icon caret Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Line Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Youtube
印度尼西亚:井里汶的民间执法在走向恐怖主义
印度尼西亚:井里汶的民间执法在走向恐怖主义
Briefing 132 / Asia

印度尼西亚:井里汶的民间执法在走向恐怖主义

I. 概述

在印度尼西亚,针对非穆斯林少数民族的扫黄突袭和行动正在演变成一条通向更加暴力的圣战之路。2011年,西爪哇井里汶的一个警察清真寺和中爪哇梭罗的一个福音教堂遭到自杀式炸弹袭击。以宣扬道德和遏制“越轨”为名,这些袭击者早期使用棍棒和石块制造袭击,后来转为使用枪支和炸弹。这些自杀式炸弹袭击表明在激进的社区中,对某些战术的使用不再只属于特定的意识形态群体。这意味着那些假设“恐怖分子”是可以明确定义的,并明显区别于强硬派活动分子和宗教民间执法者的反恐项目注定要失败。这也意味着政府必须制定与民主价值观一致的战略来对付一些神职人员。这些人员本身并不使用武力,但却鼓吹针对异教徒(kafir)或压迫者(thaghut)的流血冲突是被允许的。这里的异教徒和压迫者指的是政府官员,尤其是警察。

这些袭击者代表着新一代的圣战分子。他们的前辈要么是在海外接受的训练,要么是从后苏哈托时代的两次主要社群冲突中获得的首次战斗经验。这两次冲突10年前发生在马鲁古的安汶和西苏拉威的波索。相比那些阿富汗和棉兰老岛的前辈,这些新一代的圣战分子技能较低,缺乏经验,受教育程度也较低。他们中的大多数出身贫寒,靠做小生意为生。 在组建自己的组织之前,他们中的大多数曾是阿布·巴卡尔·巴希尔(Abu Bakar Ba’asyir)领导的印尼圣战理事会(Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, MMI)井里汶支会和唯一真主游击队(Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid,JAT)的成员。巴希尔是是印尼最臭名昭著的激进教士,现在囚于狱中。

这并不意味着来自其他组织的威胁已经消失。唯一真主游击队有成员活跃在波索和其它地方。2011年7月在雅加达郊外针对在棉兰老岛接受过培训的一个回教之家分裂集团的领导人阿布·奥马尔(Abu Umar)的逮捕行动,暴露了在印尼、马来西亚、和菲律宾依然存在着庞大的圣战组织。另外还有其它的潜在问题根源,包括:一些不再使用暴力的组织(如回教祈祷团(Jemaah Islamiyah,JI))的心怀不满或者被孤立的成员;躲过早期反恐行动追捕的逃犯;非常危险的前囚犯或者从监狱里招募的圣战成员;那些被杀或者被捕的恐怖嫌疑人的弟弟妹妹;以及接受了伊斯兰宗教军事训练(tadrib)并想测试他们的技能的人,这些人包括唯一真主游击队的成员。不过井里汶人代表着迈向圣战之路有可能成为一种常见模式。

井里汶组织的成员听从激进的神职人员巴希尔的训导,还吸收了更激进的认为袭击印尼政府是合法的牧师哈拉唯·马克姆(Halawi Makmun)的思想。同激进组织一样,他们也对2010年2月亚齐训练营解体后对恐怖分子嫌疑人的逮捕和杀害感到愤怒。因为许多人都和训练营有关系,这些行动对他们带来了极大的影响,或者激起他们对复仇的强烈欲望 。无论是在苏门答腊,爪哇,或者东边的城市,印尼几乎每个激进团体要么是和参加训练营的学员之间有联系,要么是参与了帮助逃犯,或者是帮助被捕或被杀的学员的家属筹钱。亚齐事件使得他们对警察的愤怒达到了新的高度,而2010年8月巴希尔被捕则将这种愤怒推到了更高点。在梭罗,一个名为赫斯巴哈小组(Tim Hisbah)的组织从采取民间执法发展到进行圣战,就体现了对警方在后亚齐时代的行动的愤怒。

以支持道德和正统的宗教民间执法和圣战的融合使得政府的反极端主义任务极为复杂化。恐怖主义遭到大多数人的谴责,而强硬的民间执法行动者通常得到来自政府官员或者如印尼穆斯林大会(Majelis Ulama Indonesia)这样的半政府机构的支持,这尤其体现在地方层面。如果井里汶人组织的极端化能被遏止,政府需要制定战略:在全国范围内建立关于什么是极端主义的共识;对“仇恨”言论直接予以回击;包括在扫黄行动当中,对由宗教信仰激发的不管多么微小的犯罪行为,都要执行零容忍政策。

雅加达/布鲁塞尔, 2012年1月26日

Briefing 139 / Asia

印度尼西亚:亚齐旗帜引发紧张局势

A dispute over a flag in Aceh is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Indonesia’s central government, heightening ethnic tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of the province and raising fears of violence as the 2014 national elections approach.
 

I. Overview

The decision of the Aceh provincial government to adopt the banner of the former rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) as its official provincial flag is testing the limits of autonomy, irritating Jakarta, heightening ethnic and political tensions, reviving a campaign for the division of Aceh and raising fears of violence as a national election approaches in 2014.

On 25 March 2013, the provincial legislature adopted a regulation (qanun) making the GAM’s old banner the provincial flag. It was immediately signed by Governor Zaini Abdullah. The governor and deputy governor are members of Partai Aceh, the political party set up by former rebel leaders in 2008 that also controls the legislature.

The central government, seeing the flag as a separatist symbol and thus in violation of national law, immediately raised objections and asked for changes. Partai Aceh leaders, seeing the flag as a potent tool for mass mobilisation in 2014, have refused, arguing that it cannot be a separatist symbol if GAM explicitly recognised Indonesian sovereignty as part of the Helsinki peace agreement in 2005 that ended a nearly 30-year insurgency. Partai Aceh believes that if it remains firm, Jakarta will eventually concede, as it did in 2012 over an election dispute.

Indonesian President Yudhoyono’s government is torn. On the one hand, it does not want a fight with the GAM leaders; the 2005 peace agreement is the most important achievement of a president who, in his final term, is very much concerned about his legacy. It also is unwilling to provoke GAM too far, fearful that it will return to conflict, a fear many in Aceh discount as unwarranted but one that Partai Aceh has exploited with relish. On the other hand, it does not want to be branded as anti-nationalist as the 2014 election looms, especially as some in the security forces remain convinced that GAM has not given up the goal of independence and is using democratic means to pursue it. The president and his advisers also know that if they allow the GAM flag to fly, it will have repercussions in Papua, where dozens of pro-independence activists remain jailed for flying the “Morning Star” flag of the independence movement.

GAM leaders see little to lose by standing their ground. The flag is a hugely emotive symbol, and defying Jakarta is generally a winning stance locally. Some individual members of parliament see it as a way of regaining waning popularity for failing to deliver anything substantive to their constituencies. Also, Partai Aceh took a controversial decision to partner with Gerindra, the party of former army General Prabowo Subianto, for the 2014 election. Leaders like Muzakir Manaf, deputy governor and former commander of GAM’s armed wing, may want to use the flag issue to show they have not compromised their principles by allying with a man whose human rights record is often questioned.

Within Aceh, adoption of the GAM flag has sparked protests from non-Acehnese ethnic groups in the central highlands and south west. The GAM heartland has always been along the east coast; to highlanders like the Gayo, the flag thus represents the domination of the coastal Acehnese at their expense. The issue has revived a dormant campaign for the division of Aceh into three by the creation of two new provinces, Aceh Leuser Antara (ALA) for the central highlands and Aceh Barat Selatan (ABAS) for the south west. If GAM does not back down on the flag, support for that campaign by the intelligence services is likely to rise, and with it, the probability of increased ethnic tensions.

The options for breaking the stalemate seem to be as follows: the government concedes; GAM concedes, making slight changes to the flag by adding or removing an element; GAM agrees to limits on how or where the flag can be displayed; or the dispute is taken to the Supreme Court, thereby delaying any resolution.

In the meantime, the power of the GAM machinery in Aceh continues to grow.

Jakarta /Brussels, 7 May 2013