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印度尼西亚:在地方选举中预防暴力

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印尼需要及时从2010年地方选举中发生的零星暴力事件中吸取经验教训,因为有证据显示,这些可以轻易避免的事件自那时以来发生的频率有所增加。大多数的地区投票都和平地完成,几起暴力事件确实不能揭示那些应当被修正的全国性的制度缺陷。地方选举通常是个人围绕社区权力进行的激烈角逐,这可能是非常情绪化的,而且如果不加以密切留意,就会很快演变为暴力。在这些激烈的竞选中,虽然宗教信仰和种族归属会被突出,但至今为止它们还没有引发任何宗派分裂。通过对实践、政策和法律进行相对简单的改变,就可以在今后的投票中避免许多冲突。这些政治斗争对于印尼这个大国来说很重要,而非小得不足以引起全国注意,因为自权力下放以来,正是地区层面的公共管理对公民生活影响最大。这些选举如何进行决定着选民对民主在整个印尼群岛成败的判断。

244场预期举行的竞选中,有不到10%发生了暴力事件。虽然有研究发现,在2005年到2008年的地方选举中只发生了13起事件,但在2010年,有记录的暴力事件上升到了至少20起。这轮竞选中,导致暴力事件上升的因素包括对在任者启用家庭成员作为代理人参加竞选从而绕过任期限制的愤怒,以及对管理不善与日俱增的沮丧。当投票变得暴力时,有人被杀,财产被毁,投票推迟,国家合法性受到挑战。在东爪哇的Mojokerto、南苏拉威西的Tana Toraja、中苏拉威西的Tolitoli,竞选运动与暴力联系在一起,对于自己的候选人可以取代在任者或是在任者钦点的继任者的期望被夸大。在这些情况中,懈怠的选举委员会和警方没能注意或者忽略了这些警示性的征兆。

此轮选举也有一些积极的方面。在吸取了过去的经验教训的地区,比如冲突后的中苏拉威西的波索区,安全部队、选举组织者和社区领导者随时保持警惕,共同努力在选举早期就预防任何不好后果。在这些社区,由于各方都认真负责、依法办事,并表现出共识,所以选举中没有发生任何暴力事件。国家和地方当局需要研究更多的成功案例,并将其作为对所有的选举进行系统性审查的一部分。

选择地区选举委员会的方式需要被重新考量,以提高委员会的合法性和有效性。他们的犹豫不决在于选择了软弱的成员,这些成员缺乏地方威信、领导技能以及与选民有效沟通的能力。委员会没有找到那些受到尊重和有资格胜任的人,其工作人员多是年轻聪明的求职者或能够操纵官僚选拔过程的人。在本报告所举出的三起暴力案件中,地方委员会似乎太过偏颇,没有足够的影响力去开展自己的工作。他们行动缓慢,缺乏透明度,对意外情况毫无准备也毫无预见,这些只会增加参选人的疑虑,加剧紧张态势,并引起对于偏见的控诉。安全部队在选举期间应始终严守中立。

选举管理的资金来自地区政府预算,这削弱了其独立性。应考虑从国库中抽出资金用于地方的选举管理。由于几乎没有法律约束地方行政官员,他们可以相当合法地利用国家设施和机构帮助他们重新参选。选举中贿选泛滥,并夹杂着恐吓以及靠动员民族团体的方式来支持特定候选人,这造成了人们对选举过程的低信任度。更完善的培训和资金监管,改良选举程序,以及改善全国监督机构可以解决这些问题。给选举管理和选举安全的拨款也不应被替代、挪用和滥用。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2010年12月8日

Executive Summary

Indonesia needs to learn promptly the lessons from the sporadic violence witnessed in its local elections during 2010 as there is some evidence these easily preventable incidents could be increasing in frequency since the last cycle. While most district polls pass peacefully, the small number that do not reveals nationwide institutional weaknesses that should be fixed. These contests are often intense personal rivalries for community power that can be highly emotive and, if not closely watched, can quickly turn violent. While religious and ethnic ties are accentuated by these tense races, to date they have not triggered any sectarian schisms. Many confrontations could be avoided in future polls by relatively simple changes in practices, policies and laws. Rather than being too small for national attention, these political battles matter to this large country because, since decentralisation, it is this level of public administration that has the greatest impact on the lives of citizens. How these elections take place can determine the judgments that voters make on the success or failure of democracy throughout the archipelago.

Violence occurred in fewer than 10 per cent of the 244 scheduled races. While one study found only thirteen incidents in local elections from 2005-2008, they appear to be rising as at least twenty have been recorded in 2010. Among the factors contributing to the increase in this round are anger with incumbents using family members as proxies to get around term limits and growing frustration with poor governance. When polls became violent people died, property was destroyed, voting was delayed and the legitimacy of the state was challenged. In Mojo­kerto district in East Java, Tana Toraja in South Sulawesi and Tolitoli in Central Sulawesi, campaigns linked to violence had exaggerated expectations that their candidate could oust an incumbent or his handpicked successor. In these cases, lax election commissions and police missed or ignored the warning signs.

There are also some positive aspects to this round. In places where lessons were learnt from the past, like the post-conflict district of Poso in Central Sulawesi, security forces, election organisers and community leaders were alert to the dangers and worked together early to avoid any ugly consequences. In such communities the elections proceeded without incident as all sides acted responsibly, lawfully and showed common sense. More success stories need to be studied by national and district authorities as part of a systematic review of all elections.

The way district election commissions are chosen needs to be reconsidered to boost their legitimacy and effectiveness. Their indecisiveness lies in the selection of weak members who lack local authority, leadership skills and the ability to communicate effectively with constituents. Rather than seek out those who are respected and qualified, the commissions are often staffed by young and clever job-hunters looking for work and who are able to navigate the bureaucratic selection process. In the three violent cases in this report, the local commissions seemed too partial and had insufficient clout to do their job. They moved slowly, lacked transparency and were unprepared for unforeseen situations, a combination that only increased suspicions, raised tensions and drew allegations of bias. Security forces should maintain strict neutrality at all times during elections.

The funding of electoral administration from the regional government’s budget undermines its independence. Consideration should be given to paying for local election authorities from the national coffers. There are few legal restrictions on local executives who can quite legitimately exploit state facilities and agencies to aid their re-election. The low level of trust in the process is compounded by prevalent vote buying, intimidation and the mobilisation of ethnic groups to support specific candidates. Better training and regulation of funding, improved selection processes for election bodies and national supervision could address these issues. Money allocated for election administration and security should not be fungible, diverted to other uses or misappropriated.

Jakarta/Brussels, 8 December 2010

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