments that voters make on the success or failure of democracy throughout the archipelago.

Violence occurred in fewer than 10 per cent of the 244 scheduled races. While one study found only thirteen incidents in local elections from 2005-2008, they appear to be rising as at least twenty have been recorded in 2010. Among the factors contributing to the increase in this round are anger with incumbents using family members as proxies to get around term limits and growing frustration with poor governance. When polls became violent people died, property was destroyed, voting was delayed and the legitimacy of the state was challenged. In Mojo­kerto district in East Java, Tana Toraja in South Sulawesi and Tolitoli in Central Sulawesi, campaigns linked to violence had exaggerated expectations that their candidate could oust an incumbent or his handpicked successor. In these cases, lax election commissions and police missed or ignored the warning signs.

There are also some positive aspects to this round. In places where lessons were learnt from the past, like the post-conflict district of Poso in Central Sulawesi, security forces, election organisers and community leaders were alert to the dangers and worked together early to avoid any ugly consequences. In such communities the elections proceeded without incident as all sides acted responsibly, lawfully and showed common sense. More success stories need to be studied by national and district authorities as part of a systematic review of all elections.

The way district election commissions are chosen needs to be reconsidered to boost their legitimacy and effectiveness. Their indecisiveness lies in the selection of weak members who lack local authority, leadership skills and the ability to communicate effectively with constituents. Rather than seek out those who are respected and qualified, the commissions are often staffed by young and clever job-hunters looking for work and who are able to navigate the bureaucratic selection process. In the three violent cases in this report, the local commissions seemed too partial and had insufficient clout to do their job. They moved slowly, lacked transparency and were unprepared for unforeseen situations, a combination that only increased suspicions, raised tensions and drew allegations of bias. Security forces should maintain strict neutrality at all times during elections.

The funding of electoral administration from the regional government’s budget undermines its independence. Consideration should be given to paying for local election authorities from the national coffers. There are few legal restrictions on local executives who can quite legitimately exploit state facilities and agencies to aid their re-election. The low level of trust in the process is compounded by prevalent vote buying, intimidation and the mobilisation of ethnic groups to support specific candidates. Better training and regulation of funding, improved selection processes for election bodies and national supervision could address these issues. Money allocated for election administration and security should not be fungible, diverted to other uses or misappropriated.

Jakarta/Brussels, 8 December 2010

Op-Ed / Asia

Indonesia's Police: The Problem of Deadly Force

My four year-old daughter recently came home from her Jakarta kindergarten with a story about a visit to the school from the head of our local police station. 'If there is a robber and he's running away, the policeman will pull out his gun, fire in the air, and if he doesn't stop then he will shoot him in the leg', she recounted breathlessly.

I have spent 25 years working in and around conflict zones, including more than a decade in Indonesia. My reaction might not have been that of the average parent. 'That', I replied, 'is a violation of Perkap Number 8.' Needless to say, my reference to Police Regulation Number 8 of 2009 regarding Implementation of Human Rights Principles and Standards in the Discharge of Duties of the Indonesian National Police was lost on her. She thought the visit was great.

I had recalled Perkap 8 when re-reading the Hansard of the recent sparring between Australian Foreign Minister Senator Bob Carr and Victoria Greens Senator Richard Di Natale over the police shooting of protesters in Papua. But it is not just in Papua where questionable use of deadly force by the Indonesian National Police (INP) takes place. It happens across the country. And this was what Perkap 8 was put in place to prevent.

Article 47 of Perkap 8 says that 'the use of firearms shall be allowed only if strictly necessary to preserve human life' and 'firearms may only be used by officers: a. when facing extraordinary circumstances; b. for self defense against threat of death and/or serious injury; c. for the defense of others against threat of death and/or serious injury.' This is Indonesian law, taken from the UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, and this is what should be used to assess police actions, wherever in the country they occur.

The fatal shooting on 14 June 2012 of Mako Tabuni, deputy head of the National Committee of West Papua (KNPB), in Jayapura, capital of Papua province, made Senate Estimates in 2012. The shooting of three protesters in Sorong on 30 April 2013, West Papua province, was mentioned in the testy 5 June 2013 exchanges between Senators Carr and Di Natale. You can watch it above.

In the first incident, detectives shot a suspect in the leg as he was running away and then left him to die in a hospital allegedly without making any effort to treat his wounds. In the second, police claim they were threatened by armed KNPB activists. Without more information it is difficult to judge if their response was disproportionate. Police always say they are shooting in self-defense, but it has become such a common excuse that it has started to lose its plausibility.

Cases outside Papua do not garner much attention in Australia, but lethal shootings happen all the time. On 1 September 2011 seven villagers were killed during a rowdy protest against police brutality in the Central Sulawesi district of Buol, a place so obscure even most Indonesians cannot find it on a map.

On 7 March 2013, soldiers burned down a police station in Baturaja, South Sumatra, after their off-duty comrade, First Private Heru Oktavianus, was shot dead by a police officer while speeding away from a traffic violation.

On 8 May 2013 police in Java killed six suspected terrorists in a series of raids. The police usually claim the suspects were armed and resisted arrest. But it is not always true, and many could have almost certainly been captured alive.

Ordinary criminals are shot with distressing frequency, as my daughter's visitor suggests, without any outcry at home or abroad.

Perkap 8 was signed by the then police chief Sutanto, a real reformer. It has not gotten very far. One foreign police officer working on a bilateral community policing program in a large metropolitan command told me he had once seen a copy of the Perkap on the chief's desk but suspected it had been disseminated no further.

Even when progressive regulations or orders are issued and disseminated, they are not always followed. In October 2012, the police chief of Papua, Tito Karnavian, former head of the anti-terrorism unit Detachment 88 (Densus 88), announced that he had banned police from using live ammunition when handling demonstrations in the region. This was progress and it was implemented for some demos, but the deaths in the Sorong case suggest live ammunition was used.

As Article 46 of Perkap 8 says, 'all officers must be trained in the use of power, equipment and firearms that can be used in applying force' and 'must be trained in non-violent techniques and methods.' Training almost 400,000 officers across 33 provinces is a logistical challenge, though it might be a good idea to start with elite units such as Densus 88 or personnel in the Papua provinces.

The new national head of the INP, about to be appointed, might breathe new life into two reforms already in place: implementation of Perkap 8 and Chief Sutanto's other landmark regulation on community policing, Perkap 7. The INP is a very hierarchical organisation that does follow firm orders from above. While its size makes complex reform difficult, its hierarchical nature makes implementing existing regulations with firm orders easier.

The first duty of the incoming INP chief, who reports directly to the president, will be to secure the 2014 elections. Making sure those deployed to safeguard this 'festival of democracy' are properly trained and equipped to use non-lethal force will be an important first step. After a new head of state is elected, he or she should consider issuing a directive that would see Perkap 8 properly implemented. The use of less deadly force could even be politically popular in some parts.

Outside help may also be needed, and this is where Australia comes in. A few decades back, the Victorian state police had a problem of using too much deadly force and created Project Beacon to try to rectify it. They changed the way they thought about the problem, overhauled training, and gave officers on the beat new tools, like pepper spray. Foreign assistance along these lines could help the INP improve performance and increase accountability. Crisis Group has long argued that the INP needs better orders, training, and equipment for the use of non-deadly force.

If the INP is to be more the service it aspires to be rather than the force it is, it needs to shed its military mindset, hold serious post-operation reviews after each fatal incident, and decrease reliance on shooting first and asking questions later, regardless of whether officers are following locally accepted standard procedure. When the time comes and the INP is ready to carry forward the reform of Perkap 8, Australia should be there to help.

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